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This thesis is a study of particular aspects of public health in 
Queensland from 1859 to 1914. Its aim is to establish some of the 
problems facing a new, rapidly expanding colony, in a huge country 
covering widely differing climatic zones from temperate to tropical. 
It also seeks to explain attempts made to overcome those problems. 
To simplify the presentation, the thesis is divided into two sections. 
Section I deals with the problems. The first three chapters are 
concerned with the enormous environmental difficulties which arose out 
of imperfect methods of human waste disposal, attempts to control 
noxious trades, and some examples of gigantic drainage nuisances. The 
rest of this section is devoted to a detailed analysis of particular 
diseases which presented Queenslanders with considerable difficulties 
from 1859-1914. These six chapters deal with typhoid fever, diphtheria, 
cholera, leprosy, smallpox, and bubonic plague. 
Section II outlines the methods used to provide solutions to 
Queensland's health problems. Individual chapters are devoted to the 
early struggle for health legislation, the first reasonably effective 
Queensland health act, and the much more comprehensive and useful 
measures passed in the early twentieth century. 
The short conclusion draws together the recurring.themes of the 
thesis, such as the gradual realization of the need for government 
involvement in the protection of the public health, the growing 
tendency towards centralization, and personal liberty as a casualty 
of the protection of the common good. 
N.B. In this thesis sic is not used to confirm quoted words. 
By the same author: 
"Fever and stinks: some Problems of Public Health in the 
1870s and 1880s", Queensland Heritage, Volume 2 Number 4, 
May, 1971. 
"Queensland's Contagious Diseases Act, 1868 - The Act for 
the encouragement of vice and some nineteenth century 
attempts to repeal it". Parts I and II, Queensland Heritage, 
Volume 2 Number 10, May, 1974, and Volume 3 Number 1, 
November, 1974. 
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P R E F A C E 
Although books and learned articles on all manner of medical 
problems abound, there are relatively few histories of public health 
or social histories of medicine. So much so, that in one of the most 
recently published works of this kind, the author has found no studies 
more recent than 1970, while most of his suggestions for further 
reading were produced in the 1960's or much earlier. These facts, and 
the personal feeling that a study of an expanding public health 
movement in Queensland is very worthwhile for its own sake, were 
sufficient justification for me to choose this topic for investigation. 
The choice of the area for study was made partly for fortuitous 
reasons - I was living and studying in Queensland. But it was also 
made because of a conviction that D.B. Waterson's 1968 observation -
"Queensland history has not yet attracted the attention it deserve/s/", 
3 
- still obtains ten years later. 
The time span for this thesis was chosen because of my own 
interest in and curiosity about the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This is a period when increasing medical knowledge 
coincided with a wider concept of social obligation, making it 
practicable for earnest reformers to match their philanthropy with 
the possibility of real success. I have chosen to end my thesis at 
1914 for several reasons. The outbreak of the first world war either 
curtailed or halted a great deal of normal activity in Queensland, as 
the country geared itself to the war effort; the three year period 
between the passing of the last great Amending Act and 1914 allows me 
to take some cognisance of the success of that Act; and most 
importantly, to that date the Commonwealth, which was to assume more 
1. F.F. Cartwright, A Social History of Medicine (London, 1977) 
pp.189-95. 
2. D.B. Waterson, Squatter, Selector, and Storekeeper (Sydney, 
1968), p.l. 
3. Of course a number of works have been published in the meantime, 
especially on notable political figures. For some of the latest 
see for example, Bruce Knox, The Queensland Years of Robert Herbert, 
Premier; Letters and Papers (St. Lucia, 1977), and D. Murphy and 
Roger Joyce, Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1952 
(St. Lucia, 1978). 
11. 
and more responsibility for public health matters throughout the whole 
of Australia, had as yet made only tentative moves in that direction. 
Queensland health authorities were still very much in control of 
Queensland affairs. 
This thesis does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of the 
whole of public health activities in Queensland, during the years under 
review. I have not included some areas which would normally fall 
within the ambit of public health, partly because of a lack of 
material, but most of all for reasons of space. I have not made a 
study of hospitals, insanity, or the public water supply, and although 
I have attempted a detailed analysis of some of the diseases which 
loomed large in Queensland for various reasons, I have not included 
some of great importance - tuberculosis and miner's phthisis, the 
venereal diseases, lead poisoning, ophthalmia or cancer. All of these 
areas are of interest and thoroughly deserve investigation, but it 
seems to me that each is weighty enough to deserve a special and 
separate treatment. 
The organization of this work has depended very much on the kind 
of material which recurred again and again, as I researched in 
libraries and in archival collections. For this reason I have chosen 
to divide my thesis into two parts. The first section deals with the 
problems besetting Queensland. A detailed study of the environment, 
and those gigantic nuisances which seemed to contemporaries to present 
overwhelming barriers to the provision of health and happiness, are 
included in this section. The materials available on these particular 
problems - the disposal of human waste, noxious trades and some aspects 
of drainage - are so vast, that the one chapter I first envisaged has 
expanded into three. 
I then looked at those diseases which assumed immense proportions 
for Queenslanders, either because they were killing or debilitating a 
large number of men, women and children, or because they were startling 
exotic scourges which prodded governments into passing health 
legislation, or forced local authorities to undertake huge, 
unprecedented cleansing operations. Typhoid and diphtheria fall into 
the first category. Cholera, leprosy, bubonic plague and smallpox all 
caused a flurry of governmental activity at the central and local level. 
111. 
In the second part of this thesis, I have attempted to outline 
the methods used to provide solutions to these problems. Very often, 
the legislation of the nineteenth century initiated as many difficulties 
as it resolved. Indeed the various acts passed during the whole period 
had many flaws, and promoted intense bitterness. But a start had been 
made, and a basis provided, on which future Queenslanders could build. 
The important thing was that public and government awareness had grown 
to the point where increasingly, comprehensive public health 
legislation was looked for and produced. 
Quite apart from the usefulness of tracing the development of 
these aspects of public health in Queensland, this study has been 
profitable, for me at least, because certain continuing trends have 
become clearly discernible as the thesis developed. They apply not 
only to a history of public health, but to many other aspects of life 
in early Queensland. The first is the great reliance placed on British 
experience, and the tendency to transfer English legislation to the 
Queensland statute book, often with little or no revision. 
Yet, in spite of this dependence on overseas knowledge and 
practice, Queenslanders displayed another unchangeable but contradictory 
characteristic - concern and praise for the native-born, a resentment 
of the immigrant, and a conviction that imported specialists would not 
understand local conditions and local needs. Linked to this fear of 
the unknown, and very much a part of some aspects of the history of 
public health in the state, was the xenophobia of Queenslanders where 
coloured races were concerned. 
Another constantly recurring theme is the Queensland - and 
Australian - habit of looking to the central government for aid, 
especially financial assistance. This inclination is hardly surprising, 
given the vastness of the country, the harshness of the climate, and its 
relatively small population. But, when this grasping after central 
government shekels is accompanied by a distinct dislike for that 
government's interference in local affairs, the lines are set for battle. 
Similar resentment was indicated time and time again during debates on 
health legislation, when government plans for the betterment of all 
Queenslanders clashed with the dearly-held right of the liberty of the 
individual. Powerful industrial and commercial concerns often used 
this exalted principle to defend their own vested interests. 
IV. 
A further stumbling-block to the popular acceptance of 
health legislation, was the deep-seated resentment of the general 
public towards the compulsory clauses in these measures, which aroused 
great suspicion. Very gradually Queenslanders began to look to 
government for that protection which they imagined health legislation 
could afford; accepting, often with great reluctance, the restrictions 
which such measures inevitably bring. They resisted, with even more 
vehemence, the considerably increased taxes which the preservation of 
their own health forced upon them. 
On the other hand, governments were very slow to recognize that 
they had to relax laissez-faire attitudes in order to defend the weak 
or incapable, and to provide for all, the equality of opportunity to 
acquire and keep that vague and intangible quality, good health. 
Generally, Queensland governments lagged behind the public 
health reformers in the colony, who,especially in the interests of the 
infant native-born, urged legislation upon them. In a modern society, 
the enactment of laws relating to the public health is essential, to set 
goals, and even to place reasonable limitations on public aspirations 
for the common good. But in Queensland, only fear of an approaching 
exotic disease, and vigorously expressed public opinion, finally moved 
a reluctant executive to legislative action. Even then, ministers 
continued to resist those inroads on the public purse, which would have 
resulted from the setting up of a proper department of public health. 
V>fhen the first tentative steps had been taken, Queensland 
governments still had a number of hard lessons to learn. Ministers 
had to realize that although frontier societies need to encourage 
industry and development of all kinds, this expansion must not take 
place at the expense of the people's health. "Health is certainly 
more valuable than money, because it is by health that money is 
4 
procured. National health means national wealth". Similarly, they 
needed to recognise that in a rapidly expanding society, there are 
certain tasks which only governments are in a position to undertake. 
In the early years, governments alone had access to the expertise and 
equipment needed to provide the proper sanitary arrangements, paved 
roads, and adequate drainage which are basic requirements for clean 
4. T.G. Ellery, Health Legislation (Adelaide, 1902), p.l. 
V. 
cities and healthy people. In turn, these huge capital works required 
the outlay of large amounts of money which only governments could 
command. 
Therein lay one of the largest problems for late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Queensland governments. Overshadowing 
everything, checking progress, preventing the passing of health bills, 
and inhibiting the complete implementation of successful legislation, 
was a chronic lack of funds. Drought, floods, bank failures, 
inexperienced treasurers, and reluctant taxpayers, all combined to 
restrict the amount of government finance which could be made available 
to expedite public health measures. But the sympathetic researcher must 
surely conclude that, although much remained to be done at the close 
of 1914, under the prevailing circumstances, much had already been 
achieved. 
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E)R'.4B^NE 
JjT. 
No. 1. Location of Queensland's 
Main Sanitary Problems. 
THE ENVIRONMENT TO 1887 
From the very beginning of Queensland's separate existence from 
New South Wales, sanitary conditions in Brisbane and other populous 
parts of the colony were so shocking, that any observer, who was even 
mildly interested in the preservation of the public health, was alarmed. 
This concern gained strength from an increased interest in the state of 
cities and towns in Great Britain which began to manifest itself in the 
late 1830's. It was quickly communicated to the colonies, "when it was 
impossible to avoid investigation of urgent urban problems", many of 
2 
which directly concerned health matters. The form that concern would 
take was dictated by the general acceptance of the "miasmatic" theory of 
the transmission of communicable disease which prevailed amongst 
western medical authorities during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, and even later. 
This theory suggests that the atmosphere over closely-packed 
communities is vitiated by the "mere action of the lungs of the 
3 
inhabitants", and made infinitely worse by the gases given off by 
large amounts of animal and vegetable refuse in the process of decay. 
It was upheld as official doctrine in Britain by Dr. John Simon, who 
dominated the English public health service from 1855 to 1876, and by 
Dr. T. Southwood Smith, another important health reformer. The view 
was also supported by the Central Board of Health and the Privy 
1. A. Briggs, Victorian Cities (Pelican Books, 1968), p.12, and 
R. Lambert, Sir John Simon 1816-1904 (London, 1963), pp.59-60. 
See also W. Ashworth, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning 
(London, 1954), pp.60-74. 
2. For a discussion of some very early local attempts to protect the 
public health in Britain see E.P. Hennock, "Urban Sanitary Reform 
a Generation before Chadwick?", Economic History Review, N.S., 
Vol.10, 1957-58, p.113. 
3< W.M. Frazer, A History of English Public Health 1834-1939 (London, 
1950), p.38. This was the view of Dr. W.H. Duncan, an early 
public health reformer in Liverpool. M.W. Flinn suggests that 
Duncan was one of the most distinguished authorities on urban 
disease in his period. M.W. Flinn (ed.). Report on the Sanitary 
Condition of the Labouring Population of Gt. Britain by Edwin 
Chadwick 1842 (Edinburgh, 1965), p.32. 
4. Frazer, p.38. 
5. Lambert, pp.53-4. 
Council, which, between them, held the responsibility for the health 
of the people of Britain from the passing of the first English Public 
7 
Health Act in 1848, until the end of Privy Council control in 1871. 
In Queensland, as late as the 1880's, report after report of local 
health authorities officially linked "the presence of offensive matter" 
with "fever cases in that locality". Colonial newspapers, which were 
credited with being "a power in the land.... on special occasions... 
9 
leading and educating the public", reported and commented fully and 
freely on miasmatic dangers. Frequently their own warnings were 
reinforced with colourful articles from overseas journals which 
emphasised the correlation between smells and stagnant water, disease 
and death. The reliance of officials, medical men, and propagandists 
in all British possessions on the efficacy of overseas experience, 
ensured that the early history of public health in Queensland would be 
6. Frazer, pp.15 and 39-40, and F.F. Cartwright, pp.109-110. This 
was in spite of the work of Drs. John Snow and William Budd on 
the dissemination of cholera through contaminated drinking water 
in 1849 - confirmed by Snow in 1853-4 - and the announcement of 
Louis Pasteur's Germ Theory in April 1864. The potential 
importance of Pasteur's theory was well publicised in England in 
August 1864, following Dr. Thomas S. Wells' address to the annual 
meeting of the British Medical Association. See CD. Haagensen 
and Wyndham E.B. Lloyd, A Hundred Years of Medicine (New York, 
1943), p.213, and Cartwright, pp.138-140. 
7. The General Board of Health presided from 1848 to 1858, when the 
Public Health Act of that year transferred health responsibilities 
to the Privy Council. The Council in turn relegated these powers 
to the Local Government Board in 1871. 
8. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Feb 1883; Minutes of 
Local Board of Health, Brisbane, Report of Dr. Joseph Bancroft. 
9. W.B. Kimberly, Bendigo and Vicinity (Ballarat, 1895), p.211, 
Charles Dilke^Problems of Greater Britain (London, 1890), p.155, 
and R.B. Walker, The Newspaper Press in New South Wales, 1803-1920 
(Sydney, 1976), p.63. Throughout this thesis, it is asserted that 
the press played an important role in propagating ideas and 
encouraging effective action in the public health field. This 
influence should not be overstated however, for as yet no real 
estimate of this assumed power to form opinion and promote 
activity has been made. "The plain fact is that no one in 
Australia has even started on the problem of Press power". 
Henry Mayer, The Press in Australia (Melbourne, 1968), p.17. 
10. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Jan 1883, for a very long 
piece from The Boston Herald of late 1882, from which this short, 
lurid, typical extract is taken. 
Disorder loves marshes,... riots on the banks of sunken streams 
and works its burning and shivering damage most malignantly 
where normal mutual relations between soil and vegetable matter 
and stagnant or moving water have been unsettled. 
the story of attempts - often unsuccessful - to contain environmental 
pollution, to try to prevent "bad air" from spreading disease and 
suffering in the promised land of the new colony. 
This concern had not always been evident at Moreton Bay. It was 
hardly to be expected that attention to town planning, draining of 
swamps, general drainage and sewerage, and other measures to promote a 
high standard of public health for contemporary and future inhabitants 
would be primary considerations in a settlement which began its life as 
a dumping ground for incorrigible felons - an outpost place of 
secondary punishment, conveniently distant from Sydney. The very 
impetus for settling on the Brisbane River practically precluded it 
from any rapid improvement, since the then Secretary of State, Earl 
Bathurst, was convinced that convicts must be wholly deprived of "those 
comforts and advantages which seem to be inseparably connected with the 
12 Progress of Colonization". 
But it was not long before glowing reports of future prospects 
13 began to reach Britain from Moreton Bay. The possibility of great 
profits to be gained from grazing with its allied industries through 
the opening up and settling of the hinterland, rapidly altered the 
official mind as to the fitness of the area for general colonization. 
In fact, according to Gordon Greenwood and John Laverty, although 
"/t/he origins of Brisbane are penal,... from its first beginnings it 
was conceived as a nucleus for a future society of free men". 
The early settlers of Brisbane were faced with two major problems 
as far as the environment and its effect on the inhabitants was 
concerned. One was the physical nature of the situation. This could 
be remedied by using ingenuity, good planning and engineering ability. 
But these remedies could only be successfully applied if the other 
much more difficult problems were solved. All Queenslanders, including 
those in positions of power, had to be educated and persuaded to accept 
11. Earl Bathurst to Sir Thomas Brisbane, 30 May 1823, Historical 
Records of Australia, Series I, Vol XI, pp.83-6. 
12. Earl Bathurst to Sir Thomas Brisbane, 9 Sep 1822, Despatch No.8, 
in Ibid., Vol X, pp.791-2. 
13. Especially in the reports of explorers, in particular Allan 
Cunningham. 
14. G. Greenwood and J. Laverty, Brisbane 1859-1959 (Brisbane, 1959), 
p. 25. 
4. 
the need for restrictions, and the expenditure of a considerable amount 
of money and time, in the interests of that vague and intangible entity -
their own health and well-being. All people inevitably face the 
problem of what to do with human wastes, piles of offal and other 
offensive matter caused by the production of food for human consumption, 
and how to deal with the spillage and pollution which result from even 
the most meagre amount of industry essential for corporate existence. 
Any collection of people must also face the unfortunate human failing, 
that man will always seek to rid himself of his own filth, even to the 
detriment of his neighbour, with the least inconvenience and cost to 
himself. In nineteenth century towns and villages, with little or no 
scavenging and sewerage arrangements, convenient backyards, vacant 
allotments, easily accessible but infrequently visited public places, 
and above all, local streams and rivers, lent themselves as dumps for 
all sorts of filth and garbage. These reprehensible activities were, 
and are, likely to take place in any populous area in any country. They 
are much more liable to occur in frontier communities like the infant 
colony of Queensland, where growth of population and spread of 
settlement far exceeded the provision of sanitary services. 
One of the first of the natural features to be seriously affected 
was the Brisbane River and its tributaries. Well before separation, 
private citizens and the military authorities had experimented with one 
quick, easy method of refuse disposal. They simply discharged nightsoil, 
sweepings of yards and streets, and other filth on to the banks of the 
river, which, to explorer Oxley's admiring eyes, had presented "so many 
superior situations that... a permanent Settlement would be... 
-I ^ 
advantageously formed on A;t^ /". That settlement would be ephemeral, 
warned the Moreton Bay Courier whose editor fully accepted the miasmatic 
theory, as the smell from the river bank grew "overpowering" and 
17 
"sufficient to engender disease". 
The river was subject to other forms of contamination which were 
the result of schemes propounded by a not unaware Brisbane City Council, 
backed by the Moreton Bay Courier, in an effort to preserve the purity 
15. According to W.M. Frazer, this is the most difficult step along 
the path to a proper public health system. Frazer, p.3. 
16. John Oxley's Report (Enclosure), Despatch No. 5, 1824, Historical 
Records of Australia, Series I, Vol XI, 223. 
17. Moreton Bay Courier, 20 Oct 1847. 
5. 
18 
of the atmosphere over the newly proclaimed capital. Both parties' 
concern was not always confined to an altruistic interest in the public 
health. The Moreton Bay Courier, for example, drew the council's 
attention to the nuisance caused by the practice of depositing rubbish 
in a creek running parallel to one of the main thoroughfares, Adelaide 
19 Street, with consequent danger to life in the very centre of the town. 
The paper also referred at frequent intervals to the problem of Frog's 
Hollow drainage, and the circuitous creek which connected this swampy, 
unsavoury, germ-ridden area with the Brisbane River. A similar winding 
stream on the southern side of the river, made infinitely worse by the 
20 foul outpourings from a butchering establishment on its banks, needed 
prompt attention. Both creeks were subject to tidal movement, which 
greatly aggravated the unpleasantness and danger from what were virtually 
open sewers. 
The council's proposed solution for the Frog's Hollow creek 
problem, which met with Moreton Bay Courier approval, was to divert the 
21 
offending stream underground by means of a barrel drain. This would do 
away with the nuisance, but would also shorten the route to the river. 
The primary interest of the authorities and the press on this occasion 
was to rid the central city of muddy offensive watercourses which 
meandered in and out of town allotments, and greatly lowered the value of 
22 
surrounding property. The incentive to remove these "so-called 
'creeks'" was provided by monetary considerations, not by any deep concern 
over the possible threat to health, and in this, Brisbane was no different 
from other cities world-wide. For "the attainment of a sanitary end 
without definite sanitary intention", was by no means a new experience. 
18. The city was incorporated as a municipality on 6 September 1859. 
But from 3 November 1856, when definite news of separation was 
received, the elders and citizens of Brisbane had hoped that "Old 
Fogyism" and "Red Tape" would soon depart from Moreton Bay, and 
that settlers would be free to preserve their own heritage. 
Ibid., 8 Nov 1856. 
19. Ibid., 14 Aug 1861. 
20. This was Baynes' slaughter yards. See Within, p.86,for other 
references to these butchering works. 
21. Moreton Bay Courier, 22 Oct 1861; Minutes of the Brisbane City 
Council, 21 Oct 1861. The Courier pointed out that similar 
action would be equally effective on the south side. Ibid. 
22. Ibid., 14 Mar 1861; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 13 Mar 1861. 
The history of drainage and the filling-in of swamp areas 
as sanitary measures for the upbuilding of cities is the 
history of every village, town or large city which has been 
accidentally or intentionally rendered healthful by devices 
centering on the economics of carrying on the world's 
business 'as usual'. 23. 
The health argument was certainly included by alderman T.B. Stephens in 
his speech calling for council action to clean up streams in South 
Brisbane. But as this was an area in which Stephens and his family were 
24 financially involved, it must be supposed that his chief motive, like 
that of the ancients, was not really "sanitary but economic, concerning 
25 
the livelihood and creature comforts of the inhabitants", particularly 
his own. 
In this instance action was taken quite quickly, when compared with 
the delays and frustrations which yet lay in the future. The fact that 
the proposed drains would not only improve surrounding properties, but 
would also greatly facilitate the passage of polluted fluids to the 
Brisbane River, seems to have worried no one. But, given the enormity 
of the Frog's Hollow problem to the Brisbane authorities, and the fear 
of the general public that "malarial" fevers would emanate from the 
ever-pervading effluvium which hung over the area, this haste to 
channel at least some of the offensive water away from the area, is 
27 
understandable. 
The Brisbane River and other coastal rivers in the colony on which 
28 
small but bustling townships and ports had been founded, continued to 
23. Fielding H. Garrison, Contributions to the History of Medicine 
(New York, 1966), p.393. 
24. Moreton Bay Courier, 14 Mar 1861; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 13 Mar 1861. 
25. Garrison, p.393. 
26. Moreton Bay Courier, 17 Sep 1861; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 16 Sep 1861, and Ibid., 6 Nov 1861; Minutes of Brisbane 
City Council, 5 Nov 1861. 
27. The Frog's Hollow nuisance was not removed by this early attempt, 
and the area continued to present awful problems for many years. 
See for example The Brisbane Courier, 20 May 1873, for a 
description of the area, and the diphtheria, typhoid and dysentery 
which broke out there, given by a council deputation to the 
Colonial Secretary, 19 May 1873. 
28. A detailed essay on each of the important coastal streams cannot 
be given here. Instances of extreme pollution occurred from time 
to time in the Mary, Burnett and Fitzroy Rivers, as inhabitants 
struggled with drainage, scavenging and human waste disposal 
problems. 
present difficulties to all authorities concerned with the public 
health, for the whole period under review in this thesis. Yet 
transplanted Britons everywhere had been especially aware of the 
consequences of river pollution, after the London experience of "The 
Great Stink" during the exceptionally dry summer of 1858. The stench 
was so bad that it "excited more comment even than the contemporary 
29 
Indian Mutiny, and occupied more prominent space in the newspapers". 
Members of parliament, who were forced from committee rooms and the 
library, were vociferous in condemnation of the vast nuisance which 
they believed threatened their lives. They were joined in protest by 
the citizens of London, who, loud with alarm, claimed that the River 
Thames had become "the main sewer for the whole of London, and had been 
30 
converted into a most abominable ditch". 
The unseasonable drought, the general introduction of the water 
31 32 
closet, and a vastly increased population, which itself triggered 
a whole host of problems in housing, sanitation, and town planning, had 
29. Philip Howard, London's River (London, 1975), p.222. This was in 
spite of the tremendous interest in the gory details of the 
Mutiny and the terrible vengeance demanded and wreaked by Britain, 
which was fully recorded for avid readers by the English and 
Australian press. See Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little 
Wars (London, 1974), pp.84-133, and the overseas section of the 
Moreton Bay Courier. 
30. Comment in the Lords by the Earl of Hardwicke, quoted in Howard, 
p.222. See also Gustave Dore^and Blanchard Jerrold, London 
(Newton Abbot, 1972,Fascimile of 1872 edition), pp.28, 41 and 
51, and M.C. Buer, Health, Wealth, and Population in the Early 
Days of the Industrial Revolution (London, 1968), pp.107-8. Buer 
suggests that from about 1849 the windows of parliament could 
never be opened. 
31. Alexander Gumming first patented A Water Closet upon a New 
Construction in the mid 1770's. Joseph Bramah improved it in 
1778, and by the 1880's water closets as they exist today had 
come into use. The refuse from London closets which proliferated 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, whether serviced 
by brick drains or cesspools, inevitably ended in the Thames. 
Elizabeth Burton, The Early Victorians at Home (Newton Abbot, 
1973), pp.112-13, Howard, pp.222-23, E.R. Pike, Human Documents 
of the Age of the Forsytes (Newton Abbot, 1972), pp.34 and 191, 
and Mark Girouard, The Victorian Country House (London, 1973), 
p. 15. 
32. For an explanation of the phenomenon of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century population increases see G.M. Trevelyan, History of England 
(London, 1973), pp.711-12, Cartwright, pp.131-34, and T. McKeown 
and R.G. Brown, "Medical evidence related to English population 
changes in the eighteenth century". Population Studies, Vol.9, 
No.2, November 1955. 
combined to cause the London situation. The object lesson presented to 
the newly separated colony of Queensland was very apt. The colony was 
subject to frequent, devastating droughts. There was an urgent 
necessity for Queensland to engineer her own population explosion as 
rapidly as possible to ensure a viable state with an expanding economy -
an early aim which officials considered was well on the way to 
achievement by 1866, through natural increase and, especially, through 
33 the encouragement of immigration. But there was one factor 
contributing to the 1858 Thames problem which some Queenslanders were 
determined to avoid, and the colony's first Central Board of Health, 
34 
appointed in 1865, clearly expressed that determination in their 
report of that same year. 
The question that first occupied the attention of the Board 
was that of sewerage; and, after a careful consideration of 
that subject in all its relations, present and future, they 
came unanimously to the conclusion that it would be highly 
injudicious to convert the tidal rivers of the Colony into 
main sewers, seeing that in England... the splendid rivers 
there are now regarded as monster nuisances, in consequence 
of the adoption of that system of drainage; and, instead 
of being promoters of health, by conveying sea breezes pure 
and fresh from the ocean to the towns and cities situated 
on their banks, they contaminate them with pestilential vapors, 
which, in their course diffuse disease and death all around. 35 
The rejection of the water carriage system - sewage disposal by 
dilution - which shifts the problem "from the individual to the 
community", did not completely preserve the purity of the Brisbane 
River. Many people living on or near its banks solved their nightsoil 
37 disposal problem either by throwing excrement into the stream, by 
33. There had been impressive gains in the colony's population from 
1860 onwards. "Fourth Annual Report on Registration of Births, 
Marriages and Deaths", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1864), 887-893, and Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
III (1866), 293. 
34. For details of the appointment see Within, pp. 296-98. 
35. "Board of Health Report", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1865), 1313. However, in 1864 the Brisbane City 
Council had proposed a competition to find a system of sewerage 
for the city. Only one professional man responded, but in October 
1864, councillor George Edmonstone called for a permanent 
sewerage system to be determined by the council without delay. 
The Brisbane Courier, 12 Jan 1864, and Ibid., 25 Oct 1864. 
36. Garrison, p.423. 
37. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Jul 1883. Report of Brisbane City Council 
inspector after a house to house inspection of the Kangaroo Point 
area. 
defying local authority regulations with the installation of forbidden 
38 
water closets which eventually emptied into the river, or even worse, 
by simply constructing closets over the river itself, with nauseating 
1^ 39 results. 
Nor were private citizens the only offenders. Much to the 
annoyance and frustration of the Brisbane City Council and its 
inspectors, the government took advantage of the proximity of some 
public buildings to the Brisbane River to construct water closets, 
which were defended, because they were efficient and because their 
removal would involve considerable expense. The council itself 
contributed to the fouling of the stream, once it inaugurated the 
system of dumping the contents of Brisbane closets at sea, or on the 
41 islands in Moreton Bay. 
The main long term result of the central board decision of 1865 
was to delay the provision of a proper sewerage scheme for even the 
central city area of Brisbane until 1923, when labour and material 
costs had risen astronomically in comparison with those obtaining in 
42 the 1800's. In the short term, the board's resolution created 
tremendous problem.s for central and local governments which had to 
decide on the actual systems to be used, and to try to devise foolproof 
regulations to ensure their success. It increased the difficulties of 
individual householders, who, despite the inventions of the ingenious 
38. In particular the Stombuco closets, named for their inventor. 
Ibid., 31 Jul 1883. This was in defiance of Bye-Law No.34 of 
the Municipality of Brisbane, confirmed 4 Jul 1883. Copy 
attached to in-letter no.3684, Q.S.A. (Queensland State Archives) 
COL/A 365. See also Municipality of Brisbane Bye-Law No.5, 
Clause 6. 
39. Reports of the Brisbane City Council sanitary inspectors in The 
Brisbane Courier, 3 Jul, 31 Jul, and 25 Sep 1883. 
40. As early as 1864, several government buildings were serviced by 
water closets. Ibid., 28 Nov 1864; letter to editor from 
Charles Beauchamp, Contractor. 
41. For details see Within, pp.38 ff. 
42. F.J. Brewer and R. Dunn, Sixty-six Years of Municipal Government 
(Brisbane, 1925), pp.142-43, and John Laverty, "The History of 
Municipal Government in Brisbane, 1859-1925", unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. University of Queensland, 1968, p.376. There was no 
possibility of a sewerage scheme for Brisbane suburbs at this 
stage. 
43. F.G. Connolly, "The Sanitary Question", in The Boomerang, 
15 Jun 1889. 
10. 
and the scientific, the instructions of medical men and boards, 
and the often clumsy and careless ministrations of contractors, failed 
to cope with pestilential germ-centres in their own back-yards. For 
the whole community, the result was a monster evil - the manure depot. 
Neither governments, councils, nor various boards of health were able 
45 
to administer or control this depot in a proper manner. 
The idea of returning human wastes to the soil through burial -
the principle underlying the need for a manure depot - is an ancient 
one, as the sanitary laws delivered by Moses to the Israelites will 
46 
reveal. The misapplication of the principle had posed grave threats 
47 
to health throughout the ages. But by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, revolutionary advances in agriculture had revealed that all 
48 kinds of manure are valuable. Confident, economy-conscious 
Queenslanders determined to follow the lead of that great British 
49 public health reformer, Edwin Chadwick, in whose view the channelling 
of human wastes into river systems not only exacerbated the evils of 
pollution, but also "seemed like pouring away liquid gold". 
44. Two important contributions to householders' comfort were Scott's 
Patent Air Closet, and Dr. Hugh Bell's elaborate Dry Earth Closet. 
The Queensland Times, 2 Nov 1889, and Dr. Hugh Bell, The Dry 
Earth Closet System, after Nature (Brisbane, 1881). 
45. The Brisbane situation will be discussed here, but as the burial 
system was chosen as the method of disposal in Queensland, all 
cities and towns in the colony were faced with similar problems. 
46. The Bible, Deuteronomy, XIII, 13. 
47. See for example, Jacme D'Agramont's Catalan plague tract of 
24 April 1384, which describes the state of manure heaps and the 
method of excrement discharge within the walled towns of his 
own era. Quoted in C.E.A. Winslow, The Conquest of Epidemic 
Disease (New York, 1967), p.112. 
48. Buer, p.110. 
49. Chadwick, a lawyer and supreme public servant, was foremost in the 
early public health movement in Britain. Apparently without 
sympathy for medical science or doctors, though he used the 
evidence of the most eminent medical men in his reports, Chadwick 
was vitally concerned to reduce the ill health of the masses which 
had proved ruinously expensive to the country's economy. The 
influence of his thinking in British overseas colonies was very 
great indeed. For details of Chadwick's life, personality, 
glaring faults, and remarkable achievements, see the introduction 
to Flinn's work, S.E. Finer, The Life and Times of Sir Edwin 
Chadwick (London, 1952), R.A. Lewis, Edwin Chadwick and The Public 
Health Movement 1852-1854 (London, 1952), and B.W. Richardson, 
The Health of Nations Vols I § II (London, 1965). 
50. Edwin Chadwick to Lord Francis Egerton, 1 Oct 1845, quoted in 
Finer, p.223. 
51. Flinn, p.60. See also A. Briggs (ed.). The Nineteenth Century 
(London, 1971), p.129. 
11. 
The raw colonists and the ebullient Chadwick based their plans on 
two different schemes, both emanating from Edinburgh in Scotland. The 
52 
methods proposed were diametrically different, but both schemes 
seemed to offer a way of ridding the rapidly growing cities and towns of 
human wastes, at the same time harnessing the horrible and offensive 
53 
matter to improve the nature of farmers' fields. Even before the 
appearance of the Central Board of Health's report. The Brisbane Courier, 
as the colony's watch-dog on public health affairs and the economy, was 
proposing that the council should establish a manure depot to "serve not 
merely as a receptacle for the accumulated filth of the city", but also 
to lessen the cost of carrying out the necessary sanitary regulations 
54 by the sale of "nightsoil manure". 
The Brisbane Courier continued to advocate this line very strongly 
for at least a decade. It frequently printed very long articles on the 
subject, and commented in editorials at equal length on the theme of 
"the rainfall to the river, the sewerage to the land", in the face of 
the Colonial Secretary's attempt to push a sewerage and drainage bill 
57 through the Legislative Assembly. It is very likely that the 
necessity to provide proper and effective drainage for the colony's 
cities and towns was a more urgent consideration than the sewerage 
CO 
question itself, but in any case the legislation was dropped, largely 
52. Chadwick's ideas involved an adaptation of the water carriage 
system which he had observed in the Scottish capital. Flinn, p.60. 
The Queensland Central Board of Health rejected this method, but 
were impressed by the city's collection of solid refuse using the 
dry earth system, which appeared to be both effective and capable 
of producing a profit. "Board of Health Report, Appendix B. 
The Cleansing Operations of Edinburgh by Henry D. Littlejohn, M.D., 
Officer of Health", Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative 
Assembly, (1865), 1316-17. 
53. Phenomenal productivity was claimed for the farms in the vicinity 
of Edinburgh. See Ibid., and Flinn, pp.47 and 60. 
54. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Oct 1864; editorial. 
55. See for example. Ibid., 9 Feb 1866. This is a very long piece 
"Communicated by M.A. on 7 February 1866". 
56. Ibid., 13 Feb 1866; sub editorial, and 6 Mar 1866; main editorial. 
On the other hand, some city councillors, notably J.W. Thompson, 
were agitating for a sewerage scheme. 
57. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1866), 349. 
Robert Ramsay Mackenzie was Colonial Secretary at this time. 
58. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 462. 
12. 
59 because of the uncertain economic climate, and the government's 
proposal to extract half the cost of the scheme from local councils, 
before the projects were commenced. To add to the difficulties, 
government ministers were very far from unanimity on the question of 
sewage disposal. The Colonial Secretary was apparently only half 
convinced by the economical agricultural possibilities of "nightsoil 
manure". Certainly he was still puzzled as to whether "the sewerage 
matter should be conveyed to the sea... or whether some deodorizing 
process could be adopted, while his colleague, the Secretary for 
Public Lands openly favoured a straightforward water carriage system. 
Then in January 1867, when the government seemed to have accepted 
a select committee's recommendation that a site for a nightsoil depot 
be provided, yet another problem arose. The Surveyor-General was 
quite unable to point out a suitable piece of vacant land. 
As the Government did not possess any land suitable for 
the purpose contemplated, it was submitted whether 
the construction of a shoot at the end of Boundary Street 
with a pipe from the water main to keep it clean, might 
not meet the case. The Secretary for Lands believes that 
that arrangement would dispose of the sewerage in the 
cheapest and most efficient manner, whilst it would at 
the same time be available for filling punts with such 
portions of soil as the Council might find it profitable 
to convey to more distant localities. 64 
In 1874, after several minor reservations had been gazetted, 
the government plumped officially for the dry earth closet system for 
the capital, and set aside what it considered to be an appropriately-
sized, reasonably-situated reserve for the city's refuse on 
59. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,III (1866), 463. 
60. Ibid. See also The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jun 1866; letter to 
editor from J.W.T. J.W. Thompson was highly critical of the bill 
because of these demands on already financially embarrassed local 
bodies, though he favoured a sewerage scheme. 
61. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 463. Some form of 
deodorization was essential if the waste matter was to be used 
for manuring purposes. 
62. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Mar 1867. 
63. Ibid., 8 Jan 1867. 
64. Ibid., 12 Mar 1867. This is part of a letter from the Department 
of Lands to the Colonial Secretary which was printed in full. 
65. For example, York's Hollow, an area adjoining Victoria Park, 
and a small piece of land on Breakfast Creek were reserved as 
manure depots. 
13. 
Enoggera Creek, Kelvin Grove. About the same time, a further reserve 
of twenty acres on Breakfast Creek was chosen to accept nightsoil, and 
f\ 7 
to provide earth for deodorising purposes. This move reflected the 
influence of the long despatch extolling the virtues of this system 
forwarded to Queensland by the Secretary of State for Colonies, the 
Earl of Kimberley, and the pressure exerted by the Central Board of 
Health appointed after the passing of Queensland's first Public Health 
1 
70 
69 Act in 1872, which overrode the considerable colonial medical
advocacy for a sewerage farm arrangement on Chadwickian lines 
In the meantime, correspondents to the Courier frequently drew 
attention to the serious dangers posed by the lack of a proper removal 
71 
system; the Brisbane City Council and the Secretary for Public Lands 
engaged in a series of vituperative letters, as each side denied 
responsibility for the existence of serious and disgusting nuisances 
72 in the city; a temporary depot was established in a portion of Bowen 
Park, where experiments in the deodorizing and burial of nightsoil were 
73 
undertaken; other small, unsatisfactory reserves were set aside by the 
74 government as manure depots, though at the same time the government 
and council went pussyfoot about the business of securing adequate areas 
66. Queensland Government Gazette, XV (1874), 1151-2. On 27 June 1874, 
twenty-five acres were gazetted, but the area was reduced to 
twenty-two acres on 7 November 1874 because of an error in the 
deeds. Ibid., XVI (1874), 2139. 
67. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jul 1874. 
68. "The Dry Earth System", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1871-72), 813-826. This despatch gave a detailed 
definition of the system, and examples of its use in selected 
areas in Britain, and in India. It included details of costs 
and profits, and arguments for and against the system. 
69. Within, p.311. For the central board's championship of the 
earth closet system see "Instructions issued by the Central 
Board for the Guidance of Local Boards of Health", Queensland 
Government Gazette, XIV (1873), 826-27. 
70. The Brisbane Courier, 8 May 1871; Report of the inaugural 
meeting of the Queensland Medical Society. 
71. See for example. Ibid., 31 Jan 1868; letter to editor from 
Prevention, and Ibid., 30 Jun 1868; letter to editor from 
Verb. Sap. 
72. Ibid., 20 Mar 1868 for instance. Excerpts or complete copies 
of these letters appeared in the Courier from time to time. 
73. Ibid., 24 Nov 1868 and 8 Dec 1868. 
74. See for example Queensland Government Gazette, X (1869), 247, 
and Mayor of Brisbane to Colonial Secretary, 27 Sep 1870, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 148, in-letter no.2682 of 1870 and attachments. 
14. 
75 to solve the growing problem. The urgency of that problem was 
evidenced by the increasing numbers of Queenslanders who fell victim 
to "fevers", whose origin, according to the Central Board of Health, 
7f> 
was clearly traceable to preventable causes. Robert Ramsay 
Mackenzie made another unsuccessful attempt to enact a sewerage and 
77 drainage bill, while Brisbane citizens conducted frustrating 
excursions in the search for an official dumping ground for their 
muck, as this typical letter to the Brisbane press reveals. A 
Brisbane ratepayer of five years' standing had 
never been abl^ e to_ascertain where the manure and rubbish 
depot was. /_Could/ you inform me as to its locality, or 
if any such place had been appointed?.... The urgent 
necessity that exists for such a depot must commend 
itself to everyone except aldermen.... The labours of 
the inspector of nuisances would be considerably lightened, 
to say nothing of the sanitary advantages of the improvement 
which would follow. 78 
Some contemporary observers asserted that the Brisbane City 
Council had already proclaimed its unfitness to undertake its 
traditional task, the management of the capital's sanitary affairs. 
The council had insisted on the erection of earth closets with regular 
79 
periodic removal, before a stoutly-fenced, adequately-staffed, 
properly-regulated manure depot was provided. In response to council's 
demands, many Brisbane families had adopted a travesty of the earth 
closet in which neither thoroughly dried earth nor decently constructed 
80 
closets were used. And the Brisbane corporation had further 
demonstrated its ineptitude by seeking government approval for a manure 
75. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jan 1870. 
76. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 22 Sep 1873, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 185, in-letter no.1661 of 1873. 
77. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1868-69), 189. 
78. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Jul 1868; letter to editor from A 
Ratepayer. 
79. Bye-Law No.12 of the Municipality of Brisbane. See also The 
Brisbane Courier, 19 Jan 1869. The failure of the council to 
enforce this by-law led to a "very large accumulation of nightsoil 
in the centre of the city". Ibid., 11 Oct 1870; Report of the 
Brisbane City Council General Inspector. The by-law had no legal 
force as late as 1872. Ibid., 9 Apr 1872; Report of the Brisbane 
City Council General Inspector. 
80. Ibid., 23 May 1873; letter to editor from A Correspondent. 
However, C. Tiffin had patented a simply operated, "portable, 
self-acting earth closet", and by June 1869, this was being 
manufactured by J.W. Carey of William Street. Ibid., 29 Jun 1869. 
Following this, Carey became an active public health "reformer". 
15. 
81 
depot in the "manifestly unsuitable" York's Hollow, an area close 
to the densely populated Fortitude Valley. The hillside siting of the 
depot which resulted in nightsoil being washed down creeks into the 
Valley, eventually led to a massive outcry from residents and their 
82 parliamentary representatives, prompting T.B. Stephens, Minister 
for Lands, to question seriously the commonsense of the city fathers, 
and their ability to calculate accumulating miasmatic dangers to the 
83 public health. 
But the choice also underlines the desperation of a city council 
under constant attack for allowing the soil of Brisbane to become 
"permeated with noxious matter", for encouraging "an impure local 
atmosphere of great virulence", and the collection of "masses of filth 
which remain and putrify", to "cause the high infant mortality rate"; 
a council accused of turning the capital of the colony into a "reproach 
... as an abode of filth, abominable smells, and foul and fatal 
effluvia of all kinds"; a council which was the butt of severe 
87 
castigation from all sides, but which was offered few if any practical 
suggestions or financial contributions, from either governmental or 
central health authorities, and was at wits' end to be rid of the city's 
stinking refuse. Well before 1874, as a partial solution to its 
problems, the council had begun dumping rubbish illegally on the banks 
of the not-yet-gazetted, out-of-the-way Enoggera Creek. Naturally this 
incursion greatly annoyed and distressed those who had taken up 
88 
residence in this semi-rural area, and one landowner testily requested 
the Colonial Secretary for "a means of legally abating these 
„ 89 
nuisances". 
These complaints increased steadily throughout the 1870's 
81. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Jan 1869, and Queensland Government 
Gazette, X (1869), 247. 
82. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Apr 1874; Report of deputation of 
parliamentarians and citizens to the Secretary for Public Lands. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid., 22 Oct 1872; main editorial. 
85. Ibid., 8 Nov 1872; main editorial. 
86. Ibid., 31 Jul 1873; letter to editor from Dr. K.I. O'Doherty. 
87. Ibid., 12 Sep 1874; main editorial. 
88. Ibid., 22 Oct 1873; letter to editor from Oxygen. 
89. A.O. Herbert to Colonial Secretary, 20 Aug 1868, Q.S.A. COL/A 110, 
in-letter no.2603 of 1868. 
16. 
although the chosen earth closet system was receiving "a more thorough 
trial in Brisbane than in any other of our colonial cities", and was 
eventually expected to become, "in a sanitary point of view, a great 
90 blessing to the city". To the anger and disgust of the Brisbane City 
Council, the Brisbane Local Board of Health was charged with the main 
91 92 
responsibility for this work, though at Brisbane City Council expense. 
Through diligent scrutiny of newspaper columns, the modern researcher 
may discover that the local board tried, rather unsuccessfully, to 
d 
94 
93 
compel householders to construct proper earth closets. It calle for 
tenders from nightmen for the emptying of those closets by contract,' 
decided on a periodical inspection of both nightmen's premises and 
95 private backyards to try to ensure cleanliness of operation, and 
intimated to the Brisbane City Council that a special rate would have 
96 97 
to be imposed. The board fenced the new manure depot, built sturdy 
98 
sheds to store the deodorising dried earth, and persuaded the government 
99 to form a road to the depot once fencing was completed. It employed a 
number of men to dig trenches and cover the nightsoil in them daily. 
and when operations were well underway, with the demand for deodorized 
nightsoil manure growing rapidly, the board felt justified in 
employing an extra hand to prepare the stuff for sale, and in doubling 
90. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1146. 
91. Ibid. For details of the appointment of the local board under 
the Health Act of 1872 see Within, pp.315-18. 
92. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Nov 1874. The city solicitor was 
convinced that payment of board expenses incurred on the new 
manure depot could not be successfully resisted by the Brisbane 
body. This opinion is printed in full in this Courier. 
29 Jan 1874; main editorial, and Ibid., 12 Aug 1874. 
2 Sep 1874. 
11 Mar 1874. 
2 Sep 1874. 
20 Jul 1874. 
5 Feb 1874. 
10 Jan 1874. 
22 Sep 1874. 
Sugar plantation owners were shortly to become enthusiastic over 
this type of manure. Ibid., 2 Nov 1882; Minutes of Brisbane 
Local Board of Health, discussion led by Dr. Bancroft. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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102 its secretary's salary from^50 to.£r 100 per annum. 
In 1876, the Central Board of Health revealed that it too, in the 
absence of official local health board reports, had learnt 
through the medium of the papers, that they are doing their 
best to overcome prejudice and causing earth closets to be 
substituted for other types of accommodation.... To 
the local board of the city, as at present constituted, too 
much praise cannot be accorded.... With limited funds at their 
command, they are fighting their way for the preservation of 
the health and lives of the citizens. 103 
One year later, the central board considered that Brisbane's one 
remaining "large problem", which did negate all health authority efforts 
to a considerable extent, was the lack of "an efficient arterial 
104 drainage". But the board was "happy to say" that the capital which 
had "become little better than an Augean stable" under the aegis of the 
city council, had vastly improved sanitary conditions, thanks to the 
work of "an active and zealous local board... carrying out the measures 
we suggested." 
Pugh's Queensland Almanac was inclined to agree. Although the 
colony, and especially Brisbane, was not as healthy as it might have 
been, sanitary affairs had begun to show a "great improvement" because 
102. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Mar 1876. During February 1876, thirteen 
tons of deodorized nightsoil were sold at }^1 per ton. The 
estimated revenue from nightsoil for that year was^^1,823.2.0. 
Ibid., 20 Nov 1875. 
103. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 6 Mar 1876, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 219, in-letter no.575 of 1876. 
104. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1146. See also 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVIII (1875), 469-482 and 
598-600, and Ibid., XIX (1875), 655-666, for a discussion of the 
insanitary state of Brisbane caused by improper drainage, the 
urgent necessity for government action, criticism of the 
"patchwork" nature of the Brisbane drainage bill, and the 
jealousy of other colonial cities and towns over the amount 
proposed to be spent on Brisbane drainage. In spite of opposition, 
the bill was passed. See Queensland Government Gazette, II (1875), 
1451. The Courier was highly critical of the Act. The Brisbane 
Courier, 18 Jun 1875; main editorial. But John Laverty suggests 
that by the end of 1879, improvements made possible under the Act 
were considerable. Laverty, p.226. 
105. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1146. Yet within 
two years the central board was attacking the local board very 
vigorously. In 1877 the board was large, which may have been 
somewhat detrimental to its smooth working. It had seven members 
from the council, but significantly it contained no less than three 
outstanding individualistic medical men, Drs. Joseph Bancroft, 
John Thomson, and Richard Rendle. 
18. 
of the gratifying tendency of the health boards to "awak/^ en/ to a sense 
of their duties in this respect." The Colonial Secretary, Arthur 
Palmer, was more sparing of praise, observing "that... the Local Board 
might have done a great deal more to abate the nuisances and stinks in 
the city than they had done, although no doubt they had done a good 
deal".l°^ 
A large number of Brisbane residents did not accept even this 
qualified assessment, and as usual, the capital's press was in the 
forefront of the attack. By 1874 The Brisbane Courier had begun to 
change its tune on the sewerage question. The editor had become 
convinced that although "the earth closet system was one of the best 
and cheapest ways of promoting cleanliness and preserving health in 
108 
populous places", in Brisbane's semi-tropical climate it "should 
109 
only be regarded as a palliative measure", useful until a thorough-
going sewerage and drainage system was provided. The Courier strongly 
censured the Brisbane Local Board of Health's handling of the earth 
closet system which 
had resulted in the liquid refuse being emptied into the 
gutters, and the nightsoil being hawked through the streets 
in a disgusting way at night. The system is said to be 
universally condemned. 110 
A rapidly drawn-up and quickly accepted Central Board of Health 
regulation, designed to prevent "the leaking and overflowing of closet 
111 pans" through the use of a scoop and sufficiency of dried earth, 
suggests that the Courier's observation was correct. Moreover, the 
editor was sick of "reading", "gaping", "looking serious", "admitting 
the necessity", and exclaiming that the "Government should really do 
something... about the threat of infectious diseases arising from a 
polluted atmosphere". For all the government had done was to 
bestow upon /^ Brisbane/ unhealthy boards of health who don't 
do anything, and we are really not one step nearer to an 
effective solution of the difficulty than we were five years ago. 
106. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1887, p.75. 
107. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVII (1874), 937. 
108. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jan 1874; main editorial. 
109. Ibid., 12 Sep 1874; main editorial. 
110. Ibid., 27 Sep 1875. 
111. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 22 Jan 1875, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 205,in-letter no.202 of 1875. 
See also Queensland Government Gazette, I (1875), 332. 
112. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Jan 1875; main editorial. 
112 
19. 
Not surprisingly, the Brisbane City Council, which had borne the 
brunt of vicious attacks for its earlier sanitary efforts, also lost no 
opportunity to criticize the local board. Apparently not content to 
accept newspaper reports on the management of the manure depot, the 
council made its own inspections and enquiries to assess the effectiveness 
of the supervision of employees and the general conduct of the place. 
113 It was not satisfied that the nightsoil trenches were covered daily, 
and asserted that some areas had been left open for from ten to 
fourteen days. The resultant extremely disagreeable stench was not only 
causing a nuisance, but in clear vindication of the miasmatic theory, 
was inducing sickness in the people living nearby. To add to the 
unpleasantness, nightmen had been allowed to tip nightsoil outside the 
depot area, close to the road. A further complaint, in which some 
government departments joined, was that insufficiently dried earth, 
re-used, undeodorized earth, or earth taken from old cemetery reserves, 
117 
was being supplied to Brisbane closets. 
The city's ratepayers were no more enamoured of the situation than 
the council. On 5 July 1875, they held a stormy meeting "anent 
sanitary reform", at which the protesters became very vocal in their 
criticism of the Brisbane Local Board of Health. Typically - for 
ratepayers are never happy to accept increased costs - this was not so 
much because of the board's mishandling of the earth closet system, 
but because it offended by "enforcing health regulations and imposing 
charge/s/" which were "characterised as being arbitrary and vexatious". 
The citizens rallied to the defence of their aldermanic representatives, 
passing a resolution "calling on the Council to take sanitary reform 
118 into their own hands." As for the rest of Queensland, the cities 
and towns which looked to Brisbane to give a lead on the question, had 
already labelled the capital's sanitary system as "an admitted failure", 
113. Within, p.16. 
114. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Sep 1874. 
115. Ibid., 25 Apr 1874. 
116. See for example. Under Colonial Secretary to Colonial Architect, 
2 Sep 1875, Q.S.A. WOR/A 106, in-letter No.4402 of 1875. 
117. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Jul 1875; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 26 Jul 1875. This complaint was angrily reiterated 
in 1879 by the Central Board of Health, Ibid., 12 Feb 1879 and 
18 Feb 1879. 
118. Ibid., 6 Jul 1875. For once, the Courier supported the local 
board. "Their duty is often a most unpleasant one, and it must 
often occasion much dissatisfaction. We would encourage them, 
however, to persevere." Ibid., 7 Jul 1875; editorial. 
119. The Queensland Times, (Ipswich) 27 Apr 1876; editorial. 
119 
20. 
The Central Board of Health, whose regulations progressively 
mirrored the growing inadequacies of all facets of Brisbane's sanitary 
120 
system, had become openly critical of the local board's management 
by 1879. The unchecked carelessness of nightmen, the "slovenly and 
half-hearted" attention paid by householders, and the "optional nature' 
of the earth closet system, which created "an intolerable nuisance and 
constituted a threat to the health of the citizens", were all the 
121 
consequence of the apathy of the local board. It was becoming 
increasingly necessary to urge the municipal council to work with the 
122 local board to undertake obviously needed reforms. A report of the 
local board's own assistant inspector, filed during the following year, 
proved that the board had indeed been remiss in enforcing the cleanly 
123 
working of the sanitary system. Dispirited, it decided, with 
Brisbane City Council approval, to sell its earth closet system plant, 
to let the whole of the work of tending the earth closets to contractors, 
and to lease a portion of the manure depot to those contractors. 
125 The council was to be responsible for accepting tenders. 
The problems were not resolved at once, despite some evidence of 
126 improvement. "Serious defects connected with the emptying of 
earth closets", "unnecessary expense /which_/ failed to secure the 
desired sanitary results", "unnecessary annoyance and offence by the 
frequent visitations of nightmen", caused by an over-generous licensing 
120. See for example. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
19 May 1877, Q.S.A. COL/A 238,in-letter no.2889 of 1877, The 
Brisbane Courier, 22 Feb 1877, Ibid., 5 Sep 1878, and 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXVIII (1879), 410-411. 
121. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Feb 1879; Sub Committee Report of the 
Central Board of Health on the work of the Local Board of Health 
with respect to the Earth Closet System. 
122. Ibid. The council had already been given some control. The 
manure depot reserve had been "placed under the control of the 
Municipal Council in September 1876", but at that time the local 
board was still in charge of all operations. Queensland Government 
Gazette, II (1876), 590. 
123. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Jan 1880; Report of the Assistant Inspector 
of the Local Board of Health. 
124. Ibid., 13 Apr 1880. The board reserved its right to make 
recommendations and inspections, and to proceed against detected 
offenders. Ibid., 2 Dec 1880. 
125. Ibid., 29 Jun 1880. 
126. "Central Board of Health Report" (written and presented in 
October 1880), Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1880), 1563, and The Brisbane Courier, 21 Oct 1882; sub editorial. 
21. 
system, and large numbers of householders who persisted in evading the 
127 payment of fees by burying excrement on their own properties, 
remained to plague Brisbane for the whole of the 1880's. Indeed, 
nuisances proliferated and complaints grew more vociferous to reach 
new heights in 1883. 
The first shots for the year were fired by the Booroodabin 
128 
Divisional Board, urged on by its ratepayers living in the vicinity 
of the manure depot. Following on its December 1882 petition to the 
129 
Brisbane City Council, the board requested that the Premier and 
Colonial Secretary, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, receive a deputation whose 
aim was the removal of the depot "to some more suitable position 
130 
outside the Division". The residents of both Booroodabin and 
Ithaca reinforced the board's action, by presenting a large petition to 
Mcllwraith objecting to "the faeces matter of the city and suburbs", 
dead animals and other filth, being carted through their streets, to 
131 — — 
be dumped in their area. The "disgusting odours, /which/ cannot but 
be productive of infections and contagious diseases", frightened both 
132 the petitioners and the Booroodabin and Ithaca Divisional Boards, 
especially as many cases "of typhoid fever had broken out near the 
manure depot, and at least one had a fatal termination". Economic 
considerations were also included, for there was a danger that the area 
133 
could be "depopulated and its advancement retarded from such a cause". 
127. This particular complaint came from Woolloongabba, but the 
difficulties and nuisances were rife Brisbane-wide. S. Eraser, 
Woolloongabba Local Board of Health to Central Board of Health, 
10 Jul 1882. 
128. Clerk, Booroodabin Divisional Board to Sir T. Mcllwraith, 6 Mar 
1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 355, in-letter no.1118 of 1883. Residents 
living within the Ithaca Divisional Board area, who were also 
affected by the depot, had approached their board as well. 
129. Ibid. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Petition from Residents and Freeholders of Booroodabin and Ithaca 
Divisions to Colonial Secretary, no date, (date stamped 14 Mar 
1883), Q.S.A. COL/A 355, in-letter no.1239 of 1883. In May 1882, 
they had petitioned their own boards, and in December had 
approached the Brisbane City Council. Ibid. 
132. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jan 1883; sub editorial. 
133. Petition to Colonial Secretary, as in f.n.l31. A few residents 
of some eight years' standing blamed Macler's Victoria Tannery 
for the smells and fever. Petition from Mr. Warner, Mr. Wilson, 
and Mr. Dod, signed by E. Otto to Colonial Secretary, no date 
(date stamped 4 Mar 1883), Q.S.A. COL/A 355, in-letter no.1255 
of 1883. 
22. 
The Brisbane City Council was not entirely unsympathetic with the 
request for the manure depot's removal, but pointed out that it was 
already 
situated at such a distance from the town as to make its use 
very expensive... and to remove it still further away would 
make the removal of the refuse... so expensive that it is 
feared in many cases people would be unable... to keep their 
premises in a cleanly condition.... Under the circumstances 
the Council regret they are unable to comply with the request 
of your petition. 134 
135 The staunchly anti-centralist Mcllwraith, though admitting to the 
deputation that the depot might be a nuisance, declined to interfere 
1 '^fi 
with local government affairs. He promised only to bring the matter 
before the Central Board of Health, and, if necessary, to consult his 
137 
colleagues m government. 
In fact he did much more than this, visiting and inspecting the 
depot himself, and reporting favourably to the board on the "good 
condition" in which he "was surprised to find the reserve". Mcllwraith 
did not think that the manure depot was either dangerous or overly 
138 
unpleasant, although the night-carts were "certainly offensive". 
Once again the official verdict was not acceptable to the general 
public, the press, and some interested medical men. Nearby residents 
139 insisted that "we must remove the unclean from the people", because 
of the "disgusting smells", the regular pollution of the creek with 
140 
nightsoil, the typhoid fever which was rife in homes in the vicinity 
134. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jan 1883; sub editorial. This included 
a letter of 17 January 1883 from the Brisbane Town Clerk to the 
Booroodabin Divisional Board, printed in full. 
135. Within, p. 335. 
136. Mcllwraith declined to act even when the Brisbane council 
frustrated the efforts of the Education Department to find 
accommodation for the contents of state school earth closets. 
Department of Public Instruction to Central Board of Health, 
21 Feb 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 358, in-letter no.671 of 1883 and 
attachments from the Lands and other departments. 
137. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Mar 1883. Report of Deputation of 
Booroodabin and Ithaca Divisional Boards to Colonial Secretary, 
8 Mar 1883. The central board meeting was already arranged. 
Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 8 Mar 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 355, in-letter no.1154 of 1883. 
138. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Mar 1883; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 9 Mar 1883. 
139. Ibid., 22 Feb 1883; letter to editor from Kelvin Grove. 
140. Ibid., 12 Mar 1883; letter to editor from George H. Buzacott. 
23. 
141 
of the depot, and the disgusting filth which overflowed and was 
142 
spread along the road from night-carts. To make matters worse, 
"these carts perambulate our streets and contaminate the air at a 
143 time when we are most susceptible of infection". 
The night-cart nuisance did indeed haunt all Brisbane residents 
"favoured" with their attentions, and it appears that even the central 
health authority had no constructive suggestions to offer for the 
eradication of the menace. At the December meeting. Dr. K. Cannan could 
only confirm the disgust of most Central Board of Health members. 
Residents of his neighbourhood were robbed of fully 
two hours sleep nightly by the horrible noise created in 
the first place by the ponderous night-carts...and the 
noisy conduct of the men....He commented strongly on the 
slovenly manner in which the work was carried out, and 
feelingly referred to the frightful smells from the 
uncovered night-cart and the unclean buckets passed to 
and fro by men under the windows of the bedrooms ....He 
wondered how long this sort of thing was going to last. 144 
Hope for amelioration was centred on a new local authority by-law 
for day time cleansing of closets. This regulation was of course in 
145 
city council hands, and those hands, according to Brisbane residents, 
146 
were just as incompetent as they had ever been. Certainly, there 
was no appreciable improvement in Brisbane's sanitary condition after 
the by-law had allegedly been put into operation. "TBC" reported as 
"monstrous, night-carts in twos and threes" in competition for road 
147 
space with the 10 p.m. Lutwyche omnibus. Even at council meetings, 
aldermen announced that night-cart offences and earth closet nuisances 
141. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Mar 1883; letter to editor from James 
Campbell. Campbell complained again in December, and May 1884. 
Ibid., 21 Dec 1883, and Ibid., 14 May 1884. 
142. Ibid., 15 Mar 1883; letter to editor from John Tait. 
143. Ibid., 23 Apr 1883; letter to editor from Dr.Richard Rendle.As 
part solution to "the inefficient, nastily done night work", 
Rendle suggested removal of closet contents by day, a point taken 
up later by another correspondent. Ibid., 10 May 1883; letter to 
editor from Disgusted. 
144. Ibid., 15 Dec 1883; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
14 Dec 1883. 
145. Ibid., contribution of Brisbane City Council alderman.-and 
Central Board of Health member, William Pettigrew. 
146. Ibid., 19 Dec 1883; letter to editor from E. Parr Smith, Ibid., 
24 Dec 1883; letter to editor from Janet O'Connor, Ibid.; letter 
to editor from An Old Scavenger, Ibid., 25 Dec 1883; letter to 
editor from Not Astonished, Ibid., 23 Jan 1884; letter to editor 
from Beta. 
147. Ibid., 21 Jan 1884; letter to editor from TBC. 
24, 
reported six weeks previously still remained unresolved, so that. 
people returning from Church were obliged to cover their 
noses with their handkerchiefs, the smell was so very bad. 148 
In another case, a closet left uncleansed for three weeks, despite 
several applications for attention, was in such a state that "it was 
149 
now impossible to make use of it''. 
In spite of the apparently insoluble problems connected with the 
earth closet system, the majority of Brisbane's aldermen still refused 
to countenance the idea of a sewerage system which would empty into the 
river. "Cries of no, no never", greeted alderman Heal's proposal to 
initiate such a scheme, though members of the Central Board of 
Health, probably fed up with the personal inconvenience of the night-
cart nuisance, convened a special meeting to inspect the "Stombuco'' 
water closet which had been in operation at one Mary Street residence 
151 for four years. The board was not satisfied that this water closet 
could eliminate the most serious health consequences, since it was 
"literally one for 'making your own place clean' and sending the filth 
to everyone else", and refused to endorse the "Stombuco" as an 
152 
alternative to the earth closet-manure depot debacle. 
Argument and inspections continued as typhoid fever increased 
its grip on the capital. The slovenly management of the earth closet 
system was said to have "a good deal to do with the spread of the 
153 disease", and the sanitary situation became the burning question of the 
day, as candidates for aldermanic honours campaigned on a platform of 
148. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jan 1884; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 28 Jan 1884, complaint of John McMaster. 
149. Ibid. 
150. Ibid., 29 Jan 1884. 
151. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 25 Jan 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 379, in-letter no.640 of 1884. The board had previously 
inspected this closet in 1880, when its findings were much the 
same. 
152. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Feb 1884; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 8 Feb 1884. See also Ibid., 12 Feb 1884; letter to editor 
from R.T. Jefferies, the owner of the "Stombuco" closet, for a 
description and defence of the system, and Ibid., 26 Feb 1884; 
letter to editor from Hugh Bell, M.D., F.R.C.S., for a stringent 
attack on it. 
153. Ibid., 25 Apr 1884; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 24 Apr 
1884, opinion of its Colonial Secretary chairman, Samuel Griffith. 
154. Ibid., 22 May 1884; letter to editor from Booroodabin. 
25. 
"immediate health and sanitation for the city". Newspaper readers 
continued to complain bitterly of the gross mismanagement of the earth 
closet system and the manure depot, and a large deputation "of all 
157 
shades of political opinion" waited on the Colonial Secretary. One 
of the main complaints was the inadequacy of the soil cover in the 
trenches, and the consequent "unpleasant oozing of the nightsoil". 
This was caused by the lack of underground drainage, and it would 
appear that the need for this was not understood by any of the Brisbane 
authorities, although cheap, efficient tile drains had been available 
1 58 
and freely in use from the 1840's. But once again, the official 
guardians of the public health, after inspecting the manure depot, 
found that the "danger was not there", and that the place was 
159 
"singularly free from any unpleasant smell". 
155. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Feb 1884; sub editorial. By 1884 
enormous difficulties with earth closet systems and manure depots 
were being experienced in the many cities and towns which had 
followed Brisbane in adopting that system. For some examples of 
this widespread problem see The Northern Miner (Charters Towers) 
8 Jan 1884; letter to editor from Peter Gorrie, nightman. Ibid., 
9 Jan 1884, Ibid., 26 Jan 1884; Minutes of Charters Towers 
Municipal Council, 25 Jan 1884, Ibid., 11 Mar 1884; letter to 
editor from Just-in-time Resident, Ibid., 10 May 1884; editorial. 
The Queensland Times, (Ipswich) 20 Apr 1884; letter to editor from 
Health, and Ibid., 1 May 1884; letter to editor from Decency, 
The Maryborough Chronicle, 3 Sep 1884, The Mackay Mercury, 
24 May 1884, Bundaberg Municipal Council to Colonial Secretary, 
6 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 400,in-letter no.6317 of 1884, and 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 567 (for the 
Toowoomba situation). The Cairns Post, 24 Jul 1884; letter to 
editor from Inflicted, and Ibid.; main editorial. 
156. The Brisbane Courier, 13 May 1884; letter to editor from Robert T. 
Scott, Ibid., 14 May 1884; further letter from Scott, and Ibid., 
21 May 1884; letter to editor from A Kelvin Grove Resident. 
157. Ibid., 14 May 1884; sub editorial. 
158. E.L. Jones, The Development of English Agriculture 1815-1873 
(London, 1968), p.15. William Pettigrew suggested that tile drains 
should be used in the depot from its commencement in 1874, but 
because of expense, or some reason unknown to Pettigrew, their 
use was precluded, and the depot was never a success. The Brisbane 
Courier, 26 Apr 1887; letter to editor from Wm. Pettigrew (member 
of "the first committee having to do with that place".) 
159. Visit of sub committee of Central Board of Health on 10 May 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 390, unnumbered memo attached to in-letter no.3526 
of 1884. The atmosphere at the depot was probably improved 
because rain-soaked, impassable roads had forced the dumping of 
excrement on private property some distance away, with the owner's 
consent. Angry nearby residents were quick to complain on this 
score also. The Brisbane Courier, 13 May 1884; Minutes of 
Brisbane City Council, 12 May 1884, Mayoral statement on 
complaints. 
26. 
Nevertheless, two relatively new elements, enthusiastically 
received by the general public and vested interests, now entered into 
the Central Board of Health's discussion of the nightsoil and manure 
depot problem. The first was the suggested use of 
duplicate pans which would involve no manipulation till 
arrival at the depot, and no offensive odour in transit. 
... The necessary work can be carried out during the day, 
the intolerable stench and annoyance of the night-carts 
be avoided, and the air when people sleep will not be 
loaded with poison. 161 
1 <S7 
This idea was quickly picked up for perusal by cities on the periphery, 
-I z: T 
though the scheme itself was still "open to great improvement". The 
second suggestion from the central board - that all refuse should be 
164 
subject to "purification by fire" - had been mooted earlier in the 
Courier's columns, and plans and specifications for a furnace to 
perform some burning operations had been placed before the Brisbane 
City Council, which had already registered its approval of the 
167 
system. 
An intensely interested Brisbane Courier, urged the city council 
to destroy town refuse, nightsoil and street and yard sweepings by fire. 
According to the editor, the real solution to the Kelvin Grove problem 
would be a new depot, situated downstream from Brisbane, equipped with 
160. It is obvious from the details which follow that the Brisbane City 
Council already had these two ideas under consideration. 
161. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 16 May 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 390, in-letter no.3526 of 1884. Duplicate pans could not 
overcome one large problem. Brisbane pans were square, making it 
almost impossible to seal them properly. The demand for round 
pans, which could be easily sealed and cleaned, was made by the 
Central Board of Health in June 1885. The Brisbane Courier, 
20 Jun 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 19 Jun 1885. 
162. See for example The Northern Miner, 24 May 1884, which printed in 
full a letter from Henry G. Marshall, Town Clerk Brisbane to the 
Townsville Municipal Council, explaining and advocating the 
double pan system. 
163. Ibid. See also The Brisbane Courier, 21 Jul 1884; letter to 
editor from Ratepayer. This correspondent was already complaining 
about the new system. The main difficulty seems to have been the 
return of old battered pans for new strongly made ones. 
164. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 16 May 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 390, in-letter no.3526 of 1884. 
165. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Apr 1884; letter to editor from J. 
Nightingale. 
166. Ibid., 14 May 1884; sub editorial. 
167. Ibid., 13 May 1884; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 12 May 1884. 
See also Ibid., 15 May 1884; letter to editor from Fuego. 
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a properly-built furnace, to which the city's refuse could be conveyed 
1 ftp, 
in air and watertight punts. 
This well-meant suggestion produced another spate of 
correspondence. Dr. Joseph Bancroft, who had never deviated from the 
169 
view that nightsoil treated correctly was an excellent manure, was 
horrified by the idea of the furnace and the river transport. 
Putting nightsoil on punts in town would create an 
additional and grave nuisance, and to carry the stuff on 
th^ e river woul_d pollute the river air.... Any destruction 
_/of nightsoijV by fire will pollute the city. . . in whatever 
direction the wind blows, and would require a great expense 
of fuel. 170 
Dr. Bancroft was quite wrong, retorted the manufacturer's representative. 
"But for the fastidious associations, the works could be in the city 
171 itself, they are so free of odours." As for the doctor's 
championship of farms, "from our experience of the Chinamen's gardens 
around Brisbane, the less we have of the perfumes of nature's 
172 laboratory the better". 
168. The Brisbane Courier, 14 May 1885; sub editorial. 
169. Ibid., 20 Jun 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health,19 Jun 1885. 
See also Ibid., 4 Jul 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
3 Jul 1885. By July 1885, all members of the board except Bancroft 
favoured destruction of all refuse, including excrement, by fire. 
170. Ibid., 15 May 1884; letter to editor from Joseph Bancroft. 
Bancroft's pet plan was for the transport of nightsoil in sealed 
railway wagons to a "manured farm". 
171. Ibid., 15 May 1884; letter to editor from Brown and David 
representative. 
172. Ibid., 16 May 1884j_ letter to editor from Manlove,_Allcot, Fryer 
and Co., London, /^ agent in Brisbane, V. Petherick_V The Chinese 
market gardeners' manuring methods were hotly disputed. In 1888, 
the Brisbane City Council insisted that the Central Board of 
Health conduct a "thorough inspection... of all Chinamen's _ 
vegetable gardens within the city and suburbs... /to ascertain^ / 
the mode of manuring and cultivating vegetables". Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Brisbane Municipal Council, 11 Dec 1888, No.6, p. 
69. The Brisbane Courier took up the question in two long and 
scathing editorials. Ibid., 6 Dec 1888; main editorial, and Ibid., 
22 Dec 1888; main editorial. The central board began 
investigations in January 1889, finally, drawing up regulations 
in December of that year. Considerable health breaches were 
uncovered, but the "regulations" "were nothing more than 
instructions.... and did not require any formal approval of the 
Governor in Council". Central Board of Health to Colonial 
Secretary, 5 Dec 1889, Q.S.A. COL/A 599, in-letter no.10677 of 
1889, and a large number of attachments. See also The Brisbane 
Courier, 30 Sep 1889; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 29 Sep 
1889. 
28. 
It was not only the vested interests which sprang to the defence 
of the "cleansing fires". In a rather vicious attack on his colleague. 
Dr. Leighton Kesteven deplored Bancroft's "unwarrantable and misleading 
assertions" in reporting on the furnace system. But Kesteven regretted 
above all "that the thinking public cannot be aroused to the superior 
173 
claims of water conveyance". 
Indeed in this year of special interest in the public health of 
Queensland, the whole sewerage question was revived once more, with 
prominent medical men taking opposite sides in the argument, to the 
174 general confusion of newspaper readers. In the Legislative Assembly, 
during the debate on the 1884 health bill, the fact that 
we have allowed our large towns to grow up without any 
thorough system of drainage and sewerage 
was blamed for the apparently inevitable consequence that 
Queensland is now one of the most unhealthy colonies of 
the Australian group. The death-rate is higher in 
Queensland now than in any other of the Australian colonies.... 
And I believe we should have a system of national sewerage 
through all the towns of the colony. That will cost something 
like a million of money, but it will be money well expended. 175 
On the other hand, even where the earth closet had been 
given a fair chance, it had worked badly. Theoretically the 
system was a good one, but practically it had been found to be 
a nuisance and an abomination. The only thing they could do 
in the city of Brisbane was to have the matter drained into 
the river and taken away by the tide. 176 
Despite the inability of legislators to agree on particular 
systems, the 1884 health bill had a successful passage, and great 
177 
expectations accompanied its passing into law on 21 October 1884. 
173. The Brisbane Courier, 18 May 1884; letter to editor from Leighton 
Kesteven. 
174. For instance Dr. C. Gunn wrote a series of letters to the Courier 
in praise of sewerage, which he asserted had greatly lowered the 
death rate in the United States of America. The Brisbane Courier, 
23 Feb 1884, and Ibid., 19 Mar 1884; letters to editor from 
C. Gunn, B.A., M.D. (Harvard). But see also Ibid., 24 Mar 1884; 
letter to editor from Dr. J.E. Matthew Vincent, denying that 
sewerage was the answer and extolling "an. £^ fficient earth closet 
system carried out with real energy. . . /^ as/ the triumphant solution 
of the sewage difficulty". Laymen were still debating the pros and 
cons of the systems late in the year. See for example. Ibid., 
24 Oct 1884; letter to editor from J.W.T., and Ibid., 29 Oct 1884; 
letter to editor from D. Mapleston. 
175. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 506-07. 
176. Ibid., p.564. Opinion of Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. 
177. For detailed discussion see Within, pp.346-49. 
29. 
The bandying about of suggestions and counter suggestions on sewerage, 
178 
manure depots, burial and burning methods, the general airing of 
179 
grievances which took place in both houses of parliament, and were 
1 80 
subsequently given wide coverage in newspapers throughout Queensland, 
might have been expected to lead to rapid sanitary improvements. 
Certainly a number of cities and towns throughout the colony, taking 
advantage of the powers granted to local authorities under the new Act, 
181 hastened to produce public health by-laws, or to improve existing ones. 
178. See for example, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLII (1884), 
138-140, and Ibid., XLIII (1884), 566-67. 
179. It is not certain just how wide an airing these grievances were 
given. In August 1884, the leader of the opposition, Boyd Dunlop 
Morehead, alleged that the "proprietor of certain country papers" 
had been excluded from the parliamentary press gallery. As 
The Brisbane Courier pointed out, this was a grave matter, since 
"Hansard does not reach the general public... The great majority 
of voters in the colony can only know what takes place from the 
press reports". See The Brisbane Courier, 8 Aug 1884, Ibid., 
9 Aug 1884; sub editorial, and Ibid., 11 Aug 1884; letter to 
editor from E. Thorne. Two of the papers concerned. Punch and 
Figaro, were very active in reporting health debates, and in 
offering opinions on the public health situation. 
180. Some examples of editorials and general reporting on those parts 
of the health bill debate which concerned sanitation are. The 
Brisbane Courier, 25 Aug 1884; main editorial. Ibid., 3 Sep 1884; 
main editorial. Ibid., 9 Oct 1884; Special Supplement devoted 
to articles on the public health. Ibid., 31 Oct 1884; main 
editorial. Ibid., 8 Nov 1884; sub editorial. The Queensland Times, 
4 Sep 1884; editorial. The Northern Miner, 12 Sep 1884; 
editorial. Ibid., 22 Nov 1884, Ibid., 5 Dec 1884; editorial. Ibid., 
11 Dec 1884, The Maryborough Chronicle and Wide Bay and Burnett 
Advertiser, 17 Sep 1884; editorial. Ibid., 11 Nov 1884, The 
Colonist, 27 Sep 1884; sub editorial. Wide Bay and Burnett News, 
1 Nov 1884, Ibid., 22 Nov 1884, and The Cairns Post, 20 Nov 1884; 
sub editorial. 
181. For example. Police Magistrate, Clermont to Under Colonial 
Secretary, 27 Oct 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 405, in-letter no.7672 of 
1884; The Brisbane Courier, 18 Nov 1884, Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 17 Nov 1884, Ibid., 13 Nov 1884; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 12 Nov 1884, Central Board of Health to Under Colonial 
Secretary, 15 Nov 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 406, in-letter no.7997 of 
1884, Town Clerk, Clermont to Colonial Secretary, 17 Nov 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 407, in-letter no.8138 of 1884, The Colonist, 
29 Nov 1884; Minutes of Maryborough City Council, 28 Nov 1884, 
Town Clerk, Mackay to Colonial Secretary, 11 Dec 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 409, in-letter no.8744 of 1884, Town Clerk, Maryborough to 
Colonial Secretary, 6 Dec 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 411, in-letter no. 
8607 of 1884 and attachments. Town Clerk, Bundaberg to Colonial 
Secretary, 19 Dec 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 410, in-letter no.8954 of 
1884 and attachments, and Town Clerk, Rockhampton to Colonial 
Secretary, n.d., Q.S.A. COL/A 412, in-letter no.452 of 1885 and 
attachments. 
30. 
One of the main ingredients of these by-laws was the insistence that 
closet contents and rubbish should be removed by appointed contractors 
182 
possessing the necessary equipment. The eventual result of this 
genuine desire to improve the sanitary situation was that cities and 
towns coming under the Health Act were at the mercy of firms owning 
nightsoil removal and disposal plant. These firms had an absolute 
183 
monopoly of the work, whether performed well or badly. In the 
interim, ratepayers and residents failed to detect any great 
amelioration of insanitary conditions. 
In Brisbane, the city council swiftly made "arrangements by which 
185 
they /would./ have immediate control of the cleansing of the city", 
and endless discussion took place in the search for improvements. 
These included the levying of a "very high" health rate to meet the 
1 Rf\ 
expenses of cleansing; the examination, for possible implementation 1 87 in the colony, of ideas already tried and proved in Britain; the 
appointment of a sanitary inspector whose special duties would embrace 
1 Q Q 
investigations at the manure depot; and the purchase of new apparatus 
182. See for example Wide Bay and Burnett News, 1 Nov 1884, The 
Maryborough Chronicle, 11 Nov 1884, The Brisbane Courier, 
18 Nov 1884, Ibid., 25 Nov 1884, and Ibid., 2 Dec 1884. 
183. Ibid., 4 May 1886; sub editorial. 
184. See for example The Brisbane Courier, 8 Jan 1885; sub editorial. 
Ibid., 5 Mar 1885, Ibid., 25 Mar 1885; Minutes of Sanitary 
Vigilance Committee, 24 Mar 1885, Wide Bay and Burnett News, 
13 Oct 1885; editorial, and The Queensland Figaro, 7 Nov 1885. 
185. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jan 1885; main editorial. 
186. Ibid. There were immediate protests from irate ratepayers. Ibid., 
6 Jan 1885; Report of special meeting of ratepayers on the 
sanitary levy. 
187. Ibid., 7 Jan 1885; long article - communicated - on Birmingham, 
England, and "Report on Water Supply and Sewage Disposal; by 
W.F. Taylor, M.D., M.R.C.S.", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, III (1885), 555-594. 
188. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Jan 1885; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 26 Jan 1885. 
31. 
189 
to steam clean the offending sanitary pans. Most importantly, with 
190 
the expiration of the lease of the Kelvin Grove manure depot in sight, 
the desperate search for a new area, preferably within a ten mile radius 
191 
of the city, began all over again. The same protesters wrote angry 
192 letters to the health authorities, people likely to be affected by the 
newly proposed depot site on Nundah Creek prepared a series of 
193 
objections, and The Brisbane Courier urged long-suffering Kelvin 
Grove residents to take the matter to law, should perfidious 
194 politicians fail to keep their word. 
The editor little realized, in May 1885, how important and 
necessary that advice would be. During the rest of that year, and 
throughout 1886 and 1887, protests over the "terrible state of the 
sanitary depot" which was "something awful enough to kill a blackfellow' 
mounted. Representatives of interested local authorities waited upon the 
Premier, in a concerted effort to have the manure depot removed from 
189. Secretary, City and Suburban Sanitary Co. to Colonial Secretary, 
2 Apr 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A419, in-letter no.2271 of 1885. See 
also The Brisbane Courier, 16 Apr 1885, for the report of an 
official visit to the depot. The majority of the "dignitaries" 
reported favourably, possibly influenced by the champagne 
luncheon. But see also the protest from one correspondent. 
Ibid., 17 Apr 1885; letter to editor from A Resident, and 
another dissenting note from Dr. Hill Wray, secretary to the 
central board. Wray considered the depot very unsatisfactory, 
the pan steaming "inadequate to destroy germs", and the 
attendants' work "slovenly and slipshod". This depot was in strong 
contrast to the one on the prison island St. Helena in Moreton 
Bay where three hundred men were accommodated with a clean odour-
free system. Ibid., 25 Apr 1885, Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 24 Apr 1885. 
190. The Brisbane Courier, 30 May 1885; sub editorial. The lease was 
to expire in June 1886. 
191. Ibid., 28 Mar 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 27 Mar 1885, 
192. See for example. Ibid., letter to the March meeting of the central 
board from James Campbell. 
193. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Apr 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 12 Apr 1885. Main objectors were the Sisters of Mercy, 
Brisbane, trustees for the Roman Catholic Orphanage, Nudgee. On 
19 May 1885, fifty-six acres of land were permanently reserved on 
Cabbage-tree Creek for a manure depot. Queensland Government 
Gazette, I (1885), 1202 and 1676. 
194. The Brisbane Courier, 30 May 1885; sub editorial. 
195. Ibid., 25 Jan 1887. 
195 
32. 
196 their environs; large numbers of letters expressing disgust over the 
197 
manure depot continued to appear in newspapers; more deputations 
198 
sought to influence government ministers to remove "the horror"; 
very large public meetings of irate Kelvin Grove and Enoggera residents 
were held at which members of parliament, doctors and influential 
landowners protested at being "inflicted with the abominable place for 
199 
so long"; and ratepayers and residents directly affected by the depot 
nuisance resorted to petitions to their local authorities, and to the 
Central Board of Health. In order to prove that a manure 
could be properly conducted the Courier sent its special reporter to 
inspect the "model" depot at Woolloongabba. The correspondent "failed 
to detect any bad smell whatever /^ thougli/ the afternoon was close and 
hot", and gave credit to the perfectly dried earth, the well dug, well 
covered trenches, and the fact that "the men at Woolloongabba depot 
201 
are all teetotallers".' 
196. In particular Booroodabin and Ithaca. The Brisbane Courier, 18 
Dec 1885. But see also a defence of the depot following the 
December deputation's complaints. Benjamin H. Babbidge to Colonial 
Secretary, 18 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 448, in-letter no.9618 of 
1885, As Brisbane's Mayor, Babbidge had an interest to protect, 
but Colonial Secretary Griffith went out of his way to congratulate 
him on his "efforts for the health of the people of Brisbane". 
Marginal note by Griffith on above. 
197. One of the most persistent correspondents was "Sanitas". Some of 
his letters appeared in The Brisbane Courier, 26 Apr 1886, 15 May 
1886, 23 Nov 1886, 27 Jan 1887, 19 Mar 1887. 
198. James Campbell led a Booroodabin deputation to the Premier in April 
and a large group from Kelvin Grove led by Dr. Bancroft saw 
Griffith in July 1886. Ibid., 3 Apr 1886; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 2 Apr 1886, and Ibid., 28 Jul 1886. 
199. Ibid., 9 Jul 1886. 
200. Ibid., 7 Jan 1887; Ratepayers' petition to Booroodabin Divisional 
Board, Ibid., 7 Mar 1887; Petition to the Central Board of Health 
from one-hundred-and-twenty Toombul ratepayers, and Ibid., 12 Mar 
1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 11 Mar 1887; Petition 
to the central board from the residents of Enoggera, Breakfast 
Creek and other areas. 
201. Ibid., 31 Mar 1887. This depot was undoubtedly a curiosity in 
Queensland. For descriptions of the all-too-familiar evils of 
depots in Herberton, Maryborough, Bundaberg, Ipswich and 
Townsville, see The Northern Miner, 5 May 1884, Johnston, Police 
Magistrate, Bundaberg to Colonial Secretary, 6 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 400, in-letter no.6317 of 1884, The Colonist, 15 Dec 1884; 
Minutes of Tinana Divisional Board, 14 Dec 1884, Brassall 
Divisional Board to Colonial Secretary, 2 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 
446, in-letter no.9023 of 1885, The Herberton Advertiser, 12 Feb 
1887, and The Democrat, 27 Mar 1897. 
33. 
But the central board, which was charged with the general 
oversight of all health matters for the whole of Queensland under the 
1884 Health Act, had another solution. It responded to the outcry with 
some positive recommendations on the use of "cremation jjisj the most 
202 
effectual means of disposing of all refuse, excreta, etc. in Brisbane." 
Unfortunately the mere passing on of resolutions to the Brisbane City 
Council hardly represented a commendable and energetic attack on a most 
urgent public health problem. In the first place, the final cost of 
cremating the nightsoil of Brisbane and Booroodabin was calculated at 
O rv 7 
•^40,000, an amount well beyond the means of the city council. 
Secondly, the central board appears to have "put off" positive discussion 
on a more suitable manure depot site for an inordinately long time, 
204 through the dithering indecisiveness of its members. "Sanitas" was 
certainly of this opinion, feeling that the remedying of relatively 
minor sanitary problems had left the board without 
sufficient vitality to enable it to deal with the removal 
of the notorious manure depot. Could anyone... not come 
to the conclusion that it had outlived its usefulness, and 
that it had set the seal on its own ineptitude? 205 
The Queensland government had done little better than its 
appointed board. In October 1885, a harrassed Francis Beattie, 
Chairman of the Booroodabin Divisional Board, accused the government of 
refusing permission to have the depot removed, in spite of four years 
entreaty by residents. And in December of that same year the Premier, 
in his haste to be rid of an importunate deputation, pleaded pressure of 
more urgent business, and his inability to shift the depot "at a moment's 
207 
notice" - excuses unlikely to cut any ice with the complainants. 
202. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Jul 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 17 Jul 1885, Ibid., 18 Dec 1886; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 17 Dec 1886, Ibid., 20 Dec 1886; sub editorial, and 
Ibid., 12 Mar 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 11 Mar 
1887. 
203. Ibid., 21 Apr 1887; Minutes of Brisbane and Suburban Sanitary 
Conference, 20 Apr 1887. 
204. Ibid., 20 Jul 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 19 Jul 
1885, and Ibid., 24 Jul 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
23 Jul 1886"^  
205. Ibid., 19 Mar 1887; letter to editor from Sanitas. He refers here 
to the board's go-slow tactics during discussion at its meeting 
held on 11 March 1887. 
206. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLVII (1885), 881. Supply 
debate. 
207. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Dec 1885. 
34. 
Small wonder that Griffith was reproved for being "somewhat case 
hardened and callous" in his attitude towards the manure depot 
208 
sufferers, or that protesters considered that it was the laggard 
Colonial Secretary's immediate duty to "produce /an/ alternative scheme 
209 
and the locality of /a/ new depot". But the colony's cynics were 
not really surprised, when the Colonial Secretary's office shifted the 
responsibility for the latter chore onto the Secretary for Public 
T A 210 Lands. 
Nevertheless, as had happened before, the greatest censure was 
reserved for the Brisbane City Council. At the least the council was 
charged with neglect, resulting in "constant danger from pestilence 
211 
and disease". At worst its members were labelled 
the only real culprits in the matter.... Let the ratepayers 
... concentrate their indignation on the real offenders, the 
Brisbane Municipal Council, who should have spared them the 
maladorous controversy... and the unpleasant consequences now 
resulting from it. The fact... that the Kelvin Grove Depot was 
a nuisance of which the continuance was becoming yearly more 
intolerable has long been present to the aldermanic mind. But 
what has been done? Nothing, or at most only just so much as 
could not possibly be avoided. The consideration of the question 
has constantly been put off or huddled aside.... Unless the 
ratepayers are overcome by mental paralysis, by the flabbiness 
that is said to be sapping the public life of England, they 
will find some means of awakening the municipal conscience 
on this point, and compelling a decision on some other way 
of dealing with the city refuse than the present disgusting 
and barbarous method. 212 
In the end, it was an act of God which brought the manure depot 
situation to a complete impasse. Very heavy flood rains, "more severe 
213 
than any since 1841", did enormous damage at the Kelvin Grove depot. 
208. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Apr 1886; letter to editor from 
Sanitas. 
209. Ibid., 9 Jul 1886. 
210. Colonial Secretary to Secretary for Public Lands, 28 Sep 1886, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 482, out-letter no.7341 of 1886. On 18 Dec 1885 the 
Premier had told Beattie, "I have already looked for a suitable 
site, but cannot find one". 
211. The Brisbane Courier, 4 May 1886; sub editorial, and Ibid., 
6 May 1886; sub editorial. 
212. Ibid., 10 Jul 1886; sub editorial. 
213. Ibid., 27 Jan 1887; letter to editor from N. Bartley. In another 
place Bartley suggests that the 1841 Brisbane flood was only 
surpassed by that of 1890. N. Bartley, Opals and Agates (Brisbane, 
n.d.), p.259. 
35. 
Parts of the paddock were from two to ten feet under water for days on 
end, the contents of pans were flung into the water, and no dried earth 
214 
was available. The deposits from some sixty or seventy pits and 
trenches, together with a mass of decaying vegetables from the 
neighbouring Chinese gardens were washed away, to be strewn all over the 
creek flats and the nearby allotments. Horses and night-carts were 
hopelessly bogged, sheds and equipment were blown to the ground, 
hundreds of earth closet pans were swept away, and the access road was 
215 
completely eroded and quite impassable. Chaos reigned. 
The Brisbane City Council, driven to hurried consultation by the 
unusual circumstances, held a special meeting to consider various 
2 1 fS 
systems for refuse destruction. The Central Board of Health deplored 
217 
"the great nuisance caused by the recent flooding of the manure depot". 
Brisbane seemed set for another round of animated discussion accompanied 
by masterly inactivity. But one Kelvin Grove resident, George H. 
218 
Buzacott, forced to close his house and leave the place because of 
worse-than-usual abominations following the floods, gave notice through 
his solicitor that he intended to "take such steps as he may be advised 
— — 219 
to compel /the depot'_s/ removal", if a shutdown were not effected 
immediately. Even then, as a penultimate resort, Buzacott waited with 
Robert T. Scott and Major Sanderson Lyster as a deputation on the 
Acting Chief Secretary. James Robert Dickson was sympathetic. 
214. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jan 1887; letter to editor from One who 
is afraid of Typhoid. According to observers the dry earth 
reserve was under six feet of water and two hundred loads of 
dried earth ready for distribution were destroyed. Ibid., 
general reporting. 
215. Ibid., 25 Jan 1887. See also Ibid., 28 Jan 1887; Minutes of 
adjourned meeting of Brisbane City Council, 27 Jan 1887, Ibid., 
1 Feb 1887; letter to editor from Citizen, and Ibid., 7 Mar 1887; 
letter to editor from One of them. 
216. Ibid., 9 Mar 1887; Minutes of special Brisbane City Council meeting, 
8 Mar 1887, and Ibid., 10 Mar 1887. The favoured method was burning 
but all systems are detailed. See also Ibid., 19 Mar 1887. 
217. Ibid., 12 Mar 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 11 Mar 1887. 
218. Buzacott had actively protested previously. Within, p.22. 
219. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Mar 1887. The complete text of the 
letter from Messrs Hart and Flower to the Brisbane council through 
the Booroodabin Divisional Board is given here, together with the 
Brisbane Town Clerk's admonitory reply to Booroodabin in which he 
accuses the board of making a large contribution to the manure 
depot nuisance. 
36. 
As member for Enoggera he might well have been. But he could only 
promise "to take the necessary steps to bring it forcibly before the 
220 
council... that they should take some action". Incredibly, the 
council still delayed 
not prepared at present to adopt any scheme for settling 
the much vexed question. 221 
Goaded beyond endurance, Buzacott took his case to the Supreme 
Court, and on 7 April 1887, an injunction restraining the Brisbane 
Municipal Council from depositing nightsoil at the manure depot, Kelvin 
223 
222 Grove, or within a three mile radius, was granted. The council. 
which learned the dreaded news first in the coliimns of The Observer,' 
had eight days to comply with the ruling. 
For a brief time, Brisbane's twenty-seven ponderous night-carts, 
with their loathsome contents, could be seen trundling over the Victoria 
Bridge bound for paddocks in Woolloongabba. But mercifully for the 
224 
residents of that district, this proved to be a very temporary expedient. 
Another solution was hurriedly found. Brisbane's filth was about to 
225 pollute the river and the bay on a scale as yet undreamt. The long 
nightmare was over for the residents of Kelvin Grove. But the 
carelessness,the foulness and lack of system, had simply been moved 
elsewhere. A new environmental problem had begun. 
220. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Mar 1887. In a letter dictated by 
Dickson, the Under Colonial Secretary directed the council's 
attention to the Courier's report of the deputation, and requested 
that it give immediate thought to establishing depots in 
Yeerongpilly and Redcliffe on land already earmarked but not 
gazetted by the government for this purpose. The full text 
of the letter is given in Ibid., 29 Mar 1887. 
221. Ibid., 31 Mar 1887; main editorial. 
222. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1888, p.67. The three mile radius 
provision was added by the Chief Justice Sir Charles Lilley, in 
order to prevent the use of the paddock commandeered temporarily 
in 1884. Within, p. 25, f.n.l59. 
223. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Apr 1887; Minutes of special meeting of 
Brisbane City Council, 12 Apr 1887. Newspaper columns were used 
to an extraordinary extent in the dissemination of official 
statements at this time - not only for the public's consumption, 
but also apparently, to acquaint various authorities. 
224. "Where are those twenty-seven manure vans bound?" a dismayed 
Councillor Baynes asked the Woolloongabba Divisional Board. 
The Brisbane Courier, 15 Apr 1887. 
225. Ibid., 3 May 1887. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 1887 TO 1900 
The closure of the largest single source of Brisbane's 
environmental pollution, the Enoggera Creek manure depot, did absolutely 
nothing to eliminate basic problems. Indeed, if anything the 
difficulties worsened and the protestations grew more vigorous. As 
The Brisbane Courier declared 
/t/he problem of the disposal of the nightsoil of the 
city in a manner that will offend the susceptibilities 
of no one, and in a place where it cannot be a nuisance 
to someone, is at present impossible of solution. Every 
new scheme proposed, no matter how feasible and simple at 
first sight, brings down a host of wrathful objectors. 1 
This public reaction was inevitable. Still underlying the puzzle 
of what to do with Brisbane's stinking refuse was the colonists' 
stubborn adherence to the miasmatic theory of disease transmission, in 
2 
spite of advancing medical knowledge. The old views were reinforced 
3 
constantly by long and plausible newspaper articles, by the published 
4 
opinions of local medical men, by the Registrar-General's dismal 
figures on the incidence of preventable diseases, and by the evidence 
of their own eyes and noses. 
1. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Dec 1887; main editorial. 
2. There was no excuse for complete ignorance of the advances. See 
for example. The Brisbane Courier, 19 May and 7 Jun 1884; letters 
to editor from J. de Vis, F.R.C.S., Ibid., 5 Jan 1887, an article 
taken from The Times on the occasion of the Queen's jubilee, which 
outlines national gains in morality, in conduct, and above all in 
science. Ibid., 19 Mar 1887, an article "Germs", taken from The 
Daily News, Ibid., 27 Dec 1888, an article "The Germs of Disease", 
taken from The Scotsman, Ibid., 12 Jan 1889; Minutes of Central 
Board of Health, 11 Jan 1889, Ibid., 29 Aug 1889, an article 
"Our Microscopic Foes, Bacteria and Bacilli", taken from Knowledge, 
The Colonist, 11 Feb 1888; sub editorial, and The Queensland Times, 
17 Jan 1889; editorial. 
3. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jan 1887, a long article taken from The 
Times, Ibid., 26 Apr 1888; sub editorial. Ibid., 2 Aug 1888; 
letter to editor from Proteus, Ibid., 12 Sep 1888; sub editorial. 
Ibid., 17 Sep 1888; Minutes of Toowong Progress Association, 
The Colonist, 11 Feb 1888; sub editorial. 
4. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Apr 1887; letter to editor from Richard 
Rendle, Ibid., 30 Apr 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
29 Apr 1887, The Herberton Advertiser, 8 Apr 1887; Minutes of 
Tinaroo Divisional Board, Report of Dr. Bowkett, The Boomerang, 
14 Jan 1888, an article "Sanitation and the Public" by Dr. E. 
Matthews Owens, and Ibid., 18 Feb 1888, an article "The Brisbane 
Water Supply", by Dr. Richard Rendle. 
5. For example, "The Registrar-General's Report - Vital Statistics 
for 1888", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1889), xxxi and xxxiii. 
37. 
38. 
As the river traffic in nightsoil began, another fundamental fear 
provided even greater motivation to oppose the setting up of new "depots" 
f\ 7 
on various Brisbane wharves, or on islands in the river. 
Brisbane City Showing the Sanitary Wharves. 
The council's Market wharf at North Quay was used first for barge 
traffic in nightsoil, but following strident complaints from the 
Supreme Court, this "depot" was closed and the government owned 
Queen's wharf was used. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Dec 1887; sub 
editorial, and general reporting. Ibid 
threatened Supreme Court action. Ibid. 
Brisbane City Council, 13 Dec 1887, and Ibid., 
letter to editor from Richard Philip Adams. 
9 Dec 1887; report on 
14 Dec 1887; Minutes of 
9 Jan 1888; 
The Brisbane Courier, 14 Dec 1887; Minutes of Toombul Divisional 
Board, 13 Dec 1887. Fisherman Islands were referred to here. 
39. 
Q 
Property anywhere near these disease-prone, smell-ridden areas would 
lose value at once, or perhaps become completely unsaleable. This was 
serious - especially when high-priced allotments in the city centre were 
at stake. 
Money, or lack of it, was also basic to the Brisbane City 
Council's attitude to public health improvements, as the Lord Mayor 
reminded the municipality for the umpteenth time late in 1887. For 
example, the council needed all of its persuasive powers to overcome 
ratepayer resistance to the high cleansing rates which were essential 
if satisfactory work were to be perfonned. This was a proviso which 
some cynics felt would forever preclude Queenslanders from acquiring 
12 
"the best sanitary system". And yet another dread haunted all Brisbane 
health authorities at this time - the possibility that an outbreak of 
8, The smell from the council's work on the Queen's wharf was said to 
produce sickness, vomiting and diarrhoea in Richard Adams's 
household. A number of public servants were also struck down with 
fevers of a "choleraic and typhoid nature". Some were of the 
higher echelon who presumably could not be accused of faking the 
symptoms. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Dec 1887; letter to editor 
from Richard Philip Adams, and general reporting. 
9. Ibid., 11 Jun 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 Jun 
1887, letter to board from Mrs.Scott of St. Helens. 
10. Ibid., 14 Dec 1887; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 13 Dec 1887. 
11. Ibid., 23 May 1889. Minutes of special meeting 6f Brisbane City 
Council, 22 May 1889. According to the Courier the rates were 
excessive and the service "fitful". The rates were :-
1 pan emptied once a week 9d. 
Emptied oftener 6d per service. 
Where more than one pan in use 6d per pan per service. 
This was a rise of l%d per week in the basic rate. Ibid., 24 May 
1889, main editorial. As a ratepayer itself, the Brisbane 
Newspaper Company objected to the high sanitary rate on the 
Courier building,and the manner in which the closet services 
were carried out. Minutes of the Proceedings of the Brisbane 
Municipal Council, No.6, 27 May 1889, p.167. 
12. The Maryborough Council's health committee had been watching 
Brisbane's scavenging situation carefully, and by August 1890, a 
spokesman concluded that "the ratepayers would not stand" the 
cost of a duplicate pan service on Brisbane lines. The 
Maryborough Chronicle, 6 Aug 1890; Minutes of Maryborough City 
Council, 5 Aug 1890. See also an Ipswich objection to any new 
expensive scheme. The Queensland Times, 16 Oct 1890; letter to 
editor from Ratepayer. 
40. 
epidemic fevers, "traceable to maladorous shipments", might well prove 
more costly than the expensive preventive measures at which they 
baulked. 
As far as the general public was concerned, added to the now 
well-known grievances forcefully advanced over the years by sufferers 
14 from Brisbane's sanitary system, were the new, if temporary, horrors 
of large loads of "excrement emptied within the flood-tide influence of 
the Brisbane River", from punts "so constructed that it /wa^/ impossible 
to prevent the liquid portion of the filth from making its way into the river 
en route". Even after the government had offered the use of the burial 
1 f\ 
facilities on St. Helena Island, when the steamer Mary replaced the 
punts, neither cleanliness nor efficiency obtained. Conditions on board 
ship were unbelievably bad. At first the pans were stacked on racks in 
the hold, but the unbearable atmosphere led to the prostration of 
17 
employees, two of whom had to leave the contractor's service. Later the 
tins were carried on deck, leading to protests about the sickening 
stench which enveloped the Mary, affecting riverside homes, passengers 
on other ships, and the unfortunate residents of St. Helena and 
18 Dunwich. The problem was exacerbated by a series of engine 
breakdowns which not only caused quite long delays in the clearing of 
19 
closets, but also led to the dumping of the city's nightsoil in 
13. Once again it was a London experience which brought this home very 
forcibly. During 1887, authorities there were faced with a bill of 
^0,000 to quell an epidemic outbreak which might have been 
avoided through the installation of upgraded sanitary facilities. 
The Brisbane Courier, 15 Dec 1887; main editorial. See also Ibid., 
22 Dec 1888; main editorial, in which the current preventable loss 
of life in Brisbane, at the rat^ e of_200 per annum, was said "from 
a brutal money point of view /^ to hej a direct loss of thousands of 
money yearly to the city and the country". 
14. The government granted the Brisbane City Council one month's 
permission to dump nightsoil in the Bay, just inside Moreton 
Island. Ibid., 18 Apr 1887, and Ibid., 9 May 1887; sub editorial. 
15. Ibid., 29 Sep 1887; letter to editor from F. 
16. Within, p.31, f.n.l89. 
17. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Feb 1888. 
18. Ibid., 2 Mar 1889; letter to editor from Viator. Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith mentioned the matter in parliament during the 1889 
health act amendment bill debate. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
LVII (1889), 377. 
19. For some strange reason Captain William Collin "could not engage 
another vessel to take Mary's place temporarily"! The Brisbane 
Courier, 16 Feb 1888. 
No. 2. Moreton Bay and Islands. 
41. 
20 
waters much closer to home than was normal. The Brisbane River, whose 
purity had caused such concern to the first Central Board of Health and 
other stalwarts in succeeding years, was "thus contaminated, polluted, 
— — 21 
/and/ corrupted". 
And there was no end to the evils for the community as a whole. 
Night-carts which missed the boat stood in the road throughout the 
22 following day with their nauseating, leaking freight, a practice known 
23 to and condoned by the municipality's nuisance inspector. The 
corporation's Spring Hill swimming baths, and those of the South 
24 
Brisbane council, which were looked upon as an essential - "an 
25 
absolute necessity for preserving health and vigour in a hot climate" 
20. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Feb 1888. The government hopper barge 
was pressed into service and the contents of pans were emptied off 
Mud Island. This greatly endangered the fore-shores of nearby 
watering places and health resorts. The Sandgate authorities had 
already alerted the government to the dangers of jetsam 
polluting the beach at Sandgate. Town Clerk, Sandgate to 
Colonial Secretary, 8 Feb 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 460, in-letter no.1047 
of 1886. The Courier had also warned of this possibility much 
earlier. Ibid., 5 Dec 1884; sub editorial, and occasional letters 
to the press and articles kept the matter before the public. 
Ibid., 18 Apr 1887, and Ibid., 20 Apr 1887; letter to editor from 
Ozone. Queenslanders had also heard of the destruction of the 
Yarra River in Melbourne and the pretty bays of Sydney Harbour, 
because of the drainage and sewerage systems used in the southern 
capitals. Ibid., 24 May 1886; sub editorial. For a short 
contemporary piece on the need to intercept Sydney's sewage to 
prevent fore-shore damage, see J.M. Small, "Sanitary Engineering 
and Public Health", Minutes of Proceedings of the Engineering 
Association of New South Wales, Vol. V, 1889-1890, pp.121-122 and 
124. For a description of Melbourne's manure depots and early 
water carriage arrangements see B. Barrett, The Inner Suburbs 
(Melbourne, 1971), pp.75-86 and 126-37. 
21. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Sep 1887; letter to editor from F. The 
produce of the river, especially the fish and the oysters, was 
also of great concern to this correspondent. 
22. Ibid., 1 Feb 1888; letter to editor from Richard Philip Adams. 
23. Ibid. On receipt of Adams's letter The Brisbane Courier made 
enquiries and elicited this reply. 
24. The public baths were equipped with hot and cold washing 
facilities. For a comment on the necessity for public bathing 
facilities see The Maryborough Chronicle, 13 Oct 1884; letter to 
editor from Joseph H. Ward, M.D. 
25. The Bowen Observer, 26 Nov 1889; sub editorial, and Ibid., 21 Jan 
1890; editorial. See also Dr. E. Matthews Owens's signed article 
in The Boomerang, 14 Jan 1888, in which he extols the provision 
of steam baths and plenty of soap in factories and mines, and 
calls for the erection of public baths and wash-houses throughout 
Queensland. 
x / 
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42. 
- were transmogrified into a public menace. For the baths pumping 
station was located but a short distance downstream from the "disease 
disseminating factory" of the nightsoil depot wharf. Similar dangers 
attended the use of supplies from the polluted stream for the watering 
of the city streets. 
But the main problem was that the Brisbane system itself remained 
27 
unchanged. A substantial number of Queensland obervers might be 
sufficiently impressed with Adelaide's deep drainage and sewage farm 
arrangements to hint strongly that Brisbane could do worse than follow 
28 South Australia's lead; the Central Board of Health might have 
29 
"committed itself to cremation and not the burying process". But the 
Brisbane City Council was apparently determined to avoid the expense of 
either system while any possibility of retaining the tried - although 
26. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Sep 1887; letter to editor from F., and 
Ibid., a main editorial which enlarges on "F's" letter. Street 
watering and the sluicing of drains was considered essential to 
Brisbane's well-being, but citizens feared the risky water supply, 
and the carelessness with which the watering was done. Ibid., 
5 Jan 1888, and Ibid., 29 Feb 1888; letter to editor from 
Ratepayer. 
27. One of the evils most often complained of was the method of 
deodorizing the nightsoil. The lucky householder received a 
"moiety" of dried earth, and often this was damp - sometimes wet. 
As a result the stench from Brisbane's closets was "unbearable". 
A large number of letters were sent to the press on this subject 
of which a small sample is given here. Ibid., 9 May 1887; letter 
to editor from Alex M'Lean, Ibid., 5 Jan 1888; letter to editor 
from Ratepayer, Ibid., 7 Jan 1888; letter to editor from Joseph 
Fletcher, F.C.S., F.I.C., M.R.I.A., Ibid., 19 Jan 1888; letter 
to editor from Ann Street, Ibid., 8 Feb 1888; letter to editor 
from S. Pole, Ibid., 10 Feb 1888; letter to editor from Caustic, 
Ibid., 20 Mar 1888; letter to editor from W.H. Chambers, Ibid., 
23 Mar 1888; letter to editor from H., and Ibid., 22 May 1888; 
letter to editor from J.B. 
28. The Queensland Figaro, 7 May 1887; sub editorial. For good 
examples of the considerable interest in Adelaide developments, 
see The Brisbane Courier, 21 Mar 1888, a long article taken from 
the Melbourne Argus on Adelaide's improvements, and subsequently 
reduced death rate. Ibid., 6 Dec 1888; main editorial, for a 
similar article, and Ibid., 16 Feb 1889, long article taken from 
The Queenslander, largely on Adelaide's successful sewage farm 
system. 
29. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Apr 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 29 Apr 1887. 
43. 
30 
unsavoury and untrusted - methods remained. Few voices were raised 
against the St. Helena proposal, which was made in compensation 
for the government's refusal to reserve the council's first choice, 
31 Gibson Island. The Brisbane Courier did wonder if the government 
had contemplated the possibility of mutiny. 
No work is so distasteful to the average prisoner as having 
to carry away his own slops, and there would certainly be a 
rebellious objection to acting as scavengers of the lowest 
order in spreading the nightsoil of Brisbane over the sandy 
peninsula and covering it out of sight. 32 
The Courier was also reluctant to countenance the use of the island, 
because the comings and goings involved would remove "the single 
advantage which St. Helena possesses as a penal establishment, namely 
its isolation".33 
The Queensland Figaro could only agree that "an unsavoury 
difficulty" should not be even temporarily settled "at the expense of 
the security and exclusiveness of the prison system of the colony". 
But the Figaro's editor was much more worried about another aspect. 
30. Attempts were made to inaugurate the railway carriage of Brisbane's 
nightsoil to a reserve where it could be incinerated or put to 
use on farms. The Pine River was proposed. Residents along the 
railway line protested to the minister at once. The Brisbane 
Courier, 4 Feb 1888, Ibid., 17 Mar 1888; letter to editor from 
R.J. Cottell, Ibid., 20 Mar 1888; letter to editor from Richard 
Rendle, and Ibid., 26 May 1888. Premier Mcllwraith and Minister 
for Railways Nelson were sympathetic, Mcllwraith feeling that 
railway carriage was "a filthy idea". Ibid., 16 Oct 1888. The 
matter of the Pine River area was resolved when the government 
refused the council the deeds of the land. Ibid., 27 Nov 1888; 
Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 26 Nov 1888. Letter from 
Under Secretary for Lands to Mayor printed in full, but the 
question of rail carriage was still a matter for public 
discussion. Ibid., 27 Mar 1889; Deputation to Brisbane City 
Council, 26 Mar 1889, and Ibid., 11 Jun 1889; main editorial. 
Some medical men strongly opposed the idea. Ibid., 1 Apr 1889; 
letter to editor from M.R.C.S., (London). 
31. Ibid., 9 Jan 1888; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 8 Jan 1888. 
Letter to Under Secretary for Lands regretting Gibson Island 
and accepting St. Helena, printed in full. 
32. Ibid., 15 Dec 1887; main editorial. 
33. Ibid. 
44. 
I should like to hear from Dr. Wray what he thinks about this 
manure disposal from a sanitary point of view. I suppose 
even the sternest flagellator of the criminal will admit that 
the healths of its prisoners are among a government's sacred 
charges. Here are several hundreds of men herded together in 
close confinement. They are to be subjected to all the 
malarial gases and noxious vapours inseparable from the transit 
and disposal of nightsoil - inseparable, I mean, if the work 
is carried on in the same manner as hitherto, for has not 
typhoid followed the nightsoil nuisance to its every halting 
stage?... And typhoid does not only select convicted prisoners, 
but cares not tuppence for warders, visiting magistrates, or 
even visiting members of government.... This solution of the 
nightsoil problem is both injudicious and recklessly cruel. 
We want to punish our prisoners and reform them if possible; 
but we don't want to poison them off with typhoid. 34 
In fact, the actual work of disposal was undertaken by "corporation 
labourers", but it was not long before the sober tones of the 
superintendent at St. Helena were echoing the Figaro's sentiments. In 
his 1887 report, W.M. Townley admitted that 
so far... this arrangement has been unattended with any 
serious or untoward results, yet the dangerous probability 
exists of infectious diseases being disseminated amongst the 
prisoners and free people resident here. 35 
Moreover, the prison system suffered the drawbacks of "the constant 
influx of strangers by the 'Mary'", the blocking of the island's 
tramway with nightsoil trollies, and the disruption of prisoners' work, 
as officials attempted to prevent unauthorized outside contacts. 
One year later, the new superintendent, C. Pennefather, was still 
concerned with the prisoners' trafficking with the city workmen, and 
with the security of the Mary. Both irregularities caused staff 
problems, with the imposition of extra, irksome guard duties. 
Pennefather also bemoaned the encroachment of the nauseating depot on 
the island's already limited agricultural land. But he was most alarmed 
about the stench arising from the nightsoil trenches, and the clouds of 
37 flies which had invaded the island as never before. He ascribed 
34. The Queensland Figaro, 31 Dec 1887. 
35. "Penal Establishment, St. Helena, Superintendent's Report for 
1887", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1888), 
920. 
36. Ibid. 
37. In recognising the danger of flies, "and the idea that they came 
from the corporation trenches", Pennefather was being very astute. 
General realization of the fly menace came considerably later. 
See for example. Within, p.123. 
45. 
a good deal of the sickness which has prevailed during the 
year, especially during the summer months,... to the 
disgusting system pursued in the disposal of nightsoil on 
this island. 38 
If Pennefather was justifiably anxious, the Brisbane authorities 
were not very happy about the St. Helena arrangements either. Richard 
Southall, who became Mayor of Brisbane for the first and only time in 
1888, was very critical, attributing the badly cleaned closet pans and 
other inefficiencies, to the restrictions enforced on the contractor 
39 
and his employees by prison regulations. But once again it appears 
that the city council itself had been remiss in failing to insist on 
the proper carrying out of procedures by their contractors, Dobbyn 
and Company. Dr. Hill Wray, on examining the place at the request of 
the Colonial Secretary, found that the stuff was being buried in far 
too shallow trenches, and that leaking pans were "seriously injurious 
to the health of the prisoners". His findings were confirmed by "a 
gentleman" whose curious hobby seems to have been taking the 
"opportunity to watch the /St. Helena/ process for hours at a stretch". 
He reported that the condition of the Mary and the disgustingly slovenly 
manner of dealing with the nightsoil was a disgrace not only to the 
corporation of Brisbane, but to all concerned. The contents of pans 
were not deodorized with dry earth, the essence of the earth closet 
system, and the long primitive process of landing the foul, leaking 
pans was potentially dangerous to the health of everyone on the island. 
The decking of the jetty, the trucks^ , and the clothes 
and hands of the men employed /were/ liberally 
bespattered with liquid filth, while the disgusting 
effluvia given forth poisons the atmosphere all 
around. 
The route to the trenches, a mile distant, was clearly visible 
from the overflow from the pans. Some three hundred people - prisoners, 
warders and their families, and other officials - were forced to live 
on this island. They were condemned to "a constant purgatory of 
38. "Penal Establishment, St. Helena, Superintendent's Report for 
1888", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1889), 
1162. 
39. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Feb 1888. 
40. Ibid., 16 Mar 1888. Perhaps it was his too frequent contact 
with manure depots which led Hill Wray to proffer his resignation 
as secretary to the Central Board of Health shortly after. He 
wanted to stand aside "for someone more enthusiastic in the 
matter of sanitary science". C.J. Hill Wray to Chief Secretary, 
13 May 1888, Q.S.A. COL/A 233, in-letter no.5114 of 1888. 
tainted atmosphere". 
46. 
41 
By early 1889, the inconvenience and danger of conveying nightsoil 
to St. Helena was clearly apparent. The most convenient alternative, 
a depot on Gibson Island, was granted to the Brisbane council by the 
42 government of the day. But once again the protesters prevailed, 
after "the largest and most influential /deputation/ that had ever 
waited on the mayor of the city" came to complain about the proposal. 
Members of the group protested about everything from the destruction 
of the beautiful river, which was the highway in and out of the colony, 
to the possible injury to the trade and commerce of Brisbane, and the 
loss of property values. One very telling argument was the 
indisputable fact that Gibson Island had been completely inundated with 
floods four times in twenty years. A disastrous feature, as far as the 
projected manure depot was concerned, was that no hole of more than 
eighteen inches deep could be sunk, without striking water. The 
Brisbane Courier added another objection. Life in Brisbane's hot, 
narrow streets was only bearable thanks to sea breezes. 
The breeze from the ocean naturally 
follows the course of the river.... Each waft 
of wind must therefore sweep over Gibson's 
Island, and will henceforth... circle 
about us heavily with odours.... Nay it 
may precipitate an invisible and unfelt, 
but not less deadly rain of 
typhoidal microbes. 44 
In the face of this trenchant opposition the Brisbane City Council 
abandoned Gibson Island, and requested the continued use of the 
41. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Sep 1888. See also Ibid., 25 Sep 1888; 
sub editorial, and Ibid., 4 Feb 1889, for the Courier's 
comments on St. Helena. 
42. Ibid., 21 Mar 1889; main editorial. The council was very 
anxious to secure Gibson Island. To this end members met 
Mcllwraith and Morehead in deputation, inspected the island 
with Dr. Joseph Bancroft, and discussed the question at 
length at various council meetings. See for example. Ibid., 
20 Mar 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 19 Mar 1889, and 
general reporting on the deputation. Ibid., 2 Apr 1889; Minutes 
of Brisbane City Council, 1 Apr 1889, Ibid., 12 Apr 1889; 
Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 11 Apr 1889, and Ibid., 30 
Apr 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 29 Apr 1889. 
43. Ibid., 27 Mar 1889. The deputation included John Buckland, 
member for Bulimba, Michael Cannon, candidate for Toombul 
(returned 10 May 1888) prominent businessman Tom Finney, 
J.D. Campbell, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and a 
Mr. Dickson from the Toombul Shire Council. 
44. Ibid., 21 Mar 1889; main editorial. 
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47. 
St. Helena depot. In the meantime, the council toyed with ideas 
which, if they had been pursued, would have altered Brisbane's disposal 
plans very drastically indeed. But the Brisbane authorities had not 
yet given up seafaring for good. If all else failed, the council now 
proposed dumping Brisbane's closet refuse in the Pacific Ocean, in 
deep water not less than five miles outside Cape Moreton. 
In this they had the support of the Chief Secretary, Boyd Dunlop 
48 Morehead who, careless of the eventual effects of pollution, "was 
— — 49 
bold enough to say that /the counciJ_/ 'had the whole ocean before them'". 
In fact, this was far from true if the poor inadequate Mary continued 
in use. Shipping authorities warned that in rough weather the high seas 
would sweep the vessel's decks, with unfortunate results for the 
serried ranks of closet pans nestling there. Moreover, the extra 
strain on the Mary would have an increasingly deleterious effect on 
Brisbane's cleaning service. Even a faster, more powerful boat would 
find the long haul to the ocean and back a hard day's work, though the 
main difficulty there would be the prohibitive purchase price of such 
a craft. 
By June 1889, the Brisbane sanitary situation had reached another 
crisis point. The Brisbane press had begun a concerted attack on the 
45. The Brisbane Courier, 14 May 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 13 May 1889. In response to a complaint from St. Helena, 
the council agreed to station a corporation employee on the island 
to oversee and direct all nightsoil disposals. Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Brisbane Municipal Council, No.6, 10 Jun 1889, 
p.178. In October 1889 the Central Board of Health was still 
trying to assess the extent of the council's negligence on 
St. Helena. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
8 Oct 1889, Q.S.A. COL/A 593, in-letter no.8853 of 1889. 
46. The Brisbane Courier, 28 May 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
27 May 1889. A letter about nightsoil destruction by fire to 
E. Parr Smith, Chairman of the Eureka Contracting Company is 
printed in full. 
47. Ibid., 11 Jun 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 10 Jun 1889, 
Resolution of Committee of the Whole. 
48. The Brisbane Courier and some of its readers, were only too well 
aware of pollution dangers. See for example, Ibid., 31 May 1889; 
sub editorial. 
49. Ibid., 11 Jun 1889; main editorial. See also Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 374. 
50. Morehead's answer to bad weather problems was to dump the stuff 
in the South Passage. 
51. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jun 1889; main editorial. 
52. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 375. It was 
estimated that such boats would cost £8,000 each. 
48. 
municipal authorities in an attempt to have the capital's nightsoil 
problems eradicated for good. The Boomerang published caustic cartoon 
comment, and warned all authorities concerned with health matters that 
/a/t last Public Opinion, the great motive power in our 
modern civilisation, has spoken and demands some change, 
the present system must at least be amended if not 
abolished. 53 
Other papers harped on the crippling inefficiency of the Brisbane 
54 
council, the futile attempts to work the earth closet system without 
earth, and the projected council plan which "deliberately provides 
for the pollution of our Bay for a considerable number of days in the 
year". Even the colony's parliamentary representatives were drawn 
into the general condemnation of "the present extremely offensive 
arrangements", which had worried the government very much in the past, 
57 
and would worry it a good deal more in the future. 
To a considerable degree, the acrimonious debate which followed 
Sir Samuel Griffith's introduction of this touchy subject during the 
motion for adjournment, followed predictable lines. Premier Morehead 
58 
continued to oppose railway carriage, and defended his ocean solution 
vigorously. At the same time, he attacked the corporation of Brisbane 
which, he said, was "perfectly incompetent to manage their own affairs", 
and which had burdened the government quite unfairly with the task of 
59 finding a solution to a purely municipal problem. John McMaster, 
member for Fortitude Valley, Brisbane city councillor, and sometime 
Mayor of Brisbane, admitted only the council's lamentable record 
in dealing with the earth closet system, but suggested "that they 
/were/ driven to that incompetency by the action of the Government". 
53. The Boomerang, 15 Jun 1889; "The Sanitary Question" by 
Dr. F.G. Connolly. 
54. The Colonist, 27 Apr 1889; sub editorial. 
55. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jun 1889; letter to editor from 
B.T. Gartside. 
56. Ibid., 26 Jun 1889; sub editorial. 
57. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 373, 26 Jun 1889. 
58. As The Brisbane Courier pointed out, Morehead's objection was 
personal. He lived at Bowen Hills near the line which had been 
proposed for nightsoil carriage. Ibid., 28 Jun 1889; sub 
editorial. 
59. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 374. 
60. McMaster had been Mayor in 1884, and was to take office in the 
years 1890, 1893, 1897, and 1918. 
« 
JOHtl^MASTER, M.L.A,, MAYOR OF BRISBANE. 
No. 5. The Judge , 21 June , 1890. 
49. 
He claimed, in picturesque language, that the council had done its 
utmost to solve this vexed question, but 
/w/e are placed in the position of the doves in Noah's ark 
when they were sent to look for dry ground. We have been 
sent all round the compass looking for a place for the 
disposal of nightsoil, but on every occasion, as soon as 
the council decide on a place, a deputation waits on the 
Government... and the Government accede to /the petitioner's/ 
request.... /I/t is the duty of the Government to assist tFe 
municipal council or any other town in the colony by providing 
a place to deposit the nightsoil. We are met on every 
hand by local authorities outside the municipality, and we 
have no jurisdiction beyond our own boundaries. 61 
McMaster had raised two very important points in his speech. 
Local jealousies had put difficulties in the way of progress throughout 
the whole history of public health in Queensland, and on this occasion 
there were not lacking those who rose to point out "that respect will 
have to be extended to other places besides Brisbane". 
The other matter was even more difficult to resolve. One of the 
more troublesome aspects of the manure depot disputes had been the 
resistance of neighbouring local authorities to the dumping of Brisbane 
refuse within their boundaries, or to the use of public roads within 
their areas for the carriage of the foul stuff. Thomas Mcllwraith 
reminded his colleagues of the fairly recent legislation which had 
strengthened local authority hands, while at the same time, he made 
a devastating attack on the Brisbane council's administration of 
sanitary affairs, and on the dry earth closet system, itself. 
The colony has just come under a new system.. . . under which 
very great powers were given to local authorities. We 
found... we were actually precluded in every possible way 
from getting beyond our boundaries by the powers we ourselves 
gave to local authorities. But I think the remedy is in our 
own hands.... I am perfectly satisfied that the House will 
listen to a well-digested scheme by which the sewage of the 
town is taken outside and deposited on the ground of any local 
authority, whether they object or not.... I hope the Brisbane 
council will not dirty their hands with the matter in the 
way they are now doing. I know of no city that has ever been 
61. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 374. 
62. Ibid. , pp. 376-77. Horace Tozer (Wide Bay) and '.Villiam Groom 
(Drayton and Toowoomba) were quick to suggest that any scheme 
adopted for Brisbane "will have to be made applicable to other 
towns besides Brisbane". 
63. See for example. Within, p.21. 
64. He refers here to the Local Government Act Amendment Act of 
1886 and the Divisional Boards Act of 1887. 
50. 
served on the same system that Brisbane is. I do not believe 
one exists. Theoretically the process is right enough, but 
in practice it is a huge failure.... It is all nonsense to 
say that the sewage can be taken out by carts or boats, by the 
river or on the railway, without being a nuisance. I am 
introducing to-day the Brisbane Water Scheme, and that is the 
very soluti^ on of the question vve are talking of at the present 
time.... /Water-borne sewerage/ is the only solution, and now 
that the town has grown so large, I do not see how they can 
put the question off any longer. 65 
In the meantime, Mcllwraith advised the city to get rid of the sewage 
in the best way it could. 
No radically new, readily available, and economically feasible 
suggestion had come out of the debate. But as far as Samuel Griffith 
was concerned, the real source of the difficulty had been laid bare. 
Everyone must now see that no scheme could work, because the laws 
themselves were defective. Griffith summed up his view of the colony's 
needs. There should be a general law, by which a local authority could 
secure land anywhere, for the purpose of nightsoil disposal. Troublesome 
interference by the Supreme Court should be eliminated, and no 
injunctions should be permitted except at the instance of the government. 
No private person should be allowed to proceed against a local 
authority for the removal of any nuisance. Taking a line which was 
becoming increasingly popular with politicians and the press - that 
"the liberty of the subject... must be regulated by the regard for the 
A7 
public good" - Griffith concluded that it is better that any 
unpleasantness 
should be a nuisance to one man than an intolerable 
nuisance to 10,000 people. At present a person by trying 
to prevent what is a nuisance to himself may cause a much 
greater one to his neighbours, and that ought not to be 
so. 68 
The press campaign and the parliamentary debate led to a great 
deal of correspondence to the newspapers. Readers offered ideas on 
69 island sites for future manure depots, advice on the actual handling 
of nightsoil, suggestions as to the addition of deodorants other than 
65. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 376. My italics. 
66. Ibid. 
67. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Feb 1888; main editorial, quoted from 
the Sydney Morning Herald. 
68. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 377. 
69. Bribie was the unfortunate choice of one correspondent. The 
Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1889; letter to editor from Pro Bono 
Publico. 
51, 
dried earth, and anguished protests against the Mcllwraith proposal 
70 
for "the dilution and spreading of the noxious excreta by water". 
Even more importantly, this public interest was sustained as 
Premier Boyd Morehead introduced a health act amendment bill to 
71 parliament on 12 July 1889. The bill dealt directly with Brisbane's 
nightsoil disposal problems. It gave the medical members of the upper 
house an excellent opportunity to air their views on the poor 
performance of the Brisbane council, which had delivered "dirty, old, 
battered pans covered with ejecta, and containing typhoid and 
diphtheritic germs", instead of the clean, round pans with airtight 
72 lids which should have been supplied. Both honorable members, 
W.F. Taylor, M.D. and C.F. Marks, M.D. suggested that the best mode of 
disposal was destruction by fire. They quoted the English experience, 
where in inner city Manchester crematory works were carried on without 
offence, and strongly opposed the "absolutely unnecessary" bill. If it 
were passed, it would grant local authorities "absolute control over 
/sanitary affair^/ and the government /would/ have no right to 
— — 73 
interfere.... There /would/ be no attempt at cleanliness". 
There was far less resistance in the lower house where the bill 
w< 
75 
74 
was greeted as "a very short... really good one". The main fears ere 
for the erosion of citizens' rights of access to the Supreme Court, 
and the possibility that the bill 
70. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1889; letter to editor from Dr. Joseph 
Bancroft. Other examples are. Ibid., 6 Jul 1889; letter to editor 
from Dr. Hugh Bell, Ibid., 10 Jul 1889; letter to editor from 
Edwin Alt of Shone and Alt, Civil Engineers, London, Ibid., 13 Jul 
1889; letter to editor from Farmer, Ibid., 19 Jul 1889; letter to 
editor from W., Ibid., 20 Jul 1889; letter to editor from J.S., 
and Ibid., 22 Jul 1889; letter to editor from R.S. Warry. Warry 
had been a Brisbane alderman for many years, and had been Mayor 
of the city in 1866. 
71. Morehead introduced the bill, but newspapers gave the credit to the 
leader of the opposition, Samuel Griffith. The Brisbane Courier, 
28 Jul 1889; sub editorial. What the press and even most members 
of the parliament did not realize was that Griffith had actually 
initiated and drafted the amendment bill. There was little 
opposition to the measure except on the grounds of Griffith's 
overgreat involvement. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII 
(1889), 657 and 679-80. 
72. Ibid., LVI (1889), 106. 
73. Ibid., pp.89-91. 
74. Ibid., LVII (1889), 656. View of William Stephens, Woolloongabba. 
75. Ibid., p.682. View of James Drake, Enoggera. 
52. 
would give rise to endless trouble /should^ / a local 
authority select a site for the deposition of nightsoil... 
on land which drained into a running stream from which a 
community lower down might draw its water supply. 76 
Members were almost evenly divided on the rival claims of rail or ship 
77 
conveyance, and although there was a certain amount of support for 
78 
sewage farm arrangements on South Australian lines, the old bugbear of 
costs prevented any serious consideration of that scheme. Clauses in the 
bill did open the way for the acceptance of the "burning and desiccating" 
methods, and there seems to have been a general feeling that "sooner or 
later it would be found necessary to cremate rather than bury nightsoil' 
But while the bill was before the upper house for a review of 
amendments, the Brisbane City Council acted. Claiming to be sick of 
"going cap in hand to the government", it accepted the Brisbane Sanitary 
Com.pany's tender for the carriage of the city's nightsoil to Moreton 
Bay 
for the term of five years from 1st January next, /_1890/ 
for the sum of ^ 17,500 per annum for all ratable and 
corporation properties, and 4-1,000 per annum for 
government properties. 80 
This tender v;as subject to government agreement as to the 
amount /_it would./ be called upon to pay for services, /^ and./ 
more especially in regard to the place of deposit, which might 
possibly be considered to come under the second section of 
the Health Act of 1884 Amendment Act of 1889 now before 
parliament. 81 
An irate Samuel Griffith, armed with his Brisbane Courier, once 
again elevated the "disposal of nightsoil" to the level of a motion 
82 for adjournment debate. Griffith acquainted the house with the sneaky 
76- Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVII (1889), 682. View of 
Arthur Morgan, Warwick. 
77. Ibid., p.683. 
78. The debate revealed that members had "made themselves acquainted" 
with various schemes in the southern colonies and in Europe. 
Ibid., pp.682-85. 
79. Ibid., p.685. 
80. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Aug 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
5 Aug 1889. The council proposed setting up "a depot right under 
the Victoria Bridge, which is a main artery of traffic to and from 
both sides_of the river,... right_ in front of the new public 
offices" /the Treasury Building^/. Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, TVIII (1889), 974. 
81. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Aug 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
5 Aug 1889. The recommendation also appears in full in 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVIII (1889), 974. 
82. Ibid., p.972. 
79 
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behaviour of the Brisbane City Council, whose hastily-accepted, long-
term contract was an evasive tactic designed to side-step a bill 
8 '^  
momentarily expected to become law. He urged the government to end 
the pollution of the Bay and the "wicked waste of a large quantity of 
earth, besides other valuable ingredients which are to be thrown into 
;in^  
85 
the sea", by refusi g permission for the use of the Queen's wharf as 
a place of shipment, 
Griffith had little satisfaction from the government on this score. 
The Mayor of the city had already intimated to the Premier that the 
Rf\ 
corporation "had to deal with the matter as they thought best", an 
attitude defended by Mcllwraith who considered that the council had 
"been in leading strings too long already.... and that the Government 
/had^/ no business to interfere". The leader of the opposition, whose 
surprise at the council's "inexplicable", "remarkable" resolution was 
88 
shared by The Brisbane Courier, did see his amendment bill passed with 
"a unanimity which might well convince the council of the sympathy of 
89 
our legislators". The Act was very close to the original Griffith 
draft, though the right of any person 
83. The bill was expected to return to the Assembly for the passage 
that morning, 6 August 1889. 
84. This attitude was quite prevalent in the community, farmers in 
particular regretting sea disposal for this reason in spite of 
the claims of cynics that the stuff was valueless. "Nightsoil 
deodorised and dessicated... is of little value as a manure". 
The Brisbane Courier, 11 May 1887; letter to editor from Hygiene. 
For some examples of dismay at the destruction and waste of the 
stuff see. Ibid., 11 May 1887; Minutes of Local Authorities' 
Sanitary Conference, 10 May 1887, Ibid., 6 Oct 1887; letter to 
editor from J.F.M., Ibid., 31 May 1889; letter to editor from 
X.Y.Z., and Ibid., 18 Dec 1889; main editorial. 
85. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVIII (1889),'973. The 
arrangement was to terminate at the end of 1889, and the 
government did not intend to extend the period. Ibid. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid. This of course tied in with Mcllwraith's general anti-
centralist feelings. He also pointed out that Griffith's 
present suggestion was "distinctly contrary" to his own action. 
"He now rises to something like enthusiasm over the matter, but 
when he was Premier, and had power to do what he urges the 
Government to do, what action did he take? Absolutely none". 
88. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Aug 1889; sub editorial. 
89. Ibid. 
54. 
to claim and recover compensation from any Local Authority 
in respect of any actual damages sustained by him by reason 
of any nuisance 
, 90 
was preserved. 
The Assembly was now fully involved in the nightsoil business. As 
well as passing the Act, it decided to appoint a select committee with 
wide powers 
to enquire into any sanitary contracts that have been made 
with the municipal authorities of North and South Brisbane 
during the last five years. 91 
The committee quickly uncovered a Gilbertian situation. The august 
Brisbane City Council had entered into a five year contract with a 
92 
company which, at that stage, was still only "provisional". Further 
93 
confusion followed as one key witness, George Dobbyn, first of all 
flatly refused to appear before the committee, and later, when attending 
94 
with his solicitor and a barrister-at-law, declined to produce vital 
documents, or to answer up to fifty questions put to him by the 
95 
committee. 
The witness problem was brought before parliament as a matter of 
privilege. In a very lengthy and acidulous debate, members of the 
government chose to defend Dobbyn, regretting the committee's attempts 
96 to convert the parliament of Queensland into a Star Chamber. 
90. An Act to Facilitate the Exercise by Local Authorities of certain 
Powers under "The Health Act of 1884",Clause 5. Queensland 
Government Gazette, XLVII (1889), 1497-8. My italics. One of 
the main problems which legislators hoped to settle with this Act 
was the public's tendency to "imagine a nuisance when there is 
actually no nuisance existing". Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
LVII (1889), 656. 
91. Ibid., LVIII (1889), 1039. 
92. "Progress Report from the Select Committee on Sanitary Contracts 
with Municipal Authorities of North and South Brisbane", Votes 
and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1889), 895-97, and 
"Final Report", in Ibid., p.920. 
93. George was the under age son of William Dobbyn whose company had 
held the Brisbane sanitary contracts from 1 July 1886 to 30 June 
1889. At the time of the committee's sitting William was visiting 
Great Britain. The lad had been left in charge of his father's 
business, and had been duly constituted legal attorney.Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LVIII (1889), 1862 and 1865-6. 
94. At the hearing Dobbyn was instructed by his firm's legal adviser, 
Thynne and Goertz, Solicitors. A.J. Thynne was Minister for 
Justice at this time. 
95. Ibid., pp.1858-59 and 1865. 
96. Ibid., pp.1866-67. 
55, 
They deplored a tendency to persecute the lad, in spite of the 
"notorious rumours" which were rife in Brisbane, and the fears that 
Dobbyn senior might have engaged in "serious wrongs", if not a 
definite "swindle", against the Brisbane City Council by failing to 
97 
carry out his contract properly. Indeed, the continued insanitation 
of the capital and Dobbyn's contribution to that unfortunate state, 
caused several members to introduce unsavoury irrelevancies to the 
debate, necessitating a warning to the house that it "had better confine 
— qg 
/itself^ / to the question of privilege". 
The government managed to stifle the privilege debate by "putting 
^ 99 
on the cloture", but they were unable to check newspaper comment or 
public interest. Nor could they withhold the select committee's 
final report, though Dobbyn's continued refusal to answer questions made K -^ 101 It an abortive one. 
The report contained little that the people of Brisbane did not 
already know only too well - that many fully justified complaints had 
been made as to the manner in which the contract had been performed, 
102 
or not performed, as the case might be. The report also skirted 
around some things which the citizens had only guessed, and because of 
Dobbyn's reticence could still not confirm - that some council and 
parliamentary members had had rather closer relations with Mr. William 
97. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVIII (1889), 1858 and 1864. 
98. Ibid., pp.1864-65 and 1873. 
99. Ibid., p.1873. As the Speaker explained to William Smyth, 
Gympie, "it is a form of the House usually adopted when it is 
desired to put an end to the debate without deciding the question 
one way or the other". 
100. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Sep 1889; sub editorial, Ibid., 1 Oct 
1889; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 30 Sep 1889, Ibid., 
2 Oct 1889; sub editorial, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVIII 
(1889), 1866, for a comment on a public meeting held on the 
subject of the contracts at the Brisbane town hall, and Pugh's 
Queensland Almanac, 1890, p.73, for an item on the same matter. 
101. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LIX (1889), 2053, and "Sanitary 
Contracts with the Municipal Authorities of North and South 
Brisbane. Final Report.", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, III (1889), 906. 
102. Ibid., pp.911-12. 
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103 
The full specifications of the new five year contract, which were 
included in the report, did reveal the dangers to Moreton Bay and the 
104 Pacific Ocean. But they also laid down the conditions that far 
more "proper and suitable carts and vans" should shortly be transporting 
Brisbane's nightsoil, and that the Central Board of Health's repeated 
request for round, sealed pans was soon to be met. But in a year when 
cases of typhoid were quite extensive, and were traced by many medical 
107 
men to "the odorous and primitive night-cart system"; at a time when 
the Brisbane water police and other witnesses allegedly saw Dobbyn and 
Company workmen breaking their contract by emptying nightsoil into the 
103. George Dobbyn acknowledged legitimate business dealings with 
John McMaster (ex-mayor and parliamentarian) and R.S. Warry 
(ex-mayor), but denied having drawn cheques as bribes for members 
or officers of the corporation or their families. Ibid. 
Subsequent withholding of a Brisbane City Council letter to 
A.H. Barlow, chairman of the select committee, seemed to John 
McMaster to indicate that some council members had "something 
dark behind the scenes" to hide. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Oct 
1889. See also Ibid., 17 Oct 1889; sub editorial, for the 
Courier's comment on the apparently underhand affair, in which 
the editor refers to McMaster as "the watch-dog of the council", 
and Ibid.; letter to editor from R.S. Warry, Ex Alderman, 
offering to open all of his books for inspection. For comment 
from the provincial centres see The Queensland Times, 17 Oct 1889; 
editorial, and The Colonist, 2 Nov 1889; sub editorial. 
104. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1889), 915-16. 
In part this was because two strong, fast, large steam boats were 
to be employed in the ocean dumping services in place of the 
Mary. 
105. Ibid., p.916. See also Within, p.51. 
106. "Registrar-General's Report for 1890 - Vital Statistics", Votes 
and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1890), 235. See 
also The Colonist, 28 Sep 1889; main editorial. The Brisbane 
Courier, 10 Oct 1889, The Queensland Times, 26 Oct 1889, Ibid., 
31 Oct 1889; letter to editor from Parent, Ibid., 7 Nov 1889; 
letter to editor from Another Ratepayer, Ibid., 12 Nov 1889; 
letter to editor from Chloride of Lime, Ibid., 17 Nov 1889; 
editorial. Ibid., 26 Nov 1889; letter to editor from Victor 
Carandini, C.E., and The Colonist, 30 Nov 1889; letter to editor 
from Victor Carandini, C.E., of Brisbane. Carandini had a special 
interest in communicating with provincial newspapers. He was "the 
Queensland Architect of the Eureka Burning Process", and in this 
capacity he also sent correspondence to the Central Board of 
Health. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Dec 1889; Minutes of adjourned 
meeting of Central Board of Health, 13 Dec 1889. 
107. Ibid., 24 Oct 1889; letter to editor from Channing Neill, M.D. 
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1 08 
river at the wharf; when a newly passed Health Act opened the way for 
a crematory system; when professional and trade journals were openly 
109 
advocating the latest available burning processes and designs; and 
when the Central Board of Health was putting definite recommendations on 
such a scheme to the north and south Brisbane councils. The Brisbane 
Courier took the north Brisbane authorities severely to task for 
persisting with the "Cape Moreton service", and refusing to give the 
Eureka scheme a chance. 
112 Even so, the Brisbane Sanitary Company's director, E. Parr Smith, 
did claim that he had met every objection previously put forward to an 
earth-closet, ocean-dumping programme. He "had spared no expense", 
having purchased the whole of the now defunct Dobbyn and Company's plant 
113 
and some other equipment, and could carry out the contract "without 
offence", since "the obnoxious night-carts /would/ no longer find a 
camping ground in the lane leading to the Queen's wharf". To preserve 
modesty, he intended to erect an iron fence to obstruct the wharf itself 
from the view of passers-by. He pledged "that the pans /would/ be 
covered with lids, which lids /would/ not be removed until the 
steamer... /wa_s/ out of the river", that the "pans /would/ be stowed 
away... and battened down", and that they would be thoroughly 
cleansed and steam dried before return. He announced the purchase of 
one of the promised boats, the Pacific, a worthy, ocean-going craft 
of 355 tons, and also revealed that he had acquired adequate land 
to provide dry earth for Brisbane closets. In short, E. Parr Smith 
confidently informed The Brisbane Courier's editor that, contrary to 
108. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Nov 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 25 Nov 1889. The employee concerned was brought to court. 
The report of the case appears in Ibid., 6 Dec 1889. 
109. See article and illustration in The Building, Engineering and 
Mining Journal, July and December, 1889. See also Small, pp.124-25. 
110. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Dec 1889; Minutes of adjourned meeting of 
Central Board of Health, 13 Dec 1889. But as central board members 
pointed out "if the fire process was accepted, objections would 
probably be taken by the inhabitants of any place near where it was 
proposed to erect the buildings". 
111. Ibid., 11 Dec 1889; sub editorial. 
112. E. Parr Smith was in an excellent position to extract a profit 
from the nightsoil and rubbish disposal business whatever system 
was adopted. He was also chairman of the Eureka Contracting 
Company. 
113. Since Dobbyn and Company had never had decent equipment there may 
have been some doubt in some minds on the "suitable carts and 
vans" and the "round, sealed pans" which were supposed to be 
provided. 
TOI^'ICS O F T H E W iiJEKl. 
No. 9. The Boomerang, 14 September, 1889. 
58. 
114 his predictions made just two years before, the new work would 
"prove of little annoyance to anyone" - a view shared by the "greatly 
pleased" Mayor and aldermen who had made a trial trip in the fully-
115 fitted-out Pacific on the previous day. 
Unfortunately for the high hopes, the performance fell 
considerably below the promise. True, the newly installed Mayor, John 
McMaster, did "comment on the satisfactory manner in which the sanitary 
contract was being carried out", after the reprimanding of two 
workmen, the dismissal of another, and the appointment of a sub-
inspector who would ensure that all closet pans were thoroughly cleaned 
117 
and dried, and supplied with lids. But at the Central Board of 
Health's first meeting for 1890, two medical members reported that 
they had been supplied with sand instead of the guaranteed sufficiency 
118 
of dried earth; both The Brisbane Courier and its readers complained 
that "the sanitation arrangements /continued to be/ far, very far from 
119 ~ 
what they should be"; and the retiring president of the Queensland 
Medical Society prayed that "some hygienic Hercules would rise and 
120 
purify and cleanse this fair city of ours". The Brisbane harbour-
master, J. Mackay, protested to the Brisbane Town Clerk, that the 
city's refuse, including some nightsoil, had been deposited on the river 
121 bank along the North Quay. The port-master, Captain Heath, laid a 
formal report before the Colonial Secretary, detailing a number of 
breaches of the sanitary contract with respect to the five mile ocean 
114. Within, p.37. 
115. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Dec 1889. 
116. Ibid., 18 Feb 1890; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 17 Feb 1890. 
117. Ibid., Report of Robert Lee Bryce, the Brisbane City Council's 
chief nuisance inspector. 
118. Ibid., 11 Jan 1890; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 Jan 
1890. 
119. Ibid., 16 Jan 1890; main editorial. See also Ibid., 24 Jan 1890; 
letter to editor from Alexander Costello, Ibid., 30 Jan 1890; 
letter to editor from Alfred Hughes, and Ibid.; letter to 
editor from Scholasticus. 
120. Ibid., 27 Jan 1890. Address of Dr. John Thomson to Queensland 
Medical Society, 26 Jan 1890. For Courier comment on Thomson's 
main points and on the doctor's very considerable contribution 
to medicine in Queensland see Ibid., 30 Jan 1890; main editorial. 
121. Ibid., 28 Feb 1890. Mackay's complaint was mostly concerned with 
street refuse, but other filth had also found its way to the river 
banks because of the "unusual rains". See also Ibid., 1 Mar 1890; 
sub editorial. 
59. 
limit. ^ And to cap all other complaints, as Brisbane faced "very 
bad, very widespread floods" which threatened to affect all corporation 
123 
services and all river traffic, the Premier Boyd Morehead and others 
were granted an interim injunction against the Brisbane City Council and 
the Brisbane Sanitary Company, who were prohibited from carting the 
contents of any closets 
to the wharf,... or any vessel thereat...unless the same 
shall be sufficiently purified and deodorised so as not 
to be a nuisance to the plaintiffs. 124 
All of the heavy weaponry of argument and persuasion which Sir 
125 Samuel Griffith could bring to bear on behalf of the defendants, all 
of his new-found solicitude for a whole city "thrown into confusion" 
and exposed "to the danger of a pestilence" for the sake of three 
plaintiffs, could not move Mr. Justice Mein from his original decision, 
and the injunction was upheld. Mein had some sympathy for the council, 
1 9/^  
especially under the prevailing flood conditions, but he had visited 
122. The Colonial Secretary's report on the depositing of nightsoil 
outside Cape Moreton was laid before the Central Board of Health 
on 7 March 1890. The method of determining the strength of the 
"running sea" and sailing conditions generally was a rather 
complicated one, and is given in full in The Brisbane Courier, 
8 Mar 1890; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 7 Mar 1890. In 
essence the report revealed that the sanitary steamer had failed 
to dump the nightsoil in the correct location on a number of 
days during January, even when weather conditions permitted. 
Captain Heath was very concerned over the illicit dumping and 
the breaking of the contract. 
123. Ibid., 14 Mar 1890. 
124. Ibid., 8 Mar 1890. During the Health Amendment Act of 1889 
debate, Morehead had been anxious to allow the Brisbane council 
to deal with nightsoil matters as they saw fit. But when the 
Premier himself, or property in which he had an interest, was 
affected, he was just as vicious in his attack on the system and 
the method as any other protestor. 
125. Affidavits were made on behalf of the defendants by William Baker, 
manager of the Brisbane Sanitary Company, Drs. Bancroft and W.F. 
Taylor, Messrs. J.A. Clark and J.W. Ayscough, city councillors, 
and John McMaster, Mayor. 
126. For the first few weeks of 1890, the Brisbane Sanitary Company 
had berthed the Pacific near Victoria Bridge, but when a landslip 
caused by the floods carried this wharf away, a temporary move was 
made to the old gas-works wharf at Petrie Bight. This arrangement 
fell through, and "in their own blundering fashion, the council 
transferred their unpleasant business into the heart of one of the 
most eligible sections of the city,... within a stone's throw of 
the houses of parliament, and not very distant from government 
house". The Brisbane Courier, 20 Mar 1890; main editorial. 
60. 
127 
one of the affected properties, and it seemed to him that the 
nuisance there was very injurious indeed. The defendants had to find 
128 
an unobjectionable place for shipment somewhere within the municipality. 
If Charles Stuart Mein felt some pity for the council in its 
dilemma. The Brisbane Courier could find no excuse for it at all. As 
far as the paper was concerned, the council's sanitary arrangements 
had been "consistently offensive" for as long as Brisbane residents 
;mbe 
130 
129 
could remem r. Moreover the council's attempted alteration of the 
injunction 
was an admission that the sanitary company had been 
exceedingly remiss in the very business they had contracted 
to perform. 131 
Once again, when the Supreme Court pronounced its verdict, the 
132 Brisbane City Council burst into a flurry of activity, eventually 
reaching a temporary accommodation with the Colonial Secretary, J.M. 
Macrossan, for the use of the Queen's wharf. At the same time, the 
council pledged itself to the immediate re-erection of the flood-
damaged sanitary wharf. Of more importance, was its initiation of a 
133 
vigorous campaign of inspection of all nightsoil arrangements, the 
promotion of an extensive programme to educate the public on the 
essentials of the deodorization and covering of nightsoil pans, 
with the threat of quite stiff penalties and fines for those who 
127. The occupant of this premises, Samuel Cohen, gave damaging 
evidence against the defendants, which was corroborated by 
Dr. E. Matthews Owens. 
128. The proceedings of this important Supreme Court civil case are 
recorded in full in The Brisbane Courier, 19 Mar 1890. The 
plaintiffs were the Honourable B.B. Morehead, the Honourable 
W. Pattison, and John Stevenson, Member of the Legislative 
Assembly and company manager and director. 
129. Ibid., 21 Mar 1890; sub editorial. 
130. Griffith had claimed that "to purify and deodorize all the 
nightsoil of Brisbane was... absolutely impossible... without 
extremely expensive works, if it was possible at all". This 
meant, in the Courier's view, that E. Parr Smith had falsely 
represented his company's abilities both in the five year 
contract and in his claims to the Courier on 28 December 1889. 
Within, p.58. 
131. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Mar 1890; main editorial. 
132. Council met three times as the committee of the whole, as well 
as holding normal meetings. 
133. Three extra temporary subinspectors of nuisances were employed to 
enforce the sanitary regulations. 
61, 
ignored its instructions. 
The people and press of Brisbane were not completely satisfied 
135 
with the results of the crusade, but there is indirect evidence of 
considerable improvement. Late in 1890, parliament passed a further 
Health Act Amendment Act. The initiation of the bill was prompted by 
the government's desire to reduce "the unusually large share of the 
general vote" which some local authorities, notably South Brisbane, 
had extracted from the treasury under the local government endowment 
system - an important consideration in a year which saw some 
depression in trade and a general uneasiness in the economic situation 
However, the Act did allow local authorities to charge the actual cost 
1 38 
of cleansing services directly to the occupier of any premises, a 
provision which, it was hoped, would normalise local authority services 
and finances, by strengthening their hands and increasing their taxing 
139 powers. 
134. The public was to be educated through the work and example of the 
subinspectors and through a series of newspaper advertisements. 
Strict supervision of the contractor's collection and cleansing 
methods was also to be undertaken. For the council's decision 
on all of these matters see The Brisbane Courier, 1 Apr 1890; 
Minutes of Committee on Sanitary Matters, 24 Mar 1890. For the 
growing world-wide realization of the need to teach the masses 
obedience to hygienic j^ aws which only "a small instructed 
minority understands /yhilej the mass of mankind is careless and 
indifferent, so that the portions of these laws which are personal 
in their application remain a dead letter", see "Despatch 
respecting International Congress of Hygiene and Demography, 
London, 1891", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III 
(1890),699, and The Colonist, 14 Jul 1891, a long article taken 
from The Speaker, reporting on the International Congress. 
135. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Apr 1890; sub editorial. 
136. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXII (1890), 931. 
137. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1891, p.64. See also The Cairns Post, 
23 Apr 1890, on the situation in north Queensland where 
unemployed men were reported to be "starving", and where mayors, 
police magistrates, and other officials were seeking government 
funds for "relief works". 
138. An Act to further Amend "The Health Act of 1884", Queensland 
Government Gazette, LI (1890), 1061. 
139. For debate on this bill and another equally important - the 
Local Government Endowments Bill - see Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, LX (1890), 176-77 and 229-32, and Ibid., LXII (1890), 
930-32 and 1029-45. The government also showed an awareness of 
the need to protect workers from the "effluvia arising from any 
drain, privy or other nuisance" at their place of employment. 
See debate on the Factories and Shops Bill of 1890. Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LXI (1890), 346. Unfortunately for the 
working classes of Queensland, this bill was not enacted until 
1896. 
137 
62, 
Other indications of sanitary improvements in north Brisbane 
140 
were the sudden decline in complaining letters to the press; the 
mayoral call for congratulations to the council because "very few 
complaints were now made", and because of "the excellent state 
of health of the city"; and the back-handed compliments paid to 
the Brisbane City Council by residents of outer suburbs and country 
towns, which still suffered the "abominable, brutal, wretched pan 
system", or the even filthier cesspit evil, under which "the 
authorities did not even take the sanitary precaution that was 
140. The researcher has to go to provincial papers and the reports of 
divisional boards in the Brisbane suburban areas for any large 
and detailed complaints about the nightsoil disposal question 
after about March 1890. See for example, letters, articles 
and editorials expressing grave concern in The Cairns Post, 
25 Jan 1890; sub editorial. Ibid., 15 Mar 1890, The Colonist, 
19 Jul 1890; sub editorial. The Maryborough Chronicle, 6 Aug 1890; 
Minutes of Maryborough City Council, 5 Aug 1890, The Cairns Post, 
24 Sep 1890, The Brisbane Courier, 26 Sep 1890; Minutes of 
Ithaca Divisional Board, The Maryborough Chronicle, 2 Oct 1890; 
Report for year ending 30 Jun, by the Municipal Health Officer, 
30 August 1890, The Queensland Times, 2 Oct 1890, The Brisbane 
Courier, 11 Oct 1890; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
10 Oct 1890, letter of complaint from the Coorparoo Ratepayers 
Association, The Queensland Times, 16 Oct 1890; letter to editor 
from Ratepayer, The Bowen Observer, 9 Dec 1890, Ibid., editorial. 
The Mackay Mercury, 13 Dec 1890; Minutes of Mackay Municipal 
Council. 
141. John McMaster reiterated this claim in the Legislative Assembly 
during the supply debate. The improvement had_resuj_ted from the 
pans being "taken away with covered lids and /being/ thoroughly 
cleansed with steam before being returned". Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LXV (1891), 2044. 
142. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Jul 1890; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 21 Jul 1890. The Courier did remind the Mayor that 
Brisbane had "not attained perfection" in sanitary affairs yet. 
Ibid., 1 Aug 1890; sub editorial, and some letters criticising 
particular nuisances not connected with earth closets were 
received. Ibid., 24 Jul 1890; letter to editor from Dr. Richard 
Rendle, Ibid., 26 Jul 1890; letter to editor from Rosalie, and 
Ibid., 24 Sep, 30 Sep and 2 Oct 1890; letters to editor from 
Hubert J. Tracey. In his letter of 24 September, Tracey did 
admit that "the council has done much in the past and is still 
working to keep the city clean... but much more remains to be 
done". 
taken in the city" 
63. 
143 
With its now generally accepted five year sanitary contract in 
144 hand, with the Central Board of Health more deeply concerned with 
specific diseases rather than with sanitary complaints, and with the 
rapid approach of the most severe depression yet to darken the 
colony's history - a depression which definitely precluded any radical 
143. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXV (1891), 2043, view of 
Thomas Glassey, Bundamba, referring specifically to the 
Booroodabin situation. This type of complaint continued well into 
the twentieth century as far as some centres were concerned. 
For instance, the annual reports of the Commissioner of Public 
Health revealed continuing grave offences in nightsoil 
arrangements, which were accompanied by severe outbreaks of 
disease, in such towns as Dalby, "Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 
II (1903), 169, Charters Towers, Ibid., I (1906), 184, Allora, 
Brassall, Bowen, Childers, Mackay, Rosewood and Howard, Ibid., 
II (1908), 304. Inadequate nightsoil disposal facilities in 
Southport, Beenleigh and Beaudesert were "severely criticised 
by the Health Department" in 1910. The Brisbane Courier, 
6 Jan 1910. Some of the towns continued to offend for the whole 
period covered by this thesis. See for example. Chief Inspector 
John Simpson to Health Commissioner, 25 Jan 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 
890, in-letter no.1160 of 1908, for a general condemnation of 
"faulty sanitary conditions at the various centres of population 
... especially at outside places". Simpson's italics. For 
specific examples in Beenleigh see The Brisbane Courier, 12 
and 21 Jun 1913, and most importantly in Sandgate, a seaside 
resort for Brisbane, see Ibid., 26 Jan 1910; letter to editor 
from Mater, Ibid., 28 Oct 1910; letter to editor from Resident, 
Ibid., 3 Nov 1910; letter to editor from I.A.D., Ibid.; letter 
to editor from G. Plumridge, Alderman, and Ibid., 4 Nov 1910; 
letter to editor from CD. Ferguson. The Sandgate difficulties 
had not been resolved by 1913. Ibid., 26 Jun 1913; letter to 
editor from A Long Sufferer. 
144. The ocean dumping contract was extended well beyond its five 
year term, but since conditions and complaints were similar to 
those already described, no details will be given here, but see 
for example. The Street, 18 Jun 1898. 
145. During the early 1890's, the board's time was taken up to a 
large degree with diseases which are dealt with in detail in 
this thesis - that is, leprosy, smallpox, typhoid, and 
diphtheria. It was also particularly concerned to answer 
British government enquiries about the incidence of influenza 
in the colony. See Within, p.244, f.n.l37. For extra references 
not included in that place see also The Brisbane Courier, 
28 Jan 1890, The Colonist, 1 Feb 1890; sub editorial. The Brisbane 
Courier, 5 Mar 1890, a long article taken from the Pall Mall 
Gazette, Ibid., 2 Apr 1890, Lord Knutsford, Secretary of State 
for Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of 
Queensland, 2 Apr 1890, Q.S.A. COL/A 671, 21 Apr 1890, and 
Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 17 Sep 1890, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 629, in-letter no.9826 of 1890. 
64 
changes in the sanitary system of the capital - the Brisbane City 
Council felt no need to experiment with crematory methods in the early 
lat; 
148 
147 
nineties. The re ively new South Brisbane authority was not in 
that happy position. 
Nightsoil disposal arrangements on the south side of Brisbane 
River had always contrasted favourably with the filthy north Brisbane 
149 depot on the Enoggera Creek. But by early 1890, the South Brisbane 
situation had deteriorated sharply. The depot itself had become an 
insufferable nuisance. Soakage from the area was contaminating Sandy 
Creek which was the water supply "for culinary purposes" for some 
151 
residents of the nearby Thompson Estate, and both the Central Board 
146. Although one medical man urged Queenslanders to "awaken to the 
fact that the wealth of the community is intimately associated 
with its health". The Brisbane Courier, 8 Feb 1890; letter to 
editor from Richard Rendle, even some essential projects 
connected with the maintenance of good health were postponed 
because of the depression. In fact, government funds were very 
low indeed, because of the combined effects of drought in the west, 
floods in Brisbane and the dislocation of business. Pearson, 
pp.29 and 40. As a result, the government decided, in an 
unprecedented move, to allow Brisbane local authorities to borrow 
on the outside market, a concession which had been consistently 
refused to this time. The Brisbane Municipal Loan Act 1893, 
Queensland Government Gazette, III (1893) 395, and Brisbane 
Municipal Loan Act, 1896, Ibid., II (1896), 144. In spite of these 
concessions, local authority chances of independent borrowings 
were small, because of bank failures. 
147. One interesting private experiment with model apparatus for 
burning "sanitary refuse" was made by the Honourable A.C. Gregory, 
member of the Legislative Council, at his Baroona Road, Rainworth 
home. Gregory's contribution to local government as a member and 
sometime President of the Toowong Divisional Board had given him 
the incentive to seek improvements in contemporary sanitary 
arrangements. Reporters from The Brisbane Courier witnessed the 
"decided success" of the trial. Gregory claimed that the fuel 
used would be less than that needed to take the sanitary vessel to 
the Bay, and that in addition, the cremated refuse would find a 
ready market as manure. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jan 1890. For 
provincial interest in Gregory's experiment see for example. 
The Bowen Observer, 9 Dec 1890. 
148. South Brisbane became a separate entity with its own Mayor, 
Alderman William Stephens, and council in 1888. See Laverty, 
p.264, The Brisbane Courier, 16 Feb 1888, Minutes of South 
Brisbane Council, and Queensland Government Gazette, XL (1888), 
29. 
149. See for example The Brisbane Courier, 10 Feb 1888; letter to 
editor from Caustic. 
150. Ibid., 16 Feb 1888, Ibid., 20 Feb 1888, and Ibid., 2 3 Feb 1888. 
151. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Feb 1890; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 31 Jan 1890. The report of inspector Marlow was read and 
discussed for a second time at this meeting. 
65. 
of Health's inspector Marlow, and some ratepayers, were demanding 
152 
that this health hazard be closed. 
The council was not convinced that the manure depot did 
153 
constitute an injurious nuisance. But the young body, which had 
gained something of a reputation for showing initiative and "out-
154 generalling the aldermen of the city", had already shown considerable 
interest in alternatives to the burial process. For instance, in 
January 1890 the South Brisbane Council had pronounced itself "favourably 
disposed" to Victor Carandini's Eureka workings, and had asked for a 
rough estimate of costs. William Stephens was concerned enough to 
go to the trouble and expense of a visit to the Eureka Burning Works 
at Newcastle, and in his opinion, a similar system, combined with the 
adoption of "duplicate airtight pans", would solve all of the South 
Brisbane problems. 
Damaging reports of ratepayer resistance, and proposed local 
council action against the Newcastle works appeared in the Queensland 
157 press. But after thorough consideration of the various schemes 
152. The ratepayers led by J.H. Henzell, an unsuccessful candidate at 
the South Brisbane council elections, threatened the authorities 
with a Supreme Court injunction if the burial of nightsoil was 
continued. Ibid., 25 Mar 1890. 
153. There had always been some altercation as to the actual source of 
the undoubtedly overpowering stench which arose from the manure 
depot area. There was considerable agreement among representatives 
of the press and an inspecting party from the South Brisbane 
Council that it was not the manure depot, but the effluent from 
a nearby tannery and the Graziers' Butchering company which was 
the true cause of the trouble. Ibid., 2 Jul 1888. This 
suspicion continued to be held by many in the succeeding period 
up to 1890, when the council's health committee made a visit to the 
depot without notice, and found nothing to endanger health. Ibid., 
11 Mar 1890; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 10 Mar 1890. 
154. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXII (1890), 1032. 
155. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Jan 1890; Minutes of South Brisbane 
Council, 13 Jan 1890. 
156. Ibid., 11 Mar 1890. 
157. See for example The Queensland Times, 16 Oct 1890; letter to 
editor from Ratepayer, and The Brisbane Courier, 1 Nov 1890. 
The managing director of the Newcastle company, R.M. Rooke, 
contacted the Courier to deny the Brisbane press reports, citing 
the favourable evidence of members of the New South Wales and 
Victorian Central Boards of Health and the chief guardian of 
the public health in New South Wales, Dr. John Ashburton Thompson, 
all of whom had visited the Newcastle plant. Ibid. 
66. 
1 CO 
available, the South Brisbane Council decided to go ahead with the 
crematory work. 
As the Central Board of Health had predicted, protests over 
the site of the works began at once. The first and most devastating 
came from the neighbouring Stephens Divisional Board, which objected 
to the furnaces being erected within its borders just outside the South 
Brisbane boundary. Public protest meetings and petitions brought 
a promise of support for the Stephens Division from Colonial Secretary 
Horace Tozer, who in turn took a stand on Section 2 of the Health Act 
Amendment Act of 1889. This clause certainly allowed a local 
authority to dispose of its refuse either within or beyond its own 
district, but it included the rider that 
such use shall be subject to such conditions as the 
Governor in Council may from time to time prescribe. 163 
The Colonial Secretary wished to be assured on several points 
before advising consent. These included positive information on 
places where the scheme had been tried and found successful - such 
claims to be accompanied by reports from "competent authorities" -
and reasons why the works could not be set up in South Brisbane itself 
if they were as innocuous as claimed. 
In an effort to gain Brisbane Courier support for its cause, the 
South Brisbane council handed all of the relevant official correspondence 
to the press for publication. To a certain extent this ploy 
158. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jul 1890; Minutes of South Brisbane 
Council, special report of sanitary committee, 4 Jul 1890. 
159. The council called for tenders on 20 January 1891, accepted the 
Eureka company's bid on 7 March 1891, and entered into a ten 
year contract with the company on 20 June 1891. The Brisbane 
Courier, 21 Jan, 4 Mar, and 7 Oct 1891. 
160. Within, p.57,f.n.110. 
161. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Sep 1891. 
162. Ibid., 8 Sep 1891. 
163. An Act to Facilitate the Exercise by Local Authorities of 
certain Powers under "The Health Act of 1884", Clause 2, 
Queensland Government Gazette, XLXII (1889), 1497. 
164. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Sep 1891, a letter to the South 
Brisbane Council from the Under Colonial Secretary, printed in full, 
165. Ibid., 10 Sep 1891. The South Brisbane council claimed that the 
site was large enough to ensure that no other buildings could be 
erected close to the actual furnace;, that there would be no 
drainage problems, that the land was only just inside the 
Stephens division, and that the works would cause absolutely 
no annoyance. 
67. 
succeeded. When compared with the "slow - very slow - North Brisbane 
council", the go-ahead South Brisbane body deserved praise for its 
acceptance of the crematory system, for "it /was/ impossible to 
believe... that the system involve/d/ deadly or intolerable offence 
to health or comfort". Nevertheless, continued complaints from 
Newcastle demonstrated that the process was not as "absolutely 
innocent and inoffensive" as the company had alleged. Even allowing 
for the strength of prejudice, it appeared that all objections had not 
yet been satisfactorily overcome. The Brisbane Courier, like Horace 
Tozer, could not help finding it "suspicious that the South Brisbane 
council ha /d/ not found room for the erection of the works in its own 
,, 166 territory". 
1 fi7 
Even after further deputations, and favourable reports on both 
the site and system from the government's superintendent architect 
Alfred B. Brady and analyst Robert Mar, Tozer was still against the 
(-^  ' 1 • • • • , 168 _ . . , . 
Stepnens division site. Once again a nigntsoil contract became the 
169 
subject of parliamentary debate, with the final decision to set 
aside an area of land within South Brisbane boundaries being reached 
170 by the cabinet itself. 
The choice of site was a curious one. It abutted on the gaol 
reserve, and was in close proximity to the Woolloongabba state school, 
the Diamantina orphanage, the Deaf, Dumb, and Blind Institution, and 
reserves for a future hospital and a girls' grammar school. Also 
handily placed, "giving access to the company's site", was the South 
171 
Brisbane cemetery. Tne selection either indicates the Griffith 
ministry's touching faith in the efficacy of the Eureka burning works, 
or their hope that the people most likely to be affected - prisoners, 
school children, orphans, and the deaf and dumb, "who although they 
166. Tne Brisbane Courier, 24 Sep 1891; sub editorial. In any case the 
South Brisbane council was not the only body to show this sort of 
initiative. The Ipswich hospital now had a working crematory, 
and the Toowong Divisional Board was on the verge of installing 
one. 
167. Ibid., 30 Sep 1891. This was a South Brisbane deputation. 
168. Ibid., 3 Oct 1891; Report of South Brisbane deputation, and 
Ibid. , 7 Oct 1891; Report of deputation from. Stephens division. 
169. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXV (1891), 1939-1943. 
170. Ibid., pp.1939 and 2044. 
171. Ibid., p.1939. Complaint of Abraham Fleetwood Luya, South 
Brisbane. The state school had an enrolment of 971 at that time. 
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172 
might write something about it would not say much" - would or could 
not be very vocal in objection. 
If this was their expectation, it was sadly misplaced. The 
parliamentary debate officially revealing the site took place on 5 
November 1891. The first letters bewailing the rumoured, projected 
presence of the offensive works in the midst of the "pleasant villas" of 
South Brisbane, and in close proximity to a large state school had appeared 
173 in The Brisbane Courier almost one month before - on 8 October 1891. 
But once the formal announcement was made, the residents of South Brisbane 
organised themselves rapidly to express their displeasure. On 6 November, 
the first deputation waited on the Colonial Secretary "to urge on him the 
174 inadvisableness of allowing the sanitary works to be erected". A 
working committee was formed on the spot, and well attended indignation 
175 
meetings followed. The Boomerang joined in the fray with a barbed 
cartoon well calculated to raise the hackles of any politician in either 
local or central government. 
172. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXV (1891),1941. View of 
B.D. Morehead, Balonne. 
173. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Oct 1891; letters to editor from 
Common-Sense and Ratepayer. 
174. Ibid., 7 Nov 1891; Report of deputation of South Brisbane 
residents to Horace Tozer. 
175. Ibid., 12 Nov 1891. 
176. The Boomerang, 21 Nov 1891. At the same time as these protests 
were raging, Brisbane local authorities, roused by Brisbane Courier 
comment. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Aug 1891; sub editorial and Ibid., 
2 Sep 1891; sub editorial, by the efforts of some Brisbane aldermen. 
Ibid., 1 Sep 1891; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 31 Aug 1891, 
and by letters to the Brisbane press. Ibid., 9 Sep and 6 Oct 1891; 
letters to editor from W.F. Bell, Hydraulic civil engineer, and 
Ibid., 15 Sep 1891; letter to editor from Robert Wilson, were 
holding a conference to look seriously at the sewerage question for 
North and South Brisbane, Toombul, Booroodabin, Ithaca, and Toowong. 
The authorities were interested enough to form a sub committee under 
Alderman Galloway to plan further action, but no practical steps were 
taken at this time. Ibid., 23 Oct 1891, and J.A. Clark, Mayor, 
Mayoral Report 1891-92 (Brisbane, 1893), pp.29-30. Interest was 
revived again in 1893, with a call for a sewerage scheme from 
George Watson, Jnr, Mayor of Brisbane and from The Brisbane Courier, 
Ibid., 28 Jan 1893; letter to editor from George Watson, and Ibid., 
31 Jan 1893; sub editorial. When the worst strictures of the 
depression were over, more agitation for a sewerage system for North 
Brisbane again appeared in the press. Schemes incorporated ideas not 
unlike those of the Adelaide deep drainage, sewerage farm arrangement, 
since its author, M.J. Dempsey, was in the tradition of those who did 
not want to pollute the river. See for example. Ibid., 13, 15 and 
18 Jan 1894; letters to editor from M.J. Dempsey, sanitary engineer. 
Ibid., 16 Jan 1894; letter to editor from W.T. Birkbeck. Then on 
29 January 1894, the city engineer published a scheme for the 
disposal by sewerage for the city of Brisbane. Pugh's Queensland 
Almanac, 1895, p.66. 
69. 
The protests were of no avail- The South Brisbane council had 
espoused a "new" method and was determined to see it in use. Delays 
were inevitable because of the difficulties over the site, and the 
177 illness of key personnel. But by mid-August 1892 all obstacles 
had been overcome and the burning work commenced. By early September, 
a number of letters of objection to the plant had been received by the 
council, some of them from people who had detected and complained very 
bitterly about an evil burning smell "weeks before there was any 
u • A u 178 
business done". 
Nevertheless, as far as the already antagonistic Colonial 
Secretary was concerned, the protests appeared to have some substance. 
The medical officer for Brisbane Dr. Edward Tilston had reported to him 
that a nuisance was being caused by the cremation works on 
the Boggo Road, and that in consequence of the intolerable 
stench arising from the works, the officials of the gaol 
had, in some instances, been unable to continue with their 
duty during the prevalence of certain winds.... /T/he 
nuisance was particularly offensive to... the Diamantina 
Orphanage.... The doctor had made strong representations as 
to the certainty of its proving a fruitful source of 
disease, and accordingly... it was absolutely necessary that 
steps be taken at once by the council to abate the nuisance. 179 
In an attempt to placate Tozer, adjustments were made to the 
furnaces to try "to quite remove all distinguishable odours from the 
180 
chimney vapours", though South Brisbane's Mayor Heaslop maintained 
that 
if persons would only disassociate from their minds the 
fact that the smells were coming from incinerating works, 
the "intolerable stench" complained of would not be so 
intense. 181 
His contention was certainly borne out by government architect Brady, 
who reported verbally to the Colonial Secretary that he had no 
182 
complaint regarding the works. The Brisbane Courier's representative 
agreed. 
177. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Apr 1892. A. Morry, the project's 
architect, was absent from work for some time. 
178. Ibid., 6 Sep 1892; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 5 Sep 1892, 
claim of Alderman M'Kenna. See also Ibid., 9 Sep 1892; letter 
to editor from Disgusted. 
179. Ibid., 20 Sep 1892; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 19 Sep 1882, 
letter written to the council at the direction of Horace Tozer, 
printed in full. 
180. Ibid., 4 Oct 1892; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 3 Oct 1892. 
181. Ibid. 
182. Ibid., 18 Nov 1892. 
70. 
The system seems to be a thoroughly good one.... The work 
was in progress... and although at the time of the visit 
the morning was hot and dull... the smell... was not strong 
nor particularly offensive.... Only in the building where 
the pans were opened... was there an offensive smell, but 
the pans are covered until actually required.... The 
interior arrangements are such that as far as persons 
passing close to the works are concerned, there would be 
no offence whatever. 183 
Hot on the heels of this championship of the crematory works, a 
large deputation waited on the Colonial Secretary, armed with a petition 
signed by 226 ratepayers and baleful tales of a nuisance "provocative of 
sickness,... headaches and vomiting". Horace Tozer believed every 
word about the injurious smells, but he refused to take the responsibility 
for action, and "be inspector of nuisance for the nonce". He advised the 
deputation instead to sue the South Brisbane council and the sanitary 
184 
works for redress, a suggestion which the ringleaders were quick to 
implement. 
After receiving the petitioners' threats, and the report of its 
own health officer, the South Brisbane council reluctantly decided 
to summon the Eureka Sanitary Company under the provisions of the 
Health Act of 1884, "calling on them to abate a nuisance said to 
exist". 
183. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Nov 1892. 
184. Ibid., 23 Nov 1892. 
185. Ibid., 29 Nov 1892. 
186. Dr. Kebbell's very long report was optimistic for the most part. 
By far the largest nuisances arose from atrocious drainage 
problems, and the bad habits of many householders in dealing with 
slops and other household wastes which certainly contributed to a 
large degree to the madadorous odours which hung about South 
Brisbane. As far as the incinerating works were concerned, in 
Kebbell's opinion "imagination ha/d/ something to answer for", 
but he did admit that there was an unpleasant smell at times. 
He did not suggest tha the odours caused sickness. The Brisbane 
Courier, 30 Nov 1892; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 28 Nov 
1892, Report on sanitary condition of the borough by Dr. Kebbell, 
Health Officer. Dr. F.G. Connolly, who treated some patients in 
the vicinity of the Eureka works was "not prepared to say if they 
had got worse from the smell,... but in his opinion the smell 
was injurious to health". Ibid., 31 Dec 1892. 
187. Ibid., 14 Dec 1892; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 13 Dec 1892, 
Recommendation of the Health Committee. 
71. 
Ironically, this "go-ahead", "modern" council was proceeding on 
the premise that bad smells cause sickness and are dangerous to health, 
an acceptance of the miasmatic theory of disease transmission no longer 
188 held by most contemporary medical men. The other fear which usually 
accompanied the propagation of the outworn theory was also a real 
factor in these proceedings. One of the first facts drawn from a 
witness, when the case of the South Brisbane Council versus the Eureka 
Sanitary Company opened on 29 December 1892 before Mr. R.A. Ranking, 
Police Magistrate, and a large and eager crowd, was that "the value of 
property depreciating was causing him a great deal of personal anxiety". 
Mr. Ranking's findings in a very difficult case were praised as 
190 being "remarkably judicial". A nuisance had undoubtedly been present, 
and had continued to assail delicate noses even after adjustments had 
been made. But Ranking was convinced that if ideas put forward by an 
191 
eminent engineer were adopted, and if arrangements were made to 
increase temperatures during the destruction process, the business could 
be conducted on the site without causing any further irritation. 
In fact, 
/i/n view of the great benefit which must accrue to 
the health of the borough as a whole from so rational a 
method of disposal of closet refuse, /changes can be 
made/ which will allow the company to continue operations, at 
the same time reducing the nuisance... to such infinitesmal 
proportions as may well be borne by the few in view of the 
inestimable boon... to the community at large. 192 
188. Sir Raphael Cilento suggests that by 1878 the truth on insect 
carriers of disease had been discovered, thanks in part to the 
work of Dr. Joseph Bancroft, "thus disposing of the 'miasma' 
rubbish." Raphael Cilento, Medicine in Queensland (Brisbane, 
n.d.) p.37. But as late as 1894, Dr. Charles Creighton, medical 
writer, lecturer and practitioner, in his History of Epidemics 
in Britain Vol II, still accepted the miasmatic theory. Frazer, 
pp.68 and 70. Some Queensland doctors were also obviously still 
unsure of their position in the 1890's. See for example f.n.l86 
above and Within, p.69. For the most part however, Queensland 
doctors followed the latest overseas developments. Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LX (1890), 258. View of Dr. W.F. Taylor. 
189. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Dec 1892. The case was very fully 
reported in the Courier and no details will be given here. See 
Ibid., 30 Dec and 31 Dec 1892, and Ibid., 4 Jan and 6 Jan 1893. 
190. Ibid., 16 Jan 1893; main editorial. 
191. This was M.J. Dempsey, sanitary engineer, whose later suggestions 
on sewerage made quite an impact on Brisbane thinking. Within, 
p.68,f.n.l76. 
192. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Jan 1893. 
189 
"FLORODORA" IN SOUTH BRISBANE. 
No. 11. The Street, 7 September, 1901. 
72. 
There was at least one cynic amongst the Courier's readers. Though 
hopeful, Dermott O'Donohue doubted if the remedies prescribed would be as 
effective as predicted, but he did feel that "no more /would/ be heard 
193 
of that nuisance". O'Donohue was not entirely correct. South 
Brisbane residents still had good reason for complaint over their 
194 
sanitary contract arrangements as late as 1901, and the destructor 
itself was a "very unsuitable one" in the opinion of the newly installed 
Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. B. Burnett Ham. 
Nevertheless, as Weston Bate has pointed out with reference to 
sanitary arrangements in Brighton, Victoria, the real break-through 
had already been made with the era of the universally accepted double 
pan system, which allowed the quick, easy removal of hermetically sealed, 
and therefore inoffensive pans. And if the capital of Queensland and 
other cities and towns in the state still had to wait to acquire that 
amenity which closes the gap between countrified simplicity and city 
197 
sophistication, real improvements had been made, and when compared 
with the furore of earlier years, complaints were at a minimum. 
Moreover, there was a noticeably increased public awareness of 
medical advances, together with a growing understanding of the individual's 
need to attend to personal hygiene. The arrival of the dreaded bubonic 
plague, which frightened even the careless into some sort of appreciation 
of the need for sanitary precautions, also had a salutary, if terrifying 
effect. The elevation of public health affairs to sub-departmental 
status with the passing of the Health Act of 1900, and the appointment 
of a commissioner of public health who could concentrate his energies 
on the solution of health problems for the whole of Queensland was 
another very considerable step forward in the struggle to protect the 
environment of the state. 
193. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Jan 1893; letter to editor from Dermott 
O'Donohue, Vulture Street, The Valley. 
194. The Street, 27 Jul, 8 Aug, 10 Aug, 7 Sep 1901. See also The 
Brisbane Courier, 23 Apr 1901. 
195. B. Burnett Ham to J.F.G. Foxton, 30 Mar 1901, Q.S.A. COL/A 286, 
in-letter no.5609 of 1901 - written in reply to a private 
memorandum from Foxton. With this exchange, the interest in 
destructors turned to Toowoomba, and long drawn out and 
acrimonious negotiations took place in that centre and with the 
government over the equipment, the positioning of the "depot", and 
so on. The Toowoomba affair is a saga in itself and cannot be 
dealt with here. 
196. Weston Bate, A History of Brighton (Melbourne University Press, 
1963), p.212. 
197. The idea is Weston Bate's. "Sewerage was one of the important 
factors in closing the gap between Brighton as a country place 
and Brighton as a suburb." Ibid., p.211. 
3 - SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS -
THE STRATTON DRAIN AND SOME NOXIOUS TRADES 
Apart from the difficulties associated with the unsatisfactory 
waste disposal system, one of the fertile sources of environmental 
pollution in the colony of Queensland was the very imperfect drainage. 
The grave miasmatic dangers to health from large areas of swamp land 
were well understood by the early settlers, and firm if sometimes 
ineffectual steps were taken to try to eliminate this menace, both in 
2 
the heart of Brisbane itself, and in important centres of rural 
3 
interest or coastal trade such as Toowoomba and Rockhampton. 
Later on in the century, as Brisbane's suburban sprawl began and 
large, densely populated estates were carelessly drained into convenient 
waste water areas. The Brisbane Courier suggested that both government 
and local authorities were 
to a great extent wasting the money spent on water tables and 
drains and the removal of rubbish, while we allow in our midst, 
festering swamps and accumulations of liquid filth, reservoirs 
so to speak, of the foulness that drains from our streets. 4 
Several of these fens - prominent among them the Red Jacket, 
Bayswater and Rozetta swamps which lay in the adjoining Milton, 
Toowong, Ithaca and Rosalie areas, and in Booroodabin - continued to 
threaten the well-being of nearby residents and large numbers of 
1. Within, p. 6. 
2. This was the Frogs' Hollow swamp, see Ibid. 
3. Minutes of Executive Council, 31 Mar 1865, Q.S.A., EXE/Ell 
65/18E. Local rivalries were already spurring the worthies 
of one centre to ape those of another. "The petitioners felt 
that the draining of Toowoomba swamps was more important than 
Rockhampton". See also Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II 
(1865), 257-58. 
4. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Aug 1885; sub editorial. 
73. 
74. 
school children well into the early 1900's. This was partly caused 
by the straitened circumstances in which all of the affected local 
authorities found themselves, but was also attributable to government 
unwillingness to bear any part of the cost of drainage, even where 
.1 
8 
7 
reserved crown lands were involved, unless the possibility of future 
sales of land made the project economically worthwhile. 
As well as these large and obvious nuisances, the citizens of 
Queensland had to cope with other house and street drainage problems. 
Laverty has pointed out with respect to Brisbane, that 
the appointment of a competent City Engineer in 1875 enabled 
the Council to assume full responsibility for the comparatively 
large drainage works being undertaken at the time. 9 
Full credit must be given for the very considerable contribution 
which that and other local bodies were endeavouring to make to the 
gradual improvement of the colony's health, but many nuisances, arising 
5. Ibid., 27 Feb 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 26 Feb 
1886, Reports of local authorities, Toowong and Ithaca, Ibid., 
11 Jun 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 Jun 1887, 
Report of inspector J. Marlow, Ibid., 11 Oct 1889; Minutes 
of Ithaca Divisional Board, Samuel Hammond, M.D. to Chairman, 
Shire Council, Toowong, 18 Jul 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A 706, in-letter 
no.8876 of 1892, The Brisbane Courier, 16 Mar 1900; letter to 
editor from "0'Connelltown". (The very large, evil-smelling, 
rat-ridden 0'Connelltown swamp was in the Brisbane suburb of 
Windsor.) Other evidences of the continuing swamp problems are 
Ibid., 1 Aug 1901; Deputation to J.F. Foxton from Toowong 
Divisional Board and Milton State School Committee regarding 
the Red Jacket swamp, and Department of Health to Under Secretary 
Home Secretary's Department, 14 Jul 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 891, in-
letter no.8507 of 1908, asking for information about another 
Red Jacket swamp near Jericho in western Queensland. 
6. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Jun 1887; Minutes of Ithaca Divisional 
Board. 
7. Ibid., 25 Apr 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 24 Apr 1885, 
and Ibid., 11 Feb 1888; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 
Feb 1888. 
8. The government did obtain a parliamentary vote for some swamp 
clearance in the Milton area. Ibid., 12 Dec 1885; main editorial. 
"/A/fter being partially and imperfectly drained" this land was 
laTer divided into small, unsatisfactory blocks and sold by the 
government to unsuspecting clients. Ibid., 14 Feb 1888; main 
editorial, accusation of Dr. Joseph Bancroft at meeting of Central 
Board of Health, 11 Feb 1888. See also the reply of Maurice Black, 
Minister for Public Lands, to a Maryborough deputation seeking the 
drainage of government owned marshland within their municipality, 
since "the stench from the swamp was becoming a great nuisance.... 
Black said he did not see what the government would gain by 
draining the swamp unless they could sell the land afterwards". 
Ibid., 21 Aug 1889; Deputation to M.H. Black regarding 
Maryborough's sanitary difficulties. 
9. Laverty, p. 226. 
75. 
from inadequate or completely absent drainage, still remained throughout 
the whole colony. In 1882 in Maryborough, a town labelled "filthy" by 
its own inhabitants, the local board was trying to keep certain drains 
flushed. Two years later, the city requested government loans for 
drainage works, and although Maryborough was plagued with diseases 
of all kinds throughout the 1880's, a Brisbane Courier reporter did 
_ 
notice a definite improvement by 1885. But in spite of this, there 
13 
were "stenches... which would not be tolerated in Canton", and very 
14 insanitary drains and sewers. Even after the arrival of bubonic 
plague in the early twentieth century had frightened the Maryborough 
council into immediate improvements, Queensland's chief health inspector, 
John Simpson, discovered that the whole town was "most insanitary". 
And at the very end of the period under review, the street water channels 
of the city still carried urinal wastes, and the smell at night was 
"very marked". 
Maryborough was not an isolated case. Many other Queensland cities 
and towns had similar problems. Very often these were attributable to 
17 the apathy of the inhabitants, to the small populations which found 
18 the cost of sanitary engineering exorbitant, and to the resistance 
of giant vested interests. For example, the Colonial Sugar Refinery 
in Mackay created"a seething mass of corruption" in the drains and 
19 
creeks in its area, but refused to take remedial action. Other 
difficulties arose in peripheral areas because of the carelessness, lack of 
understanding, or indifference of public servants in Brisbane, who 
failed to remedy the obvious sanitary evils, in the face of complaints 
from their own officers in the field. One such incident arose in Roma, 
10. Wide Bay and Burnett News, 18 Jan 1882. 
11. The Maryborough Chronicle, 19 Aug and 20 Aug 1884. 
12. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Mar 1885. 
13. The Colonist, 27 Apr 1889; sub editorial. 
14. "Report of the Health Commissioner", Queensland Parliamentary 
Papers, II (1903), 174. 
15. Ibid., II (1908), 318. 
16. Ibid., II (1914), 33. 
17. The Mackay Mercury, 18 Jan 1894. 
18. The Northern Miner, 2 Jun 1884 and Town Clerk, Mackay to Colonial 
Secretary 11 Dec 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 409, in-letter no.8744 of 
1884. 
19. The Mackay Mercury, 15 Nov 1894; letter to editor from Donald 
Beaton. 
76. 
where a "filthy", "fetid", "stagnant", "offensive" nuisance, created 
20 
on government property, was not removed, in spite of official protests, 
21 
until newspaper criticism forced ministerial action. In some cases, 
it was local councils which either could or would not act, leaving 
nuisances like the notorious Bell Street drain in Ipswich, which 
22 poisoned "the atmosphere for a considerable radius". And there were 
plenty of instances in the heart of Brisbane, where water tables were 
23 found "to be very defective indeed", and complaints about "dangerous 
nuisances... from green slimy pools" in the main streets recurred again 
24 
and again. At Petrie Bight, an abominable smell arose from "pools 
25 
of foul-smelling, stagnant water", and the situation in that area, 
which was accentuated by the perfumes from Pettigrew's saw-mill, did 
not improve as the months went by. 
In Fortitude Valley, "filthy stagnant water... disgusting in 
odour... black in colour... enough to sicken anyone... settled in 
27 
gutters". In the scandalous Spring Hollow drain, which was 
for the most part an open sewer... constructed of rough-faced 
blocks of stone,... suspended matters f£om the_sewer... left 
behind in the hollows and crevaces... /created^ / putrefaction 
and consequent nuisance.... Into this drain, tributary drains 
from the houses with all house drainage discharge... black 
noxious looking compound/s/ with a most offensive odour.... 
20. These began on 26 July 1883 and are attached to Seymour's letter 
noted in f.n. 21. 
21. Letters and press clippings from the Roma Free Press and the 
Western Star, filed under D.T. Seymour, Commissioner of Police 
to Colonial Secretary, 10 Jul 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 430, in-letter 
no.5012 of 1885. 
22. The Queensland Times, 29 Nov 1883. 
23. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Sep 1883, report of Brisbane City Council's 
inspector Noble. The streets concerned were Queen and George 
Streets. Wharf Street was also extremely defective. 
24. See for example. Ibid., 17 Feb 1886; letter to editor from H.P. 
But see also Ibid., 15 Mar 1884; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
14 Mar 1884, during which Thomas Finney attacked the Brisbane 
City Council for the "simply abominable", "unendurable" smells near 
his premises on Queen and Edward streets. Ibid., 25 Mar 1884; 
Minutes of Brisbane City Council, being the report of the city 
engineer, tracing the smell to Finney's own water closets, and 
Finney Isles to Town Clerk, 25 Mar 1884, Q.S.A. 1BRI/B3, letter 
no.189 of 1884, and Finney Isles to Mayor of Brisbane, 15 Apr 1884, 
Q.S.A. 1BRI/B3, letter no.239 of 1884, denying that his sanitary 
arrangements were the source of the trouble. 
25. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Nov 1883. 
26. Ibid., 26 Feb 1884. 
27. Ibid., 20 Jul 1885; letter to editor from Ratepayer. 
77. 
Spring Hollow drain contains very strong elements of sewage 
indeed. Everything there,... urinal drainage;, stable refuse, 
slopwater, house water... all except a small fraction 
excrementitious. 28 
Things were no better in the suburbs, where drainage nuisances 
"so horrible that we think it better to leave /them/ undescribed", 
29 ~ 
existed. Indeed in 1889, the Central Board of Health complained that 
whole districts in the city_and suburbs_/were/ absolutely 
undrained.... and /that the/ soil /was/ becoming sodden 
with the stuff, solid and liquid, from which fever germs 
spring and spread. 30 
None of these nuisances was as extensive nor as horrific as the Stratton 
Street drain. This badly neglected channel had effected the Stratton 
31 
estate and other low-lying portions of Booroodabin for some ten years, 
28. Ibid., 25 Sep 1885; letter to editor from W.F. Taylor, giving the 
testimony of Drs. Richard Rendle and Taylor. The latter was an 
accepted expert on drainage and other sanitary matters. See for 
example "Report on Water Supply and Sewage Disposal; by W.F. 
Taylor, M.D., M.R.C.S.,'^ Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, III (1885), 555-594. 
29. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Nov 1883; sub editorial. 
30. Ibid., 24 Jan 1889; main editorial. This was in spite of the 
Brisbane Town Clerk's report to the central board in 1886 in 
which he claimed a vastly improved condition after the expenditure 
ofi£'26,330 1. 3 exclusive of the monies laid out in drainage 
work, forming gutters, and other sanitary matters. The central 
board was astonished at the report which it regarded as neither 
fair nor true, and a committee of enquiry was set up to look 
into the matter. Ibid., 27 Feb 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 26 Feb 1886. For a few other examples of inadequate 
drainage see Ibid., 31 Jan 1900, for an account of Southport's 
Nerang street drain nuisance, A. Jefferis Turner, M.D., Health 
Officer for Central and Northern Queensland to Mayor of Gladstone, 
7 Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 239, in-letter no.10770 of 1900, for a 
description of Gladstone's mud flat drainage problems. The 
Brisbane Courier, 1 Mar and 2 Mar 1901, for John Simpson's 
scathing report on Booroodabin's Rozetta swamp. The Port Douglas 
and Mossman Record,15 Apr, 29 Apr and 6 May 1903; editorial, for 
extensive discussion of drainage problems in Port Douglas, and 
John Simpson, Chief Inspector, Health Department to Commissioner 
of Public Health, 5 Feb 1906, Q.S.A. COL/A 878, in-letter no.9706 
of 1906, for an appreciation of the special dangers of inadequate 
drainage and other sanitary problems in such northern towns as 
Rockhampton, Charters Towers and Cairns. 
31. Apparently the drain had been in existence for at least twenty 
years, though its harmful effects had been felt for the shorter 
period. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Jun 1883; letter to editor from 
J.L. Bourne. Bourne was a medical practitioner who called himself 
a health officer. 
78. 
exposing "the life and health of the inhabitants to serious risk". 
32 
It first attracted press attention in 1883, when a meeting of ratepayers 
denounced the Booroodabin Board for the "highly reprehensible" general 
neglect of the drainage of the division, and more specifically, for 
33 the widening and deepening of the Stratton Street drain. 
The new extensions created enormous possibilities for 
environmental pollution. The open drain was 
fourteen feet wide /and from three to five feet deep^ / 
down the middle of the street (which /was/ fifty-two 
feet wide) leaving a narrow lane on either side. 34 
Nearby residents, though bemoaning the drain's existence, were not 
slow to take advantage of its potential. A bitter Booroodabin Board 
35 
Chairman, mindful of the enormous cost of cleansing the channel, 
complained that some people in the area had 
turned this drain into a receptacle for all their 
household refuse and assured the Board that hiaman 
excrement had been repeatedly emptied into it. 36 
This was not the only, or even the biggest problem facing the 
board. The lack of aproper drainage scheme for that part of Brisbane 
bounded by Gregory Terrace and Boundary Street had for long resulted 
in the flooding of the lower portion of Fortitude Valley and the 
Stratton estate with the storm and surface waters from the York and 
37 Spring Hollows. In 1884, both the government of Queensland and the 
Brisbane City Council appeared to have excellent plans for alleviating 
32. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jun 1883; letter to editor from A. Ratepayer. 
33. Ibid., 21 Apr 1883; Meeting of Booroodabin ratepayers chaired by 
B.D. Morehead. Another meeting, also chaired by Morehead, was 
held in June. Ibid., 21 Jun 1883. The sceptical might wonder if 
that gentleman's burst of activity on behalf of the ratepayers had 
anything to do with his candidacy for the seat of Fortitude Valley 
in the 1883 elections. Morehead actually represented Balonne from 
October 1883 until he went to the upper house for the second time 
in June 1896. Waterson, Biographical Register, p.130. 
34. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Jun 1883; letter to editor from J.L. Bourne. 
The first petitioners who protested the enlargement of the drain 
were more concerned with limbs than life. The Brisbane Courier 
also took the board to task over this aspect of the nuisance. 
Ibid., 6 Jun 1883. 
35. The previous bill for cleansing was £20, and the absence from work 
of three employees, who "were laid up with fever". Ibid., 
5 Jan 1884; Minutes of Booroodabin Divisional Board, 4 Jan 1884. 
36. Ibid. 
37. See Within, p.15, for the difficulties of coping with drainage 
from the York's Hollow manure depot. The Spring Hollow area alone 
was about 205 acres and the approximate size of the two hollows 
was 352 acres. 
79. 
38 
this vexatious problem. By the end of 1885, the municipal council was 
well on the way to completing drainage works between Wickham and James 
Streets, while the government was constructing a channel "through what 
39 
was known as the disputed territory". But the failure of the 
Booroodabin Board to do its share to carry out all of these elaborate 
40 intentions, created new and bigger problems for that board itself, 
and eventually, after the initiation of Supreme Court proceedings, for 
the Brisbane authorities as well. 
In the meantime, the "exceedingly offensive, dreadfully bad 
stench" arising from the Stratton Street drain attracted the attention 
of two medical members of the Central Board of Health, Drs. Marks and 
Bancroft. A protracted correspondence followed, underlining the 
difficulties faced by the central board in wresting co-operation from 
local authorities, who in turn were anxious about the mounting costs 
of disease prevention through large cleansing operations. At no time 
did the Booroodabin board deny the truth of the doctors' claims about 
the state of the drain, or the likelihood that it might cause disease. 
But the board refused to contemplate the expense of lining the watercourse 
with the stone facing which was necessary if more than temporary abatement 
44 
of the nuisance was to be achieved. 
Booroodabin authorities were also reluctant to accept the sole 
responsibility for the removal of the filth, a good deal of which 
reached their division from areas under the jurisdiction of the municipal 
38. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Mar 1884; Minutes of Booroodabin Board. 
Letter from Mayor of Brisbane to board, printed in full. See also 
City Engineer to Mayor of Brisbane, 4 Mar 1884, Q.S.A. 1BRI/B3, 
letter no.114 of 1884. 
39. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Sep 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
11 Sep 1885, report on Valley drainage works by Dr. Hill V/ray. 
40. Extract of minutes of Central Board of Health meeting held 12 Jan 
1886, filed under Central Board of Health to Booroodabin Board, 
12 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 461, letter no.0269 of 1886. 
41. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Jul 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 17 Jul 1885. 
42. Unnumbered extracts of proceedings of various Central Board of Health 
meetings held between 17 Jul and 23 October 1885, concerning the 
Stratton street drain, filed under Central Board of Health to 
Booroodabin Board, 12 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 461, letter no.0269 
of 1886. 
43. Letters from Booroodabin Board to Central Board of Health, 10 Aug 
and 9 Sep 1885, filed under Q.S.A. COL/A 461, letter no.0269 of 1886. 
44. Ibid., letter from Central Board of Health to Booroodabin board, 
l7~Xug 1885. 
80. 
45 
council - a matter over which they were already in dispute. Even when 
attempts were made to clear out the accumulated ordure,which had made its 
way to the "low and swampy" James Street-Stratton Street drain area, the 
result was a strewing of the roads with "slimy mud and rusty dangerous 
Af\ 
tins", from which "in fact the smell was sickening". 
Early in the following year. The Brisbane Courier began an attack 
on the Stratton Street drain because, it was alleged, its "filthy and 
dangerous state" made it a serious source of typhoid fever. At the 
Central Board of Health, Dr. Thomson castigated the Booroodabin board 
for its failure to "put an end to a most disgraceful nuisance", 
suggesting that disputes between the board and the municipal council 
should not be allowed to jeopardise that matter "of the utmost importance 
... the health of the city". The doctor moved 
that the Booroodabin Divisional Board, having made 
default in making, maintaining and cleaning the drain in 
that Division known as the Stratton Drain, this Board do 
recommend that the Governor in Council should insist on 
the Booroodabin Board performing its duty in the matter 
of such complaint and limiting a time for its performance 
in accordance with the 15th Section of the Health Act of 
1884. 49 
At the same time, the central board urged Colonial Secretary Griffith 
to initiate a short piece of legislation which would ensure that all 
creeks, rivers and watercourses would be kept free from pollution, and 
that all visible stagnant water should be drained away, but the minister 
45. Ibid., extract from minutes of Central Board of Health held on 
28 August 1885. 
46. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Dec 1885; Deputation to Premier from 
Booroodabin and Ithaca Divisional Boards concerning the Enoggera 
Creek manure depot, the Stratton drain, and the Milton cemetery 
swamp, 17 Dec 1885. See also Mayor of Brisbane to Colonial 
Secretary, 18 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 448, in-letter no.9618 of 
1885, in which Benjam^ ji Babbidge denied that the "cleansing of 
the city... result/ed/ in an accumulation of filth within the 
Booroodabin Division". 
47. Report of Inspector J. Marlow, in extract of minutes of Central 
Board of Health held 12 January 1886, filed under Central Board of 
Health to Booroodabin Board, 12 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 461, letter 
no.0269 of 1886. 
48. "No fewer than fifteen men employed on the excavation of the Gas 
Company's new works have... typhoid fever... and the famous 
Stratton drain is asserted to be... responsible for some of the 
mischief". The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jan 1886. 
49. Extract of minutes filed under Q.S.A. COL/A 461, letter no.0269 
of 1886. 
simply acknowledged the suggestion and returned it to the board 
81. 
50 
The government also declined to take the central board's advice 
on the Stratton Street drain, even though complaints that the nuisance 
52 
was the direct cause of fevers and death were increasing. This was 
hardly surprising, for according to John Marlow, 
the drain /yas/ if possibl_e i_n a worse state than before. 
The bottom_of_the drain /was/ covered with old kerosene 
tins and /wa_s/ also evidently used for the purpose of a 
manure depot..._; The smell arising from the accumulation 
of filth reach/ed/ Ann Street and the Breakfast Creek 
Road.... This Stratton Drain /was/ a most serious 
nuisance and very dangerous to the public health, and 
should be thoroughly cleaned out and stone faced.... 53 
In defiance of this damning report, and to the amazement of 
contemporary observers, the Booroodabin Board which had cried poor 
whenever the necessary permanent improvements to the Stratton drain 
were proposed, now determined to place £2,000 of its surplus funds at 
54 fixed deposit. Even worse, in the opinion of Dr. John Thomson, who 
was mystified as to how a drain "full of stinking ink coloured sewage.... 
had been allowed to exist so long", the Booroodabin Board had engaged 
on a lawsuit to determine the Brisbane corporation's liability for the 
50. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 15 Feb 1886, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 455, in-letter no.1148 of 1886, and Under Colonial Secretary 
to Central Board of Health, 26 Feb 1886, Q.S.A. COL/G 33, out-
letter no.615 of 1886. 
51. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Feb 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 26 Feb 1886. The Booroodabin Board had promised to clean 
out the drain and the Colonial Secretary therefore decided to 
allow the matter to stand until after the May sitting of parliament. 
Marginal note on Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
3 Apr 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 459, in-letter no.2571 of 1886. 
52. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Mar 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 12 Mar 1886. The normal unpleasantness was exacerbated by 
the Gas Company which partially obstructed that part of the channel 
which ran through its property. The complaints were in letters and 
by deputation to the central board. See for example. Petition of 
March 9th to Board of Health, Brisbane, from forty ratepayers of 
the Booroodabin Division, filed under Central Board of Health to 
Colonial Secretary, 13 Mar 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 459, in-letter 
no.2108 of 1886. 
53. Dr. Hill I'/ray to Under Colonial Secretary, 19 Mar 1886, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 459, in-letter no.2088 of 1886, enclosing unniombered copy 
of Marlow's report of 4 March 1886. 
54. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Apr 1886; Minutes of Booroodabin Divisional 
Board. The board had a bank balance of -^ 3,868, part of which had 
been extracted from the government as endowments, paid under the 
Health Act of 1884. See Within, p.61. An astonished Brisbane 
Courier, claiming that the decision "was a remarkable one" in view 
of the source of two-thirds of the money asked, "Do the Boardsmen 
suppose that their Division is in a state of absolute perfection?" 
82. 
state of the Stratton channel. As Thomson stressed, this action 
could only delay remedies which were "a matter of life and death to 
many of the residents there". 
At long last, the Queensland government, which had so far shown 
57 great patience with Booroodabin, began to pressure the board, which 
58 
resulted in more promises of immediate action from that body. Indeed, 
when the work had been done, further inspections of the Stratton drain 
appeared to vindicate the board's decision to venture into court. For 
although the drain had been cleared so that 
the water now /ran/ freely there, /it wa^/ nevertheless 
an intolerable nuisance still, in consequence of the 
character of the discharge from the municipal drain. 59 
Certainly this was the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Harding, 
who found favour of the divisional board. The "municipality had 
exceeded the rights of the dominant tenement over the servient tenement 
by creating a nuisance", a judgement which The Brisbane Courier, The 
Daily Observer, and the Brisbane City Council, found very hard to 
55. In fact the action brought by Booroodabin against Brisbane in the 
Supreme Court concerned the James Street drain in particular. The 
Brisbane Courier, 1 Jun 1886; sub editorial and a very large amount 
of general reporting. But since this drain joined the Stratton 
channel and since refuse entered the latter from the city via 
James Street, both Drs. Hill Wray and Thomson probably felt 
justified in speaking of their main concern, the Booroodabin 
watercourse, in this somewhat misleading way. 
56. Ibid., 3 Apr 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 2 Apr 1886. 
57. Ibid., Minutes of Booroodabin Divisional Board. 
58. Ibid., 17 Apr 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 16 Apr 
1886. In fact John Marlow found that the work had not been done, 
or at least not to his satisfaction. Mud, tins, and other refuse 
had been thrown on the banks to lie stinking in the sun, instead 
of being carted away. 
59. The Brisbane Courier, 15 May 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 May 1886, report of Booroodabin board sanitary inspector. 
60. Although Harding gave judgement for Booroodabin and granted a 
suspended injunction against the Brisbane City Council, he did not 
award damages to the division and gave the municipal authorities 
adequate time to do the necessary work. Ibid., 1 Jun 1886; 
Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 31 May 1886. See also City 
of Brisbane Mayor's Report 1887-88 (Brisbane, 1888), pp.25-26. 
83. 
understand and very difficult to accept. To the dismay of angry city 
councillors, for once British experience and a British law which had 
gradually grown to full development over eight hundred years, simply 
was not applicable to a new country like Queensland. The government 
64 
was urged to provide fresh legislation, and Samuel Griffith promised 
the matter "careful attention". 
The results of Harding's decision were very far-reaching. It 
led to renewed talk of a "united municipality", or at least to the 
allocation of fixed drainage areas with the "cost of the works /being/ 
f\ 7 
relatively borne". It resulted in severe parliamentary criticism of 
the Central Board of Health's apparent inability to deal quickly and 
successfully with grave dangers to the public health. When 
negotiations between the city and Booroodabin over methods of building 
61. Harding found that "'all lands are of necessity burdened with a 
servitude to receive and discharge all waters which naturally 
flow down to them from lands on a higher level' but.... if the 
proprietor of the higher lands altered the natural condition of 
his property,... he would be responsible for all damage thereby 
caused to the possessor of the lower land". Harding's emphasis 
was on the natural. "So long as he was natural he was safe". 
The Brisbane Courier, 1 Jun 1886; report of Booroodabin Divisional 
Board versus the Mayor and Corporation of Brisbane before Mr. 
Justice Harding in the Supreme Court, Ibid., 2 Jun 1886; sub 
editorial. The Daily Observer, 2 Jun 1886, and James Hipwood, 
Mayor of Brisbane to Chief Secretary, 7 Jun 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 
469, in-letter no.4376 of 1886. Hipwood enclosed cuttings from 
The Brisbane Courier and The Daily Observer, which upheld his 
position, for the minister's perusal. 
62. One of the most disturbed members was John McMaster. The Brisbane 
Courier, 31 May 1886. 
63. The Daily Observer claimed that to try to apply English principles 
to a new country was "absurd". Ibid., 2 Jun 1886, yet the Queensland 
parliament did this constantly throughout the whole history of 
the public health in the colony. 
64. Mayor of Brisbane to Chief Secretary, 7 Jun 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 469, 
in-letter no.4376 of 1886. 
65. Griffith's marginal comment on Hipwood's letter above. 
66. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Jun 1886; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
31 May 1886. 
67. Ibid., 1 Jul 1886, report of Thomas Kirk, acting city engineer, on 
the effects of Harding's judgement. Kirk was strongly in favour of 
conveying all sewage directly to the river, as the most economical 
and suitable system. 
68. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, L (1886), 1128. John McMaster 
during the supply debate. 
84. 
and paying for the necessary improvem.ents and extensions to the drain 
69 broke down, the outcome was a local authority conference on the 
70 drainage question as it related to upper and lower tenements. Finally, 
problems over land levels, the drain sizes, and the provision of funds, 
sent a Booroodabin board deputation scurrying to see the Treasurer of 
n 1 ^ 71 Queensland. 
James Dickson, anxious "that a large and populous neighbourhood 
should be relieved from the danger of disease and inconvenience", and 
that the citizens should be denied the opportunity to raise a furore 
over any delays, urged the boardsmen to make haste with the project, 
72 
and promised them precedence over all other claims on the public purse. 
And after the Booroodabin board's receipt of an ci^  11,000 government loan, 
the extraction of aj63,000 compensatory payment from the Brisbane City 
74 Council, and some excellent work on the part of the contractor and 
his men. The Brisbane Courier was able to announce that 
73 
/t/hat famous and now historical Stratton ditch 
extending from James Street to Longland Street and 
near the Brisbane Gas Company's new works has been 
completely done away with.... Work now completed 
cannot fail to be of lasting benefit to the 
thickly populated neighbourhood through which it 
passes,... and the benefit... to residents and 
property owners is incalculable. 75 
69. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Nov 1886; report of drainage conference, 
17 Nov 1886. Brisbane, Ithaca, Toowong, and Woolloongabba sent 
representatives, but the Booroodabin board did not attend. 
70. Ibid., 23 and 28 Oct 1886. 
71. Ibid., 19 Nov 1886; report of Booroodabin board's deputation to 
Treasurer Dickson, 18 Nov 1886. 
72. Ibid., The fact that this money was made available with such speed 
when the treasury was so low, and the government had recently had 
to cope with an expensive cholera scare, shows the proportions which 
the Stratton drain nuisance had assumed in the government's eyes. 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, L (1886), 1129. 
73. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jan 1887; Minutes of Booroodabin Board. 
74. Mayor's Report 1887-88, p.26. See also The Brisbane Courier, 
11 Jan 1887; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 10 Jan 1887, Ibid., 
28 Jan 1887; Minutes of adjourned meeting of Brisbane City Council, 
and Ibid., 21 May 1887; Minutes of special meeting of Booroodabin 
Divisional Board, 20 May 1887. 
75. The offending drain had been taken completely underground by means 
of a tunnel fitted out with flushing chambers, massive iron access 
doors which acted as valves, manholes and so on. The Brisbane 
Courier, 21 Jun 1887. 
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Many drainage nuisances remained, and in the Central Board of 
Health at least, pessimism over the sanitary situation persisted. But 
with the elimination of the Stratton Street blight, a considerable 
break through had been achieved, to the immeasurable improvement of a 
small part of Queensland's environment. Moreover, the successful 
completion of this relatively large engineering projiect in the short 
space of six months gave heart and example to other local authorities 
throughout the colony which suffered the unbearable effects of similar 
large nuisances. 
Only one other environmental problem, noxious trades, will be 
dealt with very briefly here, though many others, such as the struggle 
to initiate a thorough-going, efficient scavenging service for 
Brisbane and other Queensland cities and towns was also of immense 
importance in the history of the public health in this state. 
One of the earliest noxious trade problems, produced as men went 
about their normal business in the infant colony of Queensland, 
concerned the ubiquitous butchers' shops and boiling down works. An 
1865 protester, concerned over the air in the vicinity of one such 
establishment, claimed that it was 
loaded with the effluvium of a frightfully dangerous 
description, while the ground /was/ covered with 
bones, skulls, hides, horns etc. etc. in all stages 
of decomposition. Joking apart, the nuisance in 
question is of a most dangerous description calling for 
immediate eradication. 77 
Things had not changed much some twenty or thirty years later. 
Three butchers died in the Brisbane hospital, allegedly because of 
78 
the conditions under which they worked, and abominable stenches, 
resulting from the run-off from butchers' shops in the main street of 
Brisbane and in Ithaca, made life unbearable for all other shopkeepers 
76. Attempts to bring in regular rubbish removals for Brisbane were 
long drawn out and parallel the nightsoil removal problem. 
The need to educate citizens to understand the importance of 
keeping their premises clean and the struggle to encourage them 
to pay for such services is also similar to the other refuse 
saga. 
77. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jan 1865; letter to editor from Pure 
Air. 
78. Ibid., 23 Apr 1884. 
86. 
79 
and residents in that area. The associated trades of fellmongering 
and tanning, and full-scale slaughtering yards caused even more 
distress. At the worst abattoirs, inspectors found "all manner of 
animal matter, sweltering and putrifying, contaminating the atmosphere 
80 
and breeding countless swarms of maggots". Dr. Kebbell found 
conditions at one Woolloongabba tannery so bad, that he ordered 
81 
immediate improvements under the threat of immediate closure, and 
John McMaster complained to parliament about the pollution of streams by 
a tannery and slaughterhouse, "that was a great hardship to the population 
82 
of Nundah and the district of Eagle Farm". Other protests came from 
Dr. Armstrong and some residents in Toowoomba about the pollution of 
Cowrie creek by tanneries which rendered the water "highly dangerous 
8 3 
for public use". 
One very foul slaughterhouse, which emitted "smells most injurious 
to health", was that owned by Messrs. Baynes and Walmsley in 
Woolloongabba. Inspectors claimed that if this nuisance was not 
84 
abolished at once a grave outbreak of fever might be expected. Baynes's 
yards were still operating as IValmsley and Company, though Baynes, who 
was standing in a local government election at the time, defended them 
strongly, refusing to alter his methods and blaming the nearby Burnett's 
79. Ibid., 27 Feb 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 26 Feb 
1886, Ibid., 1 Mar 1886; letter to editor from Sparkes 5 M'Kinnon 
denying the charge. Ibid., 5 Mar 1886; sub editorial confirming 
the intensity of the smell. Ibid., 13 Mar 1886; Minutes of Central 
Board of Health, 12 Mar 1886, report of John Marlow tracing the 
nuisance to small goods boiler. Sparkes § M'Kinnon were also in 
trouble over their slaughterhouses in Enoggera which were infested 
with pigs and from which a dreadful smell "was spread broadcast over 
the neighbourhood". Ibid., 22 Apr 1886. The Enoggera boardsmen 
found the place even worse two years later. Ibid., 7 Dec 1888, but 
in spite of this, the company's licence to slaughter was renewed by 
the Brisbane Licensing court. For the Ithaca nuisance see Ibid., 
27 Apr 1889, and Ibid., 4 Jul 1890; Minutes of Ithaca Divisional 
Board. 
80. Report of Dr. John Thomson on five slaughterhouses in Lutwyche, 
8 April 1878, filed under John Bale to Colonial Secretary, 2 Mar 
1881, Q.S.A. COL/A 308, in-letter no.981 of 1881. Thomson made 
another inspection in 1881 as the nuisance continued unabated, 
with similar results. He was still convinced that slaughter yeards 
were a possible source of typhoid in 1884. The Brisbane Courier, 
25 Apr 1884; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 24 Apr 1884. 
81. Ibid., 4 Mar 1887. 
82. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LV (1888), 994. 
83. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Nov 1888; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 16 Nov 1888. 
84. Ibid., 17 Oct 1884; Minutes of Woolloongabba Divisional Board, 
health committee's report. 
87. 
85 
swamp and Chinamen's gardens for the very obvious stinks. 
Slaughterhouses and butchers' shops were still the subject of 
intense scrutiny up to 1914, and of course beyond, but the emphasis in 
the twentieth century was on cleanliness of utensils, unblemished beasts, 
and general spotlessness of premises rather than on smells. Tanneries, 
fellmongeries, wool scours and glue piece factors' premises, were also 
closely inspected. The fact that pressure of other work was allowed to 
preclude the inspector from furnishing a report in 1906, may mean 
Rf\ 
that by that time the works were satisfactory enough, though this is 
by no means certain. Grave shortages of staff plagued the department 
in that year, and to the regret of chief inspector Simpson, some 
"useful work /including the inspection of a few slaughter yards/... 
87 had to be set aside owing to the lack of assistant inspectors". 
This was a far cry from the 1880's when the growing complaints 
prompted a mayoral call for the establishment of public abattoirs. 
These would not only eliminate the contemporary haphazard method of 
slaughtering animals for food, but would at the same time, provide a 
central slaughterhouse which would be outside the control of powerful 
88 
vested interests. Implicit in the scheme was the real possibility of 
a properly inspected, thoroughly clean establishment. But as butchers' 
shops and slaughterhouses, with their attendant piggeries, continued to 
85. Ibid., 2 Feb 1886, Ibid., 2 Oct 1886, Ibid., 16 Jun 1888; report 
of public meeting of South Brisbane residents, and Ibid., 2 Jul 
1888, "unbiased" report of Brisbane Courier representative. 
86. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 200. 
87. John Simpson to Dr. B. Burnett Ham, 5 Feb 1906, Q.S.A. COL/A 878, 
in-letter no.9706 of 1906. 
88. Mayor of Brisbane to Colonial Secretary, 6 Jun 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 
362, in-letter no.2831 of 1883. Mcllwraith's view was that this 
was a local authority matter. Marginal comment on above. 
The government did approve a by-law to prevent the improper 
carriage of meat, which helped to clean up the "barbarous and 
disgusting" meat carts, which were covered with dust and flies, 
at least a little. See The Brisbane Courier, 6 Nov 1884; sub 
editorial. Mayor of Brisbane to Colonial Secretary, 17 Dec 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 409, in-letter no.8814, and Queensland Government 
Gazette, XXXVI (1885), 305. 
88. 
89 pollute the water and poison the air throughout the 1880's and 1890's, 
the Central Board of Health joined the Brisbane authorities in calling 
90 
on the government to provide public abattoirs. Realising the large 
amount of butcher meat consumed in Australia in proportion to its 
91 population, and the consequent necessity that the produce be as 
pure as possible, the board kept up this pressure in the face of 
92 government refusals. 
As repeated accounts of renewed licences being granted to 
93 
slaughtermen who kept foul premises filled the newspaper columns, 
a specially convened conference of Brisbane local authorities met to 
discuss the slaughterhouse conditions, and to urge upon the government 
94 
"the necessity of at once erecting public abattoirs". But in spite 
of this request, and the long and bitter newspaper tirade on the state 
95 
of the meat trade, it was not until 1897 that a really comprehensive 
96 
slaughtering bill was proposed. It was not until the following year 
that the bill 
89. Pigs were fed butchers' offal as one way of reducing pollution. 
For protests over this and other nuisances connected with the 
slaughterhouses see Town Clerk to Colonial Secretary, 30 Sep 
1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 402, in-letter no.6808 of 1884,and The Brisbane 
Courier, 4 Oct 1884; report of deputation to Colonial Secretary, 
3 Oct 1884. 
90. Ibid., 24 Jul 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 23 Jul 1886. 
91. It was impossible for contemporaries to estimate exactly how much 
meat was consumed per head of population. However, it was calculated 
that the meat taken by one person per week would be "more than 
sufficient for a whole family in England". Ibid., 3 Jan 1887 -
article on the supply and consumption of meat in Australia. 
92. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jun 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 10 Jun 1887, letter to the Chief Secretary, printed 
in full. See also Ibid., 30 Jul 1887; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 29 Jul 1887. 
93. By the Brisbane Licensing Court. See for example. Ibid., 10 Oct 
1889, Ibid., 16 Oct 1889; sub editorial. Ibid., 5 Dec 1889, Ibid., 
7 Dec 1889, Ibid., 24 Dec 1889; Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
23 Dec 1889, Ibid., 11 Jan 1890; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
10 Jan 1890, The Queensland Times, 18 Jan 1890; letter to editor 
from B, and The Brisbane Courier, 1 Feb 1890; Minutes of Central 
Board of Health, 31 Jan 1890. 
94. Ibid., 10 Oct 1889. 
95. See for example. Ibid., 24 Jan 1890; main editorial. Ibid., 30 Jan 
1890; letter to editor from Hygiene, Ibid., 29 Mar 1890; sub 
editorial. Ibid., 3 Apr 1890; letter to editor from Consumer, Ibid., 
11 Jun 1890; sub editorial. 
96. Confidential letter from Under Secretary, Justice Department, to 
Under Secretary, Home Department, 25 Aug 1897, Q.S.A. HOM/A 12, 
in-letter no.10910 of 1897 enclosing copies of proposed 
Slaughtering Bill of 1897. 
89. 
framed in the direction of obtaining a thorough inspection 
of slaughterhouses, the establishment of public abattoirs, 
and the proper regulations of all matters connected with 
the slaugher and sale of meat 
97 
was passed. Even then the Act, which repealed five existing Acts, 
98 
was to be brought into operation by proclamation only when necessary. 
As late as 1913, in the opinion of one observer, who poured very drastic 
criticism on the slaughterhouses of both Brisbane and the country centres 
of Queensland, the sanitary condition of these places was very badly 
99 
neglected, and vested interests had not yet lost their powers. 
The sugar industry was another stronghold of the well-established, 
and another source of pollution and complaint. Some of the worst single 
instances of very gross nuisance were provided by the sugar mills of 
Queensland. For instance, at Hemmant, the effluent from the Clydesdale 
Mill which was allowed to lie in open drains, created "a smell worse 
than a dozen manure depots", and in the opinion of Drs. Thomson and 
Wray of the Central Board of Health, would certainly account for the 
sickness of the nearby residents. But the company, although 
acknowledging its liability, refused to remove the nuisance. 
97. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXX (1898), 1567. 
98. The Slaughtering Act of 1898, Queensland Government Gazette, 
II (1898), 1545. 
99. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Oct 1913; letter to editor from Edward 
W. Archer, a pastoralist, had been a federal parliamentarian 
from 1906 to 1910, and represented Normanby in the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly from March 1914 to May 1915. In his letter 
Archer refers in glowing terms to the South Australian abattoirs'. 
The southern colonies had always been ahead of Queensland in the 
provision of this service, but the advice given by New South Wales 
probably influenced the Queensland government against the 
establishment of public works. See especially Ibid., 30 Jun 1885; 
Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 29 Jun 1885, letter from New 
South Wales Colonial Secretary to Colonial Secretary Queensland, 
intimating that freezing arrangements and desiccating works were 
far from satisfactory, and the abattoirs were to be closed. See 
also Ibid., 16 Dec 1886, report on the abattoirs of Sydney and 
Melbourne from P.R. Gordon, chief inspector of stock, and "Royal 
Commission on the Meat Industry", Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 
II (1913), pp.677 ff. 
100. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Sep 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 11 Sep 1885. According to Dr. Thomson this was the worst 
smell he had ever encountered. Similar instances occurred in 
Maryborough, Bundaberg, Mackay and Townsville. The sugar 
industry polluted in another way, according to Dr. Thomas Lane 
Bancroft, through the shocking conditions and housing given to 
Kanakas on the fields. Thomas Lane Bancroft to Colonial Secretary, 
25 Sep 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 439, in-letter no.7315 of 1885. The 
Queensland Times was extremely critical of "King Sugar" for this 
reason as well. Ibid., 17 Nov 1885; sub editorial. 
90. 
Many citizens, alert to the impossibility of shifting offending 
industries once they had become established, brought very vigorous 
protest to bear on anyone foolhardy enough to propose rope factories for 
102 103 
South Brisbane, chemical manufacturing in the Ithaca division, and 
104 
soap factories at Hill End. But the whole question of noxious trades 
was a very difficult one, both for officialdom and for the residents 
concerned. Given the early implicit belief in the miasmatic theory of 
disease transmission, and the background of many new Australians who 
were only too well aware of the dangers pouring from the "dark satanic 
Mills" of their English home-towns, it was hardly surprising that, 
having settled in Queensland, they should object to the 
- steam mills which /were appearing/ in every direction, 
poking their brick noses alias chimneys skyward... and 
bidding fair to annihilate every vestige of uncombed 
nature. 105 
Clauses attempting to prevent belching chimneys and stinking 
effluent were written into the Health Act of 1884. But it was very 
clearly brought before the citizens of Queensland, that although 
nuisances should if possible be suppressed, business - which was 
essential to the economic health of the colony - was not to be 
interfered with m any way. 
This was a principle very well understood by the people of 
Maryborough,who were fearful of the possible health risks presented by 
108 
a proposed soap factory in the area, but were more afraid that the 
101. In fact established industries were actually protected under the 
Health Act of 1884, whereas new industries had to prove themselves 
innocuous to the public health before being set up. Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 572. 
102. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Dec 1884; letter to editor from Pedestrian. 
103. Ibid., 13 Oct 1885, report of a very largely attended public 
meeting objecting to the Elliott Brothers'factory which was to 
produce chemicals. 
104. Ibid., 12 Nov 1885; letter to editor from Nausea. 
105. Ibid., 11 Sep 1871; article from a "Special Correspondent". 
106. See in particular The Health Act of 1884, Part V, Clause 71 (7), 
Queensland Government Gazette, II (1884), 1430. 
107. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 572. 
108. Very strong objections were presented by some ratepayers who were 
backed by some aldermen. The Colonist, 1 May 1886. 
91. 
"stamping out of all new industries in the town" would lead to economic 
109 
stagnation and increased unemployment. For the same reason, the 
Bulimba Divisional Board was only too eager to welcome the chemical 
factory which had been refused a place in Ithaca - again despite 
-^  • . ^ 111 some quite vigorous protest. 
As early as 1889, Dr. Joseph Bancroft tentatively proposed the 
segregation of industry from populous areas of the capital, on the 
112 lines of the Sydney experiment. But the government had not advanced 
very far from its 1884 position, and a further suggestion from the Central 
Board of Health, that the government should prevent the indiscriminate 
113 
setting up of noxious trades and manufactories, also fell on deaf ears. 
Even in 1913, local authorities in Brisbane were still questioning 
whether so-called noxious trades should be relegated to defined areas, 
though most had no difficulty in recognising health hazards from 
chimneys and drains, if others besides themselves or their vested 
interests were apparently at fault. Certainly by this time, local 
authorities were much better informed and far better equipped to deal 
with noxious trades wherever they arose. 
109. The Colonist, 1 May 1886. 
110. See Within, p. 90. 
111. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jul 1887, Ibid., 8 Sep 1887, several 
letters from doctors and aldermen in Balmain Sydney, defending 
the Elliott Brothers, Ibid., 12 Sep 1887; letter to editor 
from John Moffatt, deploring the works, and Ibid., 13 Sep 1887; 
letter to editor from Bulimba Resident, again protesting. 
112. Ibid., 16 Dec 1889; Minutes of the adjourned meeting of Central 
Board of Health, 15 Dec 1889. 
113. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 1 Jun 1894, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 787 in-letter no.6198 and further letter no.13839 
attached. 
114. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Jun 1913; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 23 Jun 1913. 
115. See for example South Brisbane complaints on the "standing disgrace" 
of the government's chimney stack at the dry dock. Apart from any 
danger to the public health, or perhaps even more importantly than 
that, the councillors were afraid that "if persisted in the smoke 
would ruin the pictures of the South Brisbane Art Gallery"! Ibid., 
26 Aug 1913. 
116. Ibid., 23 Sep 1913; Minutes of South Brisbane Council, 22 Sep 1913. 
92 
Even so, the picture painted in this overview of the environment 
is a grim one of slow, and not always steady improvement in the sanitary 
affairs of the state. But concern over the pollution problem is not, 
as one might sometimes think, the preserve of the 1970's. As doctors, 
engineers, politicians, and the aware general public of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries became increasingly conscious of the need 
for change, reforms were made, and the public health was improved. 
Contemporary understanding went much further than this, for not the 
least of Queensland's problems were the frightening specific diseases 
which held the population in thrall from 1859 to 1914. In many cases, 
the connection of the diseases with the environmental conditions 
present in the developing state seemed painfully clear to those 
professionals charged with their removal. The stories of some of 
those diseases are included here, for they were indeed a great part 
of the problems of Queensland's search for adequate public health. 
TYPHOID FEVER 
In Queensland, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
typhoid fever presented the colonists with the all too familiar faces 
of death and disease, usually associated with the more dreadful exotic 
diseases of cholera, leprosy and bubonic plague. Not only did typhoid 
remove an inordinately large number of sufferers permanently over the 
years under review, it also left those who survived its attack greatly 
debilitated, and with complications which sometimes affected them 
seriously in later life. 
More than any other disease which made its presence felt in 
Queensland, typhoid fitted into the generally accepted medical theories 
of the mid-nineteenth century - that bad smells and dirt caused sickness 
and death. Although scientific advances have been made, this connection 
still cannot be denied; for even today, the incidence of typhoid fever 
in various parts of the world indicates the level of community hygiene. 
Where this is bad, typhoid is apt to be rife. 
Because it affected large numbers of people, many of them in the 
prime of their working lives, Queensland authorities gradually became 
aware that they must prevent the spread of this disease at almost any 
cost. Illness, unemployment, and the indigence of widows and orphans 
unavoidably presented society with that huge account, which is the 
economic cost of ill-health to any nation. As Queensland's Public 
Health Commissioner was to observe in 1911, typhoid, "both from its 
age incidence and the long period of disablement which it causes, is 
a peculiarly costly and uneconomic disease". 
There are yet other reasons for the importance of typhoid fever 
in the history of public health. The discovery that the disease was 
transmissible in water and milk, and carried by flies and human vectors, 
together with the later development of an anti-typhoid vaccine to 
provide immunity, ensures that the story of attempts to conquer typhoid 
in Queensland presents a picture of advancing medical knowledge and 
experiment as it unfolds in the period up to 1914. 
1. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1911), 5. Besides being of 
considerable importance in stimulating moves to improve the public 
health in Queensland, this axiom was the starting point of the 
greatest enquiry ever made into human conditions and ills in the 
nineteenth century. See Flinn, p.58. 
93. 
94. 
One of the greatest problems in tracing the very early incidence 
and therefore, the influence of this disease in Queensland, is the lack 
of accurate information available on the subject. This is partly the 
result of the confusion prevailing amongst medical men, as to the nature 
of typhoid and typhus fevers during the early years of settlement. The 
uncertainty as to the diagnosis of the disease was not confined to 
Australian medical men. Though many scientists had already groped 
towards defining the diseases, it was the American, W.W. Gerhard, who 
first clearly differentiated typhoid from typhus in 1837. Even then, 
many prominent medical writers continued to maintain that the diseases 
were identical. According to Charles Murchison, the author of the 
classic work on continued fevers, this doctrine was still being taught 
in most medical schools, as late as 1863. Not surprisingly, official 
recognition was slow, the distinction between the two fevers being 
adopted in Registrar-Generals' annual reports for Scotland in 1865, 
for England in 1869, for New South Wales in 1875, and for Queensland 
in 1879.^ 
In Australia, early medical men and interested laymen paid little 
or no attention to typhoid fever in their reports of diseases, or in 
addresses before learned societies. Cumpston and McCallum contend that 
typhoid fever was present during the first sixty years of settlement, 
but since it was endemic and sporadic, because the settlements 
themselves were scattered, it caused little alarm. Dr. E. Sandford 
Jackson suggests of Queensland that "if there were a common continued 
fever, it was not typhoid, and it did not find its way into hospital" 
from 1825 to 1849.^ 
By the early 1850's, the interest in fevers as death-dealing 
diseases in Queensland began to build up. The health officer for the 
port of Brisbane refers to the arrival of the ship Rajahgopaul in 1852, 
2. Haagensen and Lloyd, pp.12 and 40. 
3. Lambert, p.316. 
4. J.H.L. Cumpston and F. McCallum, The History of Intestinal 
Infections (and Typhus Fever) in Australia 1788-1923 (Health 
Service Publication, 1927), pp.13, 87, and 281. 
5. Ibid., p.7. 
6. E. Sandford Jackson, "Historical Notes from the Records in the 
Brisbane Hospital (1850-1870)", in the Medical Journal of 
Australia, I, 17 Mar 1923, p.281. 
95. 
stating that many of the immigrants from that vessel "fell sick of 
7 
typhoid en route to the interior", and spread their malady to Ipswich, 
Q 
Drayton and Myall Creek. Dr. Sandford Jackson's research reveals that 
about 1857, Brisbane hospital records began to show evidence of 
9 
appearances of typhoid in the Eagle Farm area of the settlement. The 
Reverend R. Creyke, when addressing the Philosophical Society of 
Queensland on "Public Health in Brisbane", mentioned fever as a frequent 
contributor to the death rate of the capital during the summer months. 
Early in 1864, a considerable alarm was raised in Brisbane when 
the vessel, the Flying Cloud, was accused of introducing a fever "of a 
highly dangerous and infectious nature", which was thought to be either 
typhus cerebralis or typhoid pneumonia. Neither the precise nature 
of the fever, nor the exact cause of the outbreak, seems to have been 
clearly established, though several passengers from the Flying Cloud 
12 
were taken to the Brisbane Hospital suffering from fever. The vessel 
itself was placed in quarantine "in consequence of the appearance of 
13 
fever of a malignant type among the crew", and the ship's surgeon 
was later sentenced to be imprisoned in Brisbane gaol for six months, 
for having given the port health officer a false report on the medical 
14 
condition of the passengers and crew. 
Virulent fever "of a typhoid nature" had allegedly been prevalent 
in Brisbane for at least two months before the Flying Cloud's arrival 
in Moreton Bay, and the cause was obvious to "A Citizen", who, in a 
letter to The Brisbane Courier, drew attention to the shocking state of 
the backyards of the capital. After personal inspection, he reported 
that many contained water closets filled to overflowing with "offensive 
matter... actually flowing about the premises", which with other 
nuisances, were a constant offence to the olfactory nerves. No wonder 
his medical adviser had never seen so many cases of fever in the city 
7. Challinor to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1878, Q.S.A. COL/A 257, 
in-letter no.1766 of 1878. 
8. Moreton Bay Courier, 23 Oct 1852. 
9. Jackson, p.284. 
10. R. Creyke, "Public Health in Brisbane" in Transactions of the 
Philosophical Society of Queensland 1859 to 1872 (Brisbane, 1872). 
No consecutive page numbering. 
11. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Mar 1864. 
12. Ibid., 4 Mar 1864. 
13. Queensland Government Gazette, V (1864), 182. 
14. Cumpston and McCallum, p.336. 
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before, "A Citizen" concluded. This letter and the publicity 
surrounding the Flying Cloud incident, which saw the start of a 
vigorous correspondence in the daily press, brought the typhoid fever 
question before the people of Queensland in a hitherto unprecedented 
manner. 
Public concern and government interest in the typhoid-typhus 
episode gradually diminished as the fever abated, and justice appeared 
to have been done with the conviction of the Flying Cloud's surgeon. 
Yet it is possible to speculate, in the absence of any concrete 
evidence to the contrary, that the severe outbreak of fever in 
Brisbane during 1864, and the public interest it engendered, may have 
played some part in the Executive Council decision of February 1865, 
17 to appoint a central board of health. The government was certainly 
worried over the high death-rate attributed by the Registrar-General 
18 
to miasmatic diseases, which had accounted for the high percentage 
19 20 
of 28.70 deaths in 1864, increasing to 29.54 per cent in 1865. It 
was anticipated that the miasmatic group of diseases, the exciting 
cause of which was thought to be a poison formed by the corruption 
21 
or decomposition of organic matter, would be the first to be 
affected by the initial task proposed for the central board - the 
formulation of some plan to improve the sanitary conditions of towns 
in the colony. 
Attempts to fathom the motivation of the executive to appoint a 
health board are conjectural, and evidence of the incidence of 
typhoid fever in various parts of Queensland up to 1879 is fragmentary. 
15. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Jan 1864; letter to editor from A 
Citizen. 
16. A Citizen followed with another letter to Ibid., 4 Mar 1864, in 
which he accused Dr. W. Hobbs, health officer, of allowing the 
typhoid fever ashore. Hobbs countered, Ibid., 5 Mar 1864, as 
did Captain H.C. Keen, who labelled A Citizen an "ignoramus", and 
Henry Fowler, passenger on the Flying Cloud, Ibid. Dr. William 
Smith, who had theories on the atmospheric causes of diseases 
then entered the controversy in Ibid., 7 Mar 1864. 
17. Executive Council Minutes, 17 Feb 1865, Q.S.A. EXE/Ell, Vol.7 
of 1865. 
18. These included scarlatina, diphtheria, dysentery, and fever. 
19. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1865), 868. 
20. Ibid., (1866), 1260. 
21. Dr. T. Southwood Smith, A Treatise on Fever (1830) quoted in 
Flinn, p.62. 
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But one thing is certain - the findings of the select committee on the 
hospitals of the colony, published in 1866, ended any doubts as to the 
22 
actual presence of "colonial" or typhoid fever in Queensland. The 
prevalence of the disease was attributed by the committee to "the 
large number of immigrants of the poorer class"who had lately arrived 
23 
m crowded and ill-managed vessels, and to navvies who worked on the 
24 
railways. Both of these economically-deprived groups were 
particularly susceptible to typhoid fever, according to the committee 
of investigation, and the disease was authoritatively stated to be 
25 
widespread in Brisbane, Ipswich, Toowoomba and Rockhampton. 
There were very few other official reports published on the 
health situation in Queensland in this period, and except for one 
relating to Toowoomba, these were not concerned with typhoid fever. 
It is ironic, for instance, that a large part of the Central Board of 
Health's progress report for 1877 should have been devoted to fearful 
27 predictions about a possible outbreak of smallpox, while the problems 
of typhoid fever, "the most common of the serious ailments of civilized 
28 
life /from which/ no household is safe", were entirely neglected. The 
main public interest in typhoid fever in Queensland up to 1878, appears 
to have been centred on the arrival of ships carrying fever-stricken 
29 passengers, like the Gauntlet in 1875, and the Windsor Castle in 1877. 
The Windsor Castle was ordered into quarantine by the Brisbane port 
health officer. Dr. Henry Challinor, in spite of the warning of the 
ship's surgeon that it would be "detrimental if not fatal to the health 
of som.e of those who are now in the enjoyment of sound bodily health to 
The 
31 
30 be sent to Peel Island", with its badly run-down "conveniences". 
Central Board of Health overruled the quarantine order in this case, 
informing Dr. Challinor, that the Windsor Castle was to be spared the 
22. Cumpston and McCallum, p.289. 
23. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1866), 1613-17. 
24. Ibid., p.1616. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Within, pp.100-102. 
27. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1145-46 
28. Dr. T.J. Maclagan, "Is Typhoid Fever Contagious?", The Nineteenth 
Century, XXIX, (1879), p.809. 
29. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1877, pp.49 and 51. 
30. Surgeon Superintendent Hickling to Colonial Secretary, 16 Sep 
1877, Q.S.A. COL/A 245, in-letter no.1536 of 1877. 
31. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 17 Sep 1877, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 245, in-letter no.4541 of 1877. 
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inconvenience of quarantine provided no fresh outbreak of disease was 
32 
reported. Challinor complained at once to the Colonial Secretary, 
attempting to expose the "hygienic defect or neglect" on board the 
Windsor Castle which had allowed typhoid fever to develop, defending 
the quarantine station at Peel Island, and expressing his contempt for 
33 the Central Board of Health's advice. Challinor did not voice any 
fears that the population of Queensland would be gravely endangered by 
the release of passengers from the Windsor Castle, though the need for 
protection for the country's permanent residents was implicit in all 
his arguments. 
The situation with regard to typhoid fever had grown infinitely 
worse by 1878, in many parts of Australia. A survey organised in 
New South Wales by the management of the Australian Practitioner, the 
quarterly journal of medical, surgical, and sanitary science in the 
Australian colonies, revealed that typhoid fever headed the list of 
"prevailing preventable diseases" treated by doctors in the preceding 
34 
twelve months. The years 1877-1878 were also notable for the epidemic 
prevalence of typhoid fever in Victoria, admissions to the Melbourne 
hospital for 1878 reaching the highest level for any year between 1860 
35 
and 1883. In Queensland, the need to deal promptly and efficiently 
with any severe outbreak of typhoid fever was brought home forcibly 
to the government by events in Toowoomba, early in that same year. 
Toowoomba had "long enjoyed the reputation of being a healthy, 
salubrious town....free from contagious diseases of every kind". 
This reputation had prevented the Public Health Act of 1872 -
proclaimable in any part of the colony only when formidable epidemics 
threatened - from being extended to the town, and Toowoomba's health 
arrangements had been left in local government hands. Over one 
32. Central Board of Health to Challinor, 17 Sep 1877, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 245, in-letter no.4542 of 1877. 
33. Challinor to Colonial Secretary, 22 Sep 1877, Q.S.A. COL/A 245, 
in-letter no.4640 of 1877. A very incensed Challinor returned 
to the attack during the following year, see Challinor to 
Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1878, Q.S.A. COL/A 257, in-letter no. 
1766 of 1878. Dr. Hickling, the ship's surgeon claimed that 
the patient contracted the disease through "nervous anxiety". 
Hickling to Colonial Secretary, 16 Sep 1877, Q.S.A. COL/A 245, 
in-letter no.1536 of 1877. 
34. Quoted in The Brisbane Courier, 11 Feb 1878. 
35. Cumpston and McCallum, pp.174-5. 
36. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 774. 
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37 hundred cases of typhoid fever, which local medical men attributed 
directly to the pollution of the wells in the district, underlined a 
"state of affairs not very creditable /to those in charge/ of the 
38 
sanitary affairs of the town", and emphasised the need for central 
government interference, if the health of Toowoomba were to be 
restored. Towards the end of April it was reported that while the 
"semi-panic" lasted and "ratepayers would consider no measure too 
arbitrary", the council was moving to flush out some of the most 
noisome water channels. But there was no doubt that even these 
precautions would meet with stiff opposition when "frost had squashed 
the disease". 
In the meantime, Toowoomba suffered under the rule of "King 
Typhoid". Cases were so numerous, that rather than estimate the number 
of families afflicted with the fever, "one counts the households where 
39 it is not". This was a gloomy estimate of the health situation of a 
town which had "hitherto been held up as a sanatorium for the cooped up 
40 
and enfeebled residents of Brisbane", and by 26 April 1878, Premier 
John Douglas, who had a special interest in the Darling Downs area, 
was thoroughly alarmed. He was determined, not only to extend the 
Health Act to Toowoomba to pave the way for the appointment of a local 
41 board of health, but he also set up a special board of enquiry to 
investigate "the cause of the prevalence of typhoid fever at Toowoomba 
and... to report as to the best means to be adopted for the suppression 
of the same". 
In spite of the obvious urgency of the matter, some members of the 
Legislative Assembly attacked the government over the appointment of 
this board, claiming that predictable findings made such appointments 
43 
a "monstrous farce". But in this case the government had acted 
37. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 769. 
38. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Mar 1878. 
39. Ibid., 27 Apr 1878. 
40. Ibid., 16 May 1878; main editorial. 
41. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1878), 49. 
42. Under Colonial Secretary to John Garget, 26 Apr 1878, in Ibid., 
II (1878), 768 and Executive Council Minutes, 25 Apr 1878, 
Q.S.A. EXE/E 40. 
43. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 71. 
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wisely and chosen well. It had set up a working board, two members of 
which - the Mayor of Toowoomba John Garget and the parliamentary 
representative William H. Groom - were familiar with local conditions. 
Together they could ably supplement the work of the third member, 
44 Dr. John Thomson, an acknowledged expert on typhoid fever. 
The board's task was not an easy one, for theories on typhoid 
fever had been varied up to this time, and the bacillus involved was 
not discovered until Carl Eberth isolated it in 1880. But the board 
was offered plenty of advice. In the Queensland Legislative Assem.bly, 
laymen bandied words over the predisposing causes of typhoid fever, 
and The Brisbane Courier offered a choice. 
Opinions are divided as to whether ordinary decomposing 
sewage in water is sufficient to produce the disease, 
some authorities upholding the "emanation" theory, 
whilst others adhere entirely to the transmission theory. 
Probably both are right. There can be no doubt that the 
faecal impurities are a most favourable medium for the 
spread of typhoid poisons. 46 
But in Toowoomba in 1878, Dr. Thomson and his helpers acted upon the 
generally-accepted association of the disease and filth, and on "the 
first tentative working hypothesis /of medical scientist^/ that typhoid 
fever was the result of drinking polluted water". 
The board made house-to-house inspections, visited public 
institutions, Chinese gardens and the tanneries, inspected cesspools 
and wells, interviewed medical men practising in the town, the resident 
dispenser at the Toowoomba hospital, the inspector of police, the 
inspector of nuisances for the Toowoomba council, and the nightman. 
48 Dr. Thomson made assessments and eminently useful suggestions, and 
the report was presented to the minister concerned on 6 May 1878. The 
board found four basic causes for the prevalence of typhoid fever in 
Toowoomba - drought, well water contamination, total neglect of 
49 
ordinary cleanliness, and ignorance. 
44. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 71. 
45. Ibid., p.73. 
46. The Brisbane Courier, 16 May 1878; main editorial. See also 
Maclagan, p.809, for an 1879 view. 
47. Cumpston and McCallum, p.9. 
48. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 774 
49. Ibid., p.769. 
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The main source of water supply for the seven to eight hundred 
houses in the town was individual wells. These were very low, and were 
on an average only twenty feet from cesspits, which from carelessness 
and inattention, were in a disgusting state. The board, and some medical 
witnesses in the town, did not doubt that the wells were receiving a 
considerable amount of soakage from these filthy pits. Lack of 
education on the proper disposal of the discharges of typhoid patients, 
which were thrown without disinfection into a common cesspit, had 
lamentable results. Combined with the "filthy pig-stys, dirty poultry 
houses, offensive middens,... putrefying accumulations of fruit and 
vegetables, ill-kept drains and stagnating slop-water and slime", they 
had led to a situation in which "anything in the way of disease or 
death might most naturally be expected". One disturbing feature of 
the report was the revelation of the filthiness of a number of 
government and public buildings. The immigration depot, which 
temporarily housed many of the migrants who were accused of spreading 
the disease, was "simply disgraceful". Banks and offices were also 
conspicuous for lack of cleanliness, and the huge slop-pit at the 
Toowoomba hospital, where the majority of the typhoid fever patients 
52 
were being cared for, was in a state of "stagnant putrescence". 
The board's report, which was almost entirely the work of its 
54 
53 
medical member, was described by The Brisbane Courier as a "most 
important one that all of our local authorities should take note of", 
by The Lancet as "interesting", and by Cumpston and McCallum as 
"succinct and forcible". It recommended the total abolition of all 
cesspits and the substitution of the dry earth closet system, the 
proper disposal of slop water, a ban on the use of the well water 
supplies in favour of reservoir water or rain water from tanks, the 
supervision of all Chinamen's gardens, and a prohibition on the keeping 
of pigs in the town area. It stressed the need for a system of 
registration of disease, a matter which was of "the very utmost importance 
50. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 
769 and 770. 
51. Ibid., p.770. 
52. Ibid., pp.770 and 772. 
53. Ibid., p.774. 
54. The Brisbane Courier, 16 May 1878; main editorial. 
55. The Lancet, 13 Nov 1880, p.790. 
56. Cumpston and McCallum. p.314. 
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if any attempt /wa_s/ to be made to check or stamp out contagious or 
infectious disease". It urged the proclamation of the Toowoomba 
district under the Health Act of 1872, and the appointment of a 
57 qualified inspector of nuisances. It suggested that Queensland 
school children should be instructed on the subjects of food, water, 
air, exercise, dress, ventilation and drainage, in an attempt to wipe 
out the ignorance evident everywhere, and to teach the necessity for 
scrupulous cleanliness, not only of individuals, but of their houses, 
58 yards and general surroundings. 
The question of standards of cleanliness in the Toowoomba district 
state school buildings, a matter which had been of public concern and 
59 
complaint for some time, was also raised in the report. One school 
in particular, where "the accommodation for the pupils was something 
abominable, 300 children using one apartment for the calls of nature", 
was suspected by the people of Toowoomba generally and Dr. John Thomson, 
ft 1 
of being the source of the 1878 typhoid fever outbreak. At the height 
of the epidemic, all Toowoomba schools were temporarily closed. 
Following this closure and the commencement of cooler weather, the 
numbers of typhoid fever cases in Toowoomba began to fall rapidly, and 
despite the sense of urgency with which the government had initiated 
their enquiry, and the stress which the board had laid on bringing 
Toowoomba under the 1872 Health Act, the government delayed 
f\ 9 
proclamation of the town until 17 November 1878. 
Unfortunately for Toowoomba, neither the Act, nor the local board 
ft '^ 
of health formed under it, could ensure immunity from typhoid fever. 
By 1884, typhoid was again prevalent in the town and on the Downs. 
Toowoomba's Mayor blamed the lack of proper management, and the central 
government failure to confirm urgently needed, effective by-laws for 
the prevalence of the disease. Without co-operation between central 
57. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 770-71. 
58. Ibid., pp.770, 773, and 774. 
59. The Brisbane Courier, 11 May 1878. Complaints were made to the 
Minister for Education, but to no avail. 
60. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 74. 
61. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1878), 774 
62. Queensland Government Gazette, XXIII (1878), 1021. 
63. Minutes of Executive Council, 14 Nov 1878, Q.S.A. EXE/E 42. 
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and local bodies, the earth closets which had been advocated as a means 
of preventing the spread of typhoid fever in 1878, had deteriorated into 
"a most disgraceful condition", and were now alleged to be the chief 
64 
means of dissemination of the disease. 
One other provincial centre was, like Toowoomba, proclaimed under 
the Health Act of 1872 because of a severe outbreak of typhoid fever. 
In 1865, 
Maryborough was the seaport to a large and fertile tract of 
country, and it was almost impossible to estimate the size and 
importance to which it would attain in a few years. It was 
anticipated that the new product of sugar growing, would 
alone render Maryborough the most important port in the 
colony. 65 
But Maryborough had the serious problem of a high sickness and death 
rate to overcome, if it were to realise its full potential. During 
the 1860's, there was a great deal of "fever" in the town,^^ which was 
blamed on impurities in the water supply. The sickness reached a peak 
in 1875, when torrential rain left a trail of damage and a thick 
coating of putrid mud. Local residents were first dismayed, and then 
alarmed, by the presence of typhoid fever in epidemic proportions, 
ft 7 
and Maryborough was proclaimed under the Health Act on 27 March 1875. 
The town was still "suffering considerably" from the epidemic in June 
of that year, and the combined efforts of the Maryborough Municipal 
Council and the Local Board of Health failed to effect any improvement 
to the defective state of the drainage of the place, which was assumed 
69 to be the cause of the continuing scourge. 
The sanitary situation in the town did not improve much in the 
following years. "Intolerable nuisances" and stenches which "almost 
suffocated workers" and caused fevers and sickness were commonplace 
in the town, according to "Riflebutts", a correspondent to one local 
70 
newspaper whose columns were "always open to prevent such abuses". 
64. W.H. Groom to Colonial Secretary, 24 Apr 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 388, 
in-telegram no.3122 of 1884. 
65. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II (1865), 603. 
66. The Maryborough Chronicle, 12 Apr 1865. 
67. Queensland Government Gazette, XVI (1875), 75. 
68. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVIII (1875), 447. 
69. Ibid., p.474. 
70. Maryborough and Dunolly Advertiser and Carisbrook, Timor, Majorca, 
Amhurst, Avoca and General Register, 25 Sep 1876; letter to editor 
from Riflebutts. 
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Voluminous correspondence between the Central and Local Boards of 
71 
Health and the government failed to right the situation, and by 1882, 
both "fearful nuisances" and typhoid fever were still widespread in 
72 Maryborough. 
Dr. Power, one of the medical members of the Local Board of 
Health, attempted to halt any further spread of the disease through the 
careful disposal of patients' excreta, and also proposed that all 
medical men should compulsorily report typhoid cases to local boards 
73 
of health throughout Queensland. This was represented to the Central 
Board of Health as an urgent matter, to be gazetted and enforced. A 
special sub-committee of the Maryborough board, including Dr. Power, 
was appointed to carry out the work locally, with some encouraging 
74 
results. But the excellent suggestion on the notification of 
disease was ignored by the central health authorities. 
By 1883, typhoid fever had become extremely prevalent and fatal, 
75 
not only in Queensland, but in all of the Australian colonies. 
Realising that Maryborough could expect no respite, the council 
proposed a new set of by-laws for the municipality, under which it was 
1 ft 
hoped that health and other community affairs might be improved. 
But largely for legal reasons, the government delayed the approval 
77 
of these by-laws until September 1883. By that time, through the 
ravages of drought and a general monetary depression which had led to 
the suspension of several of the town's largest industries, Maryborough's 
council was hardly in a position to carry out the reforms made possible 
under the by-laws, and all but essential sanitary works were brought to 
71. See for example, E.P. Wells, Honorary Secretary of Maryborough 
Local Board of Health, 2 Sep 1878, Q.S.A. COL/A 275, unnumbered 
in-letter of 1878, A. Rawlins to Under Colonial Secretary, 7 Apr 
1879, Q.S.A. COL/A 275, in-letter no.1368 of 1879, E.P. Wells to 
Central Board of Health, 29 Mar 1879, Q.S.A. COL/A 275, in-letter 
no.1264 of 1879, and Central Board of Health to Under Colonial 
Secretary, 23 Jul 1881, Q.S.A. COL/A 317, in-letter no.3217 of 
1881. 
72. The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 22 Apr 1882. 
73. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 23 Jul 1881, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 317, in-letter no.3217 of 1881. 
74. The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 13 May 1882. 
75. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1884), 155. 
76. Town Clerk Maryborough to Colonial Secretary, 9 May 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 368,in-letter no.2382 of 1883. 
77. Colonial Secretary to Town Clerk Maryborough, 17 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. 
COL/G 21, out-letter no.1643 of 1883. 
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78 
a standstill. During this period, when municipal neglect and private 
citizens' carelessness was "fully indicated by the beastly state of 
street gutters", the number of typhoid fever patients was very 
considerably above the average. In the opinion of The Maryborough 
Chronicle, this situation called for some special consideration - even 
79 
from an impoverished local authority. 
As the number of typhoid fever victims reached unprecedented 
heights, Maryborough was included in the list of towns which had the 
80 
greatest loss of life from the disease. The situation was such that 
the public analyst for the municipality, Daniel March, Ph.D, was 
convinced that even the district's cows, which were dying in considerable 
numbers, were suffering from typhoid fever I And in far off Charters 
Towers, where many typhoid cases had broken out owing to "the protracted 
81 
drought and the neglect of the most ordinary sanitary precautions", 
the Maryborough situation was closely reported upon, as an example of 
8 2 
what not to do in the case of typhoid fever outbreaks. 
Typhoid was certainly making inroads in the provincial cities of 
Queensland. But the capital of the colony was also badly affected by 
the disease, which received special mention in the Registrar-General's 
83 
weekly reports on Brisbane's health situation towards the end of 1882. 
Early in the following year, the presence of typhoid fever in the city 
and nearby districts was causing some excitement. The Central Board of 
Health viewed "with dismay the ever-increasing cases of typhoid and 
enteric fever traceable entirely to deficient sanitary arrangements", 
and called on the Brisbane Local Board of Health "to thoroughly 
84 
eradicate the numerous existing fever beds in this municipality". 
To this end, the central board compiled amended regulations which it 
was hoped would ensure the better working of the Health Act, and prevent 
the accumulation of those nuisances which appeared to be causing the 
78. The Maryborough Chronicle, 5 Oct 1883. 
79. Ibid., 17 Oct 1883. 
80. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 501. 
81. The Northern Miner, 11 Jan 1884; editorial. 
82. Ibid., 5 May 1884. 
83. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Nov 1882; Minutes of Brisbane Local Board 
of Health, 1 Nov 1882. 
84. Central Board of Health to Brisbane Local Board of Health, quoted 
in full in The Brisbane Courier, 20 Apr 1883. 
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85 
rapid spread of the disease. And people living in the vicinity of 
well-known nuisances, or those with specific health problems, took the 
opportunity to link the outbreak of typhoid fever with the furthering 
of their own causes, in the hope that the general alarm over the 
disease would hasten government or local authority action for nuisance 
, 86 
removal. 
Some people did reject the generally accepted opinion that 
typhoid was the result of bad smells and obnoxious effluvium". 
"Hygeia", for example, called on the city council and everyone else 
concerned with health matters, to look at the question from a scientific 
point of view. 
Some people seem to think that mere filth itself will produce 
specific and contagious diseases.... The modern microscope has 
quite upset such a theory.... Typhoid can only come from typhoid 
germs.... Specific and contagious diseases are produced by 
minute living organisms which cannot be spontaneously generated 
.... Mere filth will not produce typhoid fever... but it may 
present a favourable medium in which the germ seeds will be 
well preserved... and a good medium of dissemination.... 87 
But the majority of the letters to the newspapers continued to deal with 
the old, familiar, offensive problems, which were literally right under 
Brisbane noses. A Brisbane Courier correspondent called attention to 
the bad state of the Normanby stockyards where dead sheep were left 
rotting in the sun, a nuisance which should certainly be removed 
"seeing that typhoid fever is very prevalent and so deadly in its 
88 
effects". Long-suffering residents of low-lying areas in Fortitude 
Valley and Spring Hill began to protest about "fever beds" which had 
existed for years, which they were now hopeful might finally be 
89 
removed. One of these, in Gloucester Lane, Spring Hill, was said to 
receive "the drainage of about fifty houses and form a fever breeding 
90 
swamp containing the germs of typhoid and other deadly diseases". 
Other specific instances of shockingly insanitary conditions, 
which it was alleged had led to a proliferation of typhoid fever germs, 
were supplied to The Brisbane Courier by medical men as a warning to 
85. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 13 Apr 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 357, in-letter no.1795 of 1883. 
86. See for example. Petition of Residents and Freeholders of 
Booroodabin and Ithaca Divisions to Colonial Secretary, 14 Mar 
1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 355, in-letter no.1239 of 1883. 
87. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jun 1883; letter to editor from Hygeia. 
88. Ibid., 6 Nov 1883; letter to editor from A. McLean. 
89. The Telegraph, 8 Oct 1883; letter to editor from W.P. Gordon. 
90. Ibid., 11 Oct 1883; letter to editor from R.E. Warwick. 
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all who should read of them. One of these was the infamous Herbert 
Street, Spring Hill, nuisance where, according to Dr. John Thomson, a 
child had died from typhoid fever, "poisoned by the foul gases arising" 
from closets nearby. Another example was supplied by Dr. Leighton 
Kesteven. 
When the epidemic of typhoid fever is assuming such alarming 
proportions as it is now, very energetic efforts for the 
arrest of its extension are needed. Such a state of affairs 
as the following case... are not calculated to forward such 
ends.... In a shanty... on the Kelvin Grove Road, 8 feet by 
5 feet in dimension, lived a man and his wife, three boys of 
from 3 to 7 years of age and a girl of 21.... Not unnaturally 
typhoid fever made its appearance, all or nearly all of the 
family being struck down by it. In the midst of this, the 
addition of an adult uncle from England was made to this 
snug party. Shortly afterwards the superior sanitary authority 
took steps to relieve the overcrowding, by removing two of 
the boys to a better world. The others are... convalescent 
now, but the wretched den, the sides of which consist of old 
sacks and blankets, the roof of kerosene tins, still stands, 
though the medical man in attendance ordered it to be burnt. 
As one result of this festering focus of disease, I am now 
attending a child suffering from typhoid fever in an 
adjacent house. How many more cases may spring from this is 
impossible to say. 92 
Such gross examples of insanitation and disease were not confined 
to the dwellings of the poor. The Brisbane Courier noted with regret 
"the existence of pestilential nuisances not only in the heart of the 
q 3 
City but in the most fashionable neighbourhoods". Breezy, hill-top 
homes were just as liable to attack as were houses in lowly-situated 
places. As Dr. Joseph Bancroft concluded, in an address to the Brisbane 
Local Board of Health, it was "very hard to say how typhoid fever comes 
or where from". 
One local board of health on the outskirts of Brisbane was quite 
convinced that it had discovered the cause of an outbreak of typhoid 
amongst pupils attending public schools in its area. The Bulimba Board 
of Health had no doubt that the outbreak stemmed from the school tanks 
which were foul from years of neglect. Armed with the findings of the 
Brisbane City Council's analyst, that the tank was "unwholesome and 
likely to cause illness", the board approached the Education Department 
91. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Apr 1883. 
92. Ibid., 5 Nov 1883; letter to editor from Leighton Kesteven. 
93. Ibid., 12 Oct 1883; sub editorial. 
94. Ibid., 20 Apr 1883; Minutes of Local Board of Health, Brisbane, 
19 Apr 1883. 
108. 
for filters, only to receive an unsympathetic reply from the Under 
Secretary. A deputation to the Colonial Treasurer and Secretary for 
Education, Archibald Archer, was also unsuccessful. The minister, 
though considering it a "gross thing that children should have to 
drink impure water", was not convinced that the government should 
provide the remedy. One of the great drawbacks of paternal government 
was that parents "neglected their duty to their children and threw 
them on the state." It was the business of school committees to 
95 
cleanse the tanks and provide the filters. 
Shortly afterwards, this same conservative government, led by 
Thomas Mcllwraith, decided to discontinue the proclamation of the 1872 
Health Act, doing away with local boards of health, and leaving the 
conservation of public health, as tradition demanded, "entirely to the 
96 local bodies elected by the ratepayers". The Brisbane City Council 
did make some attempt to cope with the urgent typhoid problem, passing 
97 
a new by-law by special order. But according to The Brisbane Courier, 
matters seemed to grow worse daily, as the fever carried off victims 
98 from even the "supposed salubrious heights" of the city. Correspondents 
to newspapers were also deeply disturbed by what they saw as lack of 
action on the part of the Brisbane council. 
Don't the Rip van Winkles care that hundreds of 
children die... or that affliction, poverty and desolation 
are brought to hundreds of homes by disease. ... Do they now 
want to see the adult portions of the population decimated 
by typhoid... and a few hundred orphans thrown on the 
world? 
"Citizen" thundered. V/hen the board of health was in authority, the 
aldermen were always lamenting that they were powerless. But the 
council now had its powers over the public health fully restored, and 
99 there was still no improvement. As far as "An Old Scavenger" was 
concerned, the corporation was guilty of a "pernicious folly", for 
95. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Feb 1883. 
96. Under Secretary, Colonial Secretary's Department to Central Board 
of Health, 28 Apr 1883, Q.S.A. COL/G 20, out-letter no.750 of 1883, 
97. Town Clerk, Brisbane City Council to Colonial Secretary, 17 Jul 
1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 365, in-letter no.3684 of 1883. 
98. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Oct 1883; sub editorial. 
99. Ibid., 20 Dec 1883; letter to editor from Citizen. 
109. 
so much unnecessary stink was made and so much needless dirt 
was lying about. There were several wholesome provisions in 
the city by-laws not one of which was carried out owing to the 
municipal mind interposing its hugger mugger. 100 
"An Old Scavenger's" assessment of the situation was not entirely 
correct. The city's nuisance inspectors had been extremely busy 
investigating backyards and shops under the by-laws, and these diligent 
efforts had led to a number of convictions. One of these, denoted 
by Mr. Day the police magistrate as "the worst case in all my experience", 
concerned the burial of highly offensive nightsoil in the tiny backyard 
102 
of a home where one child was a certified victim of typhoid fever. 
In spite of increased inspectorial activities, the conviction of 
certain offenders, and some attempts to rectify the most glaringly 
offensive nuisances, the Brisbane City Council continued to be the main 
target for criticism during this period, as the newspapers, individual 
protesters, and combinations of ratepayers, tried to ensure that "this 
terrible but entirely preventible disease /typhoid/ should not be allowed 
103 ~ 
to spread". But, the government itself was not free from the charge 
that neglect, improper drainage, and insanitary conditions in public 
buildings, provided foci for the dissemination of typhoid fever. Nor 
did the central government always co-operate with local authorities to 
remove reported nuisances, even though most medical men and laymen 
accepted a mixture of the miasmatic and germ theories of disease 
propagation, and laid the blame for the continued spread of typhoid 
on these "fever beds". The government had, for example, erected a 
number of water closets in the Queensland treasury buildings, in close 
proximity to the river, though such installations connected to public 
104 drains were contrary to the Brisbane City Council's by-laws. 
100. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Dec 1883; letter to editor from An Old 
Scavenger (name supplied). 
101. Ibid., 21 Dec 1883. 
102. Robert Gowdy to Dr. Bancroft, 17 Oct 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 377, no 
numbers given. 
Memorial from Robert Gowdy to Colonial Secretary, 20 Dec 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 377, in-letter no.6756 of 1883. 
Report on Petition from Mr. Gowdy by Mr. Day, P.M., 2 Jan 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 377, in-letter no.78 of 1884. 
Also attached are medical certificate of 11 Jan 1884, and 
testimonial of John Hardgrave, Inspector of Nuisances for the 
Brisbane City Council. 
103. See especially The Brisbane Courier, 9 Jan 1884, for a report on a 
very well attended meeting of North Ward ratepayers. 
104. Municipality of Brisbane, Bye-Law No.5, Clause 6. 
no. 
Concerned over the obvious breach, and convinced that the closets were 
an offensive menace to health, the council requested their immediate 
removal, but the colonial architect, I.J. Clark, demurred. In his 
view, the water closets were far superior to the earth closets then in 
use in the same reserve. Certainly no one but the council inspector 
had made any complaint. There were only four water closets involved, 
and their conversion into earth closets would cost the considerable 
sum of eighteen pounds - perhaps the most persuasive argument as far as 
government officials were concerned. Clark suggested that the council's 
objections be overridden and that the water closets be kept, as and where 
-^1, 106 they were. 
But one of the worst instances of government neglect of filthy 
and overcrowded conditions was uncovered in the immigration depot. 
This building was allegedly "saturated with typhoid germs", which had 
107 
already accounted for the grave illnesses of several officials, not 
to speak of a considerable number of unfortunate immigrants. Added to 
the problem of the actual cases was the fear that the newcomers who had 
been kept cooped up in the grossly insanitary surroundings would "go 
from the Depot carrying the poison in their systems to private homes in 
108 
town and country". The Brisbane Courier was concerned that something 
should be done as soon as possible to right this evil, lest the colony's 
climate get a bad name, when in fact the defects "were entirely due to 
109 the neglect of those charged with the administration of public affairs". 
A number of parliamentarians were also sufficiently convinced of the 
depot's potential threat to form a deputation to wait on William Miles, 
the Minister for Works. Their object was the removal of the 
immigrants from the depot, which, as William Brookes impressed on the 
minister, had neither proper lavatories, nor adequate laundries. 
105. Complaint No.156 from Inspector Alex Noble of Municipality to 
Mr. Gee, undated, Q.S.A. WOR/A 216, in-letter no.2970 of 1883. 
Mr. Gee's notation on the complaint is dated 28 Nov 1883. 
106. I.J. Clark, Colonial Architect to Under Secretary for Works, 
19 Dec 1883, Q.S.A. WOR/A 216, in-memorandum no.3224 of 1883. 
107. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Dec 1883; sub editorial. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Ibid. 
110. Miles saw the deputation of members of the Legislative Assembly, 
William Brookes, Simon Eraser, Francis Beattie, and a Mr. R.P. 
Adams, in his capacity as Acting Colonial Secretary. MacDonald 
Patterson and J.F. Buckland, also of the Assembly, were very troubled 
about the depot, but were unable to be present at the interview. 
111. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Dec 1883. 
111. 
The prolonged and vociferous calls for action from the press and 
112 
other interested parties, and the obvious reluctance of Queensland 
landlords to let their premises to immigrants who had been housed 
113 temporarily at the depot, finally prodded the government into action, 
and the immigration agent was instructed to report on the depot. The 
agent attempted to shift some of the blame for the only-too-obvious 
insanitation onto the immigrants themselves, pointing out that the 
married quarters were "always dirty, for there are so many children 
lodged there, and the mothers are so careless of the cleanliness of 
their quarters". Similarly, although everything within reason was done 
for the convenience of the single men, "in water closet matters... they 
preferred to make the place as filthy as lay within their power". 
Even so, the agent could not deny that changes were necessary. 
Bathing accommodation was certainly "indifferent", and the supply of 
115 
water to the closets was "inadequate". More deficiencies were 
revealed, apparently inadvertently, by the colonial architect's 
memorandum on the very restricted improvements which were ordered by 
11 fi 
the government, on receipt of the report. In the architect's 
opinion, complaints from migrants about lack of privacy could not be 
remedied, because the place was "barely ventilated now", and the 
117 
erection of divisions would prevent any free circulation of air. 
Moreover, extra partitions would make the married quarters far too 
118 dark, for the place was "only just sufficiently lighted now". 
The unsatisfactory government provision for new settlers, which 
posed definite dangers for established colonists as well, was now 
officially confirmed; yet the immigration agent deplored newspaper 
attempts to make these dangerous inadequacies public, with an attack 
on the 
112. See for example. Ibid., 18 Dec 1885; letter to editor from 
A Correspondent, Ibid., 31 Dec 1883; letter to editor from 
Knocked Down, and Ibid., 17 Jan 1884; letter to editor from 
Hygeia. 
113. Ibid., 11 Jan 1884. 
114. Report of the Immigration Agent to Colonial Secretary, 24 Jan 
1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 383, in-letter no.637 of 1884. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Marginal comment on above. Only the water closet accommodation 
was to be put right, but it was to be done at once. 
117. Memorandum on the Immigration Depot from Colonial Architect 
to Colonial Secretary, 7 Feb 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 383, in-letter 
no.1017 of 1884. 
118. Second Report from Colonial Architect to Colonial Secretary, 20 Feb 
1884, O.S.A. COL/A 383, in-letter no.1529 of 1884. 
112. 
foolish and utterly unsupported outcry against this building on 
the part of the press of the colony... that it is a nest of 
typhoid fever, completely unfit for occupation by immigrants. 
It is true that at least two cases of typhoid have been 
contracted in this building. It is equally true that the large 
ntunbers of cases sent hence to hospital (correctly recorded) 
have been brought by the ships themselves. 119 
IVhatever the cause of Queensland's typhoid problem, the situation 
was so bad by 1884 that newspapers, which normally concerned themselves 
with special interests, began to express fears about the dangers posed 
by the disease to the public health. The Catholic organ. The Australian 
for example, devoted an editorial to the subject, stressing the 
widespread nature of the sickness in towns throughout the whole of 
120 Queensland. Certainly "typhoid was stalking through the colony in 
a free and easy manner... with the terrible pestilence striking 
121 
everywhere". 
In the north, the ravages of typhoid were very serious, Townsville 
and Charters Towers being particularly affected. In both towns, local 
authorities desperately sought the advice of medical men as to the 
122 best means of arresting the disease. In Warwick and Toowoomba, a 
123 
virulent type of typhoid fever was making "its baleful power felt", 
the Toowoomba outbreak being blamed on the central government's tardiness 
124 125 
in dealing with the by-law question. Ipswich was "badly afflicted", 
and Gympie had the "fell disease" in its midst, "causing a great deal of 
uneasiness... since there was not the slightest sign of abatement but 
1 Of\ 
rather the reverse". Another coastal town, Bundaberg, was recording 
127 
a high incidence of the disease and many deaths, the difficulties 
119. Report of Immigration Agent to Colonial Secretary, 24 Jan 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 383, in-letter no.637 of 1884. 
120. The Australian, 3 May 1884; main editorial. The editor proposed 
to continue his discussion over the following issues, but does not 
appear to have done so; nor did he discuss the Public Health Act of 
1884, which, in part, resulted from fears over the severe typhoid 
outbreak. 
121. The Queensland Times, 1 May 1884; main editorial. 
122. The Northern Miner, 29 Mar 1884; editorial, and Ibid., 9 May 1884; 
editorial. 
123. The Queensland Times, 3 Apr 1884; editorial. 
124. W.H. Groom. Mayor of Toowoomba to Colonial Secretary, 28 Apr 
1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 388, in-telegram no.3112 of 1884. 
125. The Queensland Times, 3 Apr 1884; editorial. 
126. Ibid., 1 May 1884. 
127. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1885, p.174. 
113. 
128 being aggravated in that city, as they were in Maryborough, by the 
129 
numbers of Polynesians who had succumbed to the diseases. 
Enormous as the problem on the periphery was, no place was 
130 
attacked in greater force than that "city of sin, smells and sorrow", 
the capital of the colony. Consternation over the epidemic prevalence 
of typhoid fever forced the always reluctant chairman of the Central 
131 Board of Health, Samuel Griffith, to the board's April meeting, where 
132 he initiated a special committee of enquiry into the disease. Three 
members of the central board, Drs. Cannan, Marks and Thomson, were 
nominated for the task. 
The doctors commenced to plan their strategy at once, but did 
not report to the government until August of that year. If the report 
is to be believed, the medical gentlemen tackled their task manfully. 
They inspected unsavoury and insanitary lodging and boarding houses 
in the most populous parts of the city; they looked into the waste 
disposal methods and the water supply in Brisbane; and they examined the 
133 production and storage conditions in Brisbane and suburban dairies. 
Nevertheless the report afforded few positive results. The committee's 
findings echoed the uncertainty felt by many of Queensland's medical 
men, whose conflicting views on the causes and cures for typhoid had 
128. The Colonist, 24 Nov 1884; sub editorial. 
129. Report of Enquiry into the deposit of nightsoil on Avoca Millbank 
Plantation to Colonial Secretary, 6 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 400, 
in-letter no.6317 of 1884. The whole question of Bundaberg nightsoil 
disposal, the liability of council contractors, and the general 
sanitary conditions of the town was thrashed out over one particular 
Polynesian death, which the police magistrate refused to admit 
was caused by typhoid. Johnston, Police Magistrate to Colonial 
Secretary, 5 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 400, in-letter no.6188 of 
1884, and R. Thompson, Town Clerk, to Police Magistrate, 3 Sep 
1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 400 unnumbered letter. 
130. The Queensland Times, 3 Apr 1884; editorial. 
131. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Apr 1883; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 24 Apr 1883. 
132. Ibid., and Cumpston and McCallum, p.315. 
133. "The Prevalence of Typhoid Fever in Brisbane and Suburbs", Votes 
And Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, III (1884), 885. 
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134 been well and truly aired in the newspapers of the capital. Drs. 
Cannan, Thomson and Marks desired 
to represent that any inquiry as to the exact cause or origin of 
typhoid fever was futile, because we are still in the da^ rk_on the 
subject of the spontaneous origin of typhoid fever....fbnt/ though 
we cannot account for the cause, or prevent the periodic occurrence 
of epidemic diseases, the sanitarian has learnt how to mitigate the 
severity of the visitation by clearing away those foulnesses upon 
which these maladies feed, and that pure air and pure water afford 
almost absolute safeguards against most forms of zymotic disease. 12 
Even before this "well intentioned but rather impractical report" 
1 ^ (^ 
from those foremost in public health affairs was openly revealed, two 
demands began to appear in the Queensland press. One was the call for the 
appointment of a medical adviser to the government on sufficient salary 
137 that he need not undertake other work. The other was an urgent request 
for the bringing down of new, effective legislation, the present "Health 
Act and the Boards established under it having proved unequal to the 
work". 
The difficulties and inadequacies which had been evident to many 
Queenslanders for so long, and which were highlighted by the typhoid 
epidemic, were belatedly acknowledged by the government, and a new Health 
Act was passed in 1884. The main object of the new Act was to bestow 
sufficient powers on central and local governments, and on the boards 
134. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jun 1884; sub editorial. The Courier had 
kept its columns "freely open... to wide discussion" of the disease, 
until it feared that the readers of the journal would "probably be 
surfeited by letters concerning typhoid fever and the repulsive 
details necessarily dwelt on". See Ibid., 13 Jun 1884; main 
editorial. There were far too many letters published for any 
useful discussion of their contents to be entered into here. Many 
of the letters came from interested laymen, but there were many more 
from medical men. For a sampling of letters from these doctors, see 
the following which are all taken from the same newspaper. 
The Brisbane Courier, 26 Feb 1884; letter to editor from Hugh Bell, 
M.D., F.R.C.S. 
Ibid., 24 Mar 1884; and 12 Jun 1884; letters to editor from J.E. 
Matthew Vincent. 
Ibid., 15 May 1884, 17 May 1884, 22 May 1884, and 10 Jun 1884; 
letters to editor from Dr. Joseph Bancroft. 
Ibid., 18 May 1884; letter to editor from Leighton Kesteven attacking 
Bancroft. 
Ibid., 19 May 1884 and 7 Jun 1884; letter to editor from J. de Vis, 
F.R.C.S., also differing in opinion from Bancroft. 
135. "The Prevalence of Typhoid Fever in Brisbane and Suburbs", Votes 
and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, III (1884), 885 and 886. 
136. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jun 1884; sub editorial. 
137. Ibid. 
138. The Northern Miner, 5 Mar 1884; editorial. 
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appointed by them, to deal with those preventable diseases which had 
"caused the greatest loss of life,... especially typhoid fever, which 
during last suiraner proved more deadly than many diseases that are 
139 
regarded by the public with much greater alarm". Within and outside 
of parliament, typhoid fever was seen as a menace which could not be 
effectively attacked and subdued, without the added powers bestowed by 
the new health provisions. 
But neither this Act, nor the much more comprehensive legislation 
of 1900, proved to be the panacea which would enable the authorities to 
rid Queensland of typhoid fever. The lack of adequate figures before 
the introduction of compulsory disease notification under the Health 
Act of 1900, makes it difficult to assess the true incidence of the 
disease in the colony during the rest of the nineteenth century, though 
141 the death-rate was very high indeed. For the years 1901 to 1916 
inclusive, typhoid topped the lists of notified, communicable diseases, 
for twelve of the sixteen years. 
As the century progressed, newspaper comment, correspondence of 
interested readers, warnings of doctors and the Central Board of Health, 
and vilification of local authorities, on whose negligence the continued 
presence of typhoid fever was blamed, have a familiar ring, and only a 
few examples are included here. Correspondents attacked the "disgusting 
and dangerous" methods of the Brisbane City Council's sanitary service, 
and laxness of the central board, which "spread infection abroad so 
143 
manifestly". Indeed, The Brisbane Courier was afraid that typhoid 
144 fever had taken up its abode permanently in Brisbane, and Dr. Bancroft 
regretfully announced that the disease was rife in the state schools, 
a circumstance which was inevitable, according to The Boomerang, which 
139. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 501. 
140. Memorandum on the Health Bill for the use of the Colonial Secretary" 
from Dr. Joseph Bancroft to Colonial Secretary, 1 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 404, in-letter no.7385 of 1884. 
141. See the various tables from Registrar-General's Reports given as 
examples . 
142. See Within, p.143. Diphtheria had a higher incidence during 1910-11, 
1912-13, 1913-14, and 1914-15. 
143. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Nov 1885; letter to editor from Indignant. 
144. Ibid., 4 Jan 1886; sub editorial. 
145. Ibid., 18 Dec 1886; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 17 Dec 
1886. 
/^ i_ i» i - l^ i_»»ui / -^ iu i \ i \n i / iur ir iL CJUIL' 
^ •• T_ I f ! • ^ 1 * 
SATIHDAV, MAHCH 1(1, 18H1». Price, ; 
I 3 E ^ T I I S I T S ON T H E X J I s T C L E A I S r T ^ l s T K I . 
No. 14. The Boomerang, 16 March, 1889. 
116, 
alleged that the polluted water in school water tanks was teeming with 
^ u -A 146 
typhoid germs. 
Dr. Bancroft's colleague and fellow board member. Dr. John Thomson, 
also fulminated against typhoid's disgracefully high incidence in the 
147 
capital. Thomson grew increasingly alarmed when, by 1888, he saw 
"cases of typhoid fever in every part of the city among both rich and 
148 poor". Typhoid was certainly no respecter of persons. It was a 
matter of some alarm to the affluent, because "filth" diseases were 
considered the almost unavoidable appurtenances of the poor, the 
degraded, the needy, and the badly-housed. Dr. Cannan himself was 
prostrated by the disease, although with Drs. Rendle and Love in 
149 
almost constant attendance, he was expected to recover, while in 
Ipswich, where typhoid was particularly prevalent in 1889, there were 
several prominent people in hospital with the disease. Significantly, 
newspapers and councils in towns such as Herberton, which had not been 
much troubled with typhoid, suddenly took an unprecedented interest in 
sanitary conditions, and in special precautions to deal with the hazard, 
151 
as the disease made its very unwelcome appearance amongst them. 
Once again, the government came under fire for the mismanagement of 
its establishments. On this occasion, it was for permitting, at the 
Boggo Road gaol, the persistence of foul drains, generally unsatisfactory 
sanitary conditions, and severe overcrowding, detrimental to the lives 
of prisoners. Although convicted offenders might "deserve incarceration.. 
they were entitled to protection from... the terrible and all too 
152 frequently fatal disorder, typhoid", which had laid the gaol's 
governor low, and seriously threatened the rest of the inmates. 
146. The Boomerang, 16 Mar 1889. 
147. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Jan 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 Jan 1887. 
148. Ibid., 17 Nov 1888; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 16 Nov 1888. 
149. Ibid., 27 Feb 1889. 
150. The Queensland Times, 26 Oct 1889. 
151. The Herberton Advertiser, 8 Apr, 15 Apr, 13 May 1887. 
152. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Jan 1888. Captain Jekyll did die from 
typhoid on 31 January. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1889, p.70. 
The complaints of gross overcrowding and foul, unbearable smells 
in and around the gaol reserve were of long standing. Near-by 
residents claimed that they also were in danger from the pervasive 
odours. See for example. Sheriff to Under Colonial Secretary, 
5 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 447, in-letter no.9271 of 1885. 
' . " • ^ 
Qu/rt 
^°- 15. The Boomerang, 19 November, 1887. 
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In fact, a combination of government negligence and city council 
sanitary bungling put prisoners at considerable risk from typhoid fever 
and other diseases, before they actually received their deserts at the 
hands of the law. The supreme court building, to the possible detriment 
of all persons who attended there, stood perilously close to two 
"veritable fever beds". One was the wharf where the contents of 
153 
Brisbane closets were loaded onto vessels for eventual disposal at sea. 
The other was a loathsome old channel which had drained the grounds of the 
hospital which was formerly in that neighbourhood. This drain passed on 
its stinking way, right under the supreme court building. 
Mr. Justice Harding complained that both nuisances combined to 
give off 
offensive odours which pervaded the building.... He had 
great cause of complaint.... Foul smells were calculated to 
injuriously effect the health of the judges and those 
present in the court.... He and others connected with the 
court were anxious to complete their duties, but should 
not be compelled to do so in unpleasant surroundings. 155 
Harding contacted the Attorney-General, Arthur Rutledge, to rectify 
the matter, but when no action was immediately forthcoming, he took his 
grievance to his brother judges, bringing the Chief Justice into the 
affair, and incidentally forming an extremely effective pressure group. 
Although The Boomerang alleged that North Quay was no more foul than 
many parts of Brisbane where poor folk were expected to live and work, 
the court refused to tolerate the situation. Chief Justice Charles 
Lilley attacked the government over its evil-smelling sewers, and the 
city council over its vile wharf work, and insisted that places where 
men were compelled to come together by law, should receive special 
sanitary attention. He pointed out that the criminal sittings were at 
hand, and prisoners - mostly unconvicted persons - would be confined in a 
cell right over the offending drain. The dangers were obvious, for the 
court keeper's wife, who lived in a cottage within the grounds, had 
recently been at death's door from typhoid fever, contracted, Lilley had 
no doubt, "from living in the neighbourhood of such foul, maladorous 
u „ 157 
stenches". 
153. The Brisbane Courier, 11 May 1887. 
154. Ibid., 9 Nov 1887, 11 Nov 1887; letter to editor from George H. 
Buzacott and general reporting, and Ibid., 12 Nov 1887. 
155. Ibid., 9 Nov 1887. 
156. The Boomerang, 19 Nov 1887. 
157. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Nov 1887. 
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No. 16. The Boomerang, 16 February, 1889. 
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Mr. Justice Harding, not to be outdone, summoned his jurors 
together to gauge their feelings about continuing to try his case in 
the "permeated" building. Further damaging evidence of the court's 
"infectiousness" was brought to light. One juror had suffered from 
"intense headache and bowel disturbance", attributable to the foul 
sewer gas hovering in the courtroom. Another had succumbed to 
sleepiness, headache and a severe attack of colic, and yet another 
"came to court well and was taken ill though he was a healthy man". 
Again typhoid fever proved a useful ally in finally damning the court 
building, for Dr. Richard Rendle, whose opinion Harding sought for the 
benefit of the jury, listed a number of dysentery and typhoid fever 
cases which he had attended "at places within a stone's throw of the 
,^, 158 
court". 
Clearly the place was unfit for use, and the judges promulgated 
a rule of court delaying all business. In the face of this militancy, 
a now fully co-operative Attorney-General set gangs of men to work, 
even on a Sunday, in order that the evil drain might be removed swiftly. 
Other workmen were engaged to fumigate the building, while the judges 
expected that the nuisance caused by council wharf operations would 
159 
also be removed as soon as possible. The threat of the spread 
of typhoid, backed by the eminence of the protesters, had achieved 
results with a speed seldom seen in the history of public health in 
Queensland. 
The dangers of typhoid fever and the theories as to its possible 
source continued to occupy the attention of all the members of the 
Central Board of Health, as the disease revealed itself "more 
murderous than Jack the Ripper". At the same time, the general 
interest in typhoid fever, the constant criticism of the sanitary 
systems of most cities and towns in the colony, and the flood of 
letters to the newspapers, encouraged some patent medicine manufacturers 
and at least one enterprising salesman, to take economic advantage of 
the typhoid scare. Many claims for the efficacy of various pills and 
potions appeared in the pages of the daily press, and this advertisement 
turned up amongst the letters to the editor of The Queensland Times, 
158. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Nov and 12 Nov 1887. 
159. Ibid. 
160. Ibid., 19 Feb 1889; letter to editor from Patient. Gory details 
of the Ripper's crimes were appearing daily in Queensland 
newspapers during this period. 
119. 
under the heading Typhoid Fever, and marked original correspondence. 
It was in fact, public notice No.714, in favour of Hargreaves and 
Company of Ipswich. 
It is with great sorrow together with deep sympathy with the 
suffering and their friends that we note the abnormal spread 
in our midst of that fell disease typhoid fever, and yet we 
are bound to confess that considering the extremely faulty 
nature of the sanitary arrangements in this town, the allowing 
of filthy cesspits and the want of supervision over the emptying 
and carrying away of their contents, in fact the want of system 
in the entire arrangements, we could hardly expect it to be 
otherwise. We venture to assert that on account of the number of 
cesspits that are and have been in use in North Ipswich and in 
other parts, together with the nature of the soil and the contour 
of the land, that a large portion of the soil of that part of the 
town, and especially where most of the typhoid appears to be 
germinating must be reeking with the accumulation of the cesspits 
for years. In this filthy mass, the typhoid germs have entered, 
and are now being emitted with ten-fold malignity. And now we 
offer to the public, not a cure-all like some patent medicines, 
but that which we conscientiously believe would largely, very 
largely, diminish the spread of this our common enemy. We refer 
of course to Scott's patent air closets. Notwithstanding all the 
prejudice that has been brought to bear, and everything its 
detractors can say, this closet with its excellence has fought 
its way into prominence, and we are now in receipt of testimonials 
from all sides - medical men, architects, engineers and 
citizens. There are a large number at present in use in 
the town, but to make it the success it deserves, it should 
become so general as to be the recognised system. We are 
prepared to meet the hard times in the matter of price. 161 
During the last decade of the century, typhoid continued to menace 
the people of Queensland - indeed Dr. John Thomson dreaded that it would 
1 A9 
become the scourge of Brisbane. Communities in the country were 
incensed when central authorities appeared ummoved by their distress as 
•1 /: v 
typhoid struck in their areas, though where disease and mortality 
was high, action was taken to proclaim towns under the whole of the 
Health Act. Sometimes the problem provoked almost as much correspondence 
164 to the press as the 1884 outbreak in Brisbane. 
161. The Queensland Times, 2 Nov 1889. 
162. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Jan 1890; address by Dr. John Thomson, the 
retiring president, before the annual meeting of the Queensland 
Medical Society. 
163. One particular outbreak in Laidley caused considerable alarm on 
the spot and in Ipswich. It was reported to the press by Dr. Albert 
Dunlop who despaired of government action as even a telegram had 
failed to rouse the Colonial Secretary. Ibid., 10 May 1892, and 
14 May 1892; sub editorial. 
164. Ibid., 10 May and 12 May 1889; letter to editor from Dr. Albert 
Dunlop, Ibid., 16 May 1892; letter to editor from Richard Rendle, 
Ibid., 8 Jun 1892; letter to editor from Dr. Joseph Bancroft, and 
Ibid., 26 May 1892; letter to editor from F.M. Geoghegan, M.D. 
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As well as this, the kind of action taken to combat the disease 
began to change. The drive for cleanliness and sanitary improvements 
was still of paramount importance, but the new scientific knowledge 
that the typhoid-inducing bacillus could be present in, and be 
conveyed by either water or milk, ensured that the typhoid prevention 
and eradication programmes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries would include stringent examinations of dairies and tank 
water supplies, in any area where an outbreak occurred. Another 
important alteration took place. Typhoid remained one of the most 
prevalent diseases throughout the whole of Queensland, and 
consequently interest in the disease never disappeared completely. 
But towards the end of the 1890's, the greatest amount of government 
1 f-i 7 
attention was turned to the frontier areas of the colony, where 
interest was focused especially on railway camps and other outposts 
where important developmental works were in progress, undertaken by 
men living under the most primitive sanitary conditions. 
This caused some resentment in some quarters. When typhoid 
broke out at the Murphy's Creek railway deviation works in 1896, and 
an apprehensive Colonial Secretary pressed the Central Board of Health 
165. Since it was feared that tuberculosis could also be spread by 
infected milk supplies, the importance of providing pure milk 
became a matter of the utmost importance. See for example. 
The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 18 Oct 1895; letter to editor 
from One who Knows. Tap water from Brisbane reservoirs was 
reported to be perfectly free from typhoid bacilli by the 
Central Board of Health. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jan 1895; 
Minutes of Meeting of Central Board of Health, 4 Jan 1895. 
166. As bubonic plague made its appearance in Brisbane accompanied 
by outright panic. The Brisbane Courier still held that typhoid 
fever, though more familiar, was the greater evil. Ibid., 
7 Mar 1900; sub editorial. 
167. There were some exceptions. When there was a severe outbreak at 
Thargomindah, involving the exchange of a number of telegrams, 
Horace Tozer could not think how the government could aid the 
stricken town, where the hospital was overflowing with typhoid 
victims, except by sending some tents, and testing the water 
supply. Police Magistrate, Thargomindah to Colonial Secretary, 
31 Dec 1895, Q.S.A. COL/A 801,in-telegram no.15571 of 1895. 
Three other telegrams, unnumbered, were sent the same day. 
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into service at once, a somewhat peeved Dr. W.F. Taylor wrote to 
The Brisbane Courier. 
There is a mild outbreak of typhoid fever near Toowoomba and 
the Colonial Secretary becomes alarmed... and takes the chair 
at the Central Board of Health.... Very commendable,... but why 
show such indifference to typhoid fever here... and the probable 
cause of it, a contaminated water supply. Surely the health 
and lives of the people of Brisbane are as important as the 
healths and lives of others elsewhere.... Nevertheless we have 
prompt, almost hysterical action in the latter case, and a 
masterly inactivity in the former. 169 
Taylor may have been somewhat harsh in judgement, for the ills of the 
capital had for long been a potent factor for change and improvement in 
Queensland public health measures. Nevertheless, this new development 
underlines a new sense of government responsibility for working men 
previously outside the attention of the legislators and their 
legislation. For the districts in which itinerant labourers lived and 
worked had rarely, if ever, been proclaimed under the provisions of the 
Queensland health acts. By 1898, it was still necessary to draw 
attention to the plight of the itinerant worker. In that year, a bad 
170 
one for typhoid, particularly in the west, Thomas Glassey repeated 
his warning of the previous year, about the lamentable sanitary 
arrangements in the shearing sheds, and demanded that sufficient funds 
be given to the Central Board of Health to investigate the causes of 
168. Dr. Love and Mr. Pound, the government bacteriologist, were sent 
to co-operate with Dr. Garde, the health officer at Toowoomba, 
and the immigration depot at Toowoomba was used as a ward for the 
typhoid patients. However, Tozer's main object was to ensure that 
the local authorities would "look after the patients as it was 
their duty to do", and not expect the central government to foot 
the bill. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jan 1896; Minutes of Central 
Board of Health, 3 Jan 1896. 
Some later examples of government interest in typhoid outbreaks 
in railway and other camps can be found in the following records:-
Health Department to Home Secretary, 31 Jan 1911, Q.S.A. HOM/B 39, 
in-letter no.918 of 1911, and subsequent of 13 Jun 1911, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 39, in-letter no.5670. This refers to the railway camp at 
Malbon. See also The Brisbane Courier, 27 Nov 1911. The men were 
working on a connection of the Duchess-Malbon line with the Great 
Western line. Typhoid was reported in the same camp and others 
in the area in 1912, John May, M.L.A. to Home Secretary, 29 Mar 
1912, Q.S.A. HOM/B 40, in-letter no.4074 of 1912, and on the 
Duchess-Townsville line in 1913. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jan 1913 
Other outbreaks connected with camps were at Friezland, 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CX (1911-12), 2573, and Winton 
and Selwyn, The Brisbane Courier, 10 Apr 1913. 
169. Ibid., 16 Jan 1896; letter to editor from W.F. Taylor. 
170. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXIX (1898), 560. 
the disease in remote areas. 
122, 
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The requirements of the burgeoning state would eventually ensure 
that the health of the workers on the periphery would receive attention, 
172 
though progress was slow. It was not until 1909, that the government 
bestirred itself to provide regulations to deal with the special 
173 
requirements of sanitation in railway, rabbit fencing and other camps. 
By that time, reports being sent by health department inspectors on the 
spot made it impossible for the government to ignore any longer the 
A ^ • ^ . . 174 
need for appropriate provisions. 
The long drawn out business of eradicating this "most preventable 
175 
of all preventable diseases" was also very wearisome. As late as 
1914, the Public Health Commissioner spent considerable periods of time 
1 '7 ft 
investigating typhoid fever trouble spots, and preparing and 
177 questioning various aspects of the typhoid regulations. Yet, in spite 
of the outbreaks which took place with monotonous regularity, in 
178 identical locations - and there is absolutely no doubt that the 
outbreaks were regarded very seriously indeed by the various health 
171. There were serious outbreaks at Longreach, Allora, Ipswich, 
Hughenden, Mt. Morgan, and in Brisbane. Incidence rates in the 
west were particularly high. See Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1899, 
pp.63, 64 and 72. See also The Truth, /Mt. Morgan/, 26 Feb, 
5 Mar and 9 Apr 1898, and The Street, 9 Apr, 23 Apr, and 14 May 1898 
172. For example, the Act to improve the Shearers' and Sugar Workers' 
Accommodation, which was largely a sanitary measure, was not passed 
until 1905, after long and bitter opposition. Provisions under the 
Act were still in dispute in 1914, as they conflicted with 
Queensland Health Acts. See Health Department to Home Secretary, 
17 Oct 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.9298 of 1914. 
173. Secretary, Department of Health to Home Secretary, 28 Jan 1909, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 22, in-letter no.1126 of 1909. 
174. See for example. Inspector Wilson's report on sanitary conditions 
of various camps and workings in connection with the construction 
of the Kananga and Blackbutt railway. Secretary, Department of 
Public Health to Home Secretary, 6 Feb 1909, Q.S.A. HOM/B 22, 
in-letter no.1560 of 1909. 
175. "Forty-first Annual Report on the Vital Statistics of Queensland 
for the year ended 31st December 1900", Votes and Proceedings of 
the Legislative Assembly of Queensland, II (1901), 1362. 
176. Especially in various centres visited by Dr. Moore on his northern 
tour during 1914. Health Commissioner to Home Secretary, 16 Nov 
1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.9491 of 1914. 
177. Health Department to Home Secretary, 10 Dec 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, 
in-letter no.10285 of 1914. 
178. Throughout the fourteen years under review here typhoid recurred 
again and again in the same areas. Mt. Garnet, Beenleigh, Bundaberg 
Ipswich, the Boggo Road gaol, St. George, Charters Towers, Chillagoe, 
Townsville, Maryborough, and always Brisbane. 
123. 
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commissioners involved - great strides in detection and prevention 
were made. The recognition that flies spread the disease, and the 
campaigns aimed at educating the public to protect food and even their 
homes with wire screening, did something to reduce the incidence of 
typhoid and other diseases during this period. 
Of even greater importance was the discovery that certain persons, 
themselves often apparently unaffected by the disease, were typhoid 
carriers - a potent threat to the whole of the community in which they 
180 lived. The Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. Burnett Ham, summed 
up both the long-standing situation, and the new scientific break 
through in his 1909 report. 
There are few diseases the prevalence of which occupied the 
attention of the officers of the Department more closely than 
typhoid fever. Despite inquiry into the water and milk supplies, 
sewage and refuse disposal, or investigation of the household 
foodstuffs, likely to have been contaminated by the house fly, 
the disease had a tendency to cling to or to recur again and 
again in the same place or locality. The discovery by German 
investigators of persons known as "typhoid carriers" serves to 
throw light on certain aspects of the question. In most cases 
of typhoid fever the individual becomes quite free from typhoid 
bacilli within a comparatively short time after recovery. Recent 
research has, however, shown that in a small percentage of cases 
germs may persist for months or even years. Persons who thus 
retain the specific organism become what are known as "typhoid 
carriers". That such typhoid carriers are a grave menace to the 
public health there can be no question, and that they may not 
unfrequently be the cause of so-called sporadic outbreaks seems 
probable. While the Medical Officer of Health may be fully 
alive to the importance of the part played by such persons in 
spreading the disease, the difficulty of discovering them and of 
preventing them from doing further mischief once they are 
discovered is great. In at least one instance of recurring cases 
in one locality we were able to obtain definite evidence of a 
"typhoid carrier". 181 
179. A good example of this is the long investigation by both the health 
department's inspector W.G. Wilson and medical officer Dr. I. Moore, 
later to be health commissioner, the careful administration of 
disinfectants, and the conference of local authorities and the 
health department, all of which arose out of the relatively small 
outbreak on a farm at Mt. Beppo. See Report from W.G. Wilson 
to Dr. Burnett Ham, 6 Apr 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 892, in-letter no. 
1248 of 1908, and subsequent correspondence and memos attached from 
the minister, A.G.C. Hawthorn, Dr. Moore, Dr. Ham, the Under 
Secretary, W.R. Ryder and others. 
180. During 1903-4, Frosch, Drigalski and Donitz established the theory 
of typhoid bacillus carriers. 
181. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1909), 337. 
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An important section of the Health Act Amendment Act of 1911 dealt with 
182 this particular problem, giving power to the health commissioner to 
have any person suspected of being a typhoid carrier examined medically. 
Should tests prove positive, the carriers were required to register, in 
order to ascertain whether their movements were in any way connected with 
any outbreak of the fever. Under particular circumstances, the Governor-
in-Council might order such persons to be isolated and detained for as 
183 long as necessary. 
There was no resistance or even much discussion of the provisions 
during the legislative debate on the health bill. While a few words 
were said on the role of cesspits in the dissemination of typhoid, 
1 84 particularly in the west, members of both houses accepted, without 
reserve. Home Secretary John George Appel's explanation of the clause, 
which in itself underlines the important scientific advances. 
Ten years ago when an epidemic of typhoid broke out... 
the cause was generally ascribed to the 
drain - there must be something wrong with the drain. We find 
today, as the result of scientific research, that persons... may 
act as carriers.... Such a carrier... is a very grave danger 
indeed... where they handle food, or in connection with dairy 
work.... Such necessary provision has been made, so far as 
they are concerned, having due regard to the interest of the 
community as a whole. 185 
Yet another scientific triumph was to be achieved in the pre-1914 
period in the fight against typhoid fever. In 1909, in a well-documented 
and closely watched experiment, F.F. Russell vaccinated the United States 
1 Rft 
army against typhoid fever. The remarkable results obtained from the 
immunisation of more than sixty thousand men, and the effects of a similar 
programme undertaken in 1910 by the British army in India were noted with 
enthusiasm by the then Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. J.S.C. Elkington 
182. Stories of "typhoid Mary", a notorious carrier, were partly 
responsible for prodding the Chief Secretary into making provision 
for dealing with carriers in the 1911 Health Act. Chief 
Secretary's Office to Home Secretary, 1 Feb 1912, Q.S.A. COL/B 40, 
in-letter no.1578 of 1912. Press clippings about "typhoid Mary" 
were attached. 
183. The particular was Clause 65 of the Health Act Amendment Act of 
1911. Queensland Government Gazette, XCVII (1911), 1789 and 1790. 
184. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12), 646. 
185. Ibid., p.515. 
186. Fielding H. Garrison, History of Medicine (London, 1929), p.869. 
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187 in his 1912 report to parliament. By 1913, he was convinced that 
this method of protection afforded "the best and most easily applicable 
safeguard against typhoid fever which has yet come within the grasp of 
1 88 
the practical sanitarian". Anti-typhoid vaccine, and the directions 
for administering it, were made available by the health department 
189 
wherever and whenever necessary, both through local medical 
practitioners, or if required, by means of a special medical officer. 
Queensland still faced very real problems in administering the full 
treatment then required - three injections at intervals of seven days -
since the principally infected parts of the state were now more often 
than not in the far north and west, and were separated by vast 
190 distances. It was complicated, as the Home Secretary noted during 
a northern tour, by the mushroom growth of new towns, which had sprung 
191 
up in many areas, without drainage or any sanitation. 
The health programme was put at further risk because the injections 
had to be paid for by the recipients. During one outbreak in the 
Rockwood shearing shed near Hughenden, sixty men agreed to pay five 
shillings per head for the three injections, but eventually many 
refused the treatment, and those who did consent would only pay three 
shillings. In the end, twenty-seven men out of the sixty were vaccinated. 
As the Chairman of the Flinders Shire Council pointed out ruefully, the 
unvaccinated men remained a danger to their fellow workers and to the 
community at large, and the local council which, under the health acts, 
had the right to "adjudicate but lacked the power to compel vaccination", 
had practically thrown away the .€100 spent on the sanitary improvements 
192 hastened by the outbreak. 
If ordinary citizens baulked at the possible pain and expense of 
protecting Queensland from typhoid through vaccination, the Department 
of Public Health was soon to have a captive body on which to use the 
anti-typhoid vaccine being produced on a considerable scale at its 
193 laboratory of microbiology. Immediately after war was declared in 
187. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 7. 
188. Ibid., (1913), 5. 
189. Secretary, Health Department to Home Secretary, 7 Jan 1914, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 44, in-letter no.244 of 1914. 
190. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 5. 
191. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jun 1914. 
192. Ibid., 16 Jun 1914; letter to editor from William Hammond, 
Chairman, Flinders Shire. 
193. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 5. 
126. 
August 1914, the Public Health Commissioner offered the military 
authorities a supply of vaccine to prevent an outbreak of typhoid 
194 
among the recently mobilized forces. The offer was accepted at 
once - any action which would avert the occurrence of enteric being 
195 
welcomed by the Home Secretary. 
Queensland had come a long way from the first tentative recognition 
given to typhoid in the 1860's and the official distinction made in 
1879. The history of typhoid fever is in essence the history of 
public health in Queensland. As the apparently indisputable example of 
the correlation between filth and disease, typhoid fever epitomises the 
long struggle for sanitary improvements, followed by the often slow 
acceptance of scientific advances. But if medical opinion readily 
accepted changes when proven, "Toowongite's" letter to The Brisbane 
Courier, published in December 1914, shows that the education of the 
public had far to go. For he, and many to whom he had spoken, still 
blamed the "maladorous" creeks and swamps for the prevalence of 
197 typhoid. It is quite clear from the Public Health Commissioner's 
report of 1913 that he at least was fully aware that the lesson still 
had to be learned and that he would need to repeat it. 
The problem of typhoid prevention has now been reduced to the 
absolute simplicity of efficient vaccination.... Drains have 
little or nothing to do with typhoid, save as possible 
collecting places for infective discharges.... 198 
194. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 7 Aug 1914, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.6674 of 1914. 
195. Appel's marginal comment of 10 Aug 1914 on above. 
196. Within, p.94. 
197. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Dec 1914; letter to editor from Toowongite, 
198. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 5. My italics. 
5 - DIPHTHERIA 
The acute infectious disease diphtheria is of special interest in 
the history of Queensland's public health movement for several reasons. 
Although persons of all ages may be attacked by this disease, it is 
between the second and tenth years that most cases occur, children up 
to five years being the most prone to attack. The young, developing 
colony of Queensland could ill afford the relatively high sickness and 
mortality which diphtheria began to effect among this most important 
section of its population from the latter half of the nineteenth 
century onwards. The history of diphtheria in Queensland underlined 
the importance of the dissemination of accurate, up-to-date medical 
knowledge in the fight against disease. Official attempts to deal 
with severe outbreaks of diphtheria throughout Queensland emphasised 
the urgent need for cooperation between agencies charged with the 
carrying out of public health measures. And as well as this, the 
government's refusal to accept the advice and regulations of their own 
central health authority on the ways and means of dealing with 
diphtheria was one of several instances which brought the whole question 
of central board powers before the people of the colony. The problems 
connected with the widespread incidence of the disease, combined with 
other difficulties in the management of public health matters, 
eventually made inevitable the appointment of a suitably empowered 
commissioner of public health, working directly with his overseeing 
minister. 
Although this disease was known in ancient times, being 
2 
accurately described by Artaeus about the second century A.D., it was 
not until 1826 that Pierre Bretonneau clearly recognised and named 
1. Age incidence of the disease in Australia 
1878-1884 
1885-1889 
1890-1894 
1895-1899 
1900-1904 
Under 5 
86.55 
83.55 
82.73 
80.09 
80.54 
5-10 
9.65 
14.76 
15.33 
15.98 
16.03 
10-15 
1.22 
0.45 
0.85 
1.21 
2.29 
Over 15 
2.58 
1.24 
1.09 
2.72 
1.14 
These figures are taken from J.H.L. Cumpston, The History of 
Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles and Whooping Cough in 
Australia 1888-1925 (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of 
Health Service Publication No.37), p.63. 
Frazer, p.81. 
127, 
128. 
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diphtheria as distinct from other throat infections. This crowned his 
contribution of the previous year when he introduced tracheotomy to 
4 
give relief to sufferers from laryngeal diphtheria. Later in the 
nineteenth century, the causative bacteria was tracked down by two 
German doctors, Klebs and Loeffler. In 1888, Roux and Yersin isolated 
the toxin of diphtheria, and in the following year von Behring 
discovered the antitoxin. Five years later the serum was in mass-
production in Vienna and being administered even to suspect cases to 
reduce the risk of death. 
The antitoxin came into general use in Europe in 1895, and 
mortality rates from diphtheria began to decline. Queensland hospitals 
were reporting the successful treatment of diphtheria cases with the 
antitoxin in that same year. In 1912, von Behring began to immunize 
with the toxin-antitoxin. He was no longer concerned only to save 
distressed patients in the throes of the disease, but to accomplish 
diphtheria prevention. The real breakthrough in the containment of 
diphtheria lies outside the time span of this thesis, for this was not 
achieved until immunization with the toxin-antitoxin mixture was 
freely accepted by both governments and the general public. Curiously 
and tragically, although diphtheria inoculation was available for some 
years before, large-scale immunization was slow in coming to Britain, 
not being accepted until 1940. The first active immunization in 
Queensland took place at Ipswich in 1925, but it was not until 1952 
that the vast majority of Queensland school children were adequately 
7 
protected from the disease with two doses of toxoid. 
Diphtheria was prevalent in Europe and in North America in the 
eighteenth century, but did not appear in England until 1857, after 
o 
which it extended rapidly over the whole country. Cumpston suggests 
3. G.S. Metraux § F.Crouzet (eds.). The Nineteenth Century World 
(New York, 1963), p.199. 
4. Frazer, p.81. 
5. In 1883, Edwin Klebs discovered the diphtheria bacillus, and in 
1884 Loeffler obtained a pure culture of the bacillus. 
6. J.Pemberton, Will Pickles of Wensleydale (London, 1970), p.112, 
7. The Health of Man in Australian Society - Social and Preventive 
Medicine for Queensland Students, Vol.2, 1967-1968, p.17, 
8. Haagensen and Lloyd, p.47. "Putrid throat" was present in 
England much earlier, see Burton, p.208, but Haagensen suggests 
that the older epidemics of '"throat distemper' cannot be 
definitely differentiated as diphtheria or scarlet fever." 
Haagensen and Lloyd, p.108. 
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that very shortly afterwards the disease was introduced to Australia 
from Great Britain.^ Certainly diphtheria was first listed in death 
rate statistics in Australia in 1860, and seems to have been present 
11 in a recognisable form for the first time in Queensland in 1862. 
But although Cilento contends that diphtheria was "constantly flogging 
12 
the public" from that date on, and Dr. Kevin O'Doherty reported 
13 having seen a malignant form of the disease in Ipswich in 1865, 
public interest in the disease was not aroused until the mid-1880's 
when diphtheria showed signs of becoming a destructive force in various 
cities and towns throughout Queensland, and in the capital itself. 
On 14 April 1883 a grief stricken father wrote to the editor of 
The Brisbane Courier warning the paper's readers of the dangers to 
children of "serious diphtheria" if they were "brought into contact with 
any bad smell". According to his doctor, the correspondent's own child 
had died from diphtheria, "poisoned by the deadly emanations... from a 
14 foul mass of corruption" in a friend's closet. The Brisbane Courier 
did not take up the matter, except as it concerned the generally 
insanitary condition of certain parts of Brisbane, nor was there any 
further correspondence on the subject of diphtheria at that time. 
Indeed, in June 1883, Registrar-General Henry Jordan's report revealed 
that diphtheria had actually been a very small-scale killer during the 
previous five years. 
The situation was similar in 1884 when the new Registrar-General 
presented his report for the previous year, though it was obvious that 
the incidence of diphtheria was increasing. Dissension among doctors 
over a well-publicised alleged case of diphtheria in Rockhampton also 
made it evident that Queensland medical men could not agree,either on 
9. Cumpston, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles, p.119. 
10. Ibid., p.61. 
11. Ibid., p.103. 
12. Cilento, p.49. 
13. Cumpston, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles, p.61. 
14. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Apr 1883; letter to editor from A.Alder. 
15. Ibid., 17 Apr 1883; main editorial. 
16. Diphtheria deaths had risen to 39 or 77.37 per 10,000 of the total 
deaths. "Twentyfourth Annual Report of the Registrar-General 
for 1883", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1884), 157. 
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the diagnosis, or the treatment of the disease. There was not even a 
consensus as to whether or not the patient should be put in isolation 17 
TABLE showing the NUMBER of DEATHS from some of the principal Causes; 
also their Proportion per 10,000 of the Total DEATHS and MEAN 
Population respectively for each of the Years 1878-82. - RETURN for 
FIVE YEARS, arranged in the order of their Degree of Fatality for 
1882. 
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17. The Rockhampton Bulletin, 11 Feb 1884, and The Brisbane Courier 
12 Feb 1884. 
18. "Twentythird Annual Report of the Registrar-General for 1882" 
Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1883), 
358 and 362. 
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In May 1885 diphtheria broke out in St. George, resulting in three 
deaths and a number of other serious cases, causing the closure of the 
public school, and prompting the Mayor to appeal to the government for 
19 
protection under the 1884 Health Act. Griffith, rather unsympathetic-
ally, informed the Mayor that his town was already proclaimed under the 
relevant sections of the Act, and that there was nothing more that the 
20 
central government could do. By the end of the year yet another 
Queensland town, Maryborough, was trying to cope with a mild form of 
diphtheria which was prevalent in one suburb, and which despite its 
21 
mildness, "had carried off a number of children". The colony's 
doctors had little to offer in the way of advice, being uncertain 
Lat 
23 
22 
whether foul drains and decaying matter, or the filthy accumul ions 
of fowl houses were the fertile sources of the diphtheria germs. 
Very little was heard of diphtheria in Queensland during the 
following year, but as was often the case in the history of Queensland 
public health, a serious outbreak of the disease in the capital of 
the colony brought some reaction both from the health authorities, and 
from the press. At the July meeting. Dr. John Thomson drew the attention 
of the Central Board of Health to the grave situation in Brisbane which 
had existed for some time. 
From 1st January to 28th July there had been no less than 
sixty-five deaths from the Brisbane Registry district alone... 
They knew that filth of all kinds was supposed to be a fruitful 
source of this disease, and the present epidemic ought to warn 
the authorities that it was time to take action and to put the 
town in the state it was at the time of the cholera scare.... 
Milk was known to be a very fruitful medium for the conveyance 
of disease. Therefore the dairies should be inspected, and the 
people about them as well as the cows. It was a disgrace to 
Brisbane at the present time that there was no fumigating chamber 
in the city where the poor people could get their garments 
properly fumigated. The majority of these people had little idea 
how to go about it if left to themselves. The Board ought to 
insist on a proper disinfecting chamber being provided by the 
municipal authorities. 24 
19. Mayor of St.George to Colonial Secretary, 20 May 1885, Q.S.A. 
COL/A425, in-letter no. 3969 of 1885. 
20. Colonial Secretary to Mayor of St.George, 5 Jun 1885, Q.S.A. 
C0L/G30, out-letter no. 1748 of 1885. 
21. The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 17 Dec 1885. 
22. Ibid., 13 Oct 1885; editorial. 
23. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Dec 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 Dec 1885. 
24. Ibid., 30 Jul 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
29 Jul 1887. 
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Thomson received immediate support from his colleague and fellow 
Board member Dr. W.F. Taylor, who castigated the local authorities for 
their neglect of sanitary laws, their refusal to appoint a sufficient 
number of properly qualified medical inspectors, and their reliance on 
the judgment of ordinary inspectors of nuisances in the important 
matter of the examination of the houses where diphtheria victims had 
lived. In Taylor's opinion, "the local authorities were morally guilty 
25 
of a great number of the deaths that had taken place in Brisbane". 
Dr. Bancroft could not agree. He was convinced that "to charge 
diphtheria to defective sanitation was wrong. They all knew that this 
disease often occurred when sanitation was perfect or in the bush". 
The matter was complicated because the cases were occurring in winter, 
a time when the adverse effects of vile smells and sanitary evils 
were usually abated. 
The Brisbane Courier took up the question of the "dreaded disease' 
and "pitiless ravager" at once, and in doing so, did not spare its 
criticism of either the local authorities or the Central Board of 
Health. The board had certainly sounded the alarm, but the editor 
feared that the medical trumpet had given rather an uncertain sound 
for people expected to prepare themselves for battle against such a 
foe. In the face of a disease which mercilessly strangled its 
unfortunate victims, the central health authority could give no 
practical help. Even worse, they did not even speak with one voice. 
The editor declared that at least one thing about diphtheria was 
obvious. It was very highly infectious and dangerous, and he called 
27 
upon the doctors and scientists to trace it to its origins. The 
apathy and lack of action of the local authorities might very well 
be traceable, not to the laissez-faire system under which they 
operated, but to their very understandable want of confidence in the 
28 dicta of the Central Board of Health. 
The central board was not without its champions in the 
community, and a brisk correspondence ensued. One reader warned of the 
very real possibility of diphtheria germs being present in milk, and 
25. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Jul 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 29 Jul 1887. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Within, p.128.Noone wrote to The Brisbane Courier about the 
Klebs, Loeffler discoveries, nor did the Central Board discuss 
them. 
28. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Aug 1887; sub editorial. 
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offered the practical suggestion that it should be used only after 
29 boiling. Dr. Richard Rendle, after expressing his views on 
diphtheria, took the opportunity to point out specific instances of 
30 
sanitary neglect. Dr. Lockhart-Gibson soundly berated The Brisbane 
Courier for its attacks on the central board, and came to the defence 
of the views of all his confr'eres. He contended that bad smelling 
drains and defective sanitation could neither produce germs nor alone 
produce diphtheria. But they did foster those germs, placing them in 
favourable conditions where their virulence increased. Germs could 
develop very rapidly in milk, and cold westerly winds increased the 
possibility of catching cold, thereby assisting the spread of 
diphtheria by preparing the soil for the germs to take root. Lockhart-
Gibson, who saw the possibility of scientific truth emerging from the 
honest differences of doctors, called for the appointment of a fully 
qualified and well paid medical man, and a sanitary engineer, who 
could concentrate their energies on looking to the health of the 
1 31 people. 
Incensed, The Brisbane Courier's editorial writer again attacked, 
not only the central board, but also those "disciples of Galen" who 
had rushed "to the defence of their brethren". The whole question of 
central board powers was discussed in this long and bitter diatribe, 
and relatively little space was devoted to the discussion of 
diphtheria. But the editor did warn that as the whole colony became 
increasingly insanitary, and with the recurring virulence of deadly 
epidemics, the central board had no time to waste on "internal 
32 dissensions" over the diagnosis and treatment of diphtheria. In the 
same issue, a Brisbane grandmother, apparently despairing of the 
effectiveness of modern science, gave details of the diphtheria cure 
propounded by a Dr. Dewar of Kirkcaldy which had appeared years 
before in an "old" Courier. "Grandmere" knew from personal experience 
in saving her own daughter that Dr. Dewar's remedy worked, and she 
thought that his ideas on the origin of the disease were at least as 
29. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Aug 1887; letter to editor from Arthur 
J. Drury. 
30. Ibid.,6 Aug 1887; letter to editor from Dr. Richard Rendle. 
31. Ibid.,8 Aug 1887; letter to editor from J.Lockhart-Gibson, M.D. 
32. Ibid.,9 Aug 1887; main editorial. 
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sensible as those of the central board. 
Naturally other colonies were having similar problems to 
Queensland's in coping with this elusive yet devastating disease. 
Indeed, Cumpston suggests that very possibly infection was being 
imported from colony to colony, though records confirming 
34 intercolonial transfers of the disease are very sketchy. The 
Brisbane health board was certainly interested to learn of the very 
considerable attention paid to diphtheria by the Victorian Central 
Board of Health. The easy propagation by means of exhalations and the 
breath of the patient, the importance of cleanliness of dwelling and 
person, the necessity of pure milk and clean air, were all stressed 
35 in the Victorian report, which was eagerly perused in Brisbane. 
The Queensland health authorities soon had another very vexing 
problem on their hands with regard to diphtheria. Much to their 
annoyance, the Premier, Samuel Griffith, refused to recommend their 
regulations for dealing with the outbreak, by the quarantining of 
sufferers. Griffith took this stand on the advice of the Attorney-
General, who considered that the proposals were ultra vires, but 
he also objected to the gross infringement of personal liberty which 
such regulations would impose. 
At an adjourned meeting, the central board, protested to 
Colonial Secretary B.B. Moreton over the refusal, pointing out 
again that the death rate from diphtheria for the first six months of 
1887 was higher than that for the whole year in each of the previous 
37 four years. The board also emphasised the extremely infectious 
nature of the disease and the consequent necessity to take repressive 
33. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Aug 1887; letter to editor from Grandmere, 
Dewar prescribed the use of sulphur - sulphurus acid painted on 
the throat, and fumigation, by sprinkling sulphur on red hot 
embers. Frequent liquid foods and orange juice formed part of 
the cure. 
34. Cumpston, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles, pp.121-22. 
35. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Sep 1887; sub editorial. 
36. Ibid., 1 Oct 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
30 Sep 1887. 
37. 1 Jan to 31 Dec 1883 34 deaths 
" " " 1884 38 deaths 
" " " 1885 41 deaths 
" " " 1886 43 deaths 
1 Jan to 28 Jul 1887 65 deaths. 
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measures. The mortality from diphtheria during the early part of 
1887 was certainly abnormally high, as the studies later undertaken 
by Dr. David Hardie were to show, and the deaths continued, at a 
reduced rate, after a peak had been reached in June. 
Despite the urgency and the danger, the Premier refused to 
comply with the board's second request of 15 October 1887, since the 
regulations were still repugnant to him. He took the argument to 
parliament and predictably gained support for his views. The 
central board might be "very indignant that Ats/ advice was not 
accepted", but Albert Norton, member for Port Curtis, thought the 
"idea of taking from their homes children suffering from diphtheria 
40 
was preposterous". And Mr. McMaster, a member of that allegedly 
defaulting local authority the Brisbane City Council, felt that the 
board had no possible justification for quarantining children who 
were "supposed to be suffering from diphtheria, /wheii/ they could not 
~ ~ 41 
agree amongst themselves as to the cause of the disease". 
The board was officially notified of the Premier's decision in 
a letter from the Colonial Secretary. It stated that the Chief 
Secretary, who had had personal opportunities for judging, was fully 
sensible of the dangers posed by diphtheria, but found that the 
suggestion to quarantine all diphtheria patients was attended by many 
obnoxious objections. It would be likely to cause very considerable 
distress, and in many cases would be absolutely cruel. Moreover it 
appeared that no other country in the world had adopted such a course, 
and in the absence of examples, Samuel Griffith was not inclined to 
42 
create a precedent. 
It would almost appear that the central board, having been 
refused their proposed regulations for dealing with the problem of 
diphtheria, for a time at least, washed their hands of a matter 
which they felt themselves unjustly denied the power to control. 
38. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Oct 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 7 Oct 1887. 
39. David Hardie, Diseases in Queensland (Brisbane, 1893), p.11. 
40. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LIII (1887), 1252. 
41. Ibid., p.1255. McMaster was both a Member of the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly and of the Brisbane City Council. 
42. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Nov 1887; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 18 Nov 1887. 
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Diphtheria did continue to affect the young children of the colony, 
43 being prevalent in the St. Lawrence area, in Hughenden, Charters 
Towers and other parts of Queensland, as well as appearing in the 
44 
capital, but the board did not discuss the disease at any length 
at their meetings. It was left to The Brisbane Courier to publish 
a pamphlet issued by the Melbourne Central Board of Health describing 
the symptoms and treatment in cases of diphtheria, because, as the 
Courier reminded its readers, the disease was "frequently appearing 
in Brisbane". 
1890 was yet another bad year for diphtheria. It prompted 
long articles on the disease in newspapers, and led Dr. John 
Thomson, in his address to the annual meeting of the Queensland 
Medical Society, to express his dread that an unclean Brisbane 
would see diphtheria as one of its curses. Unfortunately it also 
allowed Dr. A. Jefferis Turner to go some way in confirming Thomson's 
fears. Jefferis Turner stated that "by far the worst scourge of 
childhood in this city is diphtheria from which there were 50 deaths 
48 in the first six months of 1890". It caused "Scholasticus", in 
commenting on Dr. Thomson's speech, to declare dramatically that the 
"entire body politic is palpitating at heart over the demoniacal 
49 grip obtained amongst us by... diphtheria". And because it 
occurred in the hot summer months rather than in autumn, it upset 
Dr. Hardie's calculations on the effects of atmospheric conditions 
in relation to the disease. 
43. The Rockhampton Bulletin, 20 Sep 1888. These cases were in grave 
danger as "much time was lost in obtaining medical assistance". 
44. Cumpston, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles, p.61. 
45. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Jun 1888. This article was picked up 
and used by other newspapers outside Brisbane. See for example. 
The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 11 Aug 1888. 
46. See for example The Brisbane Courier, 3 Jan 1890. The particular 
article includes homeopathic and other remedies. 
47. Ibid., 27 Jan 1890. 
48. Cumpston, Diphtheria, Scarlet Fever, Measles, p.61. 
49. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Jan 1890; letter to editor from 
Scholasticus. 
50. Hardie, pp.18-19. December 1889 and January and February 1890 
had particularly high death rates. The pattern had previously 
been for high mortality in the autumn months, associated, 
according to Hardie, with low barometric pressure, low absolute 
range of temperature, high humidity, and rainfall, and a large 
amount of cloud. 
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The report of Maryborough's health officer indicated that the 
mortality among children under five had been excessive in that city 
as well - no less than forty-one deaths having been registered up 
to 30 June 1890. Nine of these deaths had been due to diphtheria, 
which was "more rife than usual". Dr. J. Hugh Harricks, like 
Dr. Hardie, laid part of the blame for the high diphtheria death 
rate on the very unusual weather experienced in Queensland in the 
flood year of 1890.^ -^  
This was to be the pattern in Queensland in the early 1890's. 
No year went by without some serious outbreak somewhere in the 
colony, usually in areas fairly far removed from the apparent germ 
centre, the capital itself. So 1891 saw serious attacks of 
52 diphtheria in Gayndah. In the following year the shire of Toowong 
was visited by the disease with tragic results, as the medical 
officer to the council reported. In the light of the European 
advances. Dr. Hammond offered a rather unscientific opinion as to the 
cause of the outbreak of the first fatal case brought to his 
attention in Toowong. He thought "that it was probably due to the 
want of proper drainage causing the sore throat to take on a 
malignant aspect". The doctor laid some of the blame for the many 
other cases on infected milk supplies, and suspected that still 
others arose from close contact with the families of diphtheria 
victims. On hearing that some of the affected children had been 
attending the public school, Hammond suggested that the place be 
closed for four weeks. He also recommended that the Central Board 
of Health should at once bring diphtheria under the same act as 
scarlet fever, but with more stringent regulations; that all dairies 
in any way affected by diphtheria, should be strictly quarantined; 
that all cases which could not be properly treated in their own 
homes should be removed to hospital at once; that the strictest 
quarantine be carried out, with a properly qualified officer to see 
to the fumigation of an infected house and all its contents; and 
finally, that during the epidemic any person attacked with a severe 
53 
cold, should seek medical advice. 
51. The Maryborough Chronicle, 2 Oct 1890; being an exact copy of 
the Report for the year ending 30 June 1890 by J. Hugh 
Harricks, Health Officer to the Municipality of Maryborough. 
52. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1892, p.63. 
53. Samuel Hammond, M.D., to Chairman, Shire Council, Toowong, 
18 Jul 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A706, in-letter no. 8878 of 1892. 
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Hammond had undoubtedly done his inspectorial work very well 
indeed. He had thoroughly examined particular trouble spots like the 
infamous Red Jacket Swamp, and many of the ditches, drains and 
sewers in the Toowong area which were generally in a "state of 
54 
stagnation and stink". His report was quickly passed on to the 
Colonial Secretary and to the Department of Public Instruction, with 
some rather curious results. Indeed it is not clear from the avail-
able records just what action was taken. The Minister for Education 
was obviously incensed by the whole business, since he had "been 
afflicted with a case of diphtheria in /hisj own house... owing to the 
gross neglect of ordinary sanitary precautions on the part of the local 
authorities in respect to drainage and dairy cattle". He declared 
that these matters "and the deprivation of Education caused by closing 
the school" required immediate remedial action. However, a 
marginal notation on further correspondence reads "I do not recommend 
57 
closing Toowong School". To complicate matters further, at the 
Toowong shire's regular meeting a letter was produced from the Under 
Secretary to the Education Department stating that he was "unable to 
direct the closing of the school as a means adequate to the solution 
of the diphtheria epidemic". Attention to neglected drainage was 
• A 58 also required. 
The Central Board of Health did act, but not as quickly nor as 
comprehensively as the medical officer of health to the Toowong 
shire would have liked. The regulations for the shires of Toowong and 
54. The responsibility for draining and clearing of the Red Jacket 
Swamp and other trouble spots in the Toowong shire was disputed 
by the local authorities adjoining the shire, and by the 
government of Queensland. 
55. Shire Clerk Toowong to Colonial Secretary, 20 Jul 1892, 
Q.S.A. COL/A706, in-letter no. 8878 of 1892. 
56. This is from a note attached to Shire Clerk Toowong to 
Colonial Secretary, 28 Jul 1892, Q.S.A. COL/A706^ in-letter 
no. 9150 of 1892. 
57. Under Colonial Secretary to Under Secretary, Department of 
Public Instruction, 3 Aug 1892, Q.S.A. C0L/A706, out-letter 
no.9937 of 1892. 
58. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Aug 1892; Report of the Toowong Shire 
Council Meeting - my italics. The minister was more correct than 
he realized.When writing his report for the years 1910-1911, the 
Commissioner for Public Health, Dr. J.S.C. Elkington suggested:-
"Closure of the school is of little use,as the unrecognised 
infectious individual will return on reopening and will continue 
to infect others". Queensland Parliamentary Papers,II (1911), 6. 
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Ithaca and the division of Taringa approved by the Executive Council 
for twelve months amounted to nothing more than temporary compulsory 
notification of the presence of the disease to the local authorities 
concerned. The requirement to notify was binding on either the 
householder affected, or on any qualified medical practitioner who 
"observed" a case of diphtheria. The regulations were not gazetted 
59 
until 6 October 1892. No doubt they satisfied the central board 
as little as they did Dr. Hammond. Nevertheless, it should be 
remembered that the battle for compulsory, automatic, colony-wide 
notification of infectious diseases had not yet been won. As late as 
17 August 1894, Dr. Hardie was suggesting to the Central Board of 
Health that it was "desirable that discussion take place on the 
advisableness of requiring compulsory notification of infectious 
diseases"; and the amended regulations, approved by the crown law 
officer in December 1894, were considered by the board to be useless, 
since they "did not make notification compulsory as had been intended 
in framing the original regulations". In the light of this, the 
central board's diphtheria regulations of 1892 were the normal 
response to a very unsatisfactory situation. Providing their 
efficient administration could be assured, and this was by no means 
certain in all cases,they could even be seen as a tentative step 
forward. 
But in the following year, when The Brisbane Courier was 
ft'? lamenting that "diphtheria is always with us more or less", the 
central board's advice to the government on the diphtheria question 
was overruled again, this time by Colonial Secretary Horace Tozer. 
The western town of Barcaldine had recently had an outbreak, serious 
f\ '^  
enough to close the state school and to create "much havoc". 
Unfortunate as this had been, at least Barcaldine had a resident 
medical officer of health, able to deal with the situation and to 
59. Queensland Government Gazette, LVII (1892), 356. 
60. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Aug 1894; Minutes of the Central Board 
of Health, 17 Aug 1894. 
61. Ibid., 15 Dec 1894; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 14 Dec 
1894. Compulsory notification was finally provided for under the 
Health Act of 1900. 
62. Ibid., 18 Sep 1893; main editorial. 
63. Ibid. 
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f\A 
attend the cases. When diphtheria appeared for the second time 
amongst the children of St. Lawrence, very deep concern was felt by 
the Central Board of Health since the nearest medical man was in 
Rockhampton. Appealed to, the Colonial Secretary replied that all 
the central board could do was to forward general directions of a 
f^f\ 
popular nature as to the mode of treatment. 
The board, unhappy about such a flimsy contribution in the face 
of desperate need, discussed the matter at a special meeting, and 
resolved to advise the government to send a doctor to St. Lawrence 
ft 7 
at once. Tozer's reaction was brusque - after all he had already 
spoken. Reiterating that general advice on the best method of 
popular treatment was all that was wanted, the Colonial Secretary 
concluded - "It is no part of my duty to supply medical aid". This 
apparent callousness is probably evidence of a general government 
anxiety about funding for health and many other public matters in a 
year of very grave depression, and it should not be automatically 
assumed that Tozer was uninterested in Queensland's health problems. 
Unlike many of his predecessors in office, he showed a concern which 
can only be called remarkable. He was always present at Central Board 
of Health meetings, and, on his own confession, had been saved a great 
deal of trouble and uneasiness by the advice he had received from that 
K ^ 69 body. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the Colonial Secretary did 
rate the threat from diphtheria as being less than that posed by other 
diseases. For whereas he approved of measles being put "under a ban", 
sanctioning the central board's stringent regulations for the control 
of that disease, "he declined to make any order with respect to so 
fatal a disorder as diphtheria". The Brisbane Courier suggests that 
64. Queensland Government Gazette, LVII (1892), 115. 
65. Dr. O'Doherty to Central Board of Health, 11 Sep 1893, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A747, in-letter no. 10657 of 1893. A telegram from 
St. Lawrence requesting aid was enclosed. 
66. Horace Tozer's marginal comment on above. 
67. Secretary, Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
15 Sep 1893, Q.S.A. C0L/A747, in-letter no. 10848 of 1893. 
68. Marginal comment on above. 
69. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXX (1893), 507. 
141. 
the Colonial Secretary probably had good grounds for his decision 
70 though he did not see fit to reveal them, and in view of the large 
amount of attention paid to diphtheria during 1894 in parliament, in 
71 the press, and among the general public, the distinction made 
between the two diseases of childhood is strange. 
At least one correspondent to The Brisbane Courier found it so. 
Writing in 1894 and reviewing the government's action, or lack of it, 
on diphtheria from 1887 onward, "Surprised" thought it amazing that 
the advice of the "Central Board, men of long standing in their 
profession /should be/ set aside by governments composed largely of 
lawyers .... The public has a right to know on what grounds,... on 
matters of life and death... advice given was disregarded by 
72 governments". 
Fortunately for the children of Queensland help was very near, 
i£ medical staff was available. On 20 October 1894, Dr. Hirschfeld 
addressed the Royal Society stressing the "urgent need to use the new 
treatment for diphtheria if the patient /was/ to be saved". Early 
in 1895 - the same year which witnessed its general use in Europe -
doctors at the Brisbane hospital successfully administered the 
antitoxin treatment to a diphtheria patient. This was followed by 
75 further complete successes in other parts of Queensland. At the 
April meeting of the Central Board of Health the secretary. 
Dr. Wilton Love, announced that up to that date forty-two tubes of 
the antitoxin had been distributed to hospitals and medical men 
throughout Queensland. The board was not sure what method of 
distribution should be used, but finally agreed that the hospital in 
each district should be made the distributing centre. Should there 
be no hospital established, the health officer for the area should be 
70. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Oct 1893; sub editorial. 
71. See for example Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXI (1894),4, 
The Brisbane Courier, 4 Sep 1894, 11 Sep 1894, 22 Sep 1894, 
30 Oct 1894, 15 Dec 1894, and The Woman's Voice, Vol.1, No.8, 
1 Dec 1894, p.117. These were articles or comments of 
considerable length - not just reports of cases. 
72. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Sep 1894; letter to editor from Surprised. 
73. Hirschfeld's address to the Royal Society of 20 October 1894 was 
commented on in The Brisbane Courier, 30 Oct 1894; sub editorial. 
74. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1896, p.71. 
75. For example, in Charters Towers later in the same year, see 
Ibid., p. 73. 
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responsible. At the same time, other medical men were to be informed 
that the serum was available if required. The Queensland government 
was to supply twelve tubes a week for distribution during 1895, after 
ift 
which the matter was to be left in the hands of private enterprise. 
One Queensland city made almost immediate use of the scheme. 
Diphtheria again "prevailed to an unusual extent" in Maryborough 
during 1895. The health officer. Dr. Harricks, reported that "as 
soon as he knew that the government would make an antitoxin available, 
he at once applied and also supplied it to the medical men of the 
77 town... as occasion required". 
In spite of the use of the life-saving serum, diphtheria 
continued to be a problem in Queensland right up to 1914 and well 
beyond that year. From time to time during the late 1890's the 
78 prevalence of the disease caused schools to close, though during 
this period sanitary problems, and difficulties over scarlet fever, 
typhoid, lead poisoning, the approaching plague, leprosy, and the 
question of their own powers were occupying the colony's health 
authorities to a very large extent. But it was in the early part of 
the twentieth century that diphtheria again began to cause real alarm 
in Queensland. 
George Rosen, in discussing the trends in diphtheria morbidity 
and mortality in England, Wales, and France, suggests that even 
before the widespread use of the antitoxin there was a marked decline 
in the incidence of, and death-rate from, the disease. He contends 
that this position undoubtedly reflects, at least in part, the impact 
79 
of the nineteenth century sanitary reform movement. According to 
76. The Brisbane Courier,6 Apr 1895; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 5 Apr 1895. 
77. The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 17 Oct 1895;being an exact copy 
of the Half-Yearly Report of Dr.Harricks to the Maryborough 
Municipal Council for half year ending 30 Jun 1895. 
78. For example, Clermont State School in 1897, see Pugh's Queensland 
Almanac, 1898, p.72. 
79. G.Rosen, A History of Public Health(New York,1958) pp.337-339. 
Death Rates from diphtheria in England and Wales and in France 
per 1000 inhabitants. 
YEARS ENGLAND AND WALES FRANCE 
1841-1850 22.4 23.3 
1861-1870 21.3 23.6 
1881-1885 19.4 22.2 
1891-1895 18.7 22.3 
1896-1900 17.7 20.7 
1901-1905 16.0 19.6 
1906-1910 14.7 19.2 
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some observers, there are indications that a similar trend was present 
80 in Australia, with the downturn taking place after 1915, although the 
figures which are given by these experts in another place do not bear 
out this contention. 
NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, QUEENSLAND, 1901-1925. 
Year 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1907-08 
1908-09 
1909-10 
1910-11 
1911-12 
1912-13 
1913-14 
1914-15 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
1919-20 
1920-21 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
Diphtheria 
255 
149 
295 
206 
325 
306 
490 
536 
750 
1152 
1858 
2428 
1600 
2153 
1566 
1616 
1908 
2369 
2841 
2989 
1391 
755 
713 
963 
Typhoid 
793 
1582 
1728 
444 
611 
536 
842 
943 
956 
848 
2019 
1336 
1386 
1183 
1730 
661 
552 
608 
731 
522 
366 
458 
464 
314 
Scarlet 
Fever 
115 
71 
644 
28 
20 
42 
73 
52 
53 
740 
249 
133 
136 
216 
313 
556 
328 
316 
340 
381 
304 
236 
357 
319 
Poliomyelitis 
5 
38 
6 
332 
27 
37 
13 
119 
17 
35 
25 
1 
8 
142 
81. 
For Queenslanders living through the period the picture^seemed 
very grim indeed. In 1901, Dr. A.C.F. Halford, the newly appointed 
medical officer of health to the Metropolitan Joint Board for the 
Prevention of Epidemic Diseases, thought the diphtheria position, 
together with that of typhoid and plague, serious enough to warrant 
82 his investigation, though the government's infectious disease 
80. Health of Man in Australian Society, Sections I and 2, 1968-
1969, p.30j. 
81. Ibid., Sections 3 to 7, 1967-1968, p.18. 1925-1939 was a bad 
period for diphtheria.Figures were rarely below 1500 per annum, 
the highest being 2259 in 1932-33. 
82. The Brisbane Courier,9 Aug 1901. See also the Supplementary 
Report of Finance Committee of the Metropolitan Joint Board for 
the Prevention of Epidemic Diseases,Thomas Proe, Chairman, 13 Aug 
1901, Q.S.A. COL/400, Report No.12 of 1901. 
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regulations of 1901 mention only plague, smallpox, cholera, scarlet 
83 fever and typhoid fever specifically. As the minutes of the Central 
Board of Health meetings and Dr. Ham's disease rate releases confirm, 
typhoid and diphtheria were by far the most destructive diseases 
reported consistently to local and central health authorities for some 
84 periods of 1901, although by October of that year only one case of 
85 diphtheria was reported. The improvement in available information 
was ensured by Part VII of the new Health Act of 1900, which 
enabled the health commissioner appointed under that Act to institute 
a proper system of notification. In 1903-1904 these figures 
confirmed that diphtheria, though a long way behind typhoid and 
scarlet fever, had the third highest notifications in the state. 
83. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1901), 
1667-1673. 
84. The Brisbane Courier, 17 May 1901; Monthly return for the State 
of Queensland for April 1901, reprinted from Dr. Ham's 
pamphlet. 
Typhoid Fever 117 cases Scarlet Fever 7 cases 
Diphtheria 16 " Erysipelas 3 " 
Bubonic plague 7 " Puerperal Fever 3 " 
Deaths from phthisis 11 
Ibid., 13 Jun 1901; Notifications and deaths for May 1901, 
published by the Central Board of Health. 
Typhoid Fever 
Diphtheria 
Plague 
Ibid., 30 Jul 1901; Notifications and deaths for June 1901, 
published by the Central Board of Health. 
Typhoid Fever 54 cases Erysipelas 4 cases 
Diphtheria 27 " Plague 3 " 
Scarlet Fever 6 " 
85. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Oct 1901. 
86. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, I (1902), 882. 
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33 
12 
cases 
II 
II 
Croup 
Erysipelas 
Scarlet Fever 
1 case 
3 cases 
15 
145, 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
NOTIFICATION 
The following cases of infectious diseases throughout the State were 
reported to the Department :-
Cases 
Bubonic Plague ... ... ... 
Diphtheria 
Phthisis 
Membranous Croup 
Erysipelas 
Scarlet Fever 
Typhoid Fever 
Relapsing Fever 
Puerperal Fever 
Continued Fever 
Deaths from Phthisis 
G] rand 1 .01 :al 
1st July 
to 
31st December,1903 
2 
135 
• • • 
1 
44 
473 
331 
• > > 
9 
1 
56 
1st January 
to 
30th June,1904 
29 
190 
9 
1 
33 
513 
446 
• • . 
11 
1 
61 
Totals 
31 
325 
9 
2 
77 
986 
777 
20 
2 
117 
2,346 
Distribution of cases within the Metropolitan Area for the twelve 
months ending 30th June, 1904, was as follows :-
Local Authority 
Brisbane 
South Brisbane 
Ithaca 
Toowong 
WynnuiB 
Sandgate 
Balmoral 
Hamilton 
Coorparoo 
Indooroopilly 
Enoggera 
Kedron 
Stephens 
Windsor 
Toombul 
Taringa 
Yeerongpilly 
Sherwood 
Belmont 
Typhoid 
Fever 
147 
67 
54 
35 
6 
3 
4 
11 
5 
4 
6 
24 
10 
5 
... 
381 
Scarlet 
Fever 
46 
30 
8 
1 
26 
5 
4 
2 
S 
6 
6 
1 
2 
... 
142 
Puerperal 
Fever 
3 
2 
1 
] I 
7 
Diphtheria 
47 
37 
19 
11 
1 
2 
3 
9 
2 
1 
1 
5 
5 
15 
24 
1 
1 
1 
... 
185 
Erysipelas 
10 
9 
1 ".. 
2 
2 
2 
3 
29 
Phthisis 
48 
15 
12 
5 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
9 
6 
4 
6 
1 
... 
113 
Total 
301 
160 
94 
54 
33 
10 
9 
27 
8 
2 
2 
12 
27 
52 
44 
16 
1 
4 
0 
857 
87. 
87. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1904), 101 
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During the following year there was room for some cautious 
88 
optimism, but during the years 1905-1906 the incidence of both 
89 diphtheria and typhoid was "distressingly high", and this trend 
continued until 1911 with occasional peak outbreaks like those of 
90 1907, which closed a large number of Brisbane state schools, and sent 
Dr. I.J. Moore of the health department posthaste to Esk to report on 
91 the epidemic diphtheria there. 
By 1911, Dr. J.S.C. Elkington, the current health commissioner, 
was seriously worried about the incidence of diphtheria in the state, 
particularly in Brisbane. Not only were the numbers of victims 
increasing, but the disease began to assume a most severe type, 
apparently caused by an epidemic wave spreading from the southern 
92 
states. Once again the state schools were foci for the attacks, but 
Elkington did not favour the indiscriminate closing of schools. 
According to the commissioner. 
The only rational method of attacking a school outbreak consists 
in carefully excluding all suspicious cases and all children from 
infected houses, obtaining swabs from the throats of all children 
in the infected parts of the school, and examining these swabs 
for virulent forms of the specific bacillus. Carriers and missed 
cases can thus be detected and excluded until they are free from 
virulent diphtheria bacilli .... 
Diphtheria is an almost typical example of a disease which 
requires human contact and human association for its spread. 
Drains and nuisances have probably nothing at all to do with its 
introduction or spread. 93 
This method of dealing with the disease was followed successfully in 
Brisbane during the year covered by this report. It was also used by 
the newly appointed school medical inspector. Dr. Eleanor Bourne, who 
was pressed into service at Inglewood in 1911. But Dr. Bourne left 
nothing to chance. As well as taking swabs from the school children, 
88. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1905), 177. The optimism 
sprang from the very marked reduction in the number of 
swabbings submitted for examination - suspects reduced from 
25,794 for previous year to 12,706. 
89. Ibid., II (1906), 180. 
90. Ibid., II (1907), 248. 
91. Report on Epidemic Diphtheria at Esk by Dr. I.J. Moore, N.D. 
Q.S.A. C0L/B17, in-letter no.6587 of 1907. 
92. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1911), 6. Number for 
1910-11 - 908 - an increase of 344 on the previous year. 
93. Ibid. , p. 7. 
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she looked carefully into the milk supply, and, having examined them 
thoroughly, was severely critical of the sanitary arrangements in the 
94 town. In the face of the danger to their children, the shire council 
95 
and ratepayers resolved to amend the situation at once. And with 
commendable zeal, the health department made sure that they did, 
calling on the local authorities for a full report from their medical 
officer of health, and for evidence that disinfectant work had been 
1 • J ^ 96 properly carried out. 
At first sight, the department seems to have been som.ewhat less 
conscientious about an earlier outbreak at Oakey. For some weeks 
before 5 August 1911, a censorious Brisbane Courier had been reporting 
the presence of diphtheria in the town, while residents were daily 
expecting an investigatory visit from the health department, but 
nothing had been done. Some further delay caused the highly critical 
Oakey correspondent, to ask whether there was a health department in 
Queensland, and what availed the notification of disease if reports 
were merely pigeon-holed. One of the very real dangers in the Oakey 
affair, was that diphtheria sufferers from outlying areas were 
travelling to hospital in Oakey on trains, obviously increasing the 
97 possibility of an even more widespread epidemic. 
On pursuing its enquiries with the health department. The Brisbane 
Courier discovered that it had been somewhat hasty in judgment. An 
o 
99 
98 inspector had been deputed to visit Oakey, though it was pointed ut 
that the onus rested on the local authority to deal with the problem."" 
In fact. Inspector Dudley did arrive in Oakey on the correct date, and 
did report - adversely - on the Jondaryan Shire Council arrangements. 
94. The Brisbane Courier,12 Sep 1911. Bourne was appointed as from 
1 Jan 1911. She was on the staff of the Department of Public 
Instruction. 
95. Ibid. 
96. Ibid., 8 Oct 1911 and 9 Oct 1911. 
97. Ibid., 16 Aug 1911. 
98. Expected date of arrival 15 Aug 1911. 
99. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Aug 1911. 
100. Dudley's report is recorded and commented on in Jondaryan Shire 
Council to Home Secretary, 19 Sep 1911, Q.S.A. COL/B75, in-letter 
no.8870 of 1911. I was unable to find the Report itself. 
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Moreover, far from ignoring the situation in Oakey, the health 
department had taken a very lively interest, requesting reports on the 
outbreak, announcing the inspector's proposed visit, and giving cogent 
suggestions, on receipt of the inspector's report. And after all 
the fuss, and the complaints about the central health authority's 
refusal to cooperate, the Jondaryan Shire Council itself "declined to 
pay the expenses for the visit of the inspector during a diphtheria 
102 
outbreak". The question, as to who was to look to the health of the 
people, and who was to foot the bill for it, was one of the most 
contentious issues arising out of diphtheria epidemics up to 1914. 
The situation did not improve during the next two years. By 
103 March 1913, diphtheria was rife all over Australia, and in Queensland 
the ability of central and peripheral authorities to work together 
amicably to remove the danger had progressed very little. Nor had the 
local authorities and the general public given up entirely the old 
outdated medical theories and left the field to the scientists. A 
frustrated Dr. Elkington wrote in his 1912 Report :-
The widespread, but entirely incorrect, idea that diphtheria is 
"bred" from drains and insanitary conditions generally, is the 
principal stumbling block in the road of suppressive measures 
against this disease. In place of obtaining prompt medical 
advice, and enlisting the assistance of the Department's 
Laboratory for the free supply and free examination of swabs 
from all contacts and suspects, valuable time is frequently 
wasted in futile attempts to discover a hypothetical source of 
infection in some adjoining drain. The relationship between 
human contact and association and the spread of diphtheria is 
so obvious and well proven by direct bacteriological observation 
that there is no need here to bring forward fresh evidence to 
indicate that the ordinary and everyday method of spread is 
directly from the infected to the healthy person, without any 
extraneous intervention. No evidence whatever exists to show 
that drains or nuisances have anything at all to do with its 
spread. The prejudices of sixty years die hard, however. 104 
101. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Sep 1911. This report records the 
following letters to the Jondaryan Shire Council from the 
Health Department. Request for report, 7 Aug 1911, advice of 
Inspector's visit, 8 Aug 1911, Elkington's comments on Dudley's 
report, 24 Aug 1911. 
102. Health Department to Home Secretary, 13 Nov 1911, Q.S.A. COL/B75, 
in-letter no. 11588 of 1911. 
103. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Mar 1913; opinion of 
Dr. J.S.C. Elkington. 
104. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 5. 
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The widespread nature of the disease in Queensland during the 
next few years illustrates the absolute necessity for all those concerned 
with public health, and the people of Queensland generally, to take heed 
of Elkington's warnings and advice. During this time, besides being 
present in Brisbane,^°^ diphtheria was rife, for varying periods, in 
Mossman,-^^^ Chillagoe, "^°^ Beenleigh, °^ Nambour, ° Oakey - again, 
Clermont,-^ -^^  Kingaroy, "^-^^ Mt. Garnet, ^''••^  Toowoomba, Tarampa and 
Clifton,-"^ ^^  Balmoral,-^^^ Childers, "^•'^^ Many Peaks, Ipswich, 
Yeerongpilly and Tingalpa, Mooloolabah, and Toowong. Above all 
123 it was very prevalent in Mackay, an area taken here as an example of 
105. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 8. 
106. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CXI (1912), 176. 
107. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jun 1912, and Jellicoe Shire Council to 
Home Secretary (through Mr. Theodore, M.L.A.), 7 Aug 1912, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B40, in-letter no. 10549 of 1912. 
108. Dr. Brade to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's Department, 4 Jan 
1912, Q.S.A. HOM/B40, in-letter no. 200 of 1912. 
109. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CXIII (1912), 2833. 
110. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 15 Oct 1912, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B40, in-letter no. 12571 of 1912. 
111. Secretary, Clermont Shire Council to Home Secretary, 15 Nov 1912, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B40, in-letter no. 13769 of 1912 and Police Magistrate, 
Clermont to Home Secretary, 15 Nov 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter 
no. 13770 of 1912. 
112. Secretary,Nanango Hospital Board to Home Secretary, 9 Dec 1912, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 14648 of 1912. 
113. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Nov 1912. 
114. Mrs. M. East to Home Secretary, 4 Jan 1913, Q.S.A. H0M/B42, 
in-letter no. 145 of 1913. 
115. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jan 1913. 
116. Ibid., 28 Feb 1913. 
117. Ibid., 30 May 1913. 
118. Health Department to Home Secretary, 2 Jun 1913, Q.S.A. H0M/B42, 
in-letter no. 6582 of 1913. 
119. The Brisbane Courier, 22 May 1914. 
120. Health Department to Home Secretary, 6 Jul 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, 
in-letter no. 5755 of 1914. 
121. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Oct 1914. 
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procedures to be followed, wherever necessary, in the event of future 
attacks. For in Mackay, "an extensive and widespread outbreak... 
necessitated action by the ^ healtli/ department, local effort having 
failed to check the spread of the disease, which was assuming alarming 
124 proportions and threatening other parts of Queensland". 
Dr. Eleanor Bourne, who happened to be in the north of the state, 
was instructed by the Department of Public Instruction to meet 
Dr. Booth Clarkson - the medical inspector for north Queensland - at 
Mackay, and to cooperate with him in every aspect of the examination 
125 
of schools and school children. The situation was so grave that 
Dr. Booth Clarkson, after a thorough inspection, and a brief trip to 
Brisbane for instructions, commenced work with a special staff of 
1 Of, 
inspectors and nurses at Mackay on 15 September 1912. The local 
authorities did not resume control until 10 December of that year. In 
the meantime. Booth Clarkson had recommended the extension of the 
diphtheria regulations to the town of Mackay and the Shires of Pioneer 
127 
and Sarina. There was some considerable dispute as to whether such 
regulations should cover the removal to isolation of carriers and 
infectious persons, not themselves showing the symptoms of the disease, 
but Queensland had come a long way from the days of Premier Samuel 
Griffith, and this too was finally allowed in the health interests of 
128 
the many. Having found the general hospital "far too small", and 
attributing the probable cause of the continuance of the outbreak to 
129 the early discharge of patients to make room for new sufferers. 
Booth Clarkson set up a tent hospital, with the full approval and aid 
130 
of his departmental head, to cater for the overflow. Armed with the 
124. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 5. 
125. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Sep 1912. 
126. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 6. 
127. Booth Clarkson to Home Secretary, 23 Sep 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, 
in-letter no. 11730 of 1912. Elkington requested gazettal on 
1 Oct 1912. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 
1 Oct 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 12865 of 1912. The 
original regulations dealing with local conditions in Mackay 
were published in the Queensland Government Gazette on 14 Sep 
1912. 
128. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Oct 1912. See also Commissioner of 
Public Health to Home Secretary, 22 Oct 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, 
in-letter no. 14414 of 1912. 
129. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Sep 1912. 
130. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 25 Sep 1912, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 11789 of 1912. 
151. 
same authority, the doctor arranged for the removal of convalescent 
131 patients to a separate isolation hospital, as well as holding the 
132 quarantine station in readiness in case of further emergencies. In 
Brisbane, the health commissioner arranged for bacteriological 
133 
examinations to take place in Mackay and in Brisbane, made liberal 
134 
supplies of antitoxin available, and, through the Home Secretary, 
organised the performing of tracheotomies at a cost of about forty 
135 
shillings each. 
All in all, the 1912 Mackay diphtheria outbreak is noteworthy 
for two things, as The Brisbane Courier pointed out. The Department 
of Public Health had "taken hold of the diphtheria situation /Tn Mackay/^ 
in a remarkable way" which contrasted strongly with the nineteenth 
century efforts of the Central Board of Health. The department's 
action, in turn, had emphasised "the difference between the old ideas 
as to the causation and spread of certain diseases and newer conceptions 
in sanitary science", based on the utilization of the antitoxin 
remedy, the use of the bacteriological examination of swabs, and the 
sterilising measures carried out on proven diphtheria carriers. But 
the newspaper warned that these measures, far-reaching and modern though 
they might be, would not be efficacious in coping with the problem in 
a minimum of time, unless "the local authority and the affected 
community cooperated heartily in the eradicative measures which had 
137 been adopted". 
Community cooperation was not achieved easily. Having been 
forced to ask for help, the local authorities, the district newspapers, 
and their readers continued to search for insanitary conditions and 
defective drains in an effort to stem a scourge which had troubled 
131. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Sep 1912. 
132. Ibid., 23 Sep 1912. 
133. Ibid., 9 Sep 1912. 
134. Ibid., 14 Sep 1912. 
135. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary 10 Oct 1912, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 12410 of 1912. Various 
supplies were also arranged. For example overalls were 
purchased at 30/- for 6. Commissioner to Home Secretary 10 Oct 
1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 12396 of 1912. Test tubes 
and disinfectants were also supplied. Health Department to Home 
Secretary, 8 Nov 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no.13475 of 
1912. 
136. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Sep 1912; main editorial. 
137. Ibid. 
152. 
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Mackay for some three years, Elkington's strictures notwithstanding. 
Despite Booth Clarkson's assurances to the Mackay Hospital Board that 
the sum of ^ 50 per quarter and 4/6d per day per patient would be paid 
139 for the treatment of infectious diseases, both this board, and the 
health board of the Mackay City Council, consistently and very strongly 
resisted the use of a special isolation hospital "because of its 
additional expense" - even to the point of protesting to the health 
commissioner himself, and to their parliamentary representatives 
140 Walter Paget and Edward Swayne. Elkington, annoyed at the 
obstructions placed in Booth Clarkson's way, telegraphed the Mayor, 
instructing the health board not to interfere in the work of stamping 
out diphtheria and to keep within the guidelines forwarded. 
The commissioner took his wide powers to restrict the liberty 
142 
of convalescents and carriers seriously, though such an assumption 
of authority was resented by some in Mackay. One convalescent 
diphtheria patient, William John Hill, who gaily left the hospital 
without permission because "he felt in good health",was fined tl or 
one week's imprisonment. Hill elected to "put in a week... at the 
isolation hospital", after being lectured by the Bench "on his duty 
143 to the public... as a carrier of infection". 
Even worse, a nurse who was a convalescent carrier was allowed 
by the hospital authorities to attend a weekend party and a wedding. 
Booth Clarkson telegraphed the information to Elkington at once, and 
the health commissioner was provoked into making an angry statement to 
The Brisbane Courier. 
138. The Mackay Mercury, 9 Sep 1912 and 13 Sep 1912. 
139. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Sep 1912. 
140. Ibid., 21 Sep 1912. Paget was the member for Mackay and 
Swayne for Mirani. 
141. Ibid., 23 Sep 1912. 
142. Ibid., 4 Oct 1912. See also Health Department to Home 
Secretary, 3 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 14414 
of 1912. 
143. The Brisbane Courier,! Oct 1912. The regulations covering the 
detention of these patients or carriers was very thoroughly 
perused by the Justice Department before being allowed. See for 
example Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 
22 Oct 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 12865 of 1912, 
and subsequent of 3 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter 
no. 14414 of 1912. 
153. 
I am now informed that the hospital committee of which the 
chairman is Mr. Macrossan apparently take the view that as they 
are not legally forbidden to discharge convalescents in an 
infectious condition, they will do so as they choose, and that 
the Health Department officers may find the discharged persons 
as best they can. This remarkable attitude in a public body 
can and will be summarily corrected by regulation, but it is 
unfortunately possible that some innocent persons will suffer 
before this can be done. It is impossible to reconcile action 
of this kind with any care for the public welfare, or even for 
the public pocket. An isolation hospital has been established 
for the very purpose of relieving the general hospital of cases 
of convalescents in order that they may be kept from 
infecting the public, and may receive suitable treatment for 
rendering them non-infectious as rapidly as possible. Any 
reasonable person would imagine that the hospital committee 
would transfer their convalescents to the isolation hospital.... 
As it is, the persistent attempts to thwart and obstruct the 
Health Department, must, if continued, force the erection of a 
special isolation hospital, where all acute and convalescent 
cases can be treated. This will mean a considerable expense to 
the ratepayers of Mackay which might readily be avoided if the 
hospital committee could be induced to cooperate in the public 
interest, or at any rate to refrain from giving trouble. The 
most serious aspect is the reckless disregard for public 
safety as evidenced by these later developments. It is easy to 
understand from this how the outbreak has been allowed to 
spread. Nearly two hundred cases of diphtheria have occurred. 
Mackay is normally a healthy place. The only explanation for 
this undesirable prevalence of a dangerous disease is that the 
public bodies which are entrusted with the duty of protecting 
the public health have failed to do their duty. Disease 
centres of the kind into which Mackay has been allowed to develop 
are dangerous to the remainder of the State, and the Health 
Department intends to see the matter through. The life of one 
child is worth more than the opinions and eccentricities of a 
dozen Mackay hospital committees. 144 
This attack "utterly amazed" the president and members of the 
hospital committee, who took the strongest exception to the 
commissioner's remarks, which so grossly misinterpreted their 
145 position. Nevertheless, from the time of that incident on, at the 
request of the Mackay council, diphtheritic patients were removed from 
the general hospital with all possible haste, and all new patients and 
convalescents were treated by the Department of Public Health at the 
• 1 ^- V. -^ 1 146 isolation hospital. 
144. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Oct 1912. 
145. Ibid., 7 Oct 1912. 
146. Ibid., 4 Oct 1912. 
154. 
While hospital authorities fumed, government departments worked 
in harmony, good relations being maintained between Education and 
Health Department officers. Children at state and Catholic schools 
were examined, and school premises were disinfected, and in some cases, 
repainted. Local authorities, also deciding to pull their weight, 
discovered previously hidden breaches of sanitary laws, and dealt 
with offenders smartly. Some dubious shipping arrangements, 
involving the over-supply of some goods, were noted and marked for 
future attention by the relevant authorities. Further supplies of 
tents were received from Brisbane to improve the isolation hospital 
accommodation, and Dr. Bowkett arrived in Mackay to take over the 
4. ^u ^ -^ 147 running of that unit. 
By 15 October The Brisbane Courier, which had faithfully 
followed events in Mackay in the interests of all Queenslanders, was 
able to relay the Home Secretary's satisfaction with the Mackay 
situation. The isolation hospital was on a full working basis, and 
there were no difficulties with examinations, either of patients or 
of the swabs taken from them. Even more importantly, the Mayor of 
Mackay had expressed a desire to cooperate fully with the officers 
from the Department of Health. John George Appel was happy to 
announce that "cordial public appreciation of the measures being 
adopted was being met with, and it was anticipated that the cause of 
148 the past friction would shortly disappear". 
The minister's claim that willing cooperation was offered by 
the locals is not entirely borne out by the facts. The local 
authorities, while willing to play a part in the fight against the 
disease, were certainly not rushing into monetary commitments. Indeed, 
they declined to raise a special rate to pay for the diphtheria 
endemic expenses, preferring to wait until the outbreak had ended, 
149 
when they intended to try to borrow the money from the government. 
Neither was the cooperative spirit evident at a meeting of ratepayers 
called to discuss the outbreak. The question of whose funds should 
fight the disease was again the issue, and the ratepayers were very 
anxious that it should not be theirs. After considerable discussion 
the meeting passed this motion for communication to the Premier, 
147. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Oct 1912. 
148. Ibid., 15 Oct 1912. 
149. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 10 Oct 1912, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no. 12396 of 1912. 
155. 
D.F. Denham, the Home Secretary, and their parliamentary 
representatives. 
That this meeting of ratepayers of Mackay and district,having 
in view the fact that the action now being taken by the Health 
Department to deal with diphtheria is in the nature of an 
isolated experiment not previously tried in the Commonwealth, 
if at all elsewhere, and that the disease being widely spread 
through Queensland and the southern states may be re-introduced 
at any moment unless concerted action is taken simultaneously 
throughout the Commonwealth, protest against the whole expense 
of such action being borne by the ratepayers, and urges the 
government to bear the cost of the experiment. 150 
The Mayor's request for funds to cover the cost of the outbreak 
was refused by the government, which claimed that it had "no fund from 
which it could bear the expense of the diphtheria campaign". The 
Mackay council therefore decided to issue a precept ofi^l,000 on all 
of the local bodies concerned with the outbreak and campaign, but 
bitter to the end over the isolation hospital, claimed the amount 
involved for equipping that -e€305 - from the government. Mackay 
and its surrounding districts got little practical help from their 
members of parliament. Edward Swayne did ask for the correspondence 
to be tabled in the house, but this the minister was quite willing to 
do, having nothing to fear from open discussion of the Home Department's 
A • ^u- 153 
record m this case. 
By the beginning of December, Elkington_, deciding that the 
epidemic had abated sufficiently for local authorities with their newly 
154 
appointed or upgraded medical inspectors to take over, reported that 
Mackay might be safely vacated by the department's officers. Central 
150. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Nov 1912. 
151. There was a letter from the Mayor of Mackay to the Home Secretary 
on the incidence of diphtheria in the area and the cost of 
combating it. It is recorded in Q.S.A. H0M/B40, 1912, but has no 
number and no date. See also The Brisbane Courier, 20 Nov 1912. 
152. Ibid. The shires concerned agreed to pay their parts of the 
precepts, which were divided as 43% each from Mackay and Sarina, 
and 14% from Mirani. See Ibid., 27 Nov 1912. See also the 
correspondence for 1913 on the matter of fitting up of isolation 
hospitals. Deductions for these were always made by local 
authorities when forwarding payments. Health Department to Home 
Secretary, 14 May 1913, Q.S.A. H0M/B42, in-letter no. 5830 of 
1913. 
153. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CXIII (1912), 2784. 
154. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Nov 1912, and 3 Dec 1912. 
155. Health Department to Home Secretary, 3 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, 
in-letter no. 14598 of 1912. 
156. 
and local health authority relations were as acrimonious at the end of 
the Mackay emergency as they had been in the beginning. Severe and 
"unwarranted" criticism of local efforts, emanating from the offices 
of both the Commissioner of Public Health and the Home Secretary piled 
harsh insult on citizens already smarting from the injury done to their 
pockets. The outcome was letters of indignation and calls to the 
Premier for an enquiry by a supreme court judge. The protests were 
of no avail. The margins of all correspondence are simply marked "no 
action" or "AWAY". 
In any case the Home Department and its Sub-Department of Health 
had little to reproach themselves with in their bold departure from the 
normal treatment of an outbreak of great severity. The anti-
diphtheritic serum had been supremely effective. Only three deaths had 
occurred, and after 124 cases of diphtheria and 1085 carriers of the 
disease had been treated, the health department could announce that the 
157 
outbreak was "thoroughly brought under control". 
Queensland, and particularly Mackay, did not escape serious 
158 diphtheria outbreaks up until 1914, as the statistics clearly show. 
In 1913, when the northern city was again subject to attack, 
correspondence almost exactly repeated itself as authorities quarrelled 
159 
over expenses in general and the isolation hospital in particular, as 
1 f,c\ 
well as over insulting comments which were again bandied about. To 
calm things down, Elkington finally visited the district to investigate 
the diphtheria situation and the grievances for himself, and reported 
156. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Dec 1912. See also Vice-President of 
Mackay Hospital Committee to Home Secretary,11 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. 
H0M/B40, in-letter no. 14799 of 1912, Pioneer Shire Council to 
Home Secretary, 11 Dec 1912,Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no.14779 
of 1912, J.J.Bolton to Home Secretary(through the Premier), 
10 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. H0M/B40, in-letter no,14970 of 1912, and 
Editor,Daily Mercury to Home Secretary, 16 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. 
H0M/B40, in-letter no.15019 of 1912. 
157. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 6. 
158. Within, p. 143. 
159. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Jun 1913.An eight month campaign was 
alleged to have cost ii68000>more than the entire cost of running 
the city for that period.There was a good deal of correspondence 
on the funding for the isolation hospital. See for example Health 
Department to Home Secretary,8 Jan 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B42, in-letter 
no. 364 of 1913, and Health Department to Home Secretary, 29 Jan 
1913, Q.S.A. H0M/B42, in-letter no. 1153 of 1913. 
160. Mackay Hospital Board to Home Secretary, 28 Mar 1913, Q.S.A. 
H0M/B42, in-letter no. 3865 of 1913. 
157. 
to his minister on 7 June 1913. 
In the end, the vexed question of who should pay the costs of 
treating infectious diseases patients was resolved, for the immediate 
future, not because of a diphtheria outbreak, but because typhoid and 
scarlet fevers were raging uncontrolled. The local authorities had no 
joy in the decision, for the crown solicitor found that should any 
persons within the area of the councils be removed to an isolation 
1 ft7 
ward, the council should pay all costs, with slim chances of 
1 f~i 3 
recovery even if the patient was financially able to pay. This 
decision made local authorities very unhappy, especially in Mackay, 
where other grievances soon emerged to add to the perennial anguish 
164 
over funds. In other areas some good was forthcoming. When 
diphtheria broke out in Yeerongpilly, and began to assume serious 
proportions because of the large numbers of diphtheria carriers in 
the district, the shire council decided that an appointment of a 
long overdue medical officer of health must be made to deal with this 
1 f\ft 
and other health crises. Nevertheless, local authority 
resentment died hard, and one local representative, councillor 
McCotter, complained that too much was being put on the already 
overburdened shoulders of local authorities. The time had arrived 
for the health department to take sole control, when there was an 
K^ v 167 outbreak. 
161. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 13 Jun 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B42, no. 7040 of 1913. 
162. Crown Solicitor to Home Secretary, 29 Dec 1914, Q.S.A. 
H0M/A5069, in-letter no. 16754 of the Department of Justice of 
1914. Local councils were to be responsible for proper food, 
medicines, accommodation, nursing and medical attendance for 
such period of time as may be necessary. 
163. Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary, Home 
Secretary's Department, 10 Dec 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/A5069, in-letter 
no. 10285 of 1914. The health commissioner could make 
recommendations in certain cases, under the particular 
regulations concerned. 
164. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Sep 1914. This particular complaint 
alleged that diphtheria regulations for carriers had been 
relaxed to accommodate "private reasons", and that diphtheria 
had again appeared in the town because of the relaxation. 
See Ibid., 11 Nov 1914, for health commissioner's recommend-
ations for re-introducing these regulations. 
165. Ibid., 4 Jun 1914. 
166. Health Department to Home Secretary, 6 Jul 1914, Q.S.A. 
H0M/B44, in-letter no. 5755 of 1914. 
167. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jun 1914. 
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Reluctantly or not, the principles essential to the fighting 
of disease were being accepted in Queensland, and diphtheria outbreaks 
had played a large part in that acceptance. Scientific methods, in 
addition to public and private cleanliness, and the necessity of 
paying for an absence of disease through dealing with suspects and 
carriers as well as treating grave illnesses, were lessons which the 
tragedy of diphtheria epidemics eventually brought home to Queensland 
central and local authorities alike. 
CHOLERA 
In December 1885, the "formidable", "dangerous", ''malignant" 
and "infectious" disease cholera made its appearance among British 
immigrants travelling down the Queensland coast between Cooktown and 
2 
Townsville on board the British India steamer Dorunda. This arrival 
was not entirely unexpected, and since newspaper coverage on the 
subject of cholera had been very considerable, Queenslanders should not 
have been unaware of the dangers which were likely to attend an out-
break of that virulent, exotic disease. 
The British had known and feared cholera well before the 
settlement at Moreton Bay was even contemplated, for in 1818 the disease 
had ravaged both the native population of India and British troops 
stationed in that country. But in 1831, when the first outbreak 
occurred in Britain, cholera was seen as a ''terrible new disease", 
one which required novel, far-reaching measures. 
Devastating the "new" disease certainly proved to be, leaving 
a total death toll of 21,882 in England and Wales, 20,070 in Ireland, 
4 
and 9,592 in Scotland, yet even these terrible inroads were not 
without some compensations. The temporary precautions taken during 
the 1831-33 outbreak indicated for the first time that the central 
government had even begun to consider its liability in the question of 
public health. A new central advisory board, responsible to the Privy 
Council, was appointed to draw up a sanitary code for Britain, and at 
their request, local boards of health were created throughout the 
country. The boards lapsed as the epidemic waned and the danger 
passed, and Longmate considers that no long-lasting impression was made 
on the British government. But action taken over the first cholera 
epidemic in Britain was to set the pattern for future health 
administration in that country, and eventually in Queensland. Moreover^ 
the most effective way of dealing with such an exotic disease was 
1. Description of Cholera in the Proclamation of the King in 
Council, 20 Jun 1831, cited in N.Longmate, King Cholera 
(London, 1966), no page number. 
2. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1886, p.110. 
3. Burton, p.200. 
4. Haagensen and Lloyd, p . 4 4 . 
5. Longmate, p . 1 4 3 . 
159. 
160. 
clearly to prevent its entry. The British government very soon 
recognised the necessity for providing efficient quarantine measures, 
and the Australian colonies too were not slow to realize their 
importance. 
Despite British efforts, cholera epidemics made further 
appearances in the country in 1848-49, 1853-54, 1865-66 and 1893. By 
1866, during what Longmate calls the Fourth Assault, The Brisbane 
7 
Courier, and other Australian newspapers, were taking it upon 
themselves to publish, not only almost daily reports on the progress of 
the disease in Britain, but also long, general reports and descriptions 
Q 
of cholera, together with appropriate warnings. 
Interest in cholera died down with the passing of the British 
epidemic, and it was not until 1883 that Australian colonists were 
Q 
again forced to consider the question. This time the centre of 
interest was Egypt, where a very severe outbreak of cholera had 
occurred, and where panic in Cairo might well have led to the 
virtual collapse of the Sherif government, but for the prompt action 
of the British occupation army. 
Two other high level commissions were also working effectively 
in Egypt to try to stem the panic of the cholera epidemic - one a 
French delegation of prominent scientists, the other a German group 
led by Robert Koch. The cholera-causing bacillus evaded the scientists 
in 1883, but Koch, after a visit to India, reported to his government 
in February 1884 that he had found the comma bacillus which causes 
1, 1 11 cholera. 
The very real concern felt in Queensland over the constant 
reports of cholera in Egypt was not surprising. The Suez Canal had 
been opened in 1869, and though not widened and deepened until 1886, 
was attracting a large amount of Australia-bound traffic and 
considerably reducing ships' sailing times. Added to this was the 
6. Longmate, pp.212-222. 
7. Notably The Argus from which The Brisbane Courier published 
several pieces. 
8. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Jan and 23 Jan 1866. 
9. See for example Ibid., 13 Jul 1883 and 11 Sep 1883, some reports 
and letters of importance being copied from The Sydney Morning 
Herald. 
10. P. Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London, 1971), p.84. 
11. Longmate, pp.225-6. 
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quicker passage of the Orient and other steamship lines, which robbed 
the colonies of the protection gained from the long duration of the 
voyage of sailing ships from Europe. It was becoming increasingly 
evident that Australia could no longer depend on immunity from 
foreign diseases, because of her geographical isolation. This fact 
was underlined, in early July, by the reports of an outbreak of 
cholera on board a ship conveying coolies to Fiji which had called 
12 into the port of Sydney during the voyage. 
A strictly observed quarantine was obviously required, and at 
least one prominent Australian medical man began to bring this 
important issue to public attention. On 20 July 1883, the government 
health officer of New South Wales, Dr. Charles MacKellar, in a paper 
read before the Royal Society, stressed the need for an efficient 
quarantine service on a federal basis. MacKellar suggested that the 
imposition of quarantine was in accordance with the teachings of 
modem medical science, that rigorous quarantine should be maintained 
throughout the whole of Australia, and that there should be mutual 
13 
agreement on this question between the various colonial governments. 
The Brisbane Courier, alarmed by the Fiji cholera reports, 
applauded MacKellar's suggestions on federal quarantine, and called 
for united colonial action, not "if practicable", nor "if possible", 
but "of necessity". Trade with India and the East was increasing in 
ever faster ships, and the dangers increased with it. Commercial 
interests, the Courier admitted, might be against quarantine for 
economic reasons, and the governments of colonies might be reluctant 
to commit funds. But cholera could "be within measurable distance... 
and certainly no precaution should be avoided which could with 
prudence be adopted". The Courier, while convinced that concerted 
colonial action to establish a federal quarantine station at Thursday 
Island would be best, warned Queenslanders not to wait for a federal 
operation, but to act promptly and alone if necessary "to perpetuate 
14 present immunity", whatever the cost. Unfortunately, Queensland's 
record in organising her own quarantine facilities left a good deal 
to be desired, and the possibilities of the quarantine officers 
themselves acting as carriers of disease had not escaped one interested 
12. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jul 1883. 
13. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Aug 1883. 
14. Ibid., 1 Aug 1883; main editorial. 
162. 
u 15 
observer. 
In the face of the obvious danger from cholera and smallpox, 
there was very evident interest in quarantine in the other eastern 
colonies. But it is very important to notice that although 
politicians were showing a definite interest in the question at this 
time, the initiative was coming from medical men - either from those 
individual doctors in government service, like Dr. Charles MacKellar, 
or from associations of medical men. For example, on 27 August 1883, 
the Colonial Secretary of New South Wales forwarded a letter to the 
governments of South Australia, Victoria, New Zealand, Queensland, 
Fiji, Western Australia and Tasmania containing the resolutions of the 
interested and aware New South Wales branch of the British Medical 
Association on the practical issues of quarantine. Such a system 
should be "framed and conducted upon federal principles combining 
efficiency, humanity and hospitality", and be carried out by the 
unanimous consent and control, and at the expense of, the Australasian 
colonies, including New Zealand. The Central Board of Health in 
Victoria was also concerned with the problem, and favoured the 
establishment of a station at Thursday Island as part of a federal 
system, if their Queensland counterparts felt that the site was 
• n--, 17 suitable. 
However, by no means all of the information being published in 
Queensland was favourable to the idea of quarantine. On 24 November 
1883 The Brisbane Courier published a very long article which attacked 
quarantine as a retrogressive system, a system which was demonstrably 
inefficient, unless all of the necessary conditions were fulfilled 
exactly. The colonies would be far better advised to institute the 
medical inspection of passengers, which would not interrupt the 
commerce and communications, which were vital to new countries 
dependent on overseas markets. Instead, they should substitute the 
"scientific precision of a plan based on intelligent observation and 
logical inference" for the "blundering brutality" of quarantine. 
Medical inspection would deal only with those ships which had sickness 
on board, and would isolate and detain only the sick. Britain had 
stood alone against the world in recommending medical inspection,having 
15. Agent for Gibbs Bright to Colonial Secretary, 31 Aug 1883, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A367, in-letter no. 4433 of 1883. 
16. The Telegraph, 8 Sep 1883. 
17. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Sep 1883; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 Sep 1883. 
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dropped her earlier strict quarantine measures in the interests of 
trade and commerce. She had seen her stand vindicated at the Inter-
national Sanitary Conference held in Vienna in 1874, when medical 
inspection in the face of an invasion of cholera was proposed by the 
18 
representatives of twenty-one governments. 
Dr. W.M. Frazer contends, with the benefit of hindsight, that 
in the 1870's and 1880's the new port sanitary authorities in Britain 
were too inexperienced to prevent the admission of persons in the 
incubation period of disease, and that medical inspection, like 
quarantine itself, is dependent on the backing of an efficient system 
19 
of sanitation throughout the rest of the country. This happy state 
of affairs certainly did not exist in Australia in the 1880's, but in 
any case, the colonial governments do not seem to have been tempted 
by the idea; nor did they rush into action to call a quarantine 
conference. 
Impatient at the delay, newspapers throughout Queensland again 
began to preach the value of an efficient quarantine system, as the 
possibility of the arrival of cholera loomed. The Northern Miner 
20 
warned of the still raging Egyptian epidemic, and the Rockhampton 
Municipal Council, stirred by the news of the outbreak of cholera in 
Europe, requested its Mayor, as a matter of urgency, to wait upon the 
Colonial Secretary in Brisbane, to discuss possible quarantine 
21 improvements. It was hardly surprising that the citizenry of these 
northern ports was worried. Steam ships bound for eastern Australia 
favoured the route which took in the convenient coaling station at 
Batavia, thus allowing them to proceed through the Torres Strait and 
down the Queensland coast. The north Queensland ports were the first 
line of defence in any quarantine system that might be devised, either 
by the colony itself, or through some federal arrangement. The arrival 
of the Dorunda was to prove just how weak that defence was. 
The Brisbane Courier also kept its readers fully alerted to the 
cholera situation in Europe, stressing the "fearful rapidity" with 
which the disease spread, and recording the numbers of deaths from 
18. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Nov 1883. 
19. Frazer, p.164. 
20. The Northern Miner^ 2 Jun 1884. 
21. The Brisbane Courier,, 9 Aug 1884. 
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cholera in Russia, Italy, France, Switzerland and Germany. Apart 
from the dreadful nature of the disease itself, the editor of the 
Courier was most concerned at "the possibility that such a plague as 
cholera should find its way here while we are so utterly unprepared 
23 to combat it. It is sufficient to make any thoughtful person shudder". 
And the editor of The Northern Miner, in warning that Australia could 
not escape the scourge of cholera, examined Dr. Koch's suggestions 
and warnings on the disease, and urged all local authorities to take 
all of the scientific precautions available to diminish the evil, or 
totally avert a visitation. At the same time, the Miner used the 
opportunity to swipe at a number of other evils, which it said, 
obtained in Townsville, though it reserved its special virulence for 
the Chinese. So it attacked 
the creek, reeking with putrid offal of all kinds, back slums 
with a foundation built on filth and rottenness, and Chinese 
stores and Chinese dirt everywhere. We wonder that the 
municipal authorities do not turn their attention to the 
removal of so direct and immediate cause of disease as the 
Chinese plant in a town. If they are to be tolerated in a 
town, they should have a separate quarter or location, a 
ghetto as the Jews have in Rome. No man should be allowed to 
poison his neighbours by letting his houses to filthy 
Chinamen.,.. /The Northern Miner/ wants the town cleared of 
Chinkies and and all other rubbish. 24 
The sanitary conference of government medical delegates from 
every colony did take place at last, at Sydney in September 1884, 
Queensland's representative being Dr. Joseph Bancroft. Interest in the 
conference was probably over-shadowed, as far as Queensland was concerned, 
by the debate - in parliament and in the press - over the new 
comprehensive health bill which was then before both houses. The 
Brisbane Courier was 
glad to see doctors getting together better in ways to unite 
and protect Australia from disease than the politicians do.... 
Legislation will be necessary, but this paper is confident 
that there will be no hesitation in passing such legislation, 
when the necessity for it is explained. 25 
The editor was wrong in his assessment as to the swift acceptance of 
the need to unite Australia on this matter. Even after federation, 
22. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Aug 1884, 12 Aug 1884, 14 Aug 1884, 
19 Aug 1884, 21 Aug 1884, 25 Aug 1884, 3 Sep 1884 and 8 Sep 1884. 
23. Ibid., 3 Sep 1884; main editorial. 
24. The Northern Miner, 23 Aug 1884; editorial. 
25. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Sep 1884. 
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quarantine systems were to remain the business of the states until their 
operations were abolished under the Commonwealth Quarantine Act of 
1908. And it was not until 1 July 1909 that a branch office within the 
Department of Trade and Customs was created under the control of a 
7 ft 
Director of Quarantine, and arrangements to suit all parties were 
27 
completed over a period. 
The Australasian Sanitary Conference of Sydney, New South Wales, 
was of considerable significance, for not only did it deal with the 
important questions of sanitation and quarantine, but also, as one of 
the forerunners of many more colonial conferences on matters of mutual 
interest, it highlighted the growing trend of Australians to come 
together across colonial borders to deal with problems affecting the 
whole country. The resolutions of the conference, which was held as an 
28 
open forum and which reported back to all colonial parliaments, 
were quite different from the secret compacts previously arranged 
between colonial governments, through the "vicious system of conducting 
29 these conferences behind closed doors". Indeed, the conference 
delegates bluntly told their various governments that for the immediate 
purpose of preventing the spread of contagious disease from colony to 
colony, constant and swift intercolonial communications were vital. 
This at present is not habitually done;and the communications 
between the Governments of this information, when it is 
transmitted, is through the Colonial Secretary's Department.lt 
was unanimously agreed, under Resolution 9, that all information 
of this kind should be systematically collected by the various 
Governments; and in order that it might be communicated with 
the promptitude which alone can render it of practical value, 
under Resolution 11 it was resolved that the Chief Medical 
Advisers to the Governments ought to have power for this 
purpose to communicate with each other. 30 
26. Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1911 
(No.5, 1912), p.1117; and see also 
J.H.L. Cumpston, A History of Smallpox in Australia 1788-1908 
(Quarantine Service, Publication No.3), p.198. 
27. Negotiations were rather more protracted than the bald statements 
in Cumpston and the Commonwealth Yearbook would suggest. See for 
example. Under Secretary, Home Department to Health Department, 
23 Mar 1910, Q.S.A. B.C. Register of 1910-1912, out-letter no.3282 
of 1910. This deals with payment of the Queensland public health 
commissioner for work done for the Commonwealth quarantine service 
during a northern tour of the state. 
28. "The Australasian Sanitary Conference of N.S.W., 1884", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1885). 
29. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Aug 1883; main editorial. 
30. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1885), 488. 
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But this was to request too much power and discretion for government 
medical men, and colonial governments continued to deal with health 
matters through the ministers concerned. 
In spite of the continued public interest in the cholera problem, 
this disease received only brief mention in the official report of the 
31 
conference, though more attention was paid to the question in 
discussion between delegates. Queensland's delegate at least was 
convinced of the propriety of relying on British experience and advice, 
though doctors from other colonies were prepared to acknowledge the 
tremendous contribution to medical knowledge provided by French, and 
32 pre-eminently German, scientists. Above all, both conference delegates 
and medical men generally, stressed the inadequacy of trying to deal 
with contagious diseases through quarantine alone. An efficient port 
system to check disease was essential in Australia, but this had to be 
backed up with "ordinary cleanliness of roads and courts", "a 
moderately perfect scheme of drainage", and "pure air and water". Under 
these conditions "of good drainage and good scavenage, cholera, as has 
33 been seen again and again, does not spread". And that was precisely 
the trouble. In Brisbane, medical practitioners began to warn the 
general public that with cholera not so far from Queensland, the 
country's need for better drainage in all her cities and towns was 
^ 34 
urgent. 
Throughout 1885 reports of cholera in Europe continued to feature 
in Queensland papers, while The Brisbane Courier began to suggest that 
no expense on sanitary precautions or delays in communications or loss 
of trade would be considered too costly and too inconvenient if 
35 Brisbane were threatened with the immediate introduction of cholera. 
Hardly had this warning been issued than the Queensland Figaro 
published a startling editorial - The Cholera is Cominglll 
31. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1885), 495. 
32. Ibid., p.510. 
33. Ibid., p.489. 
34. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Oct 1884; letter to editor from 
Dr.Richard Rendle, and 9 Oct 1884; letter to editor from 
Dr. Leighton Kevesten. 
35. Ibid., 10 Aug 1885; sub editorial 
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....The cholera is here I 
Or, if it isn't here, it soon will be. 
The cholera is here! 
Right here in Australia - in Queensland. 
Down here in Brisbane, up there in Cooktown, 
back in Toowoomba. 
The cholera is here.' 
Good God I Do you know what that means? 
Can you conceive the presence of such a scourge? 
Have you the least idea of what the 
"cholera" is? 
The cholera is here! 
AyI Right here. Men fall in the streets and women by the 
roadside. The strong go down like grain before the reaper. 
The weak die off as cattle die in the drought. 
The cholera is here.' 
....Do we want to Escape? 
Well, I do, rather; don't you? and you? and you? 
Do we want to escape? 
Then, why do we sit here like dotards, when it is time to be 
up and doing? What is Sammy* about that he doesn't set the 
sanitary machinery of the colony in motion, or step down and 
out to give place to a man that will. 
....Do we want to escape? 
Then let us go through the country with a new broom, scour out 
every city, mop out every town, scrub out every village, and 
holey-stone every house. Dig a hole in the field and bury the 
muck-heap, cart away the stinking filth that rots in many an 
alley-way, take the Chinese by the nape of the neck and, if 
they won't live like Christians bounce them bag 
and baggage. 
Do we want to escape? 
I think so,....and the way is as plain as a 
pikestaff. Faith is all right, but works count also,... 
and the dirty town that goes to church won't stand half 
as good a chance when the cholera is around as the clean 
town that doesn't. The plague without dirt is like fire 
without anything to bum, and when it strikes us we 
should have things fixed so that it dies out for want 
of fuel. „^  
Do you want to escape? 
Such editorials may have been exaggerations for the sake of 
effect, but cholera was certainly not far away. On 22 September 1885, 
The Brisbane Courier announced an outbreak of epidemic cholera in Timor. 
37 The dreaded disease had almost reached Queensland's very doors. 
* Samuel Walker Griffith - Premier and Colonial Secretary of 
Queensland at this time. 
36. The Queensland Figaro, 22 Aug 1885; main editorial. 
37. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Sep 1885. 
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Utterly dismayed, the paper contended that there was now a distinct 
possibility that the disease could find its way to Australia. 
Apparently ignoring Koch's discoveries of 1884, and the earlier work of 
38 
Dr. John Snow in London, the Courier fretted that scientific men were 
not at all sure as to the manner in which cholera spread. This seemed 
only too obviously true, as equally experienced and well qualified 
medical men differed quite openly in opinions on the subject. But in 
any case, as McKeown and Brown have wisely pointed out, increased 
medical knowledge and professional advances, important as these 
undoubtedly are, are of no practical significance until "they contribute 
39 to the preservation of health or recovery from illness". This gap 
between knowledge and results was certainly evident where cholera was 
concerned. Only one thing was certain to The Brisbane Courier in 
September 1885. Dirt, choked drains, and stagnant water, and fear, 
panic, and hysterical excitement were the trusty allies of the disease. 
Queensland had plenty of insanitary nuisances, which should be attended 
to at once, while the colonists should rally without shrinking to resist 
1,1 1 40 unreasonable alarm. 
The situation had become so grave that even the body directly 
charged with the sanitary protection of Queensland, the Central Board of 
Health, began to debate the matter - but not before the Sydney board had 
telegraphed enquiring what action Brisbane had taken to prevent cholera's 
entry. That it was an important question was obvious, and the board 
agreed that they should consider it. But any reply to the Sydney 
telegram would have perforce to be "that up to the present they had done 
nothing". The rest of the board's discussion concerned the sanitary 
conference's proposal that a medical man should go to Thursday Island, 
to try to stop any virulent, exotic disease from entering Australia. 
After some derisory talk on government miserliness on the issue of the 
salary to be paid to the proposed Thursday Island appointee, the board 
decided to interview the Colonial Secretary to stress the urgency of 
the case. The Colonial Secretary was also to be warned that ships' 
officers' guarantees of a clean vessel should not be accepted, and that 
38. In 1849, after working through the 1848-49 epidemic in London, 
John Snow published a pamphlet On the Mode of Communication of 
Cholera. In 1855 he completely rewrote liis work,presenting 
conclusive evidence that cholera was water-borne. Even so,many 
refused to believe him, labelling him a reactionary and an 
anti-sanitarian. 
39. McKeown and Brown, p.120. 
40. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Sep 1885; sub editorial. 
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careful and proper inspection of all vessels coming from China and the 
41 
eastern ports should take place at Cooktown. 
By now private persons began to take action. A small pamphlet. 
Precautions against Cholera and Diarrhoea, which was published by the 
National Society of England with the sanction of the Local Government 
Board, was reprinted by Mr. W. Carpenter of Boggo Road, and distributed 
42 gratuitously from chemist and booksellers' shops. Politicians also 
expressed fears that insanitary Brisbane offered excellent conditions 
43 for the cholera to "take up a permanent abode". And at least one 
member of that other body which was supposed to look to the health of 
Brisbane citizens, the city council, began to express his fears on 
cholera. Far better to proceed as quickly as possible with the drainage 
and cleansing of the city, as cholera approached, than to spend a 
large sum of money on the erection of a new town hall, alderman McMaster 
proposed. Perhaps the idea of a cholera outbreak in Brisbane was too 
hard for the council to contemplate. McMaster's motion was lost by eight 
44 
votes to three. At the same time Ipswich local government bodies were 
urged to do their part to deal with cholera, in the face of increasingly 
45 
close communications with European and eastern ports. 
The Central Board of Health discussed the cholera question again 
at their first October meeting, but curiously enough the telegrams which 
were examined were the ones which had been received and sent in September, 
and the only bright spot recorded was that a health officer was to be 
46 
appointed to Thursday Island during the following week. In fact the 
appointment of Mr. Arthur Salter, M.B., Ch.B., as health and medical 
officer at Thursday Island was announced at the board's November 
meeting, when the secretary was asked to draw up a list of Salter's 
duties. The Dorunda was even then steaming towards the Queensland coast, 
but the central board, not being omniscient, made no mention of the 
47 possible cholera problem at this meeting. The possibility became a 
41. The Brisbane Courier,26 Sep 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 25 Sep 1885. 
42. Ibid., 28 Sep 1885. 
43. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, JCLVII (1885), 851. 
44. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Oct. 1885. 
45. The Queensland Times, 17 Nov 1885; sub-editorial. 
46. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Oct 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 9 Oct 1885. The actual text of the telegrams is included 
in this report. 
47. Ibid., 28 Nov 1885;Minutes of Central Board of Health,27 Nov 1885. 
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reality on 9 December 1885. The Dorunda had reached the Queensland 
coast with one passenger dead from cholera. 
If the majority of those most intimately concerned had been 
lethargic before, they burst into great activity now. As The Brisbane 
Courier announced the arrival in what were, for those days, screaming 
48 headlines, the Central Board of Health was meeting to try to cope 
49 
with the emergency. Their secretary. Dr. Hill Wray, who was also the 
health officer for the port of Brisbane, was kept incredibly busy 
preparing plans and suggestions for the Premier's consideration. Among 
these were proposals for seven days of quarantine for all ships from 
Batavia, although coloured labourers from the area were to be 
subjected to three times that period in detention; that immigrant ships 
should never again be permitted to call at Batavia; that Wray be given 
immediate assistance with the appointment of an assistant health 
officer; and that four male and four female nurses be put at his 
disposal as well. 
The Premier, also acting with unwonted speed on a public health 
matter, at once proclaimed Batavia, provided Dr. Wray with his 
52 
nurses, and hastily arranged the appointment of Dr. J.E. Usher to 
53 
assist Wray. Usher, who was surgeon superintendent of the Queensland 
immigration service, had already put his experience and expertise,gained 
through contact with cholera and allied tropical diseases while port 
54 
officer at Karachi, at the government's disposal. He was not the only 
48. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Dec 1885. 
49. Ibid., 12 Dec 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health,11 Dec 1885, 
50. Wray to Premier, 16 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, in-letter no. 9496 
of 1885. Wray had been accused of neglecting his duty, and of 
tardiness in answering calls for assistance, especially in his 
capacity as medical officer to the prisoners on St.Helena. One 
constant critic was The Queensland Figaro,see for example 3 Oct 
1885. However the Premier considered Wray to be a good officer. 
If he had a weakness it was not as a medical man, but in the way 
he attended to his duties as secretary of the Central Board of 
Health, "The work of a secretary was not his forte". Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LIII (1887), 1554. 
51. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXVII (1885), 2165, 17 Dec 1885. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid., 19 Dec 1885. 
54. J.E. Usher to Colonial Secretary, 11 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A447, 
in-letter no. 9355 of 1885. 
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one to volunteer his services in a time of grave emergency. For 
although some local bodies panicked, demanding appointments of medical 
officers of health which they had previously strenuously resisted on 
economic grounds, and although people with relatives on board the 
stricken ship requested that healthy passengers should be removed by a 
specially despatched steamer, while the doomed were left to their 
56 
fate, a relatively large number of Queensland residents did show that 
courage in the face of danger which The Brisbane Courier had previously 
urged upon them. 
Some of these offers were undoubtedly genuine, such as that from 
58 
Dr. Porter of Colac, who quickly telegraphed his readiness to assist; 
from Lieutenant Walton Drake, who offered his services "for the 
preservation of order and decency at Peel Island" during the unfortunate 
59 
outbreak; and even the submission of a certain G. Buckmaster, who, in 
offering to help, apprised the Colonial Secretary of his experiences 
with a cholera panic in foreign parts, and his own fearlessness in the 
face of his companions' deaths from cholera and yellow fever. But it 
does appear that some approaches might have been made, not from 
nobility of soul, nor from concern for their fellow men, but from sheer 
inability to find alternative employment. Such, perhaps, was R.J.Dennis, 
late chief quartermaster of the vessel Gayundah. Impressed by the 
man's experience of cholera, and his knowledge of ship life, Griffith 
engaged him to work at the Peel Island quarantine station. However, on 
the morning of the day of the engagement "he drank too much and 
committed other irregularities, and was dismissed the next morning". 
55. For example,John D.Gibson,Chairman of Divisonal Board,Maytown to 
Colonial Secretary,11 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, in-telegram 
no.9385 of 1885.More often than not,these requests were refused. 
See marginal comment on above from Griffith - "not necessary to 
make special appointment", 15 Dec 1885. 
56. C.Spry to Colonial Secretary, 11 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, 
in-letter no. 9416 of 1885. 
57. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Sep 1885. 
58. Dr.Porter to Colonial Secretary, 12 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, 
in-telegram no. 9439 of 1885. 
59. Walton Drake to Colonial Secretary, 14 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, 
in-letter no. 9492 of 1885. 
60. G,Buckmaster to Colonial Secretary,12 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A448, 
in-letter no. 9540 of 1885. 
61. R.J.Dennis to Colonial Secretary, 12 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A447, 
in-letter no, 9437 of 1885. 
62. Marginal comment on above, 16 Dec 1885. 
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No. 17. Queensland Figaro, July to December, 1885, 
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If the government was prematurely congratulating itself on its 
swift action in Brisbane, a great deal of trouble was brewing in the 
north. The Dorunda had been quickly turned around in Cooktown, in spite 
of her record of extremely serious diarrhoeic cases, one of which, on 
the very evening of sailing, was to prove to be, not the milder 
diarrhoea as was supposed, but the deadly cholera. The ship had then 
sailed for Townsville, where, with the dreadful disease confirmed, it 
awaited the Premier's instructions. Since by then four persons had 
died, and sixteen more on board were very seriously ill with 
ft "^  
unmistakable symptoms of cholera, it was hardly surprising that 
passengers were showing signs of panic. The people of Townsville were 
also distinctly fearful of possible consequences in their area, 
especially as the Queensland government seemed likely to set up a 
quarantine station for the reception of the Dorunda's passengers and 
crew on Magnetic Island. 
This fear turned to complete dismay and indignation when it was 
learned that the health officer for the port. Dr. Thomas Ridgley, had 
actually been on board the vessel to examine the sick, and having 
returned to shore to order the Dorunda into quarantine, was moving 
freely about his business in the city. Townsville, from its Mayor 
down, immediately protested violently at such dangerous, "unwarranted" 
64 
action, and Ridgley was threatened with court action under the 
ft ^ 
Quarantine Act. However, The North Queensland Telegraph and 
Territorial Separationist, like its rival The Northern Miner, used the 
opportunity to champion its own long-held partisan views, as well as 
issuing grave warnings about the cholera. In The Telegraph's opinion 
Ridgley's behaviour, which was apparently condoned by the Premier, and 
the "monstrous shame of Townsville's unpreparedness" to deal with the 
cholera, were only to be expected. Both naturally resulted from 
northern "affairs being administered by foreigners", and were but 
another example of a "Southern Government's" complete unfitness to cope 
63. Cumpston and McCallum, p.344. 
64. The North Queensland Telegraph, 14 Dec 1885; sub editorial. See 
also The Brisbane Courier, 11 Dec 1885, and for copies of the 
numerous telegrams sent to the Colonial Secretary from the Mayor, 
private citizens and Dr. Ridgley see The Brisbane Courier, 
12 Dec 1885. 
65. Note from S. Griffith to Treasurer, 22 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 448, 
no.9667 of 1885. 
with northern requirements. 
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Griffith was hampered by slow and inadequate telegraphic 
communications from Dr. Hickling, the surgeon-superintendent on the 
Dorunda, on the condition of the sick - a matter which would require 
explanation, since the press and ship's agents were constantly in 
touch - but he now came to a decision which was very unpopular in the 
capital. He decided, after consultation with Dr. Wray, but against 
the majority opinion of the Central Board of Health, to order the 
Dorunda to Brisbane, with all passengers on board. 
The Brisbane City Council, which had so grossly neglected a 
large number of insanitary areas of the capital for so long, wasted 
no time now. The Mayor, the health committee of the council, members 
of parliament, and a number of citizens quickly formed a deputation 
to wait on the Premier on the evening of 11 December, urging him not 
to allow the Dorunda to proceed to Moreton Bay, The people of Brisbane, 
some of whom were showing signs of extreme fear, were convinced that the 
proper place for the treatment of cholera victims, and the quarantining 
of the whole ship, was Magnetic Island. To reinforce their position, 
the city council even solicited the help of the Central Board of Health, 
with whom they were more often than not at odds. The council urgently 
requested the board to use its influence to have the sailing orders 
for the Dorunda countermanded, so that the vessel could be "detained 
f\R 
and the passengers landed at some more suitable place in the north". 
At the same time, the Mayor and his health committee began to address 
themselves at last to the huge task of purifying Brisbane. The editor 
of The Brisbane Courier was also convinced that the government had 
blundered in ordering the Dorunda to Brisbane, not because he feared 
for the capital, but rather because he was concerned that the best 
means of saving the lives of passengers would be to land and treat 
them as soon as possible. 
All of the protests were too late. The Dorunda had already left 
for Brisbane. In the Premier's opinion, the accommodation at Peel 
66. The North Queensland Telegraph, 15 Dec 1885; main editorial. 
67. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Dec 1885;minutes of Central Board of 
Health,11 Dec 1885.Dr. John Thomson abstained from voting, 
apparently favouring bringing the Dorunda to Moreton Bay.All 
other board members voted to keep the ship at Magnetic Island. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid.; main editorial. See also Dr.Cunningham's opinion on this 
point. Within, pp.178-79. 
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Island was not all that could be desired - indeed it could hardly be 
said that the buildings on Peel were adequate at all, and most of the 
passengers were accommodated in tents, while properly attended latrine 
facilities were almost entirely lacking. However, facilities on 
Peel Island were vastly superior to the incompleted buildings on 
Magnetic Island. Moreover, should the Dorunda be held in the northern 
port, and cholera become established in tropical Townsville, Queensland 
would probably be in the position of a country like India which was never 
71 
really free of the disease. The Premier may well have been correct 
in his assumptions, but The Brisbane Courier was also right in assessing 
the danger to ailing passengers. On the voyage to Brisbane in the 
cramped and fetid quarters occupied by the indented immigrants, five more 
persons succumbed to the cholera. 
In the grave emergency, Griffith had exercised to the full his 
powers as minister in charge of public health, turning his considerable 
energy to the problem, but he did expect to receive the advice and 
support of his Central Board of Health on medical and scientific 
matters. Of special importance, and entirely within the province of 
the board, was the drawing up of a code of instructions for the treat-
ment of cholera and the prevention of its spread. But the members could 
only rely on English experience, having nothing to offer but the 
precautions laid down in 1873 by John Simon, the medical officer to the 
72 
English Local Government Board, and on 19 December 1885, regulations 
73 
on these lines were gazetted. 
Indeed, as the press of the colony was not slow to observe, the 
Central Board of Health was a very weak body, apparently incapable of 
74 
acting quickly and positively when these qualities were called for. 
Local government bodies, the other arm in the defence of the public 
health, were also feeble, lacking initiative, decisiveness, and money. 
The question of the central board's powers was raised again and again 
in this period, as the country floundered at the mercy of councils, 
70. Dr. Hickling to Colonial Secretary, 21 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A452, 
in-letter no.523 of 1886. 
71. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Dec 1885. 
72. The Queensland Times, 15 Dec 1885; main editorial. 
73. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXVII (1885), 2233. 
74. See for example The Brisbane Courier,15 Dec 1885; main editorial 
The Queensland Times, 15 Dec 1885; editorial. The North 
Queensland Telegraph, 16 Dec 1885, and The Maryborough Chronicle, 
16 Dec 1885; editorial. 
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boards and committees, and the call was made for the Premier to take 
the bold and imaginative step of appointing one competent individual 
who, "clothed with authority, and invested with full responsibility", 
could take complete control of the sanitary arrangements of the colony, 
7 ^  
with the support of the whole power of the government. Like the 
request for greater powers from the sanitary conference the year before, 
this entreaty fell on deaf ears, and Queensland was not to achieve a 
competent medical head of a sub-department of public health until the 
passing of the Health Act of 1900. 
But if the arrival of cholera had been an immense shock to 
Queensland - revealing weaknesses and underscoring huge inadequacies -
it was not an unmixed disaster. Various local authorities, taking the 
view that the disease was nature's retribution for the breaking of her 
1 ft 
sanitary laws, did begin definite programmes to improve sanitation. 
In Brisbane, six additional inspectors were employed for house-to-house 
inspection, disinfectants were bought in bulk, to be resold to the 
citizens at low prices, and temporarily, all drains were flushed, day 
and night. In the surrounding suburbs all other works were suspended, 
as men were put to cleansing shires and divisions thoroughly, gangs 
worked on opening stagnant watercourses, and medical officers and general 
inspectors were appointed to take charge of any cases of cholera which 
77 
might occur. Since these men dealt with any other medical and 
sanitary problems which arose, this was a vast improvement in the 
health position generally. The government, taking an unprecedented 
interest in the health of the people of the west, appointed 
Dr. M. Mathison to Aramac and Dr. W.S. Webb to Blackall to cope with 
78 
any cholera threat in those areas. And various newspapers throughout 
Queensland published complete supplements containing warnings about 
cholera, and suggestions for general sanitary improvements, keeping up 
that interest in public health matters which was a definite feature of 
this period, when the press stood, often almost alone, as an effective 
79 pressure group for improved sanitation. 
75. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Dec 1885; main editorial. 
76. The Maryborough Chronicle, 16 Dec 1885; editorial. 
77. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Dec 1885. 
78. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXVII (1885), 2235. 
79. See for example special supplements in The Herberton Advertiser, 
18 Dec 1885, and The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 19 Dec 1855. 
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In fact, as increasingly encouraging news was received from Peel 
Island, as the Premier was acting with energy and precision, and as the 
local bodies throughout the colony were also bestirring themselves. 
The Brisbane Courier was moved to observe that the cholera visitation, 
and the great cleansing which accompanied the threat, would actually 
8f) 
save precious lives throughout Queensland. Ironically, the 
favourable report on the state of Townsville came from Dr. Ridgley on 
17 December 1885. Ridgley, whom the Townsville corporation still 
81 
wished to sue, reported that the northern city was in a very healthy 
state, for the season of the year, and congratulated the government on 
keeping the "fell disease of cholera... out of the colony and 
Australasia". 
By 24 December it seemed that Ridgley was correct, and that the 
course of the cholera had been stayed, for the quarantine news was 
83 
reduced to a short paragraph, like any other item of minor interest, 
although all of the Brisbane dailies gained the Premier's permission to 
receive full reports from Peel Island during the Christmas holiday 
84 
break. On Christmas Day 1885 an unheaded paragraph announced that 
all was well on the quarantine station, and on 16 January 1886, all of 
Qr 
the passengers were released. Of equal, if not greater importance, 
on 21 January 1886 the proclamation of all Queensland ports as being 
infected with cholera was revoked. Queensland's enforced isolation 
from the rest of Australia and the world, and her consequent loss of 
Rft 
revenue from trade, was now at an end. 
80. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Dec 1885; main editorial. 
81. Under Colonial Secretary to Dr. Ridgley, 24 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A448, out-letter no. 3872 of 1885. 
82. Thomas Ridgley to Colonial Secretary,17 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A448, 
in-letter no. 448 of 1886. 
83. There was still a large number of letters on the subject being 
published in the newspapers.See for example, Brisbane Courier, 
21 Dec 1885; letter to editor from Kelvin Grove, Ibid., 22 Dec 
1885; letter to editor from A.P.P., Ibid., 23 Dec 1885;letter to 
editor from Office Holder,and The Queensland Times, 19 Dec 1885; 
letter to editor from Dr. H.M. Lightoller, and Ibid.; letter to 
editor from William Haigh. 
84. Editors of The Observer, The Telegraph and The Brisbane Courier 
to Premier, 22 Dec 1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A448, in-letter no.9690 of 
1885. 
85. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jan 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 12 Jan 1886. 
86. James Service,Victoria to Premier, 21 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A452, 
in-telegram no. 477 of 1886. 
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Dr. Hickling's Report on the Voyage of the Dorunda, which was 
presented on his release from quarantine, gave the tragic story of the 
journey down the Queensland coast, and incidentally provided an insight 
into the work of a busy ship's doctor under the special stress of a 
87 
frightening epidemic. Given the circumstances of the journey's long 
history of diarrhoeic cases, culminating in the devastating choleraic 
attacks, Hickling seems to have been pleased enough with the voyage, 
having nothing but praise for the captain and the ship's crew, andi 
even for most of the passengers, especially with regard to their keeping 
"good heart" during their ordeal on Peel Island. His only complaints 
were of Ridgley's behaviour in boarding the ship in Townsville after he 
had been warned as to the nature of the disease; a delay of 24 hours in 
Moreton Bay awaiting orders to land on Peel Island, which kept the 
indented immigrants, who were the most exposed to the cholera, in their 
unsatisfactory, congested quarters; a brief reference to some poor food 
which had been delivered to the island; and an attack on one passenger 
whose enmity Hickling had incurred over the cholera incident. Hickling 
was especially grateful to one Queensland gentleman who, having failed 
to have his nephew plucked from the dangerous confines of the Dorunda, 
had subsequently supplied the quarantine station with several cows, 
which, besides keeping his nephew in good health, had been a tremendous 
88 boon to all of the detainees. 
The surgeon-superintendent did not "report on the inadequacy of 
the accommodation on Peel Island", since he "believed that point to be 
well known to the government and improvements to be under consideration." 
By March 1886 the government had indeed moved on this question. Plans 
had been drawn, tenders had been called, and one had been accepted on 
the recommendation of the Public Works Department, though not without 
90 
some reluctance and positive penny-pinching on the part of Griffith. 
87. A good deal of the report is a justification of Hickling's 
apparent neglect of Thomas Doran,the first victim of cholera.The 
man reported ill at 10 am,was seen at 11 am, and again at 1 pm., 
after which the doctor was engaged in a rather difficult delivery 
of a child,Hickling saw the man again at 3.30pm,which was at the 
first moment which he judged it safe to leave his woman patient, 
and stayed with Doran until 7.30 pm, when he died.Two of Doran's 
children died on the following day and were secretly buried at 
sea,since their mother,not unnaturally,was in a "frenzied state". 
88. The gentleman concerned was Mr. C. Spry. 
89. Dr.Hickling to Colonial Secretary, 21 Jan 1886, Q.S.A, C0L/A453, 
in-letter no, 523 of 1886, 
90. Dr.Wray to Colonial Secretary, 8 Apr 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A465, 
in-letter no. 2811 of 1886. See also other letters and plans 
attached to this file and marginal comments thereon. 
89 
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Interest in the Dorunda and the cholera did not die down, though 
the Premier, considering his immediate attention was no longer required, 
left the colony to undertake official business in the south. The 
charitable people of Queensland promoted a fund for those widowed and 
orphaned by the disease, which closed when donations stood at^209/4/lOd. 
And the newspapers, noting that the course of this disease was unlike 
any other recorded choleraic epidemic, began to question the medical 
91 practitioners' assessment that it was true cholera. Whatever the 
disease. The Brisbane Courier was convinced that an exhaustive enquiry 
should be held as soon as the passengers were released, for "not only 
Queensland but the whole of Australia was really concerned with knowing 
if we were really within an ace of having this virulent plague imported 
92 
to our colonies". On 20 January 1886, The Brisbane Courier repeated 
its call, and on 21 January, the government did appoint a board, 
consisting of Drs. Wray, Bancroft, Marks, and Thomson, with 
Charles A. Bemays as secretary, to enquire into the nature of the 
93 disease on board the Dorunda. 
The board engaged in a large number of interviews and a good 
94 deal of correspondence, both within Australia and with Batavia, and 
uncovered some stringent criticism of the government's handling of the 
Dorunda situation, most particularly with regard to Griffith's decision 
to bring the vessel to Brisbane. Dr. Cunningham, late surgeon-general 
of India, wrote of the incident : 
There is no doubt whatever that the ship ought to have been 
brought to port as soon as possible and the passengers 
landed. Instead... the poor people were brought on to 
Brisbane. The consequence was that many of them were 
91. Drs.Hickling, Ridgley, Wray and Paoli - Dr.Paoli had had 
considerable experience of cholera and had joined the Dorunda in 
Townsville to assist Hickling who was showing signs of exhaustion -
all agreed that the disease was true Asiatic cholera. Cumpston 
and McCallum suggest that the description of symptoms given by 
the surgeon-superintendent leaves no doubt that this was so. See 
Cumpston and McCallum, pp.340-345. 
92. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jan 1886; main editorial. 
93. Ibid., 22 Jan 1886. 
94. See for example. Under Colonial Secretary to Dr.Wray, 10 Mar 1886, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A458, in-letter no. 1815 of 1886, British Consul, 
Batavia to Colonial Secretary, 20 Jan 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A455, 
in-letter no. 1026 of 1886, and Under Colonial Secretary to 
British Consul, Batavia, 5 Feb 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/G31, out-letter 
no. 384 of 1886. 
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attacked and died. I have no hesitation in saying that 
this was due to the inhuman proceeding of sending them 
on in the Dorunda. 95 
But if Griffith was attacked on this score, and for his 
96 
overbearing attitude to his Central Board of Health, he himself 
strongly criticised Hickling for not consulting the lately appointed 
health officer on Thursday Island over his doubtful diarrhoeic cases, 
especially as Batavia, and its coaling station, Tandjong Priok, were 
in the throes of a cholera epidemic. The Premier finally accepted 
Hickling's explanation, however, and his re-employment as a surgeon-
superintendent on immigrant ships was left to the discretion of the 
97 
agent-general m London. 
Hickling was completely exonerated in the special board's care-
ful, rather innocuous report, his efforts being described as "most 
praiseworthy", once he understood the nature of the disease that had 
invaded his ship, probably at Batavia. On this matter, although the 
board spent considerable time and effort in trying to pin-point the 
exact manner of entry, and the persons responsible, no precise 
information was unearthed. The board was very brief on the question of 
bringing the Dorunda to Brisbane, saying only that in that area, "there 
may be a difference of opinion", and indicating that Magnetic Island 
was ill-prepared and unequipped for such an emergency, while "the 
weather (there) was unpropitious". This amounted to a justification of 
Griffith's action. 
The doctors were a good deal less than happy with the inspection 
undertaken by the health officer in the port of Cooktown, where the 
ship had been granted pratique and allowed to proceed to Townsville, 
with at least serious diarrhoeic, and possibly choleraic, cases 
already on board. In the board's opinion, the examination had not been 
95. There is a whole series of correspondence between Dr.Cunningham 
and the Colonial Secretary, Dr.Hickling, and C. Lumley Hill, 
Member of Legislative Assembly. See for example. Dr.Cunningham 
to Colonial Secretary, 16 Mar 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A459, in-letter 
no. 2268 of 1886. 
96. The Australasian Medical Journal attacked Griffith for bringing 
the ship down the coast against the majority decision of the 
Central Board of Health, for his miserly attitude on doctors' 
salaries, and for his general arrogance towards his medical 
advisers, the central board. See The Brisbane Courier, 28 Jan 
1886. 
97. The top letter of this file on the cholera question is -
Queensland Government Office, London to Colonial Secretary, 
16 Jul 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A478, in-letter no. 6552 of 1886. 
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"of that searching nature which the safety of the colony demands". 
Since this was one area in which the Central Board of Health had not 
been lax, having earlier endeavoured to impress on the Colonial 
Secretary the need for excellence in the Cooktown officer, the doctors, 
who were members of both boards, no doubt felt justified in bringing 
the point forward for special notice. Above all, the enquiry stressed 
the absolute necessity for establishing a quarantine station on or near 
Thursday Island, with sufficient cleared space for pitching tents open 
to free air currents, with an ample and well-arranged water supply, and 
conveniences for disinfecting clothing. Other suitable sites on the 
coast near Cooktown and Townsville should also be selected and fitted 
out. The board had no doubt that the disease on the Dorunda was true 
Asiatic cholera, and were equally in agreement that the exigencies of 
trade and coaling could offer no justification for the dangers to which 
the colonies would be exposed, if European immigrants were brought in 
contact with tropical diseases which were to be found among an Asian 
population. 
Curiously enough, at the first Central Board of Health meeting 
held after the enquiry was completed, the secretary. Dr. Hill Wray, 
announced that they had no copies of the report, and that so far he had 
99 
seen only what had been published in newspapers. The matter was not 
therefore discussed, though the board did not neglect their inter-
colonial duty and by May, all central boards of health throughout 
Australia had received and acknowledged the reports of the enquiry. 
The Brisbane Courier professed itself well pleased with the 
report, agreeing with most of its findings, and, making the most of 
the opportunity, once more urged the government to establish "a 
thoroughly competent health officer on Thursday Island and a proper 
quarantine station there". Griffith escaped censure of any kind 
98. "Dorunda Enquiry Report". Votes and Proceedings of the 
Legislative Assembly, 111(1886), 749-750. 
99. This is rather amusing.When the board of enquiry first sat. 
Dr. Bancroft,the chairman,felt that newspaper reporters should 
not be present.They were allowed to remain only after the 
reporter had pointed out that The Brisbane Courier had been 
instrumental in having the enquiry brought about.The Brisbane 
Courier, 23 Jan 1886. 
100. Ibid., 15 May 1886;Minutes of Central Board of Health,14 May 1886, 
101. Ibid., 17 Apr 1886; sub editorial. 
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from the newspaper; indeed the Courier had earlier stoutly defended him 
against the Australasian Medical Journal's attacks, at the same time 
102 
praising his energetic and competent handling of a tense situation. 
The danger past, the Premier and the colony turned their 
attention to other matters, though sporadic interest was shown in 
103 
cholera, as infrequent articles on the subject appeared in the press. 
The dreaded disease was gone, but it was by no means forgotten. 
Certainly the Premier, who had shown a distinct parsimoniousness even at 
the height of the alarm, when discussing supply and commenting on the 
unusual expenditure for the year just passed, reminded his colleagues 
that "a good deal was spent on account of the cholera scare last year", 
and that he hoped that the disease would not return in 1887. "However, 
if it did, he could tell the committee that the government would spend 
104 the money whether it was voted or not". 
There was no recurrence in 1887 - by then even Sumatra appears 
to have been free from the dread disease - nor was Queensland visited 
by cholera in any other year. Apart from noting with surprise that 
Dr. Hickling of Dorunda fame was again working on immigrant ships. The 
Brisbane Courier confined itself to occasional articles on the subject 
of cholera until 1892, when the disease was again spreading dangerously 
in Europe. 
But this time Queensland was determined to be ready. A special 
meeting of the Central Board of Health was called and chaired by the 
then Colonial Secretary, Horace Tozer. The minister presented the 
board with the measures being taken in Victoria to cope with any 
possible entry, reminding them that "uniform intercolonial action alone 
/would./ give the perfect security desired against the entrance of 
disease". Not only should intercolonial rivalries be laid aside in the 
interests of health Australia-wide, but also the rivalries and 
dissensions between the various boards and authorities and their 
102. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Apr 1886. In the Courier's opinion,the 
tone adopted by the Medical Journal "will not help...its 
object... Laymen are apt to doubt the common sense of medical 
men. The article...will go some way to confirming that doubt". 
103. See for example. Ibid., 15 May 1886 and 6 Sep 1886. 
104. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, L (1886), 1129. 
105. Consul for the Netherlands to Premier, 18 Jan 1887, 
Q.S.A. COL/A487, in-letter no. 597 of 1887. 
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employees, central and local, should lapse until all fear of infection 
A 106 passed. 
Much more aware than in 1885, Queensland issued the proclamation 
on 15 September 1892 that every ship which arrived at any port in 
Queensland from the infected continent should be placed in quarantine. 
On the same day, the Colonial Secretary appointed no less than thirty-
four medical officers of health to treat any persons who might be 
affected with cholera. Two of the doctors were to work in Brisbane, 
107 but the rest were spread throughout the whole colony. 
There was one scare in 1893, the year of the last outbreak in 
Great Britain, when a mild form of cholera was reportedly prevalent in 
108 
Herberton, but this proved to be a false alarm. Queensland was not 
troubled again during the nineties and, by 1903, to the relief of 
government and citizens alike, the Commissioner of Public Health 
"announced that Smallpox and Cholera were diseases which were no longer 
109 to hang over us like the sword of Damocles", Dr. Burnett Ham's 
assessment of the cholera situation was astute, and it proved to be 
accurate. In 1884, when deciding against recommending any provision 
for quarantine from the east, the New South Wales Sanitary Conference 
had predicted that the greatest danger to Australia would lie in the 
disease being introduced by ships passing through the Suez Canal with 
immigrants from Europe, Longmate points out that "for Great 
Britain and Western Europe as a whole, the end of the nineteenth 
century marked also the end of the cholera era". With the area 
which provided Australia's main source of migrants safe from the 
cholera menace, the danger to Queensland was removed almost 
106. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Sep 1892; sub editorial. 
107. Queensland Government Gazette, LVII (1892), 115-116, 
108. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1894, p.69. 
109. President's Annual Report to Metropolitan Joint Board for the 
Prevention of Infectious Diseases, 6 Mar 1903, Q.S.A. COL/239, 
Rough Copy-unnumbered. 
110. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Sep 1884; main editorial. 
111. Longmate, p.231. 
automatically 
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Queensland had been taught a difficult lesson in 1885, one 
which probably would never be wholly forgotten by the people who had 
been forced to learn it. Her trade was disrupted, her intimately-
concerned Premier was drafted into the full-time service of the public 
health, and her revenue was depleted by the extra expenses involved in 
fending off the evil diseases of the old world which had threatened her 
shores. Regulations covering all three exotic diseases - plague, 
smallpox and cholera - were proclaimed from time to time, usually for 
113 periods of up to twelve months. And whenever cholera appeared in 
any European country, as it did in Russia in 1910, fears were stirred, 
and The Brisbane Courier began again to print articles and to issue 
114 
warnings. 
For a disease which never actually gained a foothold in the 
country, nor claimed one victim on her own soil, cholera very greatly 
affected Queensland, and is of considerable importance in the history 
of her public health movement. It underlined the important role of the 
newspapers as an effective pressure group, and gave excellent illustrat-
ions of the working out of the sanitary idea, and its clash with the 
newer medical theories of the day. It showed Queensland's chief 
executive in action, and by proving that good will, energy and 
initiative are not enough where the direction of public health matters 
are concerned, foreshadowed the appointment of a competent medical man 
with proven administrative ability, who could ensure that effective 
public health standards would be established and maintained throughout 
the state. The coming of the cholera revealed the weaknesses of 
Queensland's health legislation - legislation which had only just been 
passed - at the same time showing up the powerlessness of its servants 
in the nineteenth century. The scare caused by the coming of this 
scourge was only one of the cases when the unwillingness of all 
112. This record was broken early in 1977 when a woman living 
in Beenleigh, south Queensland contracted the disease. On 
12 March 1977, the World Health Organization declared 
Australia an affected area and Brisbane an affected port. 
Brisbane was taken off the list on 15 March 1977. See for 
example. The Courier Mail, 10 Mar to 16 Mar 1977. 
113. See for example. Secretary of Public Health Department to 
Colonial Secretary, 29 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. H0M/B19, 
in-letter no. 11120 of 1908. 
114. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jun 1910. 
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authorities concerned to spend sufficient money to effect a permanent 
cure was all too evident - in spite of the cry being bandied about 
everywhere, that "a nation's health /wa_s^ / a nation's wealth /and that/ 
it would be easy to show that imported epidemics /were/ more 
disastrous and more costly than armed invasions". And perhaps most 
importantly of all, cholera was one of the diseases which showed the 
growing tendency of Australians to unite to face problems affecting the 
whole continent, as faster communications removed what had once been 
"the tyranny of distance". 
115. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, III 
(1885), 485. 
LEPROSY 
Unlike some of the diseases dealt with in detail in this work, 
leprosy did not attack many people in Queensland. Its importance to 
the history of public health in this state lies not because of its 
widespread nature, but in the fact, that in spite of its low incidence, 
it caused endless hours of agonising for all health authorities, since 
the labelling of a leper victim was tantamount to bringing down a 
sentence of life imprisonment. It engendered violent disagreements 
within the medical profession, and it created an atmosphere of extreme 
fear and racial prejudice on an alarming scale, amongst the people of 
Queensland. 
One of the most terrible diseases, leprosy is a chronic 
contagious illness brought about by infection with the lepra bacillus 
discovered by Hansen and Neisser in 1879. According to CG. Lambie, 
leprosy was introduced to the northern parts of Queensland by the 
Chinese, who had also carried the disease to what were formerly 
Indo-China, Siam, and the Straits Settlements. There is no evidence 
that it was imported by whites. Certainly this is not one of the ills 
brought into the colony of Queensland from Great Britain. Although 
there had been something over two hundred lazar houses for the 
incarceration of lepers in England in mediaeval times, by the middle 
of the sixteenth century the disease there had been almost completely 
eradicated. 
It was in 1877 that Queensland's Central Board of Health first 
found it necessary to warn the government of the 
danger run from the probable importation of the loathsome 
disease of leprosy, which is very prevalent amongst /the 
Chinese people/. 
The neighbouring colony of Victoria has already had to 
encounter this danger, and for years past been obliged to 
form special "camps" in which to isolate the unhappy 
creatures found afflicted with it. 
1. CG. Lambie, "The History of Leprosy", The Medical Journal 
of Australia, I (4 Jun 1938), p.955. 
2. Sir A. Newsholme, The Last Thirty Years in Public Health 
(London, 1936), p.134. 
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It is worthy of consideration whether special instructions, 
with plain descriptions of this disease, very unfamiliar to most 
practitioners, should not be supplied to each of the Health 
Officers of the Northern Ports. 3 
The need for extreme caution seemed to be confirmed when it was 
reported on 26 September 1881, that there were three cases of leprosy 
4 
among the Chinese at Cooktown. The necessity for "special 
instructions, with plain descriptions" to be issued to health officers 
throughout Queensland, was also clearly demonstrated, by the following 
incident. In spite of the assurances of Dr. Webb of Blackall that a 
sick Chinaman was not suffering from leprosy, the people of that town 
expelled the man, paying one of his fellow countrymen^25 to convey him 
via Bogantungan, to Rockhampton. As the unfortunate so-called leper 
was camped by the Bogantungan water reserve, which he was using for 
7 
bathing, there was considerable agitation. Hugh McNeely, a railways 
medical officer based in the area, was convinced that the Chinaman did 
Q 
have leprosy, though his colleague, from Rockhampton, who was called 
9 
in for a further consultation, was equally satisfied that he did not. 
In the meantime, the panicky Mayor of Rockhampton had telegraphed the 
Colonial Secretary to prevent the Chinaman being conveyed there, the 
man had been hounded from his refuge at the water hole, and the 
12 
railways had refused him carriage by train to Rockhampton in any case. 
3. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health for 1877", Votes 
and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1145. 
4. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1882, p.75. See R. Evans, K.Saunders 
and K. Cronin, Exclusion,Exploitation and Extermination 
(Brookvale, 1975), p.306 for the fate of these men. 
5. Patrick Bowen, Police Sergeant, Bogantungan to Colonial Secretary, 
25 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A370,in-telegram no. 4874 of 1883. 
6. John L.Adams,Chairman,Bogantungan Divisional Board to Colonial 
Secretary,25 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. C0L/A370, in-telegram no. 4871 of 
1883. 
7. W.Mcllwraith to T.McIlwraith/C'olonial Secretary/,22 Sep 1883, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A370, in-telegram no. 4870 of 1883. 
8. Police Magistrate,Bogantungan to Colonial Secretary,24 Sep 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A370, in-telegram no. 4873 of 1883. 
9. W.F.Thurston to Colonial Secretary,28 Sep 1883,Q.S.A. C0L/A370, 
in-telegram no. 4921 of 1883. 
10. John Ferguson,Mayor of Rockhampton to Colonial Secretary,25 Sep 
1883, Q.S.A. COL/A370, in-telegram no. 4871 of 1883. 
11. Patrick Bowen to Colonial Secretary,25 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. C0L/A370, 
in-telegram no.4874 of 1883. 
12. W.F.Thurston to Colonial Secretary,4 Oct 1883, Q.S.A. C0L/A370, 
in-telegram, no number given. 
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This sort of uncertainty among medical men was to continue. So was 
the harassment of persons, even if they were only suspected of having the 
13 disease. Sometimes, the mere fact of their being Chinese was 
sufficient to incite the local people and the authorities to act against 
them, just in case they did have "the Chinese disease". One such case 
occurred at the Palmer River goldfields, where some very poor Asiatics 
who "lived in hovels in the greatest filth" were caught bathing in pools 
in the river. They were hauled before the bench, fined twenty shillings, 
and ordered not to pollute the river again. There was no evidence to 
show that any of them was suffering from any disease. Again in Bundaberg, 
information retailed to the police magistrate about a supposed leper 
being harboured by the Chinese market gardeners there, proved to be a 
wild rumour; but, not before an immediate, thorough and ruthless 
search of all property belonging to the men had been made by both health 
17 
officers and the police. 
This attitude from the public was hardly surprising. It was fed 
partly by the considered opinion of medical men, who sometimes displayed 
a very biassed attitude, though in his address to the sanitary conference 
18 in Sydney Dr. Joseph Bancroft made some attempt to be fair. 
Leprosy...was introduced to the notice of the Conference by the 
Delegate of Queensland. He pointed out that Leprosy is a 
contagious disease, known in several parts of the world to 
attack white men living among leprous races or to whom contact 
with lepers is made possible by importation of the latter. 
Fortunately this disease appears to be contagious only after 
prolonged and continuous contiguity of the sick to the healthy; 
but it is at present an incurable disease, and hereditary. Its 
attack is slow and so insidious that persons already in the 
early stage of leprosy are not always distinguishable, it is 
13. A great deal of detail on this hysterical fear of lepers, and the 
Chinese as the source of it, is given in Evans et.al., especially 
in Part 3, Chapters 1, 2 and 3. 
14. The "Chinese disease" - leprosy - had been discovered amongst 
Chinese making cigars in San Francisco. The news of this added to 
the agitation in north and west Queensland. 
15. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Nov 1884. 
16. Robert Johnston, Police Magistrate to Colonial Secretary, 25 Mar 
1885, Q.S.A. C0L/A418, in-telegram no. 2013 of 1885. 
17. Robert Johnston to Colonial Secretary, 25 Mar 1885, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A418, in-telegram, filed under Ibid. 
18. See Evans et.al. p.303 for Bancroft's later strictures (1892) on 
the introduction of leprosy by the Chinese, and the consequent 
spread of the disease through the agency of mosquitoes. 
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said, from healthy persons. The only way in which it could 
certainly be kept out of this country would be by forbidding 
certain races of men to enter, but this would be manifestly 
unjust, and only possible, indeed, because those races are 
distinguished by their colour from the whites. It would 
moreover lead to the exclusion of several races on account of 
the possible illness of a few individuals who, in many other 
parts of the world, are serviceable in humble capacities. All 
that can fairly and scientifically be done in this matter seems 
to be provided for by the 50th Resolution. Under it, all that 
is needful to ensure the absolute exclusion of this disease is 
improved methods of diagnosis, and to discovering them the 
attention of physicians who are qualified by their experience 
for this task is already directed. 19 
There was one other way of partially removing the Chinese leprosy 
problem once it was detected, and the Queensland government made use of 
it from time to time. This was to get rid of certain offending leper 
victims permanently by sending them home to China. Where the 
recommendation of the medical attendant could be obtained, and often 
approval was a mere formality, this action - and the voucher to cover 
20 the cost of transport - was approved without hesitation. The same 
neat solution to the problem was not possible with that other group 
"distinguished by their colour from the whites". When leprosy was said 
21 to be spreading among the aboriginal populations of Etheridge and 
22 
Georgetown, there was considerable panic amongst the white population 
in the area. Since they could hardly get rid of the indigenes en masse, 
it was with relief that they heard that their black neighbours were 
23 
suffering from erysipelas, although it is possible that not a few of 
the neglected, underfed, abused aborigines had also contracted venereal 
disease. It does not seem to have occurred to the white settlers in 
19. "The Australasian Sanitary Conference of Sydney, N.S.W., 1884", 
Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1885), 488. 
20. Police Magistrate, Cooktown to Colonial Secretary, 27 Jan 1885, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A414, in-telegram no. 635 of 1885. When lepers were 
being banished either out of Australia or to remote lazarets, 
the funds do not seem to have been denied. The communication was 
almost always by telegram.No objections to the cost of telegrams 
were made,though the expense of telegraphic communication over the 
diphtheria epidemic in Mackay in 1913 was a matter for censure.See 
Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary,15 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B42,in-letter no. 8398 of 1913. The letter concerns 
expenses in general and the considerable sum of i^ 50.16.2 spent on 
telegrams alone. 
21. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1889, p.71. 
22. Evans, et.al., p.98, 
23. Ibid. 
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north Queensland, that all of these diseases had become established 
among the natives of the country only after their own arrival. 
Curiously enough, the fear felt by ordinary Queenslanders and the 
government's own lively conception of the dangers, did not prevent an 
attempt to recoup some of the expenses outlaid for the housing of lepers 
by one Queensland administration. In 1889, the Morehead government 
endeavoured to auction the Cooktown "leper's shelter", only to be roundly 
castigated by the northern press. Seizing the opportunity to put forward 
the rights of the north against the stubborn, ignorant perversities of 
southern officials - a chance which no self-respecting northern 
24 
separatist would disregard - The Cairns Post joined The Cooktown 
Independent in protesting against the sale. 
Leprosy, that repulsive concomitant of an influx of the Chinese 
was to be shifted from the shores of Cooktown to an island afar 
off where there is more danger of tainting the air of heaven than 
communicating the loathsome disease to a closely settled population. 
But the Morehead government, who though on pleasure bent,are of a 
frugal mind, laboured under the delusion that the sale of the 
galvanised iron and fittings which had harboured the victims of 
this most repulsive of diseases would add a trifle to the revenue, 
and the auction was duly advertised, scoffed at by the Independent, 
ridiculed by the public, and naturally enough attended by noone.... 
The human brain would soon be lost in a maze of the wildest 
conjecture if it began to imagine whether the government thought 
that the lepers' shelter should form a nice summer house for the 
garden of the collector of customs, appropriate shelter for the 
playground of the st£te school, an annex to a cheap boarding 
house, or what.... /What a./ novel^ idea of a cheap and easy method 
of spreading disease and death [xsj the sale of a leprous charnel 
house. 25 
Again, in spite of the awareness of Queenslanders on the subject 
of leprosy, and the Central Board of Health's considerable preoccupation 
2.f\ 
with the general Chinese menace to the health of the colony, it was 
left to the New South Wales board to prepare a report on Leprosy in 
Australasia, based on information supplied by boards of health and 
27 
other authorities in the various colonies. In the following year, the 
Queensland Central Board of Health did act, preparing regulations for the 
24. Within,pp.172-73. 
25. The Cairns Post, 15 Jun 1889; editorial. 
26. Because of their methods of manuring fruit and vegetables. The 
Brisbane Courier, 19 Apr 1890; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
18 Apr 1890. 
27. Within, p.136. This is a similar case where the initiative for 
presenting a comprehensive report was taken by a southern health 
board. 
190. 
treatment of persons affected by leprosy and for the prevention of the 
spread of that disease, in pursuance of the powers conferred on them by 
the Health Act of 1884. The regulations were very stringent, an 
indication of the great dread with which the whole population of 
Queensland viewed the disease. On being informed of the presence of any 
case or suspected case of leprosy in the colony, the Central Board of 
Health could 
cause investigation to be made by two or more legally qualified 
medical practitioners, and upon being satisfied that such 
person is suffering from that disease, may order that such 
person be removed to and detained in such place or places as 
may be from time to time set apart for the isolation and 
treatment of persons suffering from leprosy, and any person 
so ordered who wilfully refuses or neglects forthwith to obey 
any such order or directions given by the Board, or escapes 
or attempts to escape from any such place of isolation 
(or lazaret), may, with such necessary force as the case may 
require, be removed or brought to any lazaret or other 
suitable place. 28 
One of the worst problems for any leper victim was emphasised by the 
regulations - the terrible sentence of loneliness imposed because of 
the disease. Apart from any attendants who might be employed to care 
for and supervise the leper, no other person could enter the limits of 
the lazaret without the authority of the minister, the Central Board of 
Health, or the government medical officer. In the case of unfortunate 
coloured lepers, doomed to a life sentence on various inhospitable 
29 islands off the north Queensland coast, even the food, medicine, 
clothing and other necessities which were to be provided under the 1891 
regulations were not forthcoming. There seems to be little doubt that 
the government sent them to these almost uninhabitable outposts, only 
to let them die from neglect and starvation. 
In spite of the apparent severity of the regulations, and 
the remarkably small number of lepers in Queensland, which was a matter 
28. Queensland Government Gazette, LIII (1891), 1001. 
29. Conditions on Dayman Island were notorious, as were those on 
Fitzroy and Friday Islands. 
30. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVI (1892), 49. See also 
Ibid., LXVII (1892), 239. Tozer, in introducing the leprosy 
bill, said "of course only periodical visits are paid to Dayman 
Island. I have no report of any recent visit....At the last 
examination there were only two lepers there,and I do not suppose 
there will be even one at the next examination". No thought or 
compassion seems to have been spared for the lonely last victim. 
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31 for congratulation, the government felt it necessary to take even 
stronger measures, and in 1892, a leprosy bill was introduced into the 
Queensland parliament. Its general principle was 
to accomplish the segregation of lepers as we do with 
lunatics, .... since this was the only way that any 
community can rid itself of this loathsome, repulsive 
and unclean disease. 32 
The Colonial Secretary went so far as to suggest that such treatment 
was the most humane possible. Clean and hygienic surroundings, a 
wholesome diet, and intelligent medical treatment would be provided 
for white lepers, and in such circumstances, the separation from home 
and loved ones would scarcely be felt. In any case, the minister 
continued hardily, in the latter stages of the disease the victims 
would be only too glad to hide themselves from their fellows. Locking 
33 
them away in a lazaret was really doing them a favour. 
One of the main problems for the authorities would be taken care 
of under the proposed bill. The minister was fully cognisant of the 
latest overseas discoveries, but the difficulty was to understand the 
means of transmission. Whatever this might be - by contagion, by 
heredity, by infection, or by fetid air - the emphasis on segration in 
the proposed legislation would protect the population in general from the 
ravages of the disease. To show that he really was au fait with modern 
developments, Tozer announced that he was awaiting the results of the 
34 
Royal Commission on Leprosy, whose decision was shortly expected. In 
the meantime, the minister took advice from Her Majesty's representative 
in Queensland, who had seen a great deal of leprosy in India and Jamaica. 
General Sir H.W. Norman's opinion - that there was no danger from ordinary 
contact with lepers, or even from habitual visits to the stricken -
seems to have had little effect on Queenslanders. As Tozer noted, with 
some dismay, there was a great scare in the colony over the leprosy 
question, not only among private individuals, but also within government 
departments. He deplored the sensational paragraphs in the press, because 
these had aroused so much fear among wharf and ship employees, that a 
vast amount of trouble had been encountered in trying to convey 
35 
unfortunate victims to the lazarets. 
31, According to Tozer there were only five lepers in Queensland as at 
11 April 1892 - both white and black. See Ibid. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
I b i d . , 
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This general anxiety seems to have communicated itself very 
strongly to several members of the Queensland parliament. So 
F.T. Brentnall, Member of the Legislative Council, who was probably 
not always in touch with the sentiments of the common man, joined in 
the debate with a repetitiveness that should have made his sincerity 
obvious to anyone, Brentnall declared that 
leprosy is not only a matter of public danger, but it is a matter 
of public alarm and public dread,... We have heard such conflicting 
testimonials as to the contagiousness of the disease that I find 
it difficult to come to a decision.... but on the question of 
public utility and public feeling with regard to this matter, I 
do not hesitate to say that opinion and feeling are strongly in 
favour of the legislature doing something to prevent the spread 
of a disease, which, whatever may be its real nature, is a 
matter of alarm and apprehension to the public mind. 37 
In the Legislative Assembly, the member for Maryborough had no 
difficulty at all in tracing the disease to its true source. 
There is no doubt in the minds of many people that this disease 
emanated from Chinamen, and it behoves us one and all, and the 
authorities especially, to look after these hells or dens, or 
Chinese boarding-houses as they are called. 38 
Richard Hyne received very quick and positive endorsement for his view, 
as member after member rose to condemn the "abominably dirty and 
filthy and stinking" homes and habits of the Chinese in Queensland, and 
the consequent danger from their special disease to white residents in 
39 the colony. 
'There were some dissenting voices. Notable among them was that 
of Dr. W.F. Taylor. He was upset because the drafting and presentation 
of the bill was entirely the work of laymen, who had not even consulted 
the Central Board of Health. His chief concern was with the medical 
aspects of the bill, and the way in which the problems over the 
theories on contagion had been used for political purposes. 
He was also interested in the fate of lepers already incarcerated 
on Dayman and Friday Islands. The doctor desired that these people 
should be treated as if they were suffering from disease, "and not as 
36. Frederick Thomas Brentnall was chairman of directors of the 
Telegraph Newspaper Company, director of Queensland Insurance, 
Queensland Trustees, Queensland Deposit Bank and Building 
Company, director of Finney Isles and Company, Tartana Mines Ltd., 
and several other large companies. 
37. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVI (1892), 40-41. 
38. Ibid., LXVII (1892), 240. 
39. For example, see Ibid., p.241. 
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40 if they were mad dogs to be put out of the way to die". The Central 
Board of Health had conscientiously enquired into conditions on Friday 
Island, as they had a right to do - wishing to know the proximity of 
the nearest health officer, how often he visited the leper colony, and 
41 
what facilities were available to him when he did visit. Far from 
satisfying the board on these questions, the Colonial Secretary was 
still stalling by asking for what purpose that particular departmental 
42 information had been sought. It now appeared likely that board 
members would be placed in the invidious position of condemning these 
unfortunates to imprisonment for life, without the possibility of 
43 
supervising the conditions in which they were kept. 
Dr. Taylor was also deeply distressed that the leprosy bill 
allowed the liberty of a subject to hang, not on the pronouncement of 
two doctors as the Central Board of Health's 1891 regulations required, 
but on the diagnosis of one medical man who might never have seen a case 
44 
of leprosy in his life. In spite of this, the doctor concerned risked 
a fine of one hundred pounds if he failed to report his discovery. 
This imposes a very heavy penalty on any doctor. He may suspect 
that a man is a leper; but knowing the dreadful consequence of 
reporting to that effect - that the man will be sent to the 
lazaret or deprived of his liberty, probably for life - he will 
hesitate before he makes a report. 45 
It was on this question of the liberty of the individual that 
most of the opposition to the leprosy bill was to come, for it appeared 
that many of Queensland's politicians joined Dr. Taylor in doubting 
the powers of the colony's medical advisers to give consistently correct 
diagnoses, not necessarily through any fault of their own. Echoing 
Taylor in the lower house, John Hamilton supposed "that in Brisbane one 
medical man out of twenty would know a case of leprosy if he saw it". 
But at least in the city there was the chance of consultation, whereas 
40. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVI (1892), 46. 
41. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 25 May 1892, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 698, in-letter no.6326 of 1892. 
42. Marginal comment on above. 
43. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVI (1892), 46. In a sense, 
Tozer had answered some of the Central Board of Health's questions 
in the house. See Within, p.190, f.n.30. 
44. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVI (1892), 36. 
45. Ibid., p.39. 
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46 in the bush there was only one medical man for hundreds of miles. It 
was necessary therefore, in all cases, that specimens from supposed 
47 
victims should be submitted for bacteriological examination. Other 
parliamentarians agreed that such a course was essential, for as 
W.H. Wilson pointed out with some asperity, even where several medical 
opinions were available, "it never happened that all the doctors 
48 
agreed". But although considerable uneasiness was expressed by many 
in debate and in committee, and in spite of Taylor's warning that the 
final decision on a leprosy case lay, not with the trained doctors, 
49 but in the hands of the minister, the Act received assent with only 
slight changes, on 20 July 1892. Such was the known fear of the 
population and of those who legislated to protect them. 
Even with their powers extended under the Act, in practice the 
Queensland government did hesitate to banish suspects to lazarets 
without thorough examination, but their treatment of supposed victims 
was not less reprehensible for that. In some cases, coloured suspects 
were 
confined for weeks in the very hearts of tropical towns, 
guarded and nursed by constables, sampled by local doctors 
for the benefit of Brisbane experts, and still kept under the 
same conditions when the connoisseurs of leprosy had 
condemned the victims. 51 
In all cases where this happened, the suspects were reviled as a 
severe danger to the community, and as a disgusting hardship to the 
policemen concerned. And the sight of coloured victims, "handcuffed 
by both hands, heavily chained and guarded...like dogs" did not arouse 
46. This was actually one of the important reasons for presenting the 
bill. The Colonial Secretary pointed out that it was very 
necessary for the bill to authorize one doctor to investigate a 
case "as there are places in the colony, like Herberton, where 
two medical men cannot be secured". Ibid., LXVII (1892), 239. 
47. Ibid., p.242. 
48. Ibid,, LXVI (1892), 48. 
49. Ibid., p.36. 
50. Changes were mostly semantic.Incarceration on the certificate of 
one or more doctors was still possible,and the necessity for 
bacteriological examination was not written into any clause.The 
Act,without these definite instructions,would allow flexibility 
"in order to meet varying circumstances of the colony",according 
to the Chief Secretary,Sir Samuel Griffith. Ibid., LXVII (1892), 
243. 
51. The Cairns Post, 15 Oct 1892; main editorial. 
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52 pity for the sufferer, but fear, revulsion and contempt, which was 
encouraged by the radical press. Not only did these papers greatly 
exaggerate the incidence of leprosy - every day we have more deplorable 
proof that "this fell disease appears to have taken a firm hold on the 
53 
continent" - but they also laid the blame for the disease on all of the 
representatives of the coloured races in Queensland. Warning that 
widespread leprosy was the penalty Queenslanders had to pay for 
sanctioning the introduction of cheap alien labour. The Eagle claimed 
that by 
permitting the scum of the sewers of the world, Afghans, 
Japanese, Chinese, Javanese, Malays, Coolies, and Polynesians 
to come to our shores, we are encouraging the propagation of 
this foul disease leprosy. How succeeding generations will 
curse us.... /b/ut for the apathy of the working classes, this 
monstrous sin could not be perpetrated. 54 
More considered opinion being put forward by medical men at this time 
suggested that while the community at large had a morbid fear of leprosy, 
the real and increasing danger to the public health lay in a disorder of 
which the general public was almost entirely ignorant - the ravages of 
55 
cancer. 
But meanwhile, the Queensland government did have a very real 
problem, for leprosy had indeed claimed some victims amongst the white 
population. Even before the leprosy bill had been brought before 
parliament, a young man Quigley, a native of Rockhampton, was 
proclaimed by five doctors to be a confirmed victim of the dread 
ry 
disease. Some of the medical men confessed themselves puzzled as to 
the source of Quigley's infection, but Rockhampton's parliamentary 
representative had his own theories on the origin of the disease, and 
did not hesitate to voice them. Unfortunately for Quigley, and another 
Rockhampton suspect, a lad named Hemworth, 
52. The Cairns Post, 15 Oct 1892; main editorial. This incident took 
place in Geraldton. The man was a Kanaka. 
53. The Eagle, 16 Dec 1893. However, the writer also admitted that 
"Queensland is the proud possessor of two lepers". 
54. Ibid.; The Fossicker's Notebook. 
55. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Aug 1893; letter to editor from Samuel 
Kennedy, L.R.C.P., L.R.C.S., Edinburgh. Kennedy mentions, among 
other things. Dr. Hirschfeld's address to the Royal Society on the 
"Prevalence and rapid increase in cancer in the Australian 
colonies". Kennedy himself gave a lecture in Brisbane on 22 August 
1893 entitled "The Alarming Increase in Cancer and the means of 
arresting its Progress". Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1894, p.67. 
56. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVII (1892), 243. 
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their parents resided near the old gaol where the Chinese 
leper was located many years ago, and I have no doubt that 
is where they have contracted the disease. I believe, to a 
certain extent, precautions were taken;but for a long while 
that Chinaman was not isolated as he should have been....It 
must be twelve or fourteen years since that leper died,but 
he was located in a tent,... with only a two-railed fence 
separating him from the public; and on many occasions he was 
allowed to roam about as he liked. I think that will account 
for the leprosy of these two young men, 57 
In fact, Hemworth had not contracted the disease, but in the following 
year, another Rockhampton victim did come to light in the shape of 
58 
Patrick Molloy, otherwise known as MacDonnell. On being, as Pugh's 
Queensland Almanac put it, "pronounced by the faculty to be suffering 
59 
from leprosy", the unfortunate Molloy was transferred to Dunwich to 
join Quigley in confinement. 
By this time, the Central Board of Health was taking an active 
part in advising local medical men, when any doubts arose over the 
diagnosis of suspects. One suggestion acted on by the central board 
and by authorities on the periphery, was that police magistrates should 
take a series of photographs of suspects which could be sent to the 
board for examination, together with blood samples which were to be 
tested by the government bacteriologist. But the board continued to 
run foul of the Colonial Secretary over the leprosy question, mainly 
because it was tied up with the matter of its own powers. Tozer took 
umbrage at almost any of their actions at this time. Certainly he was 
annoyed over the innocent but perhaps carelessly worded request for 
permission for Dr. W.F. Taylor to see any reports on leprosy which 
might be "lying in the Minister's office". Tozer was willing to 
allow Taylor access to the information, but resented the implication 
ft"? 
that it was lying about unregarded. 
The central board and the minister were shortly to be inundated 
with problems with regard to leprosy which left no room for petty 
57. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXVII (1892), 243. 
58. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Nov 1894. 
59. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1895, p.77. 
60, The Brisbane Courier, 12 Mar 1894; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 9 Mar 1894. 
61, Secretary, Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
17 Jan 1894, Q.S.A. COL/A759, in-letter no. 705 of 1894. 
62, Tozer's marginal note on above. See also Within> pp.354-57. 
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quarrelling. The first arose from the findings of the Indian Commission 
on the disease. The commissioners had not reached a unanimous decision, 
but some at least believed that leprosy was scarcely infectious at all, 
and "that there was no necessity whatever for taking lepers from amongst 
ft "^  
their people and confining them as outlaws". In the light of this, a 
sub-committee of members of the central board was formed to draw up 
new regulations for the treatment and prevention of leprosy, and these 
were forwarded to the Colonial Secretary following the board's 30 
November meeting. 
These hopeful views were to be used by the central board, with 
the instant approval of the Colonial Secretary, in an attempt to counter 
"popular feelings of wild alarm" which swept the capital, as in 
succession a confirmed case was reported in a boy of eleven, living at 
Kangaroo Point and attending the Normal School, a leprous Kanaka was 
ft 7 
detected at Toowong, another Kanaka sufferer was discovered at 
Beenleigh, a third in Mackay was suspected of having the disease, 
70 
and a white woman in Brisbane was found to be suffering from leprosy. 
The left wing press had a field-day, maintaining the fears of 
71 Queenslanders at fever pitch, as they conducted their long-standing 
campaign against cheap imported, and very possibly leprous, labour. 
In contrast to these virulent, scurrilous press attacks, the Central 
Board of Health's attempts to restore calm to the people of the colony 
look very puny indeed. Their efforts were marred by differences of 
63. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Nov 1894; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health. Dr. Little expounded at length on the findings of the 
Indian Commission protesting, as a medical man, "most strongly 
against the inhuman way in which we were dealing with lepers". 
64. Ibid., 1 Dec 1894; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 30 Nov 
1894. 
65. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 28 Apr 1895, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A792, in-letter no.4932 of 1895. The findings of the 
Indian Commission, couched in non-technical language, were 
actually approved for display in Court Houses only. 
66. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1896, p.68. 12 March, 1895. 
67. Ibid., 21 March, 1895. 
68. Ibid., p.70. 28 April, 1895. 
69. Ibid., p.72. 4 June, 1895. 
70. Ibid., p.78. 28 September, 1895. 
71. For a number of examples of attacks on the Chinese and other 
coloured races by The Boomerang, The Worker and other 
newspapers, see Evans et.al., pp.302-303. 
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72 
opinion, and by their own admission that leprosy was known to be very 
73 
prevalent amongst dark races. This was hardly likely to inspire 
confidence, though one board member, Dr, Little, did suggest "that to 
blame the Chinese was a cruel slur,...Because it was found amongst them 
74 does not say they introduced it". The support given to the board by the 
7 ^  n f. 
Colonial Secretary both publicly in parliament, and privately, very 
possibly only confirmed the suspicions of many Queenslanders that this 
was a concerted attempt by vested interests to maintain a cheap labour 
77 
supply, with the connivance of the doctors. 
But the Colonial Secretary did not fully endorse all of the board's 
proposals. Purely in the interests of protecting "black people" from 
unwarranted attacks, the Central Board of Health recommended the 
"periodical examination of all coloured races and their quarters in 
78 Queensland", in an effort to prove them free of disease and so allay 
suspicion, Tozer was unwilling to take the legislative steps involved in 
79 this further "interference with the liberty of the subject", and no 
72. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Mar 1895;Minutes of Central Board of 
Health,15 Mar 1895.Dr.Bancroft,now deceased,had suggested that 
the disease might have been brought by the mosquito,but Dr.Little 
maintained that leprosy could not be innoculated. 
73. Ibid., opinion of Drs. David Hardie, Little and Thomson. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXIII (1895), 764-5. 
76. See C.P.Perry to Colonial Secretary, N.D., Q.S.A. COL/A791, 
in-letter no. 9041 of 1895. Perry, who claimed to be very 
interested in the public health,wrote to the Colonial Secretary 
after attending a sale of unredeemed pledges at an auction mart 
in Queen Street,Brisbane.He retailed the story of one large 
blanket,brought into a pawn shop by a Chinaman."A horrible stench 
emanated from the blanket which had been folded up without washing 
....Possibly this blanket was never redeemed owing to some Chinese 
leper having slept in it./Perry's italics^ / The note from Tozer 
reads,"It has been conclusively proved that leprosy is not contag-
ious and no known instance is recorded of any person having caught 
such from clothes.If the writer would read the report of the Father 
Damien commission such would modify his views concerning leprosy,as 
it has mine.I am not aware that the Chinese are more than usually 
prone to leprosy", 
77. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Mar 1895; letter to editor from Hygiene. 
78. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary,23 Mar 1895, Q.S.A. 
COL/A791,in-letter no. 3428 of 1895. 
79. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Mar 1895; letter to editor from S.B.P. 
criticizing Hygiene's letter mentioned above,and approving the 
Central Board of Health's moves. 
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80 
action was taken. Nor was the Colonial Secretary inclined to offer 
even "reasonable sums" for supposed cures for leprosy, since, as he 
pointed out to H.G. Molyneux of Melbourne, there were so few persons 
81 
afflicted with the disease in Queensland. 
There were many members of parliament who did not agree with the 
minister, either on his calculation of the numbers involved, on his 
newly acquired ideas on segregation, or his rejection of the 
recommendations of the health board on periodical inspections for all 
82 
coloured races. There were even those who suggested that the 
administration's attempts "to keep cases of leprosy quiet" were the 
real sources of the "unfounded panic", "exaggerations", and "scares". 
Calm official announcements instead of the spread of information by 
83 
rumour and inuendo would have removed some fears. 
The Central Board of Health was not much help in allaying 
public alarm. It still failed to reach any concerted opinion as to 
the source of known cases, its urgently needed revised regulations were 
84 delayed over minor matters, and it was apparently unable to confirm 
leprosy in a patient, even after long, frequent, and painful 
examinations of supposed victims by both clinical and bacteriological 
o r 
means. Fresh suspect cases continued to be brought before the board 
Ptft 
with similar results, but it does appear that where there was the 
80. Marginal note from Tozer to Chief Secretary on Colonial Secretary 
in-letter no. 3428 above. 
81. H.G.Molyneux to Colonial Secretary, 5 Aug 1895, Q.S.A. COL/A795, 
in-letter no. 9502 of 1895. 
82. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXIII (1895), 764-766. 
83. Ibid., Messrs Turley, Browne, Fisher and McDonald all spoke 
during the supply debate on this matter. 
84. See The Brisbane Courier,4 May 1895, 18 May 1895, 1 Jun 1895, and 
15 Jun 1895. 
85. The board was particularly baffled by the Santo and Molloy cases. 
In Santo's case at least 50 samples of lymph exudate were taken -
from Molloy 20. After all this "they had not sufficient evidence 
to enable them to express an opinion". Molloy was finally 
pronounced to be suffering from nerve tubercular leprosy. He was 
released from the leper station on Stradbroke, but not from 
Peel Island to which he was removed on the instancy of the 
Colonial Secretary and on the recommendation of the board of 
health,See Ibid,, 20 Jul 1895; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 19 Jul 1895. 
86. See The Brisbane Courier, 24 Aug 1895, for the review of the 
cases of John Wilde and Ra-re-Hossey, Both cases had taken an 
inordinately long time to decide. 
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least doubt, the central board refused to commit patients tp a living 
death on the stations, while it seems to have done its best to "lessen 
87 
the harshness of the restrictions imposed upon occupants of the lazaret". 
QQ 
The young woman leper who joined the colony during 1895, caused 
another problem for the government - moral considerations necessitated 
that extra facilities, and an additional amount for salaries, be found. 
The government was urged not to stint supplies granted on this account, 
for as one sympathetic member of the Legislative Assembly, Samuel 
Grimes, pointed out, one of the great principles of public health was 
involved here. 
The lepers...were not there through any fault of their own, 
but through misfortune....Those men were almost suffering 
an imprisonment for the good of the community, and every 
possible indulgence ought to be placed within their reach. 89 
The minister was more than willing to comply with lepers' desires and 
needs, from the supplying of bagatelle tables, to sending green 
90 
vegetables to the lazaret every Monday morning. It is true that one 
request was denied - a request for liquor - but this was purely for 
the lepers' own good. In any case, the Home Secretary said, "he 
91 believed they preferred ginger ale".' 
One other gratification was forbidden. In 1897, Patrick Molloy 
requested permission to marry the female leper, a course which her 
friends were eager for him to take. Horace Tozer requested the central 
board to give a judgment on the affair, asking "that the discussion and 
action be not communicated to the press". The board did keep the matter 
secret, though the general public would probably have approved their 
decision, for they were "distinctly of the opinion that marriage 
92 between these two lepers should not be sanctioned by the state". 
87. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Oct 1895; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 18 Oct 1895. 
88. Ibid., 5 Oct 1895;Minutes of Central Board of Health,4 Oct 1895.At 
first it was proposed that the woman should be sent to Sydney,but 
the New South Wales authorities refused to take her.Later arrange-
ments were made to house the girl on Peel Island.See Ibid.,4 Jan 
1896 and 20 Jul 1896,and Within, p.197. 
89. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXV (1896), 798. 
90. Ibid. Under questioning Tozer admitted that this was a new 
development,resulting from complaints about the food from the 
inmates, 
91. Ibid. 
92. Patrick Molloy to Colonial Secretary,25 Mar 1897,Q.S.A. H0M/A9^ 
in-letter no. 6972 of 1897,and marginal reply from the board. 
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The Central Board of Health soon had to deal with another much 
more grave and very nasty problem concerning the family of the boy leper 
who had been banished to Stradbroke Island, with his parents' easily-won 
93 
consent, in 1895. The difficulty with this case, as with all others 
concerning white lepers, had been the problem of tracking down the 
source of the infection, for as far as could be ascertained, the boy 
Walters had never been exposed to the disease. Had definite contacts 
with offending Chinese or some other acceptable means of dissemination 
been established, perhaps the disagreeable episodes which followed may 
have been avoided. Another method, which might have quelled the fuss, 
would have meant forbidding absolutely any visits by the boy's family 
and friends to Dunwich. 
As it was, in November 1896, the central board received a letter 
from the Kangaroo Point state school committee which virtually asked 
them to sanction the banning of the lad's sister from the school. The 
central board, trying to preserve a balanced view, replied that "it 
would be cruel to refuse education to the family provided the usual 
certificate certifying freedom from the disease was produced." 
This was far from being the end of the matter, and, once again at 
the root of the agitation was the medical practitioners' inability to 
give reasonable assurances on the matter of contagion. The Brisbane 
Courier, wishing to be fair to the family, but also making "some 
allowance... for. the traditional horror with which the disease has been 
regarded", called on the Central Board of Health for "a clear indication 
as to the infectiousness of leprosy". At the same time, the paper 
begged those concerned with the Kangaroo Point state school not to deny 
untainted relatives of known lepers communal life, social privileges, 
A J .• 95 
and an education. 
The Home Secretary also required an immediate opinion from the 
central board on this grave matter of the inconvenience and injury that 
would be meted out to lepers' relatives, through state interference with 
their liberty and rights. 
93. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Mar 1895. 
94. Ibid., 2 Nov 1896; Minutes of the Central Board of Health, 
30 Oct 1896. 
95. Ibid., 6 Feb 1897, 
96. Ibid.; Minutes of the Central Board of Health, 5 Feb 1897. 
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The matter was not only grave, it was also urgent, At the 
prompting of the state school committee, the headmistress had already 
excluded the child, a "spirited action" which was applauded by some 
97 
correspondents to The Brisbane Courier. But the Central Board of 
Health, having reviewed the situation, reiterated its opinion that the 
98 
child should be permitted to attend the school, and Dr. Thomson 
reproached otherwise intelligent men who had made violent threats at 
lively public protest meetings. 
It seemed to be thought that a very great danger existed.... 
There was no danger to be apprehended from members of the 
Lad's family associating with other children. He knew the 
ramifications of the families who would be effected by such 
a cruel and unkind act which would effect the population of 
the colony and Brisbane more than people would believe. It 
reminded him of the dark ages, of the time when witches 
were burnt.,.,He was satisfied that a very foolish fear had 
arisen,and it did not reflect on the intelligence of the 
nineteenth century.,.,He would have no hesitation in letting 
his own children attend the school. 
On the question of allowing visitors into the lazaret, the central board 
decided to permit relatives and friends to speak to inmates from a buggy, 
without alighting. Later, arrangements for fencing the area would be 
, 99 
made. 
The Brisbane Courier welcomed the central board's clear decision 
on the question, which, it was happy to note, was unanimous for once. But 
the Courier did repeat its view that on the matter of public feeling 
about leprosy it was necessary for a good deal more understanding to 
be shown by those in authority, and especially by the board of health. 
Doctors possibly have too little toleration for the 
ignorance of the general public in matters peculiar to their 
profession. But we are none the less bound, with the 
reiterated opinions of the Board before us, to lay stress on 
the fact that the agitation we refer to rests on a purely^ 
imaginery danger....We hope that after this concession /of _ 
refusing close contact of visitors and lepers at the lazaret/ 
we shall hear no more of protests. 100 
This was a vain hope, for more public meetings, letters to newspapers, 
deputations to ministers, and other declarations of defiance were to be 
made, before the "parents' fuss" died down. But gradually, numbers 
attending meetings dwindled, and the incident, if not forgotten, was at 
97. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Feb 1897,and 17 Feb 1897;letter to editor 
from A. Alder, 
98. Ibid., 20 Feb 1897;Minutes of Central Board of Health,19 Feb 1897. 
99. Ibid. 
100. Ibid., 23 Feb 1897; sub editorial. 
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least no longer allowed to poison the lives of the untainted victims of 
the fearful disease. 
Damaging and bitter as the Kangaroo Point state school campaign 
had been, it was as nothing in comparison with the continuing attacks 
102 
against the coloured races - particularly the "yellow fellows". The 
Labor Party's election campaigns, for example, took the form of an 
"appeal to unreasoning passion" against the Chinese as the bearers of 
leprosy. This, thundered The Brisbane Courier, was "nothing short of 
103 
wickedness,... and an outrage of common humanity". The party's 
tactics had been perfectly legitimate, countered The Patriot. 
The cry of leprosy was introduced into the campaign from facts.... 
We have all along agreed that leprosy is a horrible thing, and 
we do not think it is absurd to write as if it was spreading 
amongst us like a pestilence. It would be too late then to 
strike at the cause of the pestilence. The Labour Party required 
prevention, and justifiably used the leprosy cry to expose one 
of the evils to which the country is subjected... by the too 
great preponderance of alien races....It is not unlikely that 
one or two syphiloids were mistaken for lepers...but this is 
fair in political war. 104 
The popular press went further, actually seeking out and exposing 
lepers. The Patriot unearthed a Kanaka, who "on their own say so" was 
leprous, and demanded that the police "dig this mass of corruption out 
of his den and maroon him", and The Street reporter sallied forth on 
an inspection of the horrors of the Chinese dens in the capital city of 
"Leper Land". 
The scene was not only repulsive, it was hideous. Two of the 
Chinese had that form of leprosy that is known as anaesthetic. 
They had no pain, but their fingers were simply "dropping" 
away...dropping away...joint by joint...The others had the 
tubercular form of leprosy...the so-called leonine form.... 
The Street does not want to cause alarm....It simply applied 
to the authorities and asked if these cases were unknown... and 
was assured they were known,but there is no necessity for 
"creating a scare". 106 
101. See especially the public meeting held to discuss,not only the 
problem of leprosy,but also the alleged great discourtesy of 
ministers. Ibid., 14 Apr 1897. 
102. The Patriot, 17 Jun 1899. 
103. The Brisbane Courier,29 Mar 1899. 
104. The Patriot, 8 Apr 1899; sub editorial. 
105. Ibid., 9 Sep 1899. 
106. The Street,29 Jan 1898.This paper asserted that it had previously 
"stuck up for Queensiand",which hated the label "Leper Land",but 
after their visit to the Horrors of Leprous Slums,they had changed 
their mind about the worth of the colony. 
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Private communications between governments carried on this theme, 
that in the official estimate the "scares" and dangers from coloured 
immigrants were highly exaggerated. When the Premier of Western 
Australia urgently requested that Queensland's immediate plans on 
Chinese immigration should be communicated to him, the Premier Hugh 
Nelson replied that the question was under consideration, but no 
precipitate action was likely. In his view, the Chinese in Queensland 
107 
at that time were not objectionable, for any reason. 
Unfortunately, the destruction of state records has meant that 
satisfactory information on the prevalence of leprosy, and the 
magnitude of the problem in Queensland is not available for the years up 
108 
to 1910. Figures revealed from time to time do tend to show that 
109 leprosy was on the increase, though almost certainly not to the 
extent claimed by The Worker, which reported that at least one hundred 
lepers, all coloured, were incarcerated on Friday Island, with eleven 
whites being held on Stradbroke Island in 1898. But under the 
pressure of these press attacks, the Queensland Home Secretary, James 
Robert Dickson, who held office briefly from March to October of that 
year, was very sensitive to questioning, though he felt that "the 
stigma attempted to be thrown on Queensland of having a large number 
of lepers was undeserved". This was especially so, when the comparative 
figures for leprosy in Queensland and New South Wales were examined. 
107. J. Forrest, Premier of Western Australia to Hugh M. Nelson, 10 Nov 
1897, Q.S.A. HOM/A 14, in-telegram no.14400 of 1897, and Nelson's 
reply of 11 Nov 1897. 
108. C Cook, The Epidemiology of Leprosy in Australia (Department of 
Health Service Publication No.38, 1927), p.74. 
109. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1899), 92. 
Cases of leprosy reported from 30 Jun 1898 to 1 Jul 1899. 
No. of cases : 22 
Districts Involved : Ayr 1, Brisbane 2, Bundaberg 1, Cairns 1, 
Charleville 1, Cooktown 1, Childers 1, 
Geraldton 1, Ingham 1, Isisford 1,Mackay 9, 
Nambour 1, Townsville 1. 
Nationalities of Victims : English 3, Danish 1, Queenslander 1, 
Chinese 1, Aboriginal 2, Pacific Islanders 14. 
110. The Worker, 28 May 1898. This article reproduced one from The 
Adelaide Weekly Herald. It reported the visit of two South 
Australian parliamentarians to the lazaret at Dunwich, and 
resulted in heated denials from the Home Secretary. For reports 
see The Brisbane Courier, 8 Jun 1898. 
111. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXIX (1898), 543. 
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Relatively little change, either in attitudes or actions came with 
the new century. Differences which were notable, very often did not 
reflect any credit on the governments in power or the people of 
Queensland. Cases of leprosy were still to be found in various centres 
112 
throughout the colony, indeed, as Francis Kenna, the member for Bowen, 
pointed out during the 1903 supply debate, a perusal of the 
bacteriological institute's report showed, that an alarmingly increased 
number of leprosy specimens had been dealt with during that year."'''^ ^ 
Fortunately not all of the specimens tested were positive, and most of 
the fifteen proven cases were aborigines and coloured aliens. Nevertheless, 
such a spread of that fearful disease filled Kenna with a dread which was 
114 
certainly not unfounded, as the even higher figures for the following 
year were to prove. 
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112. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly,!(1900), 190. 
113. "Appendix B of the Bacteriological Institute Report".Thirty 
specimens had been examined over the whole year. Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1903), 175. 
114. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCI (1903), 458. 
115. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1905), 141. 
206. 
In the early 1900's, unrest over the leprosy problem was still 
very evident in Queensland, though bubonic plague had taken the limelight 
as far as the Department of Public Health was concerned. Complaints 
continued to be made about coloured victims wandering about the 
countryside at will. Indignation and uproar followed the discovery 
that, early in 1905, no less than three supposed lepers were at liberty in 
Cairns. All of them proved, on further examination, to be true cases of 
leprosy. The worst case, a man who had been "allowed" to live with his 
countrymen in Chinatown, was obliging enough to leave this vale of tears 
with despatch, and the police were able to report that "owing to the 
ablutions used, and precautions taken with the burial, there was no 
117 danger of any future evil effects". Nevertheless, the tardiness of 
government action did not escape the Cairns local authorities, including 
the fact that in spite of the council's early and frequent protests and 
warnings about his condition, the Chinaman had died four days before the 
medical officer's official notification of suspected leprosy had reached 
the Home Secretary's office. 
Even more alarm was felt over the other two cases. One, a black 
trooper Charlie, was declared a leper by the Central Board of Health on 
26 January 1905, but was still "allowed to mingle with children in this 
118 
town for some time afterwards". Another victim, a white man named 
Costello, was permitted to live in his sister's house, "mixing with 
people in the town unhindered". Costello was certainly an embarrassment 
to the government, for having been permitted this privilege while his 
119 
case was under review, he had "cleared out" for parts unknown. Not 
unnaturally, the Mayor of Cairns, Charles McKenzie, "demanded" immediate 
120 
action for the protection of his community. 
In an effort to defuse an explosive situation. The Brisbane 
Courier sought an explanation for the government's apparent failure to 
isolate supposed leper victims from the minister and the health 
116. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1900), 25. 
This particular instance concerned an aboriginal woman in 
Etheridge. 
117. Memorandum attached to Town Clerk, Cairns to Home Secretary, 
18 Feb 1905, Q.S.A. COL/A 863, in-letter no.2279 of 1905. 
118. Ibid. 
119. Ibid. Costello was eventually located and conveyed to the lazaret. 
120. Mayor of Cairns to Home Secretary, 16 Feb 1905, Q.S.A. COL/A 863, 
in-telegram no.2035 of 1905. 
207. 
commissioner Dr. Ham. The doctor fell back on the findings of the 
Indian Leprosy Commission, suggesting that the extent to which leprosy 
was contagious or inoculable was "exceedingly small". Furthermore, 
there was no provision for isolating a person under the Act, on the mere 
suspicion that he was a leper. The Home Secretary, Peter Airey, simply 
declared that all the public controversy over the matter had been based 
121 
on information that was "entirely inaccurate". 
The episode degenerated into yet another sparring match between 
local authorities in the north and the central government. The aggrieved 
Cairns council questioned whether the department's correspondence was 
"consistent with the courtesy which is due from a Government department 
122 
to a Local Authority". The under secretary of the offending 
department ended the matter by "again asseverating" his previous 
statements, and concluding that no good purpose would be served by 
123 further correspondence. 
In comparison with the Cairns affair, the case of the Indian 
hawker in Roma stands out in amusing relief. Upon discovery, and 
pending advice and definite instructions, the supposed victim was 
124 
immediately detained. Since he showed some external symptoms of the 
125 
disease, further tests, including clinical examinations by the 
medical officer Dr. A.A. Doyle in consultation with a private medical 
practitioner. Dr. Ernest Sheaf of Roma, and bacteriological tests were 
1 2f> 
ordered. In the meantime, the suspect's condition had improved to 
such an extent that Dr. Doyle began to regret his detention. Doyle 
gives this light-hearted account of an incident which could not have 
been very amusing for the central figure. Pier Moi. After relating 
his early suspicions. Dr. Doyle continued. 
Thereupon I waited upon the Police Magistrate here and sought 
his advice as to the best place to locate the man, pending 
such time as I had arrived at some definite conclusion. I 
121. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Mar 1905. 
122. Town Clerk,Cairns to Home Secretary,4 Apr 1905,Q.S.A. C0L/A863, 
in-letter no. 4567 of 1905. 
123. Under Secretary of Home Department to Town Clerk,Cairns,4 May 
1905,Q.S.A. COL/A863,in-letter no. 4567 of 1905. 
124. Police Inspector,Roma to Commissioner of Police,14 Dec 1901, 
Q.S.A, C0L/A844, in-telegram no. 1513 of 1901. 
125. Dr. A.A.Doyle to Police Magistrate,16 Dec 1901,Q.S.A. C0L/A844, 
in-letter no. 19840 of 1901. 
126. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary,17 Jan 1901, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A844, in-letter no. 798 of 1901. 
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pointed out that my ideas were purely tentative and unformed.... 
I had no notion that our short unimportant interview was to be 
the means of raising an official whirlwind of unknown dimensions. 
In ten minutes an energetic constable was on my premises guarding 
the astonished and harmless Pier Moi. Then followed the Police 
Inspector, eager for information. A second constable hovered 
round ready for any emergencies. The surrounding inhabitants 
stood on their door steps in galvanized expectancy,whilst the 
street traffic ceased and I myself became overwhelmed with the 
sense of the awful commotion I had unwittingly raised. Meanwhile 
the Police Magistrate was hysterically despatching the news to the 
Board of Health, and a couple of days later I was commanded to 
obtain..,serum.,.to be sent to the Bacteriologist for examination. 
Sir, in the States anaesthetic lepers follow their daily avocation 
unmolested, and in South Africa lepers are segregated certainly, 
but their existence causes no commotion, even though they be 
loose....Meanwhile, as a result of the daily examination, I 
concluded that the man is not a leper, though he is a liar, not 
perhaps intentionally. His difficulty of speech and understanding 
hampers him, and he is ever ready to agree with suggestions.... 
The areas of milk white paleness are, I now learn, due to his 
working amongst prickly pear,..causing loss of pigment. Such 
Sir, is the history of the very tame, unsensational case of Pier 
Moi, concerning which I shall be delighted to meet Dr. Sheaf in 
consultation should you deem it necessary, 
128 
The Home Secretary did not deem it necessary, and the matter was 
dropped. But in spite of the doctor's levity, or perhaps because of it, 
the incident highlights the blind, unreasoning panic which broke out in 
any Queensland town, when the cry of leprosy was raised. 
Some of the other more unpleasant aspects in the history of 
leprosy in Queensland, recurred with weary repetitiveness until 1914. 
Increasingly, murmurs of discontent about conditions, food, and 
129 treatment in the lazarets began to reach the capital during this period. 
For instance, although the same disease made them all captives for the 
sake of the public good, the white lepers at Stradbroke Island 
"deputationized" the Home Secretary during his visit there, objecting 
to the presence of the unfortunate coloured lepers who were awaiting 
transport to Friday Island. The demand for the removal of the Chinese 
and other lepers was made, even though "their quarters were 30 yards 
130 
away from those of the white patients". 
127. Report of A.A. Doyle to Under Secretary, Home Department, 
24 Jan 1902, Q.S.A. C0L/A844, in-letter no. 1300 of 1902. 
128. Peter Airey's marginal comment on the above report. 
129. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly,! (1900), 190. 
130. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCIII (1904), 1091. 
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During the following year, a protracted correspondence took place 
on the Friday Island patients' complaints over the supply of salt meat, 
before the government finally agreed to arrangements to forward a 
131 quantity of fresh meat to the island occasionally. After the 
comparative freedom granted to the inmates on Stradbroke under 
Dr. Stockwell, the restrictions placed on them by the new superintendent 
after 1906 were a severe blow, which brought protests from the unfortunate 
132 
"prisoners". Even worse was to follow. As early as 1904 the 
government was calling for a review of the costs per leper at the 
133 Stradbroke and Friday Island institutions, with the intention of 
cutting expenditure to an absolute minimum. The then medical superintend-
ent. Dr. Stockwell, protested that "no doubt there will be considerable 
discontent if the new dietary scale is approved". The Central Board of 
Health's emphatic opinion was that "whatever saving is to be effected in 
the expenditure upon lazarets should not be at the expense of the 
135 dietary", and that the "proposed scale is quite inadequate", but the 
Home Secretary was determined to cut expenses in spite of opposition. 
By 1906, he had the willing cooperation of Dr. Row, the acting 
medical superintendent at Dunwich. Apparently operating on the principle 
1 Tf^ 
that "if any would /or could/ not work, neither should he eat". Row 
131. Leper Lazaret,Friday Island to Under Secretary,Home Department.See 
correspondence under various dates during 1905 under Q.S.A. 
COL/A865,in-letter no. 9353 of 1905. At least no leper was left 
alone on Friday Is land,as some had been on Dayman.Also, Friday 
Island lepers no longer had to cook and look after themselves.An 
attendant and a cook had been provided.Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, XCIII (1904), 1091. 
132. See Dr.Row to Home Secretary in margin of P.Smythe to Home 
Secretary,22 Mar 1906, Q.S.A. COL/A870, in-letter no. 4072 of 
1906.Smythe had asked the Home Secretary-"If I buy a horse and 
feed it at my own expence can I have one here at the lazarette. 
I hope you will say yes, as it will pass away many weary hours for 
me". Row considered that a dangerous precedent would be created 
if Smythe's request were granted,and informed the Home Secretary 
that he was tightening security generally. 
133. Analysis of the cost per leper in Stradbroke and Friday Islands, 
N.D., Q.S.A. COL/A871, in-letter no. 12396 of 1904.This report 
was received in the department on 16 Sep 1904. 
134. Dr.Stockwell to Home Secretary, 5 Oct 1904, Q.S.A. C0L/A871, 
in-letter no, 13215 of 1904. 
135. Secretary,Central Board of Health to Under Secretary,Home 
Secretary's Department,27 Oct 1904,Q.S.A. COL/A871, in-letter no. 
14034 of 1904. 
136. The Bible, Thessalonians II, iii, 10, 
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drew up a new scale of diet for the inmates of Dunwich which made 
"differences,..in the ration of Bread and meat (2 ozs) between the 
employed and unemployed". Lepers were to have fruit "occasionally, 
say 2 or 3 times a week", and "eggs laid by Lazaret fowls when 
137 
available". The Central Board of Health again protested at the 
government's niggardliness, which, in its view, would further undermine 
138 
the general health of the lepers. In the house, the radical 
Vincent Lesina deplored the "scandalous piece of parsimony" which 
reduced the dietary scale of lepers "whose freedom was sacrificed... 
139 in the interests of the community". He was joined by the 
conservative Robert Philp, in pleading for a little extra expenditure 
to make the last few years of the lepers' lives more comfortable. Home 
Secretary, Peter Airey, was adamant, because it suited him. The scale 
had been fixed by the medical superintendent in whose control the matter 
lay. No extra "comforts" would be supplied without Dr. Row's consent. 
Very large changes were made in the following year when a new 
lazaret was set up at Peel Island. The health commissioner Dr. Ham 
announced that each patient was to have separate accommodation, women 
were, of course, to be secluded from the men, and just as importantly, 
the coloured inmates, who had all been transferred to Peel Island from 
the north, were to be separated from the whites. The new arrangement 
promised both improvements in facilities and comforts, and unique 
141 
opportunities for a systematic and scientific study of the disease. 
Such an optimistic appraisal of the move hardly seems to have 
been borne out in fact. There was no medical man resident at the 
station, and the journey to the lazaret from Dunwich alone took "hh. 
to 4 hours. The extra medical duties undertaken by Dr. Row, "so as to 
cut down expenses as much as possible and thus save the Government a 
142 
a considerable outlay", would hardly allow time for "a systematic and 
137. Acting Medical Superintendent Row to Home Secretary,19 Apr 1906, 
Q.S.A. COL/A871, in-letter no. 5104 of 1906. 
138. Central Board of Health to Home Secretary,26 Jun 1906,Q.S.A. 
C0L/A871, filed under in-letter no. 5104 of 1906. 
139. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCVII! (1906), 1604. 
140. Ibid. As a consequence of his many strictures,Row was extremely 
unpopular with the lepers.A flood of complaints finally led to an 
enquiry.See Queensland Parliamentary Papers,! (1908), 321-2. 
141. Ibid., 1! (1907), 232. 
142. Dr. Row to Under secretary. Home Department, 23 Sep 1907, 
Q.S.A. COL/A890, in-letter no. 10223 of 1907. 
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scientific study of the disease". As to the facilities at the new 
lazaret, Mr. J.G. Macdonald, who was deputed by the Home Secretary to 
enquire into lepers' complaints about their medical treatment, clothing, 
the bad quality and shortage of food, and the doctor's censorship of 
their mail, found most of the claims not proven. But he did consider 
that the housing was inadequate, though his main concern was the close 
proximity of the male and female wards, and the mixing of the sexes 
which resulted. Macdonald feared that this laxness could lead to 
"grave scandal... at any time". It was also unsatisfactory that white 
lepers were able to forgather with the coloureds, many of whom had been 
prompted to bring complaints before the Home Secretary, at the 
instigation, and in imitation of, the attitude of the white lepers. 
When in 1910, there was a proposal made to solve the sex problem 
for good by housing the female lepers on a property "Myora" near 
Dunwich, a vigorous outcry from residents and other vested interests 
144 
resulted. The matter was settled by Dr. J.S.C. Elkington who was then 
Queensland Public Health Commissioner. In Elkington's opinion 
to establish a lazaret at "Myora" would... surely be a costly way 
of adding to the grave danger to the public health which is 
already created by the present system of dealing with leprosy in 
Queensland.... The place is entirely unsuitable and undesirable 
for the purpose of a lazaret, and I recommend that the project 
of so using it be abandoned. 145 
As far as Elkington was concerned, no really satisfactory solution 
to the leprosy problem would be reached until the Commonwealth government 
took overall strict control of quarantining and other arrangements 
146 
Australia-wide. From mid-1910 onwards, the question of handing over 
the care of lepers became a matter of negotiation between the Commonwealth 
and the state, in the persons of the Home Secretary John George Appel, and 
147 Dr. Norris, the Director of Federal Quarantine. The process was very 
long drawn out. The Commonwealth authorities had assumed control of 
about one hundred and sixty acres on Peel Island, including the lazaret, 
143. "Report made by Mr. J.G. Macdonald into Complaints made against the 
Administration of the Lazaret, Peel Island", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, I (1908), 321-322. 
144. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Apr 1910; letter to editor 
from T.W., and 13 Apr 1910; letter to editor from W.J.D. 
145. Ibid., 19 May 1910. 
146. Ibid. 
147. Ibid., 10 Jun 1910. 
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under the Federal Quarantine Act in December 1910, but this 
proclamation did not interfere with the maintenance and management of 
the leper station which was still under the control of the state 
^ 148 government. 
Matters were much the same at the end of 1911, although the 
requirements of federal quarantine arrangements had led to much stricter 
control over the ingress and egress of visitors to the lazaret, as 
149 Elkington had predicted they would. In January 1912, the Public Health 
Commissioner apprised The Brisbane Courier that matters between the two 
governments were almost completed, and that the transfer of the whole 
administration would only be a matter of a little time. Elkington 
was somewhat premature in his statement. Final arrangements had still 
not been completed as late as 1914, by which time Elkington himself was 
in the Commonwealth health service, and Dr. J.I. Moore had become 
Commissioner of Public Health in his stead. The Queensland health 
department was anxious for the matter to be completed, because control 
152 
was clumsy and inefficient, but matters continued as they were until 
well after 1914, the Queensland Public Health Commissioner having 
control over the lazaret, while the government medical officer regularly 
153 
visited and reported on the unfortunates there. 
The value of any "scientific" experiments undertaken on the 
leprosy problem up to 1914 in Queensland is very difficult to judge, 
partly because the records are so sparse. Some attempts to fight the 
disease were made by the mid-1890's. The then superintendent of the 
Dunwich lazaret, Dr, Maloney, reported to the Central Board of Health 
that he had set a dietary scale, "one of the most important features of 
leprosy treatment", on the broadest and most liberal lines, to improve 
the lepers' general health. Maloney had also tried the internal and 
148. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Dec 1910. 
149. Ibid., 28 Nov 1911. 
150. Ibid., 27 Jan 1912. 
151. Ibid. , 1 Feb 1912. 
152. Health Department to Home Secretary, 7 Jan 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, 
in-letter no. 228 of 1914. 
153. See regular reports of the commissioner up to the 1920's. See 
also Health Department to Home Secretary, 11 May 1914, 
Q.S.A. H0M/B44, in-letter no, 4082 of 1914 and subsequent 
no. 4941 of 1914. 
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154 
external use of chaulmoogra oil, but when he found, after a very short 
time, that the patients were unwilling to persevere with the treatment, 
he abandoned it. The trial period had been too short for him to make any 
personal observations on the action of the treatment. 
No such optimism is apparent in the report of 1898. No mention is 
made of attempts to interest any of the eleven patients in undertaking 
any course of treatment, and the description of the "incurable" disease 
and its effects on the "debilitated" patients whose general health was 
more or less hopelessly undermined, is depressing in the extreme. 
Even after the appointment of the health commissioner under the 
1900 Health Act, only passing reference was made to leprosy in annual 
reports. In 1904, Dr. Ashburton Thompson, the President of the 
Department of Public Health in New South Wales, did use some information 
on the history of Queensland leper patients, in his Report on Leprosy in 
Australia to the Berlin International Congress on the disease. The 
stimulus of the conference and general scientific interest led to a 
large amount of research being conducted overseas. This apparently bore 
fruit by 1905, culminating in the work of Captain Rost of the Indian 
medical service. Rost claimed to have grown the leprosy bacillus, and 
to have treated the disease successfully by inoculating patients with 
"Leprolin". Small doses of the treatment were obtained for Queensland as 
soon as possible, and one patient underwent the injections. No 
noticeable improvement was discerned in the man by Dr. Ham, the lazaret 
superintendent, or other doctors, although the patient proclaimed 
himself somewhat better, and both he and his companions began to clamour 
for regular inoculations. Arrangements were made for the bacteriological 
157 institute to manufacture the serum, and excited questions were asked in 
parliament. The Home Secretary was unwilling to commit himself any 
further than Dr. Ham had done. "Only time would tell if the relief would 
1 "-iR 
be permanent or whether the remedy would effect a cure". 
154. Chaulmoogra oil is derived from a plant which is native to Burma, 
where it has been long used as a remedy for chronic skin diseases. 
For long, the derivatives from the oil were the only drugs found 
efficacious in the treatment of leprosy. 
155. The Brisbane Courier, 23 May 1896; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 22 May 1896. 
156. Report on the Lazaret, Dunwich, 30 Jul 1898, Q.S.A. H0M/A12, 
in-letter no. 10172 of 1898. 
157. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II C1905), 141. 
158. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCVI (1905), 1324. 
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Unfortunately for the hopeful lepers of Dunwich, time told a 
very sad story indeed. Exhaustive investigations into Dr. Rost's 
work by his collaborator Colonel Semple, found no evidence of the 
development of leprosy bacilli. C.J. Pound, the government 
bacteriologist, who had previously made experiments similar to those 
of Rost with almost identical results, announced that "rumours 
concerning the discovery and preparation of Leprolin were not 
159 
confirmed on further experiments being made". 
Lepers at the new lazaret at Peel Island were forced back to the 
use of chaulmoogra oil, which appeared to make considerable improvement 
in the patients, if they could be persuaded to persevere with the 
treatment. During the following year. Dr. Row noted some further 
successes with the oil on all of his patients, including those 
transferred from Friday Island. Like Maloney in 1896, Row found 
that the "great nausea" caused by the internal use of the oil made it 
difficult to induce the patients to continue with the treatment for any 
length of time. 
One patient, Thomas Morton, a half-caste aboriginal has persevered 
with it with praiseworthy effort for some considerable time -
three years - with the result that there is a marked improvement 
in his condition which I trust and believe will continue. 
Row was also making experiments with Guaiacol and a preparation called 
Ichthyol, and even more importantly, was trying to discover the best 
method of administering these drugs. As far as the leprous sores were 
concerned, he had prepared several ointments, in an effort to establish 
4. -I 1 .• 162 a successful lotion. 
159. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 212. Pound pledged 
himself to continue the investigation "as opportunity affords". 
160. Ibid., II (1907), 232. 
161. Ibid., II (1908), 280. The Friday Island lepers were in a very 
bad state on arrival. They had terrible sores, and were in a 
filthy condition. Row to Home Secretary, 5 Aug 1907, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 881, in-letter no.8624 of 1907. See also Within, 
p.209, f.n.131. 
162. Report of the Lazaret, Peel Island for the half year ending 
31st December, 1907, Q.S.A. COL/A 889, in-letter no.5110 of 
1907. 
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RETURN SHOWING THE NUMBER OF LEPERS ON THE REGISTER IN THE STATE DURING 
THE YEAR 1907 , AND NUMBER SEGREGATED AT THE LAZARET, PEEL ISLAND, 
MORETON BAY, 1907 . 
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163. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, I I (1908), 281, 
216. 
In spite of this, the Commissioner of Public Health concluded 
that little real research work had been undertaken, the tranfer to Peel 
Island notwithstanding, and it was decided to try the newly acclaimed 
164 
Nastm treatment at the lazaret. This treatment was to cause very 
considerable trouble amongst the patients, which had nothing to do with 
whether or not it was effective medicinally. Dr. Row was convinced 
that patients were building too much hope upon the treatment, which he; 
feared would "not be nearly as efficacious as many believed". The 
chief health officer of New South Wales was also anxious to evaluate 
Queensland's experience with the use of Nastin, on which such great 
hopes were placed. In fact, the Nastin treatment did prove to be a 
failure at Peel Island, as it had in the much larger experiment in 
„ . . , ^ . 168 British Guiana. 
Once again Queensland lepers went back onto the chaulmoogra 
treatment, but this time a purified oil - anti-leprol - was obtained at 
the suggestion of Dr. Anton Breinl, Director of the Australian 
Institute of Tropical Medicine. Though the unpleasant side effects 
169 
still remained, the effectiveness of the treatment seemed to be proven. 
Many of the Peel Island inmates took anti-leprol in conjunction with the 
Guaiacol treatment, which Linford Row had initiated. Indeed, Row's 
article in the Australasian Medical Gazette for January 1910, on his 
experiments in the treatment of leprosy by hypodermic injections of the 
bactericidal drug Guaiacol, was hailed as a very considerable achievement 
170 by the Queensland press. The drug was not new, but the use of the 
164. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II C1908), 280. 
165. Row returned temporarily to the mental asylum at Goodna and the 
Nastin treatment was delayed.Many complaints about the non-
treatment, the way in which the Nastin was to be administered, 
and about Dr.Row himself were directed to the Home Secretary at 
this time.See for example,13 Inmates of Lazarette,Peel Island to 
Home Secretary,27 Feb 1909, Q.S.A. COL/A903,in-letter no. 2611 of 
1909, and subsequent correspondence. 
166. Linford Row to Under Secretary,Home Secretary's Department,15 Apr 
1909,Q.S.A. COL/A903,in-letter no. 4406 of 1909.See also The 
Brisbane Courier,14 Jan 1909,for a description of the very large 
practical tests being made by Professor Deycke,the proponent of 
the treatment,in a 600 bed leprosy hospital in British Guiana. 
167. Health Department to Home Secretary, 5 Apr 1909, Q.S.A. HOM/B22, 
in-letter no. 3990 of 1909. 
168. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1911), 9. 
169. Ibid. Medical men held this opinion of the purified esters of 
this oil until the mid-1940's when sulfone drugs began to be 
widely used. 
170. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Feb 1910. 
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treatment was introduced by Row in 1908, and tested over two years at 
the Queensland lazaret. The Courier was anxious that credit for the 
• • 171 
original tests should go to Linford Row, and to Queensland. 
Only one other aspect of Queensland's "scientific" experiments 
remains to be discussed. The problem of how leprosy was transmitted had 
been a bugbear for the Central Board of Health and the central 
government, since the introduction of the disease. The puzzle remained 
unsolved and the source of bitter debate throughout the whole time under 
review, and well beyond. Many leading medical authorities believed 
implicitly that the disease was communicable, and even those who on many 
occasions claimed that it was not, still held to the principle of 
segregation of victims, both in the interests of the general public, and 
172 
of those of the sufferers themselves. 
Many other theories abounded. The idea put forward by 
Dr. Bancroft in 1892, that the disease was spread by mosquitoes,"^ was 
still apparently acceptable to Linford Row, the Queensland "specialist" 
in the disease in 1907. Certainly Row suggested in that year, that at 
Peel Island, 
I have to run a much more considerable risk than in the past 
of contracting the disease myself, owing to the fact that the 
New Lazaret swarms with Mosquitos which was not the case at 
the Old Lazaret. 174 
This view was entirely rejected by Burnett Ham, though no less an 
authority than Dr. W.J. Goodhue, the medical superintendent of the 
Molokai leper settlement on the Hawaiian Islands, was still adhering to 
this opinion. Goodhue also brought the "novel charge" of spreading 
175 leprosy against the common bed-bug. Difficulties facing the early 
twentieth century medical men of Queensland over this question can be 
understood to a certain extent, when it is realised that C.Cook, M.B., 
171. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Feb 1910. 
172. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1905), 141. 
173. Evans et. al., p.303. 
174. Dr.Row to Under Secretary,Home Secretary's Department, 23 Sep 
1907, Q.S.A. COL/A890, in-letter no. 6317 of 1907. Row was 
making a special plea for an increase in salary in this letter, 
and lists a number of reasons in justification of which the 
mosquito danger is only one, but it does seem to have been a 
genuine belief on his part. 
175. Robert H. Lawson to Under Secretary, Home Secretary's 
Department, 25 Oct 1906, Q.S.A. C0L/A875, in-letter no. 12715 
of 1906. 
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Ch.M. (Sydney), D.T.M. ^ H., staff member of the Commonwealth Department 
of Health, could seriously propose in 1927, that "the bed-bug is still 
1 1 ft 
suspected of playing some part in the role of vector". 
The disease of leprosy was never to claim many victims in 
Queensland. At its height, in the period up to 1914, only upwards of 
seventy persons were affected with the disease at any one time. Yet, 
as Dr. John Thomson of the Central Board of Health warned, because of 
this disease Queenslanders were in danger of reverting to the dark 
177 
ages and the law of the jungle. They were not peculiar in this. 
In almost all cultures, emotional loathing and rejection has resulted 
in the excommunication of lepers. The difference in Queensland was 
that the rejection took on such blatantly racist tones. 
The incidence of the disease had other important effects, apart 
from the medical arguments it aroused. Not the least of these were 
the political problems which were involved. The greater number of the 
people most affected by leprosy were, personally, politically unimportant. 
Yet the difficulties stemming from the attempted containment of the 
disease, presented governments with some of the most sensitive issues 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The great controversies 
of the liberty of the individual, and the necessity or otherwise for 
state intervention, were fought out here. Moreover, since leprosy, 
like many other public health problems, underlined the differences 
between governments and local authorities, and state and Commonwealth 
administrations, the pros and cons of centralism, with the attendant 
bitterness which that question can generate, were also implicated. 
176. Cook, p.10. 
177. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Feb 1897; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 19 Feb 1897. 
SMALLPOX 
Smallpox in its severer forms is fatal to a large proportion of 
the victims it attacks, and is one of the most highly infectious of all 
known communicable diseases. It was one of the terrible exotic scourges 
which made its appearance in ships reaching the Queensland coast during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Smallpox was to claim 
only a handful of sufferers amongst the resident population. But early 
fear of the disease was so great, that Queensland's first Public Health 
Act of 1872 was hurriedly added to the statute book to enable the 
government "to deal with the formidable disease of smallpox in the event 
of its breaking out in the colony, as there was a possibility of its 
doing". Later, amending bills were also proposed,because of this 
disease. 
Modern observers have pointed out that whereas the other great 
pestilences of the era - bubonic plague, typhoid, typhus, cholera and 
yellow fever - have all diminished with improvements to sanitation and 
2 
hygiene, these advances have not affected the prevalence of smallpox. 
This particular was overlooked entirely by the people living through 
the period. As the nineteenth century progressed, the arrival of any 
infected vessel stirred up strident cries for immediate sanitary 
improvem.ents from the public, the press, and the central health 
authorities. These outbursts were important in keeping the need for 
cleanliness and for better drainage and sewage disposal before the 
central and local government bodies, but the story of smallpox in 
Queensland has much more significance than a mere demand for better 
sanitation. It is quite clearly recognised today, that the only 
effective means of preventing smallpox is by vaccination. As early as 
1860, all of the Australian colonies, except New South IVales and 
Queensland, had accepted this method as a useful preventive measure, 
and had enacted legislation for compulsory vaccination. The attituc 
and tactics of the Queensland government in flirting with the idea of 
1. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 595. 
2. Dr. A.H. Humphry, in The Health of Man in Australian Society, 
Vol.1, p.64. 
3. Professor E. Ford, "Australia and the Great Plagues", address to 
the Sydney University Engineering Club, 20 Oct 1953. 
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vaccination, to the extent of appointing public vaccinators without 
ever giving way to medical pressure for compulsory vaccination, form 
an important part of the smallpox story. 
Of equal significance, was Queensland's acceptance of the efficacy 
of quarantine in keeping the disease outside her borders. In fact, 
quarantine was to prove very effective, in spite of the many 
inefficiencies which attended it. 'iVhen the system broke down, it was 
not so much through a failure to screen overseas immigrants properly, 
as through the difficulties experienced on an interstate basis. Fears 
of an invasion of smallpox from the south were to engender unprecedented 
anger and bitterness between the two Australian states which had not 
only neglected to protect their citizens compulsorily by the accepted 
scientific means, but which had failed to carry out adequate interstate 
quarantine arrangements as well. 
One of the earliest ships to bring smallpox victims to Queensland, 
and to be quarantined as a result, was the Hannah More which arrived 
4 
in Brisbane on 11 March 1865. The press of the capital showed little 
interest in the event. Obviously they were well satisfied that the 
existing quarantine arrangements would protect Queensland's shores. It 
was equally plain that their main concern was with Brisbane's unpaved 
streets, which were either choking with dust or obstructed by mire, 
with backyards reeking with filth and stench, with inadequate water 
supplies, and almost total lack of drainage. 
Queensland's first Central Board of Health, which was appointed on 
8 April of that same year, did not depart from this already well-worn 
theme. The board's first report to parliament contained no mention at all 
•y 
7 
of smallpox, and neither the health bill prepared b the board, nor the 
parliamentary debate on it, referred to the disease 
By 1871, when the immigrant ship the Shakespeare arrived in 
4. Minutes of Executive Council, 29 Mar 1865, Q.S.A. EXE/E 11, 65/16. 
5. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Apr 1865. See also comment in The North 
Australian, 12 Jan 1865; editorial. 
6. "Board of Health Report", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1865), 1313-20. 
7. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, (1865), 378-81, and 649. 
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Q 
Queensland with six cases of smallpox on board, the population of the 
colony had become much more alive to the problem. The British 
government, through its Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, had 
circularized all colonies, warning of the dangers of a possible smallpox 
9 
invasion. The Brisbane Courier took up the matter at once, expanding 
on the circular and explaining the virtues of vaccination. Even if 
people were unfortunate enough to contract the disease after vaccination, 
lack of scarring and lesser virulence of the disease would be the 
rewards of the preventive treatment. 
All of the Courier's readers were not convinced of the unalloyed 
benefits of vaccination. One correspondent "P", brought up the question 
which was to exercise the minds of medical men to a considerable extent 
in the future. "P" wrote 
I don't much believe in Vaccination, that is I think there are 
great evils arising from the use of impure lymph. I want to know 
what guarantee I have if I get my child vaccinated by the 
Government Officer that it may not have introduced with the 
vaccine other diseases, the result of which it is painful to 
contemplate. I think a little more information would be 
beneficial. 11 
Medical opinion then being expressed did little to calm such lay fears, 
as prominent doctors adhered to traditional sanitary methods for the 
prevention of all diseases, and rarely discussed the vaccination question 
publicly. For instance. Dr. K. Cannan, the first president of the newly 
formed Queensland Medical Society, in deliberating on the possible arrival 
of smallpox and other exotic diseases on-the Queensland coast, seemed 
content enough with "our quarantine laws /which/ protect us from the 
lY ~ introduction of pestilence from abroad". His main concern was that 
any diseases which might slip through the cordon of quarantine should 
not be "encouraged" and "perpetuated" by "the accumulation of faecal 
matter in cesspools which exist in the premises of every habitation in 
13 this city". 
Dr. O'Doherty, in attempting to persuade the Queensland parliament 
14 
to legislate for public health in 1872, used the approach of smallpox, 
8. Cumpston, History of Smallpox, p.85. 
9. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Mar 1871. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., 14 Jul 1871; letter to editor from P. 
12. Ibid., 8 May 1871; Inaugural address to Queensland Medical 
Society by Dr. K. Cannan. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 596. 
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that "most threatening" and "most contagious" of diseases, as a very 
effective weapon against the attacks of his parliamentary opponents, 
who had overridden his even more comprehensive measure of the previous 
year. O'Doherty's hand was greatly strengthened by the discovery of 
two distinct cases of smallpox which broke out in Sydney, immediately 
1 ft 
before the introduction of the health bill, and the Act received 
17 
assent on 12 August 1872. Even so, O'Doherty was very far from seeking 
provisions to deal with smallpox through the universal vaccination of 
Queenslanders. His Act was much more general. He wished to see the 
appointment of a sanitary board to act as advisers to the government, 
with power to compel the cleansing of houses, lodging houses, backyards 
and streets. 
IVith the Act passed, and the Sydney problem dealt with through 
19 
successfully carried out emergency quarantine measures, Queensland 
fears over smallpox were quelled for some considerable time. Only the 
Central Board of Health appointed under the 1872 Act remained concerned 
about the possibility of a smallpox outbreak. They included a clause 
stressing the "absolute necessity" for vaccination in their proposed 
health act amendment bill of 1874, pointing out that there were officers 
appointed by the government to perform vaccinations, and that although 
the operation was free, very few people availed themselves of the service. 
21 This amendment bill was doomed to failure, even though a large majority 
of members agreed on the necessity for strengthening central board powers 
to remove "plague spots". Most Queensland parliamentarians found the 
seventh clause which dealt with vaccination objectionable, many fearing 
that the board "proposed to make vaccination compulsory". The principles 
of laissez-faire were still firmly entrenched in the colony, and members 
22 
certainly objected to any hint of coercion. 
15. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 597. 
16. Ibid., p.560. O'Doherty introduced the bill the next day. See 
also Executive Council Minutes,11 Jul 1872, Q.S.A. EXE/E 38, p.252 
regarding the submission of the health bill to Council and the 
immediate implementation of the 1863 Quarantine Act. 
17. Queensland Government Gazette, XIII (1872), 1263. 
18. Ibid., pp.1264-65. 
19. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 560, and f.n.16 
above. The quarantine restrictions were to extend to all 
Queensland ports. 
20. Ibid., XVII (1874), 936. 
21. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1874), 381. 
22. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVII (1874), 937-38. 
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The government and people of Queensland were jolted from their 
complacency when, early in 1877, no less than three ships carrying 
23 
smallpox-stricken passengers reached the coast. Then it became 
a matter of public notoriety that the colony was threatened with 
smallpox; the greatest anxiety prevailed, not only here but in 
the neighbouring colonies; and the government were bound to take 
the strongest possible steps to prevent the outbreak of that 
disease, and to allay public anxiety. 24 
R.M. Stewart, who held the post of Colonial Secretary briefly in the 
Thorn and Douglas ministries, anxiously called the Central Board of 
Health together to discuss the smallpox problem, as evil reports of the 
Queensland mail steamer Brisbane reached the capital. Although it had 
25 
already proved inadequate, the 1872 Health Act was put to immediate 
use, each of the northern ports being proclaimed, and local health 
boards being organised to deal with expected difficulties, under the 
direction of the Central Board of Health. Official sanction for 
vaccination was also forthcoming. A competent medical officer was 
0 ft 
authorized to act as public vaccinator in every town proclaimed, 
while the Central Board of Health had "no hesitation in advising parents 
and guardians to have all the young people provided with the indelible 
27 brand of the vaccine mark". 
Because of this sudden official interest in the virtues of 
vaccination, one very serious problem attended this particular emergency. 
The government which had refrained from insisting on inoculation, had 
naturally enough, neglected to build up any large reserves of vaccine 
lymph. An immediate intercolonial search for reliable vaccine was 
undertaken, and abundant supplies of "excellent" lymph were obtained 
from Melbourne, to be distributed where needed throughout the colony. 
Vaccination, the Central Board of Health, was happy to report, was "being 
28 
very widely carried out /noj cases being attended with a bad result". 
23. They were the Brisbane, which reached Keppel Bay in March, the 
Thales, which was near Cooktown in March, and the Kate, which 
reached Brisbane in April. Colonial Secretary to Health Office 
Brisbane, 7 Apr 1877, Q.S.A. COL/ 440, out-letter no.794 of 1877, 
and attached unnumbered copies. 
24. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXIII (1877), 73. 
25. Another health act amendment bill was brought forward in 1877, 
but was discharged before the second reading. 
26. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jan 1877; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
3 Jan 1877. 
27. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1145. 
28. Ibid. 
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The central board dealt with another important aspect of smallpox 
control in their progress report to parliament in 1877. New arrivals 
from China, who had already attracted the odium of being carriers of 
29 leprosy, also posed peculiar problems with regard to smallpox. 
Consequently the board offered special advice which contained a nice 
mixture of science and hard common sense. 
We consider the Government would be justified in requiring every 
Chinese immigrant to be vaccinated whilst undergoing their sixteen 
days' detention; and we venture to suggest it with the purpose of 
being an additional protection to the health of the colony. A 
small fee might be charged in each case. 30 
The government was not over-anxious to encourage the Central Board of 
Health's encroachment into any area of quarantine control, except in an 
advisory capacity, at that particular time. Certain colonial secretaries 
had been put to some inconvenience through the central board's interference 
31 in these affairs, and in 1874, the government had actually rejected the 
board's contention that it should have the powers of a board of 
32 quarantine, acting directly under the minister. 
At the same time, the government fully accepted the absolute 
necessity for strengthening quarantine procedures in the light of the 
33 1877 emergency. The burst of interest in the preventive value of 
vaccination had certainly not blinded the Colonial Secretary to the 
virtues of the older stand-by. One of the most important results of the 
1877 incidents, which were complicated when the Thales was disabled off 
29. Especially in the colony of Victoria. See Within, p.186. 
30. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1877), 1145. 
31. See Within, pp.97-98. After the public revelation of the incident 
recorded there, the house was divided as to whether Dr. Challinor 
or the central board were correct in their judgement. The Colonial 
Secretary, William Miles, thought Challinor "had a peculiar temper", 
"was as stubborn as a mule", and that his obstinacy should not be 
tolerated any longer. But the majority of members felt that 
Challinor was justified in his action, that the central board 
should not have interfered, and that any minister who_"submitted 
to the castigations of this troublesome subordinate /was_/. . . 
unworthy of his position". Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
XXIV (1877), 1352. 
32. See Ibid., p.1146, and Ibid., XVII (1874), 937. 
33. Dr. Cumpston, in his official history of smallpox in Australia, 
does not even mention the problems of 1877. Apparently relying 
on the Australian Medical Journal for his information, he skips 
from 1871 to 1879 in detailing smallpox scares in Queensland. 
Cumpston, History of Smallpox, p.85. 
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the north Queensland coast, involved an order in council amending and 
consolidating the existing quarantine regulations, to enable the 
35 government to deal promptly with any smallpox emergency. 
The two important questions of quarantine and vaccination were 
kept before the public of Queensland during 1878, by parliamentary 
debate on yet another health act amendment bill. Under this, the 
government intended to give the Central Board of Health increased 
powers over vaccination, in order to provide for the more efficient 
management of the procedure. But once again the board's proposal 
to render vaccination compulsory was rejected. The Premier, John 
Douglas, did not think "that public sentiment would justify us in 
•Zf. 
coming to such a conclusion". 
The government also proposed to give the central board increased 
powers over the actual organisation of quarantine under the amendment 
37 bill. This temporary departure from the 1874 position was not 
appreciated by Brisbane's health officer. Dr. Challinor, who had 
already maintained a collision course with the Central Board of 
38 Health. Challinor protested against the bestowal of any new, 
extensive powers on an irresponsible board, which was "not legally 
39 liable for the maladministration of its functions". Challinor also 
commented on another matter connected with quarantine, which had arisen 
after the arrival of a minute from Dr. Seaton, the chief medical officer 
34. The Thales, from Hong Kong, was disabled near the Endeavour River 
with smallpox on board. A special area of land with beaches 
stretching seven miles between the salt swamp and the mountains 
was proclaimed a lazaret on 30 March 1877. See unnumbered 
attachments to Colonial Secretary to Health Officer, Brisbane, 
7 Apr 1877, Q.S.A. COL/ 440, out-letter no.794 of 1877. 
35. Queensland Government Gazette, XX (1877), 1033. 
36. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 66-67. For a press 
comment see The Brisbane Courier, 10 May 1878; main editorial. 
57. The government soon returned to its former position with regard to 
the central board and quarantine services. See for example. 
Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 20 Aug 1881, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 319, in-letter no.3671 of 1881, in which the central 
board made adverse comments on the health officer's routine in 
examining ships. The Colonial Secretary, A.H. Palmer, commented 
in the margin: "I cannot see what the Central Board of Health have 
to do with this matter". 
38. Within, p.224, f.n.31. 
39. Challinor to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1878, Q.S.A. COL/A 257, 
in-letter no.1766 of 1878. 
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40 
of the Imperial Local Government Board. Seaton's minute advocated the 
British system of medical inspection to replace the time-consuming and 
expensive process of quarantine. Challinor pointed out the utmost 
foolhardiness of Queensland's relying on such a scheme, in the absense 
of the highly organised sanitary authorities which obtained in Great 
Britain. The situation was made infinitely more dangerous by the colony's 
very close proximity to the Asian ports, which harboured exotic diseases 
of all kinds, and by the short travelling time between Asia and the 
north Queensland coast. Indicating that current medical opinion estimated 
the latent period for smallpox to be sixteen days, Challinor reminded 
the Colonial Secretary that the voyage from Singapore to Thursday 
Island took only twelve days, to Cooktown fourteen, Townsville sixteen, 
Bowen seventeen days, Keppel Bay eighteen, and Moreton Bay twenty-one 
days. Under these circumstances, it was quite possible for the disease 
to enter the colony, undetected by any health officer or ship's surgeon. 
The central board, which had appointed a special sub-committee to 
examine Dr. Seaton's report, did not quarrel with Challinor on the score 
of the perils imposed on the colony through the conquering of the 
"tyranny of distance". The board was not unsympathetic to British aims, 
but warned the Colonial Secretary that 
whilst... your Committee urge that the quarantine law of this 
country may be very safely and judiciously modified in the 
direction of this medical inspection,... they are not prepared to 
advocate so sweeping a change.... It must be borne in mind that, 
as yet, we have happily succeeded in preventing some of the 
most formidable of these contagious and infectious diseases 
from finding a footing on this continent: cholera, smallpox 
and typhus fever have appeared more than once at our doors, but 
by the aid of our stringent quarantine laws we have succeeded in 
driving them off. In reference to these diseases, we consider it 
would be desirable to adhere to the strict letter of our 
quarantine laws. 42 
The Douglas government favoured an "approach more nearly to that 
/_system/ in the mother country" - always allowing for exceptions to be 
made should smallpox-ridden ships approach the coast - because this would 
40. "Minute of Dr. Seaton", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, I (1878)^457. See also Within, pp.162-65, for The Brisbane 
Courier's 1883 comment on the British medical inspection system. 
41. "Re Dr. Seaton's Report and action taken thereon by the Central 
Board of Health", Dr. Challinor to Colonial Secretary, 11 May 1878, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 257, in-letter no.1766 of 1878. 
42. "Report of Board on Dr. Seaton's Minute, r£ Quarantine and Medical 
Inspection", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1878), 
455. 
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reduce the interruptions to trade and consequent loss of income which 
quarantine occasioned. But in the end, the 1878 health bill failed 
to pass into law, and proposals regarding quarantine and vaccination 
45 lapsed with it. 
In 1881, after a short lull when general sanitary matters consumed 
whatever attention was paid to the question of public health, and smallpox 
raised no interest either publicly or among the members of the Central 
46 
Board of Health, another outbreak of the disease in Sydney 
had an awakening effect on the guardians of the public health, 
indeed upon the population generally in Queensland.... Fear is 
a wholesome principle and like other national instincts is 
designed to play a part in protecting the welfare of individuals 
and society. The "scare" at present occasioned by the appearance 
of a dreadful disease... will not be without its beneficial 
results if it lead to a thorough purgation of unclean places in 
cities and towns, and if the recognised amelioration, if not 
prevention, by vaccination be generally adopted. 47 
The Central Board of Health was galvanised into action. A room was 
immediately placed at the disposal of the government medical officer as 
48 
a dispensary for public vaccination, and board members also persuaded 
the Brisbane Local Board of Health to provide a special isolation ward in 
49 
Victoria Park, for the accommodation of any possible smallpox patients. 
43. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 66-67. 
44. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1878), 18. 
45. There was another attempt to amend the 1872 Health Act in 1879. 
Only very brief reference was made to Central Board of Health 
action to prevent the Chinese bringing in smallpox during the 
parliamentary debate. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXVIII 
(1879), 409. 
46. See for example, "Central Board of Health, 1879 Progress Report", 
in Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1880), 
1503-4, which contains no mention of smallpox. See also a short 
article in The Lancet of January 1880, which comments on a piece 
published in The Queenslander by "An Old Practitioner". "An Old 
Practitioner" asserted that the practice of vaccination in 
Queensland had fallen into disuse, and that "quarantine 
arrangements may be relied upon to keep smallpox out, if their 
strictness is not meddled with". The Lancet was astonished 
at this attitude, suggesting that an unvaccinated population 
would be decimated should smallpox gain a hold. "Queensland would 
do well to place her public vaccination arrangements upon a sound 
basis, and endeavour to carry out systematically and continuously 
the vaccination of her people". The Lancet, 31 Jan 1880, p.180. 
47. The Queensland Times, 14 Jul 1881; sub editorial. 
48. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 9 Jul 1881, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 317, in-letter no.3002 of 1881. 
49. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Jul 1881. 
228. 
The usual calls for 
our civic authorities... to take at least a few ordinary 
precautionary steps... to remove the most disgusting nuisances,... 
the vile effluvia and... the putrid bodies of animals... in the 
face of the smallpox scare 50 
were made by both the colony's newspapers and their readers. Under the 
pressure of the smallpox emergency, one ingenious Queenslander, Frederick 
Scott, turned his hand to inventing a "portable smallpox hospital" for the 
use of one or more patients. 
These will make it possible to cause all nature's ejectments 
and the air that passes through the room to go through fire 
before they reach the outside air. An ambulance could 
easily be constructed on the same principle. 51 
But during 1881, by far the greatest interest was concentrated on 
the benefits of vaccination. Prejudices against injection had persisted, 
in spite of increasing official support, because of the possibility of 
52 
noxious contagion from lymph obtained through the human subject. 
Successful experiments carried out with calf lymph in Europe, led to 
the use of the new vaccine in England for the first time at St. Mary 
53 Abbots, Kensington, the lymph being obtained from Holland. Members 
of the medical profession in the southern colonies in Australia soon 
turned their attention, with considerable success, to that source of 
lymph, and Queensland medical men were urged by The Queensland Times 
both to investigate the new vaccine and to encourage widespread 
vaccination. Campaigns to create an educated public opinion with 
50. See for example. The Queensland Times, 14 Jul 1881, 23 Jul 1881, and 
8 Sep 1881; main editorial, and The Brisbane Courier, 21 Jul 1881. 
The quotation is taken from The Queensland Times, 9 Jul 1881; letter 
to editor from Sanitas. 
51. Ibid., 23 Jun 1881; letter to editor from Frederick Scott. Scott 
had also invented a patent air closet which was on sale in 
Queensland. See Within, pp. 118-19. 
52. "Arm to arm" vaccination was practised at first. The method was 
introduced to Britain from Turkey in 1721. Many deaths resulted 
from this method, and there was also the risk that syphilis and 
other diseases might be transferred from one person to another. 
"Arm to arm"vaccination was forbidden by law in England in 1840. 
Until experiments took place on the continent with the much 
safer calf lymph, material for injection was usually obtained 
from vesicles of persons recently vaccinated, and to a small 
extent from cows suffering from cowpox. 
53. Frazer, p.172. The government calf lymph establishment was set 
up in London in 1880, but did not issue lymph officially until 
1881. 
54. The Queensland Times, 8 Sep 1881; main editorial. 
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regard to sanitary matters, and to popularize vaccination, were also 
undertaken by various New South Wales and Victorian Health Societies, 
one of the most prominent being the Australian Health Society. Based 
in Melbourne, but as its name imported, being a nation-wide organisation 
with branch societies in the various colonies, the Australian Health 
Society published a number of useful and eye-catching health tracts, 
some of which were used effectively in Queensland. 
Local boards of health in cities and towns proclaimed in 
Queensland, because of the possibility of a smallpox invasion, began to 
petition the central government as never before for new fever hospital 
accommodation, suitable vehicles for the conveyance of patients to 
hospital, the proper and thorough inspection of vessels in port, and 
above all, for the government to take steps to ensure that lymph was 
available for vaccination. The government itself decided on the 
appointment of medical officers in various far-flung parts of 
Queensland, because 
it was felt that in consequence of the present outbreak of 
Smallpox in the Colonies it is very desirable that every 
district should have a recognised Public Vaccinator, and as 
it is impossible to tell how soon Queensland may be visited 
with this loathsome disease, that all precautionary measures 
should at once be taken. 57 
Unfortunately for some local health boards, their own appointment 
under the 1872 Health Act, and the provision of health officers as 
government vaccinators, did not automatically mean the smooth conduct 
of the work. The Cooktown Local Board of Health, for example, contacted 
the Colonial Secretary's office in some distress, drawing attention to 
the particular need for vaccination in their very vulnerable area, and 
the desirability of providing the officer concerned. Dr. Mohs, with all 
58 facilities. Mohs was disinclined to accept orders or advice from the 
55. The Australian Health Society had a large number of tracts 
printed. Some of the more effective were on the evils of bad 
smells, the Sanitary Alphabet, and one on smallpox and 
vaccination, copies of which are apparently no longer available. 
The Queensland Times records that four thousand of the smallpox 
pamphlets were distributed throughout Australia by the Melbourne 
Central Board of Health. Ibid., 20 Oct 1881; main editorial. 
56. Secretary, Local Board of Health, Rockhampton to Colonial Secretary, 
18 Jun 1881, Q.S.A. COL/A 315, in-letter no.2645 of 1881. 
57. This particular record concerns the appointment of Dr. Swayne at 
Springsure. Colonial Secretary to Dr. Swayne, 31 Jul 1881, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 319, filed under in-letter no.3511 of 1881. 
58. Local Board of Health, Cooktown to Colonial Secretary, 6 Sep 1881, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 324, filed with in-letter no.4690 of 1881. 
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Cooktown board, rejecting "any interference in /hisj private practice 
— — 59 
and in /his/ duty as Health Officer". The government supported the 
Cooktown Local Board of Health, after it had warned that Mohs was 
neglecting vaccinations. But if the doctor is to be believed, the 
department itself was also at fault. The lymph did not arrive in 
Cooktown until 7 October 1881, after Mohs had put in several applications 
for the stuff, having previously obtained his lymph privately from 
Sydney. 
Public interest in smallpox, in vaccination, and in quarantine 
continued throughout the eighties in Queensland, particularly when 
infected vessels, or outbreaks of the disease in the south, threatened 
the health of the colony. The arrival in Sydney of a smallpox-ship from 
f\'? 
Fiji caused a considerable scare in Brisbane; but when the mail 
steamer, the Duke of Westminster, put into Moreton Bay with some 
passengers and the ship's surgeon infected with the disease, there was 
great alarm. Pausing only to attack the health officer at Keppel Bay -
wrongly as it turned out - for not boarding the Duke of Westminster and 
consequently for failing to detect the disease in Dr. Woodward, The 
Brisbane Courier went on to emphasize the weaknesses of the Queensland 
quarantine system, and the value of vaccination in the face of such 
inadequacies. A very indignant Courier editor declared that 
if the colony had escaped infection, it was by a sheer stroke 
of good luck. The fault which originally exposed us to the 
danger lay not as we supposed, with the Health Officer at 
Rockhampton, but with the Department.64 The rule we find is 
that a steamer arriving at the Northern port is there inspected 
and then passes down as a coasting steamer with no further 
visits from Health Officers. This provision is manifestly 
inadequate.... Now we repeat, the colony owes to sheer 
accident its escape from a serious and widespread outbreak 
of smallpox. There is good reason to complain of the manner 
in which the authorities charged with the preservation of the 
public health perform their duties. When a "scare" sets in, 
they display prodigious energy, but when it abates, they seem 
59. Health Officer, Cooktown to Colonial Secretary, 26 Sep 1881, 
filed under Ibid. 
60. A marginal comment on the above letter states that "Mohs must 
work with the Board." 
61. Dr. Mohs to Under Colonial Secretary, 21 Oct 1881, Q.S.A. COL/A 
324, in-letter no.4690 of 1881. Mohs was still declining to 
take orders from the local board of health at this time. 
62. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jul 1883, and 1 Aug 1883; main editorial. 
63. Ibid., 29 Aug 1883. 
64. The department of the Colonial Secretary controlled quarantine 
arrangements. 
231, 
to go comfortably to sleep. This colony is peculiarly 
liable to infection. Steamers constantly touch here which have 
been in Asia or the Indian archipelago, where virulent smallpox 
is... rife. And yet we have good reason to fear that the health 
inspection, in most, if not all cases, is performed in a very 
careless and perfunctory manner. It could hardly be otherwise. 
There is a constant and not unnatural resistance by shipowners 
and agents to inspection which might entail on them the costly 
delay of quarantine.... It is not merely in the precautions 
to keep out the disease that the authorities are chargeable 
with carelessness, but also in the equally important precautions 
to minimize its effects should it unfortunately break out. The 
value of vaccination is universally admitted by intelligent men. 
If ever any scientific fact was established by an overwhelming 
body of testimony, it is the efficacy of vaccination as a 
safeguard against smallpox.... If vaccination were universal 
in this community, the outbreak of smallpox here would be a 
no more serious affair than a common epidemic of measles. 65 
The Courier's anxious reminder that quarantine was an insufficient 
barrier against smallpox, was reinforced by a long letter to the editor 
on the Duke of Westminster incident from Dr. J. Ashburton Thompson, a 
medical man then employed in the Queensland government service, who was 
destined to become chief medical adviser to the government of New South 
Wales. Ashburton Thompson wrote that since smallpox in its early stages 
would escape the notice of even a shrewd observer, the limitations of 
the powers and the true scope of quarantine, had to be grasped by both 
the government and the people of Queensland. Ashburton Thompson 
asserted that 
quarantine cannot prevent the importation of disease. It can 
only limit the number of infected centres.... It is... clear 
that quarantine can only be a part, and a part of inferior 
value, in a general scheme of preventive medicine.... In 
short, there is no... royal road to public health.... and a 
country in which there is no compulsory vaccination may well 
dread the importation of smallpox. 66 
One very important exponent of vaccination, who had already borne 
all of these matters in mind, was Dr. Hugh Bell of the Central Board of 
65. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Aug 1883; main editorial. In fact the 
government announced an extraordinary proclamation of the Duke 
of Westminster on 29 Aug 1883. Queensland Government Gazette, 
XXXIII (1883), 617. 
66. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Sep 1883; letter to editor from J. 
Ashburton Thompson, M.D. (Brux), San. Sci. Cert. (Cambridge). 
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Health. Early in 1883, before the Duke of Westminster scare had 
arisen. Bell urged the central board to bring in the 
universal adoption /of vaccination/ to prevent as far 
as possible the spread of smallpox, should we be so 
unfortunate as to have it introduced amongst us, 
our line of coast and trade rendering us peculiarly 
liable to this. 68 
The Central Board of Health discussed this motion briefly at their 
March meeting, but spent far more time considering Bell's other 
suggestion, that all coloured races should be compulsorily vaccinated. 
But although this idea was fully supported by Colonial Secretary 
69 Mcllwraith, no definite decision was made. 
Bell persisted with his motion at the April meeting of the Central 
Board of Health. His chances of success were slim. He had failed to 
draw up any comprehensive statement in connection with his suggestions 
70 
on vaccination, as he had been asked to do. Even more importantly, 
the Queensland-wide scheme envisaged by him had, as its most 
conspicuous feature, the use of unqualified persons as vaccinators. 
67. Dr. Hugh Bell is an important figure in the history of Queensland's 
public health movement. He was a convinced sanitarian, having 
produced a model dry earth closet. But Bell was by no means a 
traditionalist. He illustrates the struggle between opposites, 
"the miasmatic theory" and the theory of contagium animatum -
"that increasingly important element in late nineteenth century 
public health, the co-existence of energetic sanitarianism with 
the emergence of the germ theory". A discussion on this conflict 
within the medical profession itself appears in Margaret Polling, 
"The Reality of Anticontagionism - Theories of Epidemic Disease 
in the Early Nineteenth Century", in The Society for the Social 
History of Medicine, Bulletin No.17, 1976, p.5. 
68. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Feb 1883; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 8 Feb 1883. 
69. Mcllwraith chaired this central board meeting. He took 
particular care to assure the board that his championship of the 
idea of vaccination of coolies and Kanakas was not motivated 
by racial prejudice. He stressed that British immigrants, for 
the most part, were covered by the British Vaccination Acts of 
1853, 1867 and 1871, and therefore presented no danger to 
Queensland. In taking this position, he overlooked the fact 
that vaccination did not give permanent immunity, unless followed 
by booster injections. Large numbers of English families 
neglected this precaution. On the other hand, Mcllwraith 
correctly pointed out that Asians had no vaccination protection 
in their own countries, where smallpox was very prevalent. Ibid., 
10 Mar 1883; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 9 Mar 1883. 
70. Ibid., 14 Apr 1883; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 13 Apr 1883, 
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Without this provision, complete vaccination throughout the immense 
area of the colony could not be effected; but the other medical men 
on the board were decidedly against any such scheme, except in a grave 
71 
emergency. 
Another stumbling-block to the proper protection of Brisbane 
residents through vaccination in the 1883 emergency, was the failure to 
advertise the name and whereabouts of the public vaccinator for the 
capital. Once again it was newspaper agitation which revealed this 
government negligence. On 29 August 1883, Charles Birkbeck, signing 
himself "An Anxious Enquirer", forwarded a letter to The Brisbane Courier 
requesting information about vaccination arrangements. The Brisbane 
Courier did not publish the letter, but did begin investigations. Two 
days later it announced that it had tracked down the medical man, but 
questioned how many colonists knew who he was, or where he was to be 
72 
found. Birkbeck, apparently somewhat put out that The Courier had not 
only failed to publish his correspondence, but had also neglected to 
name the doctor and his location, again addressed himself to the 
editor on 8 September 1883. Whereupon The Courier published his second 
letter, praised his initiative, and revealed Dr. Marks as the public 
vaccinator, a fact which was "apparently a state secret, only to be 
73 discovered by assiduous search". 
The arrangements for vaccination themselves were also cumbrous 
and off-putting to say the least. Vaccinations were carried out 
"whenever necessary" at the police court. Any person desirous of 
having the operation performed had to notify the police. The fee 
charged was 2/6d., but this was returned to patients on their visiting 
the public vaccinator for re-examination. Dr. Marks, who retailed this 
information to The Brisbane Courier, seemed surprised that "for some 
— — 74 
time past there /had^ / been no applicants". 
71. The Telegraph, 20 Oct 1883. Tliis article is an exact copy of a 
paper read by Dr. Bell at the Central Board of Health meeting held 
on 12 October 1883. Besides setting out his plan for vaccination, 
and the board's antagonism towards it. Bell attacked the central 
board for its poor showing during the Duke of Westminster 
emergency. It "seems to have been met in a practical and efficient 
manner creditable to all parties concerned and thoroughly 
successful, but without the aid of the Queensland Central Board 
of Health". 
72. The Brisbane Courier took up the question on 29 August 1883, and 
again on 31 Aug 1883; main editorial. 
73. Ibid., 8 Sep 1883; letter to editor from Charles E. Birkbeck 
and Note from the Editor following. 
74. Ibid., 10 Sep 1883. 
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A far larger and long-continuing problem concerned the supply of 
proper and effective lymph. For a number of years, the Central Board 
of Health had experienced difficulties with lymph mixed with blood, and 
with lymph which looked perfect, but which was quite ineffectual when 
75 injected. The board refused to pay for this material, further 
1 f\ 
reducing lymph supplies from one particular large producer. When 
Dr. Hugh Bell, public vaccinator for the whole of Queensland during the 
77 1883 emergency, was on his northern and western tour of the colony, 
he met with similar difficulties. Of one thousand tubes of vaccine 
lymph supplied in Townsville, "much had to be destroyed... as unfit to 
use", though an excellent start had been made on the vaccination 
78 programme. Bell's answer to the lymph problem was the "setting up of 
a Central Vaccination and Lymph Establishment", a project in whose 
79 formation Bell expressed himself "happy to assist". 
The government did nothing in this matter immediately, and the 
problems associated with obtaining a pure lymph supply inhibited 
vaccination programmes for many years. Doctors in various parts of 
Queensland found it utterly impossible to get supplies of fresh lymph, 
as outbreaks of the disease in the southern colonies in succeeding 
years resulted in corresponding alarm and desire for preventive measures 
throughout Queensland. Brisbane parents, who were anxious to have 
their children vaccinated, searched in vain for doctors properly 
75. Dr. Benjafield to Colonial Secretary, 8 Apr 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 
358, in-letter no.1841 of 1883, and copies of letters for 1881 and 
1882 attached. 
76. See marginal comment on in-letter no.4211 of 1881 and no.1841 of 
1883. Benjafield contended that his lymph was good, and that the 
central board should pay as Victoria, South Australia, and New 
Zealand had continued to order and to pay for large quantities 
of his lymph. 
77. Dr. Hugh Bell, Public Vaccinator for Queensland, to Colonial 
Secretary, 3 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 367, in-letter no.4455 of 1883. 
78. Dr. H. Bell to Colonial Secretary, 27 Apr 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 359, 
in-letter no.2114 of 1883. Bell was in Townsville for seven 
weeks and vaccinated 150 children. He also began to request 
payment for the operation from the government at the rate of 
2/6d.per head. 
79. Dr. H. Bell to Colonial Secretary, 3 Sep 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 367, 
in-letter no.4455 of 1883, Bell's italics. Bell also printed a 
pamphlet Suggestions in Vaccinations. Apparently this was done 
at his own expense. There was no request for remuneration, and 
the pamphlet is marked "With Dr. Hugh Bell's compliments". The 
tract gives clear instructions for vaccinators, with small 
illustrations of the way scratches were to be made, as well as 
information about taking and storing the lymph. Enclosure in 
in-letter no.4455 of 1883, as above. 
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equipped to undertake the operation. Even in very sensitive areas 
along the north Queensland coast, which were proclaimed from time to 
81 
time under the Health Act because of smallpox in the south, government 
medical officers petitioned without success for fresh, pure lymph 
82 
supplies. Doctors in equally vulnerable railway towns on the New 
South Wales-Queensland border experienced similar frustrations, as 
83 frightened residents eagerly sought vaccination. Brisbane had no 
pure lymph supplies to send, and apparently made no attempts to procure 
84 
any. This government apathy was the more regrettable in view of 
earlier pronouncements of prominent medical practitioners made at the 
Australian Sanitary Conference held in Sydney in 1884. The colonial 
delegates to that conference unanimously accepted the efficacy of 
85 properly carried out vaccination to contain smallpox. 
As late as February 1888, the difficulty faced by Queensland 
medical practitioners in keeping up a supply of reliable lymph was 
labelled by Dr. W.F. Taylor as the "greatest, if not the only drawback 
Ptft 
to vaccination being freely resorted to". Harking back to Dr. Hugh 
Bell's 1883 suggestion that a Queensland lymph institute be established 
to provide pure material, and to make the area independent of southern 
80. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Aug 1884; letter to editor from An 
Anxious Father, and news items in Ibid., 28 Aug 1884, 8 Sep 1884, 
and 9 Sep 1884. 
81. Medical Officer, Rockhampton to Colonial Secretary, 5 Nov 1884, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 408, in-letter no.7852 of 1884. 
82. See for example. Dr. Thurston, Rockhampton to Colonial Secretary, 
6 Jun 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 392, in-telegram no.4043 of 1884, and 
the same, 12 Jun 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 392, in-telegram no.4202 
of 1884. 
83. Medical Officer, Goondiwindi to Colonial Secretary, 14 Sep 1886, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 482, in-letter no.7252 of 1886. 
84. Dr. Hobbs to Colonial Secretary, 24 Sep 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 482, 
in-letter no.7428 of 1886. "There is no pure lymph in Brisbane, 
that I am aware of". The Colonial Secretary's marginal direction 
was "Inform Goondiwindi accordingly". Border towns also tried to 
get railway carriages fumigated as another method of containing 
smallpox - again without success. See Chairman, Divisional 
Board, Stanthorpe to Colonial Secretary, 2 Dec 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 408, in-letter no.8469 of 1884. 
85. "The Australian Sanitary Conference of Sydney, N.S.W., 1884", 
Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, III (1885), 
490-494. Stress was laid on the necessity for the operation to 
be carried out by qualified medical men, for the lymph to produce 
the proper reaction in the patient, and on the need for re-
vaccination. 
86. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Feb 1888; letter to editor from W.F. 
Taylor. Taylor did not favour a compulsory vaccination system. 
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87 
supplies. Dr. Taylor again urged the government to deal with this 
problem which was rendered urgent by a smallpox crisis in Darwin. The 
Chief Secretary, Samuel Griffith, carelessly allowed the opportunity to 
pass, leaving Queensland ill-prepared for any smallpox emergency, which 
88 
Taylor was now convinced could not be far off. In the following year, 
the Central Board of Health "discovered that they had nothing to do with 
vaccination". From that time on, until a Queensland supply centre was 
set up, all communications offering to supply calf lymph received by 
on 
the central board were to be referred to the Colonial Secretary. 
But by the end of 1889, in view of further alarms and telegrams from 
southern boards of health, the Queensland central board resolved to 
recommend to the Colonial Secretary that a public vaccinator be appointed, 
that he "be paid by fee, and that the public be notified of the time 
90 
and place of such vaccinations". 
During the 1880's the Central Board of Health did manage to take 
one important step, which foreshadowed the later developments which were 
to embrace the schools in a concerted effort to improve the public health 
91 
of Queenslanders. In 1884, on the motion of Dr. John Thomson, the 
board resolved to get in touch with the Secretary for Public Instruction 
with a view to his bringing the necessity for general vaccination 
under the notice of all teachers at our state schools, the 
teachers to point out to all the children under their care, the 
great advantage to be derived from vaccination. It was held that 
in this way children would be prevailed upon to willingly submit 
themselves for vaccination, and that the matter being thus 
prominently brought under the notice of the parents, they would 
not shrink from the duty. 92 
Smallpox scares occupied the health authorities of the various 
colonies from time to time, during the remainder of the century, and 
there was a considerable degree of intercolonial cooperation in the 
87. Within, p.234. 
88. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Feb 1888; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 10 Feb 1888. 
89. Ibid., 10 Mar 1889; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 9 Mar 1889. 
90. Ibid., 30 Nov 1889; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 29 Nov 1889. 
91. The most important development to this end was the setting up of a 
school medical inspection service under Dr. Eleanor Bourne on 
1 January 1911. 
92. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Dec 1884; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 12 Dec 1884. 
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notification of the disease, and in the exchange of knowledge and 
93 
experiences, when outbreaks did occur. As far as Queensland was 
concerned, the arrival, in any part of Australia, of ships carrying 
smallpox continued to present valuable propaganda material for the 
pro-vaccinationists. One grossly overcrowded German migrant ship, 
the Preussen, in which smallpox had spread very rapidly indeed, and 
94 from which the ship's engineer had deserted in Melbourne, brought a 
rash of hostile newspaper comment, as well as admonitions to vaccinate. 
The efficacy of the network of quarantine stations, which had been 
established Australia-wide to protect the whole continent, was brought 
into question because of the Preussen outbreak, as authorities in Albany, 
Western Australia, were accused of not recognising the disease, and of 
95 
allowing it to get out of hand. The Colonist in Maryborough was quick 
to take up the story of "this death ship" which was a special danger to 
Queenslanders, by "reason of climate and positions". Queensland was 
doubly unfortunate, according to The Colonist, in having a government 
which professed 
to legislate for our social needs, but A'hicli/ to their shame,... 
do nothing, and our voluminous code of statute law is still 
minus a Vaccination Act. 96 
The Queensland Figaro, which could always be relied on to attack 
established authority, and to provide comic relief in doing so, also 
joined in the argument over the Preussen, and put a scornful finger on 
the central problem concerning vaccination in Queensland. 
93. The usual procedure was an exchange of telegrams at premier level. 
See for example, James Service, Premier of Victoria to Premier 
of Queensland, 6 Jan 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 411, in-telegram no.105 of 
1885. 
94. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Jan 1887. 
95. Ibid., 7 Jan 1887; sub editorial. See also Premier, New South 
Wales to Premier Queensland, 7 Jan 1887, Q.S.A. COL/A 485, 
in-telegram no.164 of 1887, about the quarantining of the ship 
in Sydney. The passengers were in quarantine in Melbourne. 
96. The Colonist, 15 Jan 1887; main editorial. 
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The plague cloud threat darkens and darkens, it spreads and 
spreads over the horizon. The storm itself hasn't burst yet, 
but things look uncommonly like a blow down.... They've got 
smallpox at Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney. Quarantining is 
keeping the various dangers in check, but what assurance have 
we that they won't dodge in and jump on us. We haven't any 
assurance. Some unforeseen circumstances might disturb 
calculations and start disease and death on a tour through 
our continent.... The apathy of our government in the face 
of this fearful possibility is what appals me.... There is no 
vaccination and very little sanitation. Manure depots poison 
the air, Chinese dens are pest houses ready to hand.... 
Yet there is nothing to mind about smallpox if the government is 
wise.... Health is a mere question of intelligence.... Suppose 
smallpox breaks out in the Valley in the morning. Red Hill in 
the afternoon, and at night at Woolloongabba.... I suppose I 
will trot off with a host of everybodys to the health office. 
What good will it do me? "Vaccinate me please", I will say 
to the fat salaried clerk, or perhaps to the fat salaried 
gentlemen who run things. "Can't, Old Man. No lymph and 
nowhere to get it," I shall be told. What is this but 
criminal neglect, but inviting the wholesale slaughter of those 
who depend on this broken reed government.... The divine 
discovery that knocked the teeth down Mr. Smallpox's throat is 
barred from us by Griffithian neglect. 
Shouldn't we be up and doing? Oughtn't we to sweep out and 
roll our sleeves up while we have time? If smallpox comes it 
will be worthwhile to be in a position to laugh at it. And 
smallpox is coming. Either sooner or later, as communication 
with Europe and America increases, it is bound to come. Let 
us be ready. 97 
Discussion on all aspects of a possible smallpox invasion, 
including vaccination, was widened still further as other newspapers 
took up the question of the Chinese and other coloured races as carriers 
of the disease. Ever since Dr. Hugh Bell and Thomas Mcllwraith had 
revived the question of compulsory vaccination for non-white immigrants 
98 in 1883, the idea had simmered in the minds of Queenslanders. In June 
1886, Dr. Joseph Bancroft expressed a strong opinion in favour of a 
99 
vaccination programme for all coloureds entering Queensland. John 
McMaster emphasised the particular perils posed by the Chinese during 
the debate on the Health Act Amendment Act of 1886. And on 17 
September 1886, after receiving an urgent letter on the recruitment of 
coloured labour for the sugar plantations from areas where smallpox was 
97. The Queensland Figaro, 15 Jan 1887; editorial. 
98. It was first raised in 1877 by the Central Board of Health. 
Within, p.224. 
99. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Jun 1886; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 11 Jun 1886. 
100. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIX (1886), 742. 
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rife, the Central Board of Health notified the government that 
as regards vaccinating all coloured labour before landing in the 
Colony, the Board are unanimous in the opinion that the Government 
should legislate on the subject at an early date, and they would 
most respectfully urge upon you to bring in a short Act to deal 
with the matter. 
It is a well-known fact that smallpox is endemic in Japan, 
China, and the Straits Settlements, and so long as the 
natives of these countries are permitted to land in Queensland 
without any restrictions, the Colony will be in danger of the 
dread disease. 102 
Samuel Walker Griffith, unable to concur with Mcllwraith and the 
Central Board of Health on this and many other issues, was not prepared 
103 to advise his government to take this step, and the flow of 
unvaccinated, and often illegal, immigrants continued unimpeded by any 
official barriers against the smallpox health risk. The problem was 
exacerbated as newspapers became increasingly afraid that "smallpox 
might come stealthily into the colony" across the unwatched Northern 
Territory border, since it had been discovered that the Chinese were using 
this overland route into Queensland to avoid payment of the Queensland 
poll tax. When Darwin was revealed to be "simply a breeding ground for 
all sorts of diseases.... with the infected Chinamen coming from Port 
1 Of, 
Darwin to Queensland", the central board was convinced that the 
government should "take all necessary precautions to prevent it /smallpox/ 
107 ~ "~ 
extending to Queensland". Pressed for further details on a scheme 
101. C.H. Clarkson, Polynesian Hospital Mackay to Central Board of 
Health, 13 May 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 480, unnumbered in-letter of 1886. 
102. Central Board of Health to Chief Secretary, 17 Sep 1886, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 480, in-letter no.7188 of 1886. See also Central Board to 
Chief Secretary, 9 Aug 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A 480, in-letter no.6225 
of 1886. 
103. Under Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health, 16 Aug 1886, 
Q.S.A. COL/G 36, out-letter no.2755 of 1886. The reply to in-
letter no.7188 of 17 September 1886 simply acknowledges its 
receipt. Under Colonial Secretary to Central Board, 22 Sep 1886, 
Q.S.A. COL/G 36, out-letter no.3207 of 1886. 
104. There were other restrictions however. The Pacific Island 
Labourers Act was repealed in 1885, to take effect after 1890, 
though this was reversed in 1892 by an Extension Act. There were 
other evidences of racial feeling for health and other reasons. 
Anti-Chinese riots took place in Charters Towers and Mackay in 
October-November 1886, and there were anti-Chinese demonstrations 
in Brisbane in July 1887. 
105. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Aug 1887; sub editorial. 
106. Ibid., 11 Feb 1888; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 Feb 1888. 
107. Copy of resolution passed by Central Board of Health on 10 February 
1888, attached to Medical Inspector on S.S. Moyune to Colonial 
Secretary, 21 Mar 1888, Q.S.A. COL/A 539, in-telegram no.2509 of 1888, 
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for the protection of the colony, the board could only suggest the 
lea V 
109 
108 
employment of patrols along the border, an id which was merely 
acknowledged by the Colonial Secretary's office. 
If the central board had been unable to persuade the government to 
legislate for compulsory vaccination, or even to establish their own 
lymph supply, it did, in time, manage to start preparations on a place 
to receive possible Queensland smallpox victims. The earliest patients, 
who contracted the disease within Queensland waters, were accommodated 
in special areas on quarantine stations with varying degrees of success. 
For instance, in 1883, when the Duke of Westminster brought its 
complement of victims to Moreton Bay, there was considerable unrest 
amongst the quarantined but unaffected passengers. Bland newspaper 
reports that "every provision has been made for the comfort and safety 
111 
of the quarantined immigrants", were strenuously denied by the 
detainees. "A Peel Island Correspondent" drew a graphic picture of 
l i f e at Peel Island for TheTel^raph readers , and at leas t one of the 
points made in that article - the complaint that the doctor moved 
freely between victims and the well immigrants - was officially confirmed 
112 by the Duke of Westminster's agents. 
The landing place can only be called a jetty by courtesy. 
Single women occupy the first building from the "jetty".... 
Each woman has a sack and a pair of blankets. These are laid 
on the floor and a rough table placed in the centre.... Five 
other similar places containing the married couples... form 
the town of Peel.... On the brow of the hill about two hundred 
yards from the town are seventeen tents (so-called), which 
appear to have been the first efforts of weaving by machinery 
judging by the number of holes in them. 
108. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 20 Mar 1888, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 539, in-letter no.2542 of 1888. 
109. Marginal note on in-letter no.2542 above. 
110. Peel Island was declared a quarantine station for the smallpox 
victims and for all contacts on 29 August 1883. Queensland 
Government Gazette, XXXIII (1883), 618. The victims were actually 
held on tiny, nearby Bird Island. 
111. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Aug 1883. 
112. Agent for Gibbs Bright to Colonial Secretary, 31 Aug 1883, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 367, in-letter no.4433 of 1883. The government seems to 
have been somewhat unsympathetic in other directions. A telegram 
from Dr. Woodward's wife anxiously enquiring as to his condition 
apparently went unanswered. Fanny Woodward to Under Colonial 
Secretary, 31 Aug 1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 367, in-telegram no.4438 of 
1883. Marginal comment is simply AWAY, and there is nothing in 
the out-letter book to indicate that a reply was sent. 
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Food. Could an epicure feel a twinge of discontent at the ample, 
varied menu of last Sunday. I leave your readers to judge. 
Three-quarters of a small pannikin of tea, and a small quantity 
of porridge with a roll and a ship's biscuit.... Midnight, the 
scene changed. Ten hungry men with glistening eyes and in 
silence are devouring small beach oysters.... That reminds me 
that the "experienced" medical officer who has charge here has 
only one suit, and that he visits the smallpox patients without 
an overall, and then goes about among the emigrants of our 
island that is at present without contagion. 113 
The Brisbane Courier, while still reporting that "the passengers 
114 
were comfortably put up and all the immigrants were well and contented", 
was also publishing letters which contradicted its own reports. 
It is creditable as far as the buildings are concerned, but the 
tents are eminently unsuitable... so rotten and holey are they.... 
The immigrants.... are all agreed that they are inadequately fed, 
that to satisfy the cravings of hunger they have eaten snakes, 
that several have been seriously ill from eating poisonous crabs, 
that I have seen strong men at midnight devouring small oysters 
urged by hunger. 115 
If this accommodation was found to be sadly inadequate, at least 
desperation ensured that it was available. Isolation wards within the 
colony for the expected Queensland victims were slower to materialize. 
The scare of 1881 had led to temporary arrangements being made in 
Victoria Park, by an agreement between the Local and Central Boards of 
Health, but in 1885, when "any outbreak or introduction of smallpox 
... was a matter of very great urgency", the central board failed to 
extract a ruling on the possession and use of that cottage, either from 
117 the Park trustees, or from the Colonial Secretary's office. The 
situation was complicated by the passing of the Health Act of 1884, 
118 
which caused the local boards of health to disappear completely. This 
forced the central board to deal with a Brisbane City Council which was 
definitely "against a hospital of that character being allowed in a 
119 public park", and a government which "did not care to undertake the 
113. The Telegraph, 8 Sep 1883. 
114. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Sep 1883. 
115. Ibid., 8 Sep 1883; letter to editor from Semper Idem. 
116. Within, p.227. 
117. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Jan 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 23 Jan 1885. The letters from Hill Wray to the department 
requesting the handing over of the cottage were read at this 
meeting. 
118. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1442. 
119. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Feb 1885; Minutes of Brisbane City 
Council, 24 Feb 1885. 
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120 fitting up of... the proposed cottage". The council suggested that 
a hulk on the river would be a more suitable arrangement, and an 
agreeable central board sought advice on plans and specifications for 
such a ship from the health authorities in Sydney, who had already 
provided and outfitted the appropriately named Faraway, to act as an 
121 isolation ward for smallpox victims in that colony. 
Dr. Hill Wray's discovery that the ship's doctor had not reported 
the presence of smallpox on board the Waroonga, lent urgency to the 
122 
situation as far as the central board was concerned. At its June 
meeting, the board called on the still-dallying government to provide 
a hulk at once, and decided on a deputation to the Premier to speed up 
123 
the matter. Apparently successful at last, the board learned that 
Premier Griffith had granted it the use of a small coal hulk, rejoicing 
124 in the name Jemima, which could be fitted up as a smallpox hospital, 
125 
once the war scare was over. Over a month later, the central board 
1 9(^ 
had not even inspected the Jemima which was still full of coal. 
The situation was finally resolved when the barque Beatrice was 
127 purchased for ^ 1,500. She was to be used as a smallpox hulk, and to 
1 28 be anchored in the river off Lytton. Shortly afterwards, a fresh 
120. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Mar 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 27 Mar 1885. The government clung to the cottage idea 
however, retaining it as late as July 1885, pending other 
definite arrangements. Ibid., 4 Jul 1885; Minutes of Central 
Board of Health, 3 Jul 1885. 
121. Ibid., 28 Feb 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 27 Feb 
1885. 
122. Dr. Wray, Secretary Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
5 May 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 426, in-letter no.3347 of 1885, and Ship's 
Surgeon, Waroonga to Colonial Secretary, 2 Jun 1885, Q.S.A. COL/A 
426, in-letter no.4035 of 1885, offering an explanation which was 
finally accepted. Another ship also caused a scare. The Oceanien 
was found to have smallpox on board for the second time, having 
been in Australian waters and discharging passengers for some time. 
The Brisbane Courier, 14 Aug 1885; sub editorial. 
123. Ibid., 6 Jun 1885; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 5 Jun 1885. 
124. Ibid., 4 Jul 1885. From the beginning Dr. Wray complained that 
the Jemima was too small. 
125. Presumably the war scare refers to the 1885 Sudan campaign. 
126. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 17 Aug 1885, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 434, in-letter no.6071 of 1885. Marginal comment - "Coal 
will be taken out of her shortly". 
127. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1886, p.100. 
128. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Sep 1885; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 25 Sep 1885. 
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outbreak of smallpox in New South Wales, not only damaged Queensland 
trade by closing the ports of Brisbane, Maryborough and Rockhampton to 
129 
vessels from that colony, but brought the threat of an outbreak of 
the disease even closer to Queensland, justifying the central board's 
130 pressure for isolation accommodation, at least in their own eyes. 
The mere purchase of the smallpox hulk failed to satisfy the 
central board, the politicians, and the public. One thorny problem was 
the perennial one of costs. The comparatively small annual grant 
proposed when the Beatrice first appeared on the estimates was challenged 
by Albert Norton, both on the grounds of its size, and because it "was 
131 
anticipated to be a continual charge". Far more immediately important 
from a Central Board of Health point of view, was whether the Beatrice 
was fit for service, as she might be required to be ready for use "at a 
132 
moment's notice". The best promise which could be extracted from 
Colonial Secretary B.B. Moreton, was an offer to "partly furnish her... 
133 if wanted". 
The positioning of the Beatrice, should she be in use, presented the 
authorities with another emotionally-charged problem. The central board 
was of the opinion that the hulk should be moored in the Garden Reach of 
the Brisbane River to facilitate the boarding of patients, and in line 
with British and European practice, which not uncommonly situated smallpox 
134 hospitals in the heart of large cities. But fears of a public outcry 
swayed the balance in favour of Lytton as the mooring place - the only 
135 position to win Griffith's seal of approval. 
Queensland was kept well-informed through reports on vaccination 
129. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1885), 1071. 
130. Howard Smith Agents to Colonial Secretary, 29 Sep 1885, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 439, in-letter no.7266 of 1885. 
131. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LIII (1887), 1255. The amount for 
1887-88 was (i6200 to cover the cost of maintenance and the salary of 
a caretaker. 
132. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 14 Feb 1887, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 489, in-letter no.1296 of 1887. 
133. Moreton's marginal comment of 15 February 1887 on ibid. 
134. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Feb 1887; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 11 Feb 1887. 
135. A second marginal notation on Central Board of Health to Under 
Colonial Secretary, 14 Feb 1887, Q.S.A. COL/A 489, in-letter no. 
1296 of 1887. 
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and various other aspects of smallpox from the south during the early 
1 "^ft 
1890's. But other diseases, notably, typhoid, scarlet fever, and 
epidemic influenza were the immediate concerns of Queensland health 
137 
authorities during this period. In 1892, shocked Queensland journals 
138 
announced the return of smallpox to Australia, mainly through the 
139 
agency of the infected steamer Oroya. But there was real alarm when 
it was learned that a quarantine official resident in Queensland, a man 
named Ives, had actually developed the disease after contact with one 
140 
of the Oroya passengers. The victim was immediately isolated at the 
quarantine station, and the disease was contained, though Ives's life 
141 
was forfeit. But the dire prognostications of the central board had 
come true, and it now busied itself with producing regulations for the 
treatment of persons affected with smallpox, and for preventing the 
ling 
143 
142 
spread of that disease - measures which, accordi to The Brisbane 
Courier, were extremely repressive and rightly so. 
136. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Apr 1890; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 18 Apr 1890. 
137. Leprosy and other diseases could be included here, but influenza 
was especially prevalent during 1890. A special meeting of the 
Central Board of Health was held to discuss the problem on 16 
January 1890. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
17 Jan 1890, Q.S.A. COL/A 604, in-letter no.547 of 1890. A special 
report on the incidence of the disease was later submitted to the 
government. "Epidemic Influenza in Queensland", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, III (1890), 697. As late as 
November 1891, the containing of influenza was taking up a 
considerable amount of the central board's time. See for example 
The Brisbane Courier, 14 Nov 1891; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 13 Nov 1891, when a circular was drawn up to apprise 
Queenslanders of the symptoms and methods of dealing with the fever. 
138. See for example, Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1893, pp.61 and 63, and 
The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1892, 7 Jul 1892, 18 Jul 1892, 3 Aug 
1892 and 5 Dec 1892, and The Queensland Punch, 6 Aug 1892. 
139. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1893, p.61. 
140. Cumpston, History of Smallpox, p.75. See also The Brisbane Courier, 
2 Jul 1892; main editorial, which contains Dr. John Thomson's 
comments to the Medico-Ethical Society on this first case of 
smallpox contracted within Queensland. 
141. Ibid., 5 Jul 1892. Ives had been vaccinated. Doctors took the 
curious attitude, in view of his eventual death, that "he would 
have been attacked by the disease in a much more violent manner I" 
had he not been vaccinated. 
142. Queensland Government Gazette, LVI (1892), 559-560. 
143. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1892; main editorial. 
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In the face of this genuine emergency, the lymph supply in 
Brisbane was discovered to be disastrously low, a matter which the 
Colonial Secretary, Horace Tozer, showed every sign of remedying with 
144 
the establishment of a bacteriological laboratory in Brisbane. Tozer 
was encouraged in this scheme by a deputation from the Medico-Ethical 
Society which suggested that the outlay for the necessary appliances 
would only be about .^ 200. Once again, a real problem for the Colonial 
145 Secretary was the recurring annual expense. But the great stumbling 
block in 1892, was the grave financial situation already facing the 
colony, which was to reach its peak in the depression of the following 
year. 
Dr. Cumpston, in his official history of the disease in Australia, 
suggests that 
for a brief period, vaccine lymph was cultivated on calves in 
Brisbane during the year 1892, several calves being innoculated 
by Dr. Hirschfeld, Honorary Bacteriologist to the Brisbane 
Hospital. The government of the day however did not continue 
this work and it lapsed. 146 
However, it would appear that by far the greatest amount of lymph used 
in the increased vaccination programmes of 1892 came from the southern 
colonies, particularly Victoria. Certainly this is the impression to 
be gained from the minutes of a further special Central Board of Health 
meeting held on Saturday afternoon 23 June 1892, when the hardships 
entailed in the quarantining of passengers, the difficulties caused by 
the absence of a compulsory vaccination act, and the problems of 
maintaining an adequate lymph supply, were discussed at very great 
147 length. The biggest drawback, which Dr. Wray pointed out, was that 
the government had "no power to vaccinate the people unless they agreed 
to it". But as Dr. Taylor retorted it would have been an easy matter 
to have an adequate lymph supply, 
144. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1892; main editorial, and Ibid., 
23 Jun 1892; Minutes of special Central Board of Health meeting, 
22 Jun 1892. This urgent meeting was held to discuss the arrival 
of the smallpox-infected ship the Bunyinyong. Ironically, on the 
previous day. The Brisbane Courier had announced that medical 
men had "smallpox under control". Ibid., 22 Jun 1892; sub 
editorial. 
145. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1892. 
146. Cumpston, History of Smallpox, p.140. 
147. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jun 1892; Minutes of a special meeting 
of Central Board of Health, 23 Jun 1892. See also Ibid., 1 Jul 
1892, about Melbourne lymph supply arrangements. 
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to be kept in readiness, by proper instructions being given by 
the government. He had repeatedly urged the necessity of 
some action in the Legislative Council... so that the 
government could not plead ignorance of the present position. 
The disease could be thoroughly stamped out by efficient 
vaccination. 148 
With the government at bay under this trenchant attack from leading 
medical members of the Central Board of Health, and from passengers 
149 incarcerated in the quarantine station, the search for a scapegoat 
began. It ended with an action being brought against the captain of the 
Oroya, who had allegedly failed in his duty to prevent the spread of 
contagious diseases on a merchant ship, but to the government's 
150 disappointment, the case was dismissed on technical grounds. An 
official enquiry into quarantine station conditions, which were alleged 
to have caused Ives's illness, was held by Dr. Hill Wray in his capacity 
as government medical officer sitting with the under colonial secretary, 
W.E. Parry Okeden, as a civil service board. 
The enquiry "completely vindicated" the actions of most of the 
government officers, though it did suggest that those attending smallpox 
victims should be isolated from ordinary passengers. In the board's 
view, the main trouble stemmed from the demands of the shipping company 
that passengers should pay for supplies, while they were confined in 
quarantine. 
That medicines and provisions should be supplied by the 
government appeals to commonsense.... They perfect the 
machinery for arresting infection on the threshold, and 
they save us from the imputation of selfishness in 
burdening private individuals for the public good. 151 
148. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Jul 1892. 
149. There were a great many letters of complaint sent to The Brisbane 
Courier. See for example issues of 1 Jul, 2 Jul, 7 Jul, and 
14 Jul 1892, for complaining letters from persons unnamed, and 
4 Jul 1892; letter to editor from R. Rendle. See also Ibid., 
2 Jul 1892; main editorial, which "takes up the cry of the 
quarantined" - the discomforted, the frustrated, the irritated and 
those in pecuniary difficulties. Apart from this, all unaffected 
passengers on Peel Island attended a protest meeting on 30 June 
1892, to draw up a petition to the governor. This petition concerned 
the shipping company's demand that quarantined passengers should 
pay for food and medicines, and urged "that the expenses_incurr^ed, 
being, for the protection of the public of Queensland, /should./ 
be borne by the government". Ibid., 1 Jul 1892. 
150. Ibid., 28 Jul 1892. The case was brought under an English shipping 
act of 1850. 
151. Ibid., 26 Aug 1892. 
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t)N THE BTiAIN. 
PARRY-OKEDEN. 
The Queensland Punch, 6 August, 1892. 
The real irony of the 1892 affair was the panic over what to do 
152 
with the "supposedly" infected Kanaka Jimmy Berry, alias Harry, and 
the condition of the smallpox hulk Beatrice. A very sick Harry had 
arrived in Brisbane from Cleveland on 23 July 1892. He visited a 
boarding house in Mary Street, went to the immigration depot and to 
the Brisbane hospital, where his case was diagnosed as smallpox - all 
by public transport. This necessitated huge cleaning-up operations, 
authorised by the Central Board of Health. Harry's Cleveland quarters, 
two railway carriages - "just in case" - the boarding house and 
immigration depot, an omnibus, and the clothes of numerous casual contacts, 
152. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1893, p.63. See also Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LXVIII (1892), 1540-41 for a discussion 
as to whether or not this Kanaka had smallpox. The hospital 
superintendent and several other doctors pronounced the man 
infected, but some doubt remained. In any case, he survived the 
ordeal. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Jul 1892. 
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153 
not to speak of Harry, were fumigated. Those people who had been 
in closer communication with the afflicted Kanaka were detained in 
their own homes under police guard. 
The Beatrice which was to be ready "if wanted", was found, after 
inspection by Captain J. Mackay, to be quite unfit for isolation duties. 
"The services of six or eight men would be needed to tow her down the 
river... and she was leaking through her decks". To the disgust of 
the Central Board of Health, Harry and five of his compatriots had to 
be conveyed by spring van to some hastily erected tents in Victoria 
Park. They were encircled with large amounts of barbed wire and 
"guarded by a cordon of police and men belonging to the permanent defence 
force", while the spring van and horse retired into quarantine. 
The fiasco did have one positive outcome. The Colonial Secretary, 
the Central Board of Health, and representatives of twelve local 
authorities from as far away as Beenleigh, met to discuss the provision 
of a "central place of isolation" for the victims of severe epidemics. 
No immediate decisions were reached, indeed the conference resulted in 
more questions being raised than solved. But the first faltering steps 
had been taken towards that "proper isolation" of patients, which was 
153. It was not until 1898 that regulations for disinfecting cabs, litters 
and all forms of transport were drawn up by the Central Board of 
Health because of the high incidence of a number of diseases. 
Heading the list was smallpox. See Central Board of Health to 
Home Secretary, 12 Sep 1898, Q.S.A. COL/A 827, in-letter no.11607 
of 1898. The City Ambulance and Transport Brigade objected to the 
idea. The City Ambulance and Transport Brigade to Home Secretary, 
12 Sep 1898, Q.S.A. COL/A 827, in-letter no.11630 and 22 Sep 1892, 
letter no.12025 of 1898, which to a large degree rested on the 
provision of a fumigating chamber by the local authorities. Since 
this did not eventuate, the matter of complete fumigation was left 
in abeyance for the time. Tozer's marginal note on Central Board 
of Health to Home Secretary, 29 Nov 1898 Q.S.A. COL/A 827, in-
letter no.14661 of 1898. See also The Brisbane Courier, 27 Aug 
1898; sub editorial, for the method in use by the ambulance and 
hospital staff. 
154. Later, when it was ascertained that the Beatrice would cost/300 
for repairs and a great deal of continual maintenance, the Colonial 
Secretary and the Central Board of Health decided to scrap the 
idea of a floating smallpox hospital and to spend the money on 
improving the Peel Island quarantine station instead. Ibid., 
13 May 1893; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 12 May 1893. 
155. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jul 1892; Minutes of special Saturday 
meeting of the Central Board of Health, 23 Jul 1892, and a great 
deal of general reporting. In spite of the elaborate precautions, 
one of the Kanakas evaded the cordon and could not be traced. 
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to become an absolute necessity with the coming of the bubonic plague. 
"In consequency of no result having accrued from the conference", 
and following another "very formidable" outbreak of smallpox, this time 
in Western Australia, the Central Board of Health renewed its efforts on 
behalf of a smallpox hospital, and the provision of a sufficiency of 
lymph. Far from hiding behind the immunity which distance might have 
been expected to provide, the board was only too conscious that 
owing to the facility of communication between Perth 
and this colony, the danger is imminent. 157 
Queensland escaped any ravages from smallpox at that time, but 
further scares did occur throughout the 1890's, as outbreaks of the 
1 CO 
disease appeared in ships off the Queensland or Australian coast, in 
Adelaide, in Darlinghurst, Sydney, and in German New Guinea. 
Throughout this period the Central Board of Health did not cease to 
call for the establishment of a vaccine institute and compulsory 
156. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Dec 1892; Minutes of special meeting of 
Central Board of Health, the Colonial Secretary and local authorities, 
2 Dec 1892. The Colonial Secretary announced that the meeting 
was something of a mistake on the part of one of his subordinates. 
He had intended the local authorities to meet alone in the first 
instance. As far as isolation hospitals were concerned, even in 
England few positive steps towards their provision had been taken 
until a special act was passed in 1893. Even then these hospitals 
were small, there were too many of them, and they were "expensive 
and relatively inefficient". Newsholme, p.36, and Frazer, p.288. 
See also Hon. Dr. Campbell, M.L.C., "The People's Health", S.A. 
Register, January, 1898, p.7. 
157. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 24 Apr 1893, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 732, in-letter no.4656 of 1893. 
158. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Jan 1893. This was on the Taiyuan at 
Thursday Island. This vessel offended again in 1894 when smallpox 
was discovered in her off Cooktown. Refusal by the Queensland 
government to allow the sick man quarantine on Peel Island was 
alleged to have caused his death in Sydney, and led to strong 
protests from the New South Wales authorities. Ibid., 16 May 
1894. Another affected ship was the Australia. Ibid., 13 May 
1893; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 12 May 1893. 
159. Ibid., 10 May 1893. 
160. Ibid., 26 Oct 1893. 
161. Proclamation of Wm. McGregor, Lieutenant Governor of British New 
Guinea, 4 Aug 1896, filed under Governor of Queensland to Home 
Secretary, 21 Oct 1896,Q.S.A. COL/A 811, in-letter no.16571 of 
1896. 
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vaccination, nor did it fail to underline the difficulties of 
securing regular supplies of fresh calf lymph of good quality from 
the traditional sources in the southern colonies. In 1897, the 
central board, with the approval of the Colonial Secretary, seemed to 
have set up a satisfactory working arrangement with the Pasteur 
164 Institute in Sydney, though reports about the ineffectualness of the 
lymph, from Dr. Garde, the health officer in Toowoomba, and Dr. John 
Thomson, raised doubts about even this supply. 
It was the arrival of the Duke of Buckingham at Thursday Island 
1 ftft 
which created a new interest. Shortly before this disease-ridden 
ship made her appearance en route from the infected port of Batavia, 
medical representatives from all of the mainland colonies had met to 
discuss and draw up uniform quarantine regulations, which were later 
168 
1 <^7 
adopted by four of the Premiers. With the advent of the Duke of 
Buckingham these new regulations were implemented for the first time. 
Long before the achievement of federation, the government of Queensland 
looked to one who was officially known as a "Federal Medical Officer" 
stationed on Thursday Island to be responsible for the protection of 
162. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Apr 1893; sub editorial. Although 
plenty of publicity attended Dr. K.I. O'Doherty's appointment 
as public vaccinator in 1895, Brisbane people were apathetic and 
few took advantage of the service. Ibid., 8 Jul 1896. 
163. Ibid., 1 Jun 1895; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 31 May 
1895, and Ibid., 28 Mar 1896; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
27 Mar 1896. 
164. Pasteur Institute, Sydney to Central Board of Health, 1 Jun 1897, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 817, in-letter no.8517 of 1897 and attachments. 
165. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Oct 1897; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 22 Oct 1897. See also Ibid., 5 Nov 1898; Minutes of 
Central Board of Health, 4 Nov 1898, for further complaints about 
the state of the lymph. Some of the lymph came from New Zealand. 
166. For the considerable press coverage, see for instance Ibid., 
27 Nov, 28 Nov, 30 Nov, 1 Dec, 2 Dec, 3 Dec, and 4 Dec 1896. 
167. "Proceedings of the Australasian Quarantine Conference of 
Melbourne, Victoria, 1896", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, II (1896), 1007-21. New South Wales, South Australia, 
Queensland and Victoria accepted the resolutions, subject to some 
modifications, at the Conference of Premiers in Sydney. Ibid., 
p.1021. 
168. At the special meeting called by the Colonial Secretary to discuss 
the Buckingham incident, special emphasis was placed on this being 
the "first instance under the regulations". The Brisbane Courier, 
19 Nov 1896; Minutes of special meeting of Central Board of Health, 
18 Nov 1896. 
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169 the colony from the dreaded smallpox. But the Central Board of 
Health reminded the Home Secretary, that under the rules of the 
Intercolonial Medical Conference, it was Queensland's responsibility 
170 to supply lymph to that federal quarantine station. 
In spite of this obvious dependence on a strengthened quarantine 
system, the whole issue of compulsory vaccination came up again during the 
171 discussion on the health bill of 1900. In a pre-debate editorial. 
The Brisbane Courier, while expecting the provision to be opposed, 
suggested that the idea of compulsorily vaccinating all persons in 
areas where the proposed act was in force, including infants within 
six months of birth, was a most reasonable one. The Courier argued 
that it is "infinitely better to have this instrument at hand in an 
172 
emergency than to rush to legislation when it is too late". 
The Labor member for South Brisbane, Joseph Henry Lewis Turley, 
173 did not agree. In a very long, very well received speech, Turley, 
who had armed himself with a great many facts and figures on the state 
of compulsory vaccination in England and the continent, asserted that 
in its Rip Van Winkle fashion, the government had gone to sleep for a 
number of years, and had failed to understand what was going on outside 
its own little world. 
In no English-speaking country to-day dare the 
Government put the provisions of the Vaccination 
Act in force. Yet the Minister tells us that it is 
necessary in Queensland, where we have never suffered 
from an epidemic of smallpox. 174 
Enlivening his speech with references to the horrific possibilities of 
169. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Nov 1896. Regulations 3 and 14 were 
invoked by Horace Tozer, making the federal officer responsible 
for all notifications to all colonies, for the exhaustive inspection 
of the ship, and for the thorough fumigation of all mails. 
"Resolutions of Quarantine Conference", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, II (1896), 1021. 
170. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Nov 1898; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 18 Nov 1898. 
171. Twelve clauses - 130-142 - dealt with this question and with 
smallpox generally. 
172. Ibid., 7 Aug 1900; main editorial. 
173. For the acclaim and support for Turley see Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 234-35, 243, and 245. The speech was made 
on 7 August 1900. 
174. Ibid., p.230. 
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inexpert vaccination which, he claimed, could cause erysipelas, 
175 
syphilis or tuberculosis, Turley declared that above all, he would 
certainly defend the freedom of individual choice. He would endeavour, 
as far as he could, 
to see that there is some little liberty left to the 
people of this colony who wish to protect their children, 
if they think proper, from the possible ill effects of 
vaccination or inoculation in any shape. 176 
Turley had an excellent chance of carrying the house with him 
through his appeal to this sentiment, for it was the rock on which 
every previous attempt to bring in compulsory vaccination had foundered. 
Moreover, the "conscience clause" which had been added to the British 
Vaccination Act of 1898 to accommodate those parents who were unwilling 
to submit their children to vaccination, and to placate public 
177 
antagonism to compulsion, could only add weight to his argument. 
In an effort to preserve the compulsory section of the clause, 
without which they considered proper protection could not be afforded 
to Queensland, a deputation of medical men met the Home Secretary. 
They urged that calf lymph only should be used in the colony to overcome 
1 78 
Turley's objections. But Justin Foxton found the protests 
irresistible. The amendments to the bill dealing with smallpox and 
vaccination were so extensive, that the whole of the subdivision 
179 
concerned had to be reprinted. 
After further consideration and some additional alterations 
proposed by Turley, the new section, including an escape clause, which 
in effect permitted vaccination to remain voluntary, was passed by the 
175. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 232. The 
possibilities certainly existed when arm to arm vaccination was 
performed, but as The Brisbane Courier pointed out on the 
following day, this argument lost its force if glycerinated calf 
lymph was used, as it was in England. The Brisbane Courier, 
8 Aug 1900; sub editorial. 
176. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 234. 
177. Cartwright, pp.90-91. See also The Brisbane Courier, 8 Aug 1900; 
sub editorial, where an excellent explanation of the contemporary 
British position is given. 
178. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Aug 1900; Deputation of medical men to 
Home Secretary with important suggested alterations to the health 
bill, 13 Aug 1900. See also Minute Book of the Queensland Branch 
of the British Medical Association for 1900, pp.182-84. 
179. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Aug 1900; sub editorial. See also Ibid., 
8 Sep 1900; letter to editor from ZYX of Warwick, opposing 
compulsory vaccination. 
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Assembly. Some Legislative Council members had reservations on the 
181 
conscience clause, but the upper house as a whole expressed the 
familiar feelings on compulsion, and the new subdivision was approved. 
The colonists had preserved their reputation as inheritors of the 
British love of freedom of choice, but the scene had been set for 
fresh alarms in the early 1900's. 
Queensland apparently started the new, hopeful federal era quite 
well-equipped. The reliable Dr. Kevin I. O'Doherty, who had held the 
182 
post since 1895, was reappointed public vaccinator for 1901, and it 
appears that the Hastings Vaccine Institution in New Zealand had become 
the dependable source of at least some of the vaccine lymph used in the 
183 
State. Although the news of smallpox outbreaks in the south was far 
from reassuring. The Brisbane Courier consoled its readers that 
/i/t is a good thing that the creation of the Commonwealth 
should be practically coincident with the present outbreak 
of plague and smallpox, and that the necessity for one 
comprehensive scheme for quarantine should present itself 
at the time when it is possible. 184 
The Courier was somewhat premature in its reckoning on this 
occasion. The possibility of a joint effort was certainly there, though 
the performance was as yet not in sight, and the Home Secretary had no 
18 5 idea when a federal government takeover was likely. But in any case, 
the Queensland authorities took major precautions unilaterally, with the 
introduction of stringent regulations for the notification of infectious 
diseases, and the immediate isolation of infected vessels or premises. 
The exotic scourges of plague, smallpox and cholera headed the list of 
1 Rft 
notifiable diseases. At the same time, prominent Australian medical 
men active in the field of public health, including Queensland's newly 
appointed Health Commissioner, Dr. Burnett Ham, continued to treat 
180. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 642-45. 
181. Particularly Dr. Marks. 
182. Ibid., LXXXV (1900), 1476. 
183. Vaccine Institution, Hastings to Home Secretary, 6 Aug 1903, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 853, in-letter no.10023 of 1903, and attached bundle 
of receipts. 
184. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Jun 1901; sub editorial. 
185. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIX (1902), 714. 
186. "The Infectious Diseases Regulations of 1901", Votes and Proceedings 
of Legislative Assembly, II (1901), 1667-71. These regulations 
were reintroduced from time to time "in any emergency". See for 
example, "The Plague, Smallpox, and Cholera Regulations of 1903", 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, I (1903), 181-85. 
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quarantine, smallpox and vaccination as important matters for discussion 
187 
at the Interstate Medical Congress held in Hobart in 1901. 
It was as well that they did. The presence of smallpox in London 
in 1902, necessitated a special meeting of the Central Board of Health 
to decide what measures should be taken to protect Queensland from an 
invasion of the disease, through "passengers, seamen, clothing or other 
goods" passing between this special and privileged trading partner and 
188 the state. Then smallpox reappeared in Launceston in 1903, 
compelling the proclamation of Tasmania by Queensland as an "infected 
189 place", though curiously enough, a short time later, the government 
felt justified in dispensing with the services of the public vaccinator, 
despite protests that "they might at any time be attacked with an 
190 
epidemic of smallpox". In 1907, a renewed interest in vaccination 
prompted Dr. Burnett Ham to suggest that Herbert Chesson be appointed 
as public vaccinator, and, bowing to public pressure, the new Premier, 
191 William Kidston, approved the move. 
The long freedom from any close brushes with the disease ended in 
1908. In the first incident, a vessel carrying cases of smallpox was 
only permitted to approach Port Archer for signalling purposes, and 
192 
caused no concern. But the Changsha, which had reported smallpox in 
Manila, and which was carrying a large complement of Chinese crew and 
Japanese passengers, was a very different matter. It was the subject 
187. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 7 Apr 1902, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 845, in-letter no.5619 of 1902. 
188. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Feb 1902. 
189. B. Burnett Ham to Under Secretary Home Department, 25 Jan 1903, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 858, in-letter no.8271 of 1903. 
190. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCI (1903), 465, supply debate. 
The Premier, Robert Philp, gave no reason for this action, merely 
saying that "there was no need for a public vaccinator". 
Presumably the need for thrift gave Philp grounds for his action. 
191. Department of Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 16 Jan 
1907, Q.S.A. COL/A 891, in-letter no.569 of 1907 and marginal 
comment. Increasing numbers seeking vaccination prompted Frederick 
William Woolrabe, who was Deputy Commissioner of Public Health, to 
seek a post as public vaccinator also. This was permitted as part 
of his official duties, but carried no extra remuneration. 
F.W. Woolrabe to Under Secretary Home Department, 11 Jul 1908, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 891, in-letter no.8427 of 1908 and marginal comment 
by Ham. 
192. Gibbs Bright ^ Co. to Home Secretary, 14 Apr 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 
888, in-letter no.4819 of 1908. 
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of a frenzied telegraphic exchange between Dr. B. Burnett Ham and 
Drs. Humphry and Wassell, as the vessel proceeded down the Queensland 
193 
coast. As a result some earnest reports were made on the expeditious 
194 
vaccination of the passengers and crew, some ten Japanese passengers 
and thirteen Chinese were quarantined on Thursday and Magnetic Islands 
196 
195 
respectively, and the Townsville police made an inspection of the 
facilities and conditions at the Magnetic Island quarantine station. 
As well as incarcerating this considerable number of coloured passengers 
and crew at the remotest possible quarantine stations, the health 
authorities placed a further four passengers - two Europeans and two 
197 Chinese - m quarantine at Colmslie, at the mouth of the Brisbane River. 
After a rather doubtful start, the Queensland health authorities 
could congratulate themselves on the successful handling of the Changsha 
198 
affair. All mail and cargo were carefully fumigated on landing, and 
all passengers were eventually released from their various places of 
199 
seclusion, safe and well. Above all, the dreaded disease had not 
been permitted to wreak havoc on the population of Queensland. Moreover, 
it seems clear that a precedent had been set as far as "alien" passengers 
were concerned. When the Empire reached Thursday Island in the following 
year, after landing a smallpox patient at Timor, eleven coloured 
passengers were quarantined. But after fumigation and vaccinations had 
been performed, the Europeans were permitted to sail to Sydney under the 
193. There was a series of telegrams and urgent telegrams sent between 
17 September and 24 September 1908. Copies are attached ^o a 
resume''of the affair, "Smallpox", Case on S.S. Shangsha /also 
spelt Changsha/ undated and attached to Wassell to Under Secretary 
Home Department, 17 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-telegram 
no.3088 of 1908. 
194. Humphry to Ham, 21 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-telegram no.3121 
of 1908. 
195. Ham to Wassell, 24 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, copy of unnumbered 
out-telegram regarding Thursday Island, and Humphry to Ham, 
21 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-letter no.11067 of 1908, 
about Magnetic Island. 
196. Police Report on Magnetic Island Quarantine Station to Home 
Secretary, 1 Oct 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-letter no.11606 of 
1908. 
197. Dr. F.W. Woolrabe to Commissioner of Public Health, 24 Sep 1908, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-letter no.3300 of 1908. 
198. Ibid. 
199. Telegrams to Home Secretary from Thursday and Magnetic Islands, 
26 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, unnumbered copies, and Woolrabe to 
Burnett Ham, 28 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. COL/A 894, in-letter no.11190 of 
1908. 
Yellow Flag, without further imposition 
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200 
Shortly before the Changsha's arrival, another development took 
place which set up a position which was to continue until the Commonwealth 
government took over quarantine as a federal affair. On 22 July 1908, 
the Controller General of Customs and Excise requested that quarantine 
stations and lazarets be handed over to the Commonwealth, and that the 
Queensland Commissioner of Public Health be appointed quarantine officer 
201 for the state. Almost one year later, after frank and full discussions 
202 had taken place at a Quarantine Conference in Melbourne, and after 
communications from the Australian Prime Minister on the Quarantine Act 
203 
of 1909, the Queensland government was pleased to announce that 
medical officers at twelve posts throughout the state, Drs. Ham and 
Woolrabe, and a number of fumigators and other employees at quarantine 
stations, were approved to perform "certain duties in connection with 
Quarantine for the Commonwealth". The federal government was to 
reimburse the state at fixed rates to cover the services rendered by 
205 its officers. During the 1910 supply debate, the Home Secretary 
told the house that no appropriation was asked for quarantine, "that 
200. A series of telegrams from Wassell and Humphry to the Commissioner 
of Public Health filed under Q.S.A. COL/A 901, telegram no.5921 of 
1909. This incident is important for another reason which cannot 
be discussed in detail here. Over a period, friction had developed 
between doctors on the periphery and the Department of Public 
Health over the payment of overtime for fumigation work, the 
boarding of stricken vessels and so on. See for example, pre'cis 
of correspondence between Dr. Humphry, Health Officer, Townsville 
and the Health Department filed under Q.S.A. COL/A 897, in-letter 
no.1128 of 1908, and Humphry to Under Secretary Home Department, 
11 Jan 1909, Q.S.A. COL/A 897, in-letter no.593 of 1909. The 
Empire caused further difficulties for Humphry, after which the 
commissioner curtly informed him that his opinion "as to his 
legal duty" was of no consequence as far as Ham was concerned, 
and that Humphry "must take his instructions from me". Marginal 
comment by Commissioner of Public Health on Humphry to Under 
Secretary Home Department, 13 Apr 1909, Q.S.A. COL/A 901, urgent 
in-telegram no.4414 of 1909. Humphry was_not the only doctor 
involved. See also Dr. Voss /^Rockhampton/ to Commissioner of 
Public Health, 26 Mar 1909, Q.S.A. COL/A~903, in-letter no.7252 
of 1909 and attachments. 
201. Controller General of Customs and Excise to Home Secretary, 22 Jul 
1908, Q.S.A. HOM/B 19, in-letter no.9001 of 1908. 
202. Report of Dr. Ham on Quarantine Conference, 10 Mar 1909, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 22, in-letter no.2963 of 1909. 
203. Commonwealth Prime Minister to Home Secretary, 9 Jun 1909, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 22, in-letter no.6862 of 1909. 
204. Queensland Government Gazette, XCIII (1909), 6 8 - 8 July 1909. 
My italics. 
205. Under Secretary Home Department to Health Department, 23 Mar 1910, 
Q.S.A. B.C. Register 1910 to 1912, letter no.3282 of 1910. 
90 A 
matter having been taken over by the Federal Government", but in fact, 
this was not done until 23 December 1912 
257. 
Government", but ii 
207 
For despite further discussion, and an early official visit to 
208 Queensland by the Commonwealth Director of Quarantine Dr. Norris, a 
great deal of reorganisation of the various states' machinery was 
essential before a smooth federal takeover was possible, and 
Queensland still had to deal with smallpox incidents as they arose. 
One very important step was taken with this end in view. Worried about 
the vulnerability of Queensland coastal towns to a smallpox invasion 
from visiting ships, the incoming Commissioner of Public Health 
Dr. J.S.C. Elkington brought to ministerial attention the "urgent 
desirability of establishing depots of active vaccine lymph at certain 
210 
mam coastal towns". Later in that same year, after he had undertaken 
211 
a long and detailed tour of north Queensland, Elkington was able to 
reveal that arrangements had been made to place vaccine lymph in cold 
storage at the principal ports, and that the venture had been undertaken 
212 
"on a co-operative basis between State and Commonwealth". 
The Commissioner for Public Health continued to stress the dangers 
from the north during 1911, pointing out that widespread smallpox 
outbreaks had taken place in Dutch New Guinea, and in the Aru Islands, 
which lay "within the jurisdiction of Queensland". A fast steamer could 
easily bring an afflicted but undetected smallpox sufferer into 
206. Queensland Parliam.entary Debates, XVII (1910), 2184. 
207. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, (1913), 9. See also Within, p.212. 
208. Norris came early to Queensland because of Dr. Ham's resignation 
as commissioner and his imminent departure for Victoria. 
209. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Jul 1909, and Ibid., 9 Oct 1911; 
sub editorial. 
210. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 1 Mar 1910, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 24, in-letter no.2468 of 1910. 
211. Copy of Report on Tour of Inspection in Tropical Queensland by the 
Commissioner of Public Health, 22 Aug 1910, attached to Commissioner 
of Public Health to Under Secretary, Home Department, 5 Sep 1910, 
Q.S.A. HOM/J 69, in-letter no.9930 of 1910. 
212. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1910), 384. 
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Queensland coastal waters, or even as far as Brisbane, "before the 
213 
expiration of his incubation period". Indeed from an epidemic 
214 
standpoint, Queensland was "sitting over a volcano". 
Grave fears were held as this possibility became a reality in 
September 1911, when smallpox was discovered on the Van Linschoten 
215 in Sydney. The vessel had called at Brisbane, and a number of 
Queenslanders had had dealings with the passengers, mostly in an 
official capacity. Up to thirty representatives of shipping firms and 
waterside workers were rounded up, vaccinated, and placed in quarantine 
as a precautionary measure, and the provisions of the Plague, Smallpox, 
217 
and Cholera Regulations were hastily reactivated. The Home Secretary, 
John George Appel, was able to assure the community that the Department 
of Public Health was in control, but he did regret Queensland's 
unvaccinated state in this emergency, and declared that the government 
218 
would "have to consider the question of making /vaccination/ compulsory. " 
Despite this ministerial statement, compulsory vaccination was not 
written into the proposed health act amendment bill of 1911, and no 
discussion on this point took place during the very long-drawn-out 
219 debate which continued from August to December of that year. But in 
direct response to Elkington's pronouncement on endemic smallpox in 
220 
areas to Queensland's north, the government decided, as "a highly 
important", very urgent matter, to establish a northern sub-office of 
213. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1911), 3-4. 
214. Copy of Report on Tour of Inpsection in Tropical Queensland by the 
Commissioner of Public Health, 22 Aug 1910, attached to 
Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
5 Sep 1910, Q.S.A. HOM/J 69, in-letter no.9930 of 1910. 
215. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Sep 1911. For another example of a similar 
incident on the Yawata Maru, see the Commissioner of Public Health's 
"Annual Report", Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 5. 
216. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Sep 1911. See also Ibid., 12 Sep 1911. 
217. "The Plague, Smallpox, and Cholera Regulations of 1911", 
Queensland Government Gazette, XCVII (1911), 723, dated 9 Sep 1911. 
218. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Sep 1911. 
219. See the appropriate sections of Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
volumes CVIII, CIX, and CX (1911-12). 
220. Ibid., CX (1911-12), 2586, ministerial statement during the supply 
debate of 1911. Elkington had begun to pressure for a northern 
sub-office almost from the date of his appointment, and certainly 
after he had undertaken the northern tour. 
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the Department of Public Health in Townsville, under the supervision 
221 
of Dr. James Booth-Clarkson. 
During the following year, there was sustained interest in smallpox 
in Queensland as increasing numbers of ships passing down the coast 
222 
reported the disease on board. In view of the inadequacy and 
defectiveness of quarantine accommodation, the "chronic starvation" of 
funds for maintenance, and the failure of the federal government to 
complete the takeover of existing facilities and the erection of new 
ones, the federal Director of Quarantine, Dr. Norris, warned against the 
whole nation's 
unique and invidious position in its attitude towards 
"vaccination". It is unquestionably the worst protected 
civilized community in the world a^ far as personal protection 
by vaccination is concerned.... /T/his unsatisfactory position 
is ascribed to popular ignorance of the nature and 
ravages of smallpox, and to prejudice against 
vaccination. 223 
Norris's report in the federal sphere was reinforced by the 
evidence of Dr. B. Burnett Ham, now head of the health department of 
224 Victoria, to a parliamentary committee in that state. Dr. Ham 
emphasised that there was no guarantee of "holding" smallpox, if 
Australians relied 
221. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CX (1911-12), 2586. For an 
assessment of Booth Clarkson's qualifications and experience see 
The Brisbane Courier, 27 Oct 1911. Of course the office was 
concerned with far more than smallpox. In its first report the 
sub-department reported that the sanitary condition of northern 
towns was the biggest worry, while diphtheria was the disease 
giving the most concern. "Report of Medical Inspector, North 
Queensland", Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 1037-38. 
222. The same steamers crop up regularly as infected ships on the 
eastern run. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Jan 1912 -
the Empire, The Brisbane Courier and The Observer, 7, 8, 10 May 
1912 - the Changsha, Ibid., 25 and 30 May 1912 - the Yawata Maru, 
and Ibid., the Taiyuan, Ibid., 8 Jul 1912 - the Prinz Sigismund, 
and Ibid., 12 Aug 1912 - the Montoro. 
223. The Brisbane Courier, 1 May 1912; sub editorial. See also Ibid., 
12 Dec 1912. The prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, announced in 
August 1912 that the real reason for delay had been the difficulty 
in finding suitable sites in the northern Queensland ports, and 
that the problem was then resolved. Adequate provision had been 
made in the Commonwealth estimates, and the work would proceed 
without delay. Ibid., 29 Aug 1912. 
224. "Blue Book", Victorian Parliamentary Papers, III (1910), 1233. 
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on isolation and quarantine alone.... Smallpox was 
... a loathsome disease... and explosive in spread.... 
He thought vaccination should be brought in for all. 225 
The citizens of Queensland were not greatly impressed by these 
dicta. 
With smallpox knocking at our very doors, the same 
weary old arguments against vaccination that Jenner 
combated over a hundred years ago, clothed even in 
the same words, and backed by the same appeals to 
old wives' remedies, appear in the Press of today. 226 
But the majority of Queenslanders were not averse to their northern 
coloured neighbours being compulsorily vaccinated for the protection of 
227 
the mainland, though the Anti-Vaccination League protested with vigour. 
Since smallpox was once again rife in New Guinea and the Arus, a new 
"external line of defence" was thrown up by the Queensland Department 
228 
of Health, and "the vaccination of every man, woman and child on all 
229 
the islands" in the Torres Strait took place. The Commonwealth was 
committed to the undertaking to the extent that it supplied the lymph 
230 for the northern tour - but at a cost of^^20 to Queensland. Later 
in 1912, a very real fear on the part of the Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, 
over the high incidence of smallpox in Papua and the consequent threat 
to Queensland, led to another vaccination programme. Once again, the 
campaign was directed against non-Europeans - this time with the enforced 
225. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Aug 1912. 
226. The Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 3. 
227. National Anti-Vaccination League to Chief Secretary of Queensland, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 40, in-letter no.10878 of 1912, protesting about the 
compulsory vaccination by Queensland. 
228. The Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 4. 
229. C. Cato, Unpublished Memoirs, p.12. Cato was an inspector in 
the Queensland health department, having followed Dr. Elkington 
from Tasmania. He exaggerates the numbers reached. Elkington 
calculated that only 71% of the islanders were vaccinated owing 
to the absence of a number of young adult males employed on the 
pearling luggers. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 1044. 
230. Director of Quarantine to Home Secretary through the Health 
Department, 14 Mar 1912, Q.S.A. HOM/B 40, in-letter no.3553 of 
1912. Marginal note approved 27 Mar 1912. See also Report of 
Commissioner of Public Health on Vaccination of Torres Strait 
islanders to Home Secretary, 25 Jun 1912, Q.S.A. HOM/B 40, 
in-letter no.8263 of 1912. 
vaccination of all Papuans employed on Thursday Island. 
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At about the same time, "an important new move was made with 
232 federal quarantine". At the state's request. Dr. Elkington was 
relieved of its oversight because of increased Queensland health 
department duties. Dr. J.H.L. Cumpston of Melbourne assumed control 
in his place, and "the administration of _/^ sea/ quarantine transferred 
~ 233 
wholly to the staff of the Federal Quarantine Bureau". It was 
unfortunate therefore, that when the real dangers presented themselves, 
they came not from the Asian north, but from Vancouver, Canada, via 
234 Sydney, New South Wales. 
On 2 July 1913, The Brisbane Courier first began its reports of 
an outbreak of what was considered to be mild, but genuine smallpox, 
amongst girls working in a clothing factory at Redfern, New South Wales 
Reaction in Queensland was very swift indeed. The Commissioner of Public 
235 
Health made an urgent request for one thousand doses of vaccine, which 
s 
237 
9 "Zf^  
was approved immediately by the minister. Over the next ten days 
another six thousand tubes of the stuff were asked for and granted;' 
231. Commonwealth Prime Minister to Home Secretary, 19 Dec 1912, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 40, in-letter no.14542 of 1912, and 27 Dec 1912 Q.S.A. HOM/ 
B 40, in-letter no.14812 of 1912. 
232. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Dec 1912. 
233. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1913), 15. 
234. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1913. The first case probably occurred 
about 12 April after a girl had contact with the crew of a ship 
from Vancouver where there was a mild outbreak of smallpox. 
Various ships with smallpox on board did arrive in north Australian 
waters during this period but were dealt with satisfactorily. 
See for example. Ibid., 15 Jan 1913, the Mataran, and Ibid., 
25 Feb 1913, the Eastern. 
235. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Jul 1913. Detailed reports and letters to 
editor filled several columns almost daily until November 1913, 
when a medical conference held in Melbourne signalled the lifting 
of a quarantine embargo on Sydney. Ibid., 20 Nov 1913; sub 
editorial. 
236. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 3 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.7766 of 1913. Approved in ministerial 
memo, 3 Jul 1913. 
237. Health Department to Home Secretary, 8 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.7991 of 1913, for 2000 tubes, and Commissioner of 
Public Health to Home Secretary, 10 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.8111 of 1913, for 4000 tubes. One thousand tubes 
cost J650. 
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but such was the sudden demand for vaccination, that a general authority 
2 38 
to purchase lymph "as required" was later approved. Seizing the 
opportunity presented by the "considerable alarm throughout all 
239 Australia", Dr. Elkington assumed the mantle of the old Central Board 
of Health. He, and his department, began to agitate for the immediate 
establishment of a vaccine plant, to be set up to conform with plans 
already approved by the Works Department, at the relatively low cost 
of ,^650. But John George Appel, also running true to form, suggested 
an unsatisfactory conjunction with the Department of Agriculture and 
240 Stock at Yeerongpilly, in the interests of thrift. This idea was 
rejected by the Health Department as a permanent plan. But it did 
press "on with the preparation of vaccine on the stock experimental 
farm at Yeerongpilly", at the height of the emergency, and as southern 
242 
supplies of lymph dried up or proved unsatisfactory. 
In the meantime, both Commonwealth and state authorities busied 
themselves with the outbreak. Dr. Cumpston was summoned to Sydney by 
the federal minister for customs, so "that the Commonwealth should be 
243 
represented on the spot". In an effort to confine the disease to 
New South Wales, the federal bureau supervised rail as well as sea 
traffic, requiring an official certificate of vaccination before any 
244 ticket was issued for interstate travel. This was a matter of great 
importance to Queensland in view of the considerable numbers of 
passengers crossing the Queensland-New South Wales border at Wallangarra 
and Coolangatta. The federal government also proclaimed Sydney as an 
238. Health Department to Home Secretary, 21 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.8644 of 1913. 
239. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jul 1913. 
240. Secretary, Health Department to Home Secretary, 10 Oct 1913, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 42, in-letter no.11848 of 1913, and minister's marginal 
comment. 
241. Health Department to Home Secretary, 4 Nov 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.12701 of 1913. 
242. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Jul 1913. See also Health Department to 
Home Secretary, 13 Feb 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.1148 
of 1914 and subsequent 16 Apr 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter 
no.3297 of 1914. The work was placed in the hands of Dr. Harris, 
Director of the Laboratory of Microbiology and Pathology, though 
conditions of manufacture were primitive and an improvement in 
the potency and keeping qualities of the lymph "was expected 
when conditions improve". "Commissioner of Public Health's Report^' 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 6 and 18. 
243. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Jul 1913. 
244. Ibid., 5 Jul 1913. 
263. 
infected port, an action appreciated by the other states, but greatly 
resented by New South Wales Premier Holman, who assured his interstate 
colleagues that "state officers... will not allow contacts or suspects 
to go anywhere outside their own state". 
In Queensland few chances were taken. Inspectors were despatched 
to Wallangarra and Tweed Heads to examine vaccination certificates and 
to issue surveillance forms, and officers in the police and railway 
departments were pressed into supervisory service as well. Officials 
in charge of any areas where Queenslanders were compulsorily herded 
together, particularly in gaols, aboriginal reserves,^^^ orphanages 
249 7^ 0 
and asylums, and in government offices, asked for, and received, 
permission to vaccinate those under their control. In Brisbane, 
authorities arranged for public vaccination to take place in a central 
hall three times daily, and once on Sunday. Colmslie was readied 
o r o 
for the immediate reception of smallpox victims or contacts, the 
253 
epidemic regulations were again invoked, and arrangements for 
vaccinations were made in various important or vulnerable centres 
245. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jul 1913. The Prime Minister categorised 
Holman's outburst as "rather unfortunate". Ibid., 8 Jul 1913. 
In his work on Holman as Labor leader in New South Wales, Evatt 
does not even mention the smallpox epidemic which did, apparently, 
assume considerable importance in the Premier's eyes, not least 
in the question of commonwealth and state responsibility and 
power. H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader (Sydney, 1945). 
246. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jul 1913. 
247. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 7 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 42, in-letter no.7949 of 1913. 
248. Deputy Chief Protector of Aborigines to Home Secretary, 9 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8070 of 1913. 
249. Magdalen Asylum, Wooloowin to Home Secretary, 19 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8624 of 1913. 
250. Secretary, Health Department to Home Secretary, 7 Jul 1913, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 42, in-letter no.7989 of 1913. 
251. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jul 1913. This was the Drill Hall, 
Adelaide Street. Cato also records that a large marquee was erected 
in Adelaide Street near the present Anzac Park for the reception 
of those requiring vaccination. Cato, p.14. 
252. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Jul 1913. 
253. "The Plague, Smallpox, and Cholera Regulations of 1913",Queensland 
Government Gazette, CI (1913), 47-48. 
throughout the state 
264, 
254 
Inevitably the question of compulsory vaccination of Queenslanders 
255 
was raised again. For even though citizens, who had previously 
eschewed the operation, now demanded its protection in such numbers 
that "the services of the police had to be requisitioned" to maintain 
order amongst the "unwieldy" crowds, "only about 30,000 people were 
vaccinated in this State out of a population of 625,555, i.e., less 
.. 1-0 256 than 5%. 
This being so, it was a matter of the utmost gravity when the 
Queensland Commissioner of Public Health discovered a distinct lack of 
cooperation being offered by the New South Wales railways authorities. 
Contrary to federal quarantine regulations, unvaccinated passengers 
were being issued with tickets, necessitating "drastic action" by, and 
extra expense for Queensland, as all persons concerned were interned 
257 in Colmslie. Real alarm resulted from the discovery of a suspicious 
258 259 260 
case in Toowoomba, and others in Ipswich, Mackay, and Brisbane 
Oft 1 five confirmed in all. But patients were successfully isolated, all 
contacts were vaccinated, and fortunately, because of the mildness of 
Of, 9 
the attacks, no patients died and the disease was contained. 
254. Some of the towns involved were Ipswich, Stanthorpe, Normanton, 
Townsville and Toowoomba. See for example Minister's memo on 
Stanthorpe, 9 Aug 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, letter no.9501 of 1913. 
In this town, which is very close to the New South Wales border, 
persons unable to pay for vaccination were to be done without 
cost. See also Cato, p.14. 
255. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 24 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8793 of 1913. On 25 July 1913 the 
Home Secretary advised The Brisbane Courier that the government 
had not considered compulsory vaccination. The Brisbane Courier, 
25 Jul 1913. 
256. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 6. 
257. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Jul 1913. The people concerned faced 
prosecution and were "charged with the cost of their maintenance 
while in quarantine". 
258. Ibid., 19 Jul 1913. 
259. Ibid., and Ibid., 24 Jul 1913. 
260. Ibid., 27 Jul 1913. 
261. Ibid., 5 Aug 1913; sub editorial. 
262. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 6. In the opinion of the Courier 
Queensland had "proceeded through the smallpox scare with very 
good fortune". The Brisbane Courier, 5 Aug 1913; sub editorial. 
265, 
Though fresh cases were announced almost daily from Sydney until 
November 1913, there was little to report from Queensland, and as early 
as 29 August, the numbers of applicants for vaccination were so small, 
mooi 
264 
Of, "^  
that the drill hall was closed in the afternoon. By the middle of 
September, vaccination had "almost ceased", 
Considerable animosity against New South Wales had been engendered 
over the disease, both in Commonwealth and Queensland circles, because 
it was felt that as Holman had not "placed an embargo on the disease in 
Of\ ^  
his own state", he had permitted his fellow Australians to be 
attacked. To add to that grievance, the total cost of the scare to 
Queensland had been sizable, both medically and commercially. It 
included the cost of lymph, the expense of inspecting passengers from 
0 ftft OA V 
Sydney, the outlay on two extra nurses needed for public vaccination. 
Of, R 
the charge for medical consultations, the engagement of two extra 
269 
medical men on a temporary basis, the hiring of isolation tents from 
270 the Commonwealth, and the reimbursement of local authority expenses. 
At the Smallpox Conference held in Melbourne to discuss the outbreak 
271 
with its medical and commercial repercussions, the loss in trade and 
revenue was treated as a matter of very considerable importance by the 
medical men attending. Indeed, this aspect weighed so heavily with the 
health authorities that prohibitions against Sydney were lifted in 
263. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Aug 1913. 
264. Ibid., 17 Sep 1913. 
265. Ibid., 14 Oct 1913. Prime Minister Cook's opinion. 
266. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 10 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8109 of 1913. 
267. Secretary, Department of Health to Home Secretary, 8 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8110 of 1913. 
268. For example. Police Magistrate, Croydon to Home Secretary, 15 Aug 
1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.9711 of 1913, regarding 
Dr. Taylor's consultation in Normanton. 
269. Secretary, Department of Health to Home Secretary, 22 Jul 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.8688 of 1913. 
270. Honourable J. Cook, Prime Minister to Chief Secretary Queensland, 
7 Mar 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.2180 of 1914. 
271. Chief Secretary to Home Secretary, 31 Oct 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.12519 of 1913. See also Report of J.I. Moore, 
Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 24 Nov 1913, 
Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, in-letter no.13335 of 1913. 
266. 
272 
November 1913, and full trading was restored, with the provision 
that the New South Wales government should appoint officers, to enforce 
273 
and carry out stipulated conditions. 
A further outbreak of smallpox in New South Wales in 1914 taxed 
relations between Queensland and that state almost to breaking point. 
Not only were even more considerable expenses entailed, but once again, 
Queensland health authorities reported the failure of the New South 
Wales government and its railways department to enforce border 
274 quarantine regulations. As well as this, a number of passengers 
on the Canberra and Ulysses from Sydney could not produce certificates 
275 
of declaration, while the whole crew of the Tasman, and a large 
01 ft 
number of passengers, had no undertakings regarding smallpox. The 
New South Wales authorities had also been remiss in not reporting a 
277 
case of smallpox in Glen Innes, a spot too close to the Queensland 
border for comfort. 
Already pushed beyond tolerance, following the reported discovery 
of a few suspect smallpox cases in Queensland, the administration 
appealed to the Commonwealth authorities for help in dealing with 
New South Wales intransigence. Cumpston records that after the receipt 
of a Queensland request for federal interference, the New South Wales 
health department officers were deputed to act under the Commonwealth 
272. J.I. Moore to Home Secretary, 19 Nov 1913, Q.S.A. HOM/B 42, 
in-letter no.13227 of 1913. 
273. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 6. 
274. Health Department to Home Secretary, 24 Apr 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, 
in-letter no.3551 of 1914, and Health Department to Home 
Secretary, 22 Jun 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, in-letter no.5258 of 1914, 
again complaints about Wallangarra and Tweed Heads. 
275. Health Department to Home Secretary, 16 Jun 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, 
in-letter no.5071 of 1914. 
276. Health Department to Home Secretary, 22 Jun 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, 
in-letter no.5337 of 1914 and subsequent of 25 Jun 1914, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 44, in-letter no.5376 of 1914 regarding the Cooma. 
277. Health Department to Home Secretary, 11 Jun 1914, Q.S.A. HOM/B 44, 
in-letter no.4912 of 1914. 
278. Honourable A.H. Barlow to Home Secretary, 27 May 1914, Q.S.A. 
HOM/B 44, in-letter no.9488 of 1914. It is by no means certain 
that Barlow's information was accurate. Dr. Moore reports that 
five Queensland cases overall contracted the disease in fully 
confirmed cases. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 6. 
267. 
Quarantine Act, though a senior Commonwealth quarantine officer was 
"stationed in Sydney... specially to keep in touch with the progress 
279 
of the epidemic and the methods of State control". 
By strenuous effort in an emergency situation, with a fair degree 
280 
of luck, and still clinging largely to its unvaccinated state, 
Queensland emerged practically unscathed from all of its smallpox scares 
up to 1914. The enormity of that escape can be calculated by a 
comparison of Queensland's five diagnosed cases with Sydney's 1,296 
281 
cases during the fiscal year 1913-14. Yet despite its small 
inroad, smallpox exerted a considerable influence on Queensland thinking. 
Its approach was directly responsible for the passing of the first 
Health Act, and fear of its endemic state among Queensland's northern 
neighbours was the catalyst which led to the establishment of the 
important northern branch of the health department. On the other hand, 
the medical means of immunity had been available to the public of 
Queensland for the whole of the 1859 to 1914 period, but had been 
stubbornly refused, together with medical advice faithfully tendered, 
but consistently ignored. 
279. J.H.L. Cumpston, "The Health of the People - A study in 
federalism", being an unpublished manuscript used with the 
permission of the Librarian, National Library, Canberra, p.53. 
280. See for example. Commissioner of Public Health's "Annual Report", 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1915), 305, where the doctor 
reports that requests for vaccination had "practically dropped 
into abeyance". 
281. Ibid., II (1914), 6. 
THE FIRST PLAGUE 
YEAR - 1900 
Undoubtedly, the most frightful disease to invade Queensland in 
the period up to 1914 was the bubonic plague - a disease of rats 
conveyed by the agency of the rat flea to man, for whom the affliction 
is acute and highly fatal. F.F. Cartwright suggests that from British 
and European experiences dating from the fourteenth century, when the 
pestilence became endemic in northern Europe, "fear of plague was 
entirely justified". Even Shrewsbury, who in his excellent history 
of the disease in the British Isles has done much to correct the 
misconceptions perpetuated by historians who have greatly exaggerated 
the numbers of people ravaged by "the Great Pestilence", uses such 
dramatic words as "woeful", "erratic and unpredictable" therefore 
"greatly feared", "malignant", "raging", and "violent" to describe the 
disease. 
The plague had abandoned its old stamping-ground in London and 
England by the end of the seventeenth century because 
the development of the all-sea trade between Europe and 
India, . . . aboli^ shed. . . the "rodent pipe-line" for the 
transit of P./^ asteurella./ pestis from its Indian 
homeland. 3 
In other words, the western hemisphere was saved from the plague by the 
"elimination of the risk of exposure". But the disease had not been 
eradicated from the east. When the old scourge broke out in epidemic 
proportions in Hong Kong, India, Japan and Russia, in the last seven 
years of the nineteenth century, the new fast ships plying their trade 
on the eastern routes, easily brought the disease within striking 
distance of Queensland. 
1. Cartwright, p.69. 
2. J.F.D. Shrewsbury, A History of Bubonic Plague in the British Isles 
(Cambridge, 1970), pp.3 and 478. See also Thomas McKeown, The 
Modem Rise of Population (London, 1976), p.69. 
3. Shrewsbury, pp.485-86. Cartwright, on the other hand, suggests 
that plague in the rats themselves eventually killed so many of 
the hosts that the fleas died out, since they can only exist on 
a living rat. Cartwright, pp.73-74. This does not account for 
the plague's continued existence in India and other parts of the 
east. 
4. McKeown, p.88. 
268. 
269. 
Some good things emerged from the frightening pandemic. IVorking 
independently, Shibasaburo Kitasato and Alexandre Yersin discovered 
the plague bacillus in 1894, the year in which the disease reached 
Canton and Hong Kong, causing over 90,000 deaths. Shortly afterwards. 
Bacillus pestis in the human 
spleen, a microbe which is 
carried by rats. 
ORIGIN OF THE BLACK DEATH 
working in Hong Kong, Yersin demonstrated the identity of the human 
and rat plague, and in 1897 in Formosa, Ogata Masanori found the plague 
bacilli in the fleas of plague-ridden rats. In the following year. 
Dr. P.L.G. Simond gave proof of the transmission of the bubonic 
plague by fleas, although "the intermediate place of the flea as vector 
was not fully worked out until 1905". 
Despite this proviso, it is clear that from the mid-1890's 
onwards, enough was known of the disease to indicate that any fight to 
eradicate it would provide an object lesson in the power of sanitation. 
But absolute prevention is better than cure, and all of the Australian 
colonies had a means of protecting themselves from the entry of dreaded 
exotic diseases, which was far better than fighting them when they had 
gained a foothold. The foreign press might mock the panic in Australia, 
where the authorities were "notoriously particular in these matters", 
and had closed ports and stopped trade with the afflicted Hong Kong. 
Outsiders might see this as an unnecessary procedure in view of the 
7 
length of the journey from that part of Asia to Australia. But 
5. Cartwright, p.71, and Garrison, pp.862 and 864. 
6. The Queensland authorities had declared Hong Kong an infected 
port on receipt of the plague outbreak news. The proclamation 
was rescinded in October 1894 on the advice of the Central Board 
of Health. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Oct 1894; Minutes of 
Central Board of Health, 5 Oct 1894. 
7. Ibid., 15 Jun 1894; sub editorial, with quotations from the 
Hong Kong Daily Press, 10 May 1894. 
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The Brisbane Courier contended that 
that is a safe sort of notoriety, and we may trust our 
medical authorities and governments to do whatever will 
give the maximum of protection. t 
The government, the health authorities, and the press 
continued to keep a close watch on developments in India and other parts 
of Asia and Africa, while the British Secretary of State for 
Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, offered advice on coping with cholera, 
yellow fever and the plague, from experience gained in dealing with 
12 infectious diseases in the ports of the United Kingdom. The Brisbane 
Courier particularly stressed the Lancet's warning that bubonic plague 
was "a filth disease". Though the paper felt no cause for alarm, it 
did urge that 
there will be nothing lost by caution, and we get 
anew the lesson that cleanliness is next to 
Godliness. 13 
The Central Board of Health, with considerable prescience, began 
communications with their colleagues in the other colonies on the means 
14 
of exterminating rats, and in December 1899, when bubonic plague was 
confirmed in New Caledonia, the member for Rockhampton North, James 
Charles Stewart, asked pertinent questions on the state of Queensland's 
preparedness to deal with the plague. 
This was a matter of paramount importance in view of Dr. Ashburton 
Thompson's 
8. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Jun 1894; sub editorial. 
9. Hugh Nelson, Premier of Queensland to Home Secretary, 5 Feb 1897, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A813, in-telegram no.1613 of 1897, from Hobart where 
Nelson was consulting his fellow premiers on this and other problems 
10. Government Medical Officer, Brisbane to Home Secretary, 6 Feb 1897, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A813,in-letter no.1712 of 1897,Central Board of Health 
to Home Secretary,8 Feb 1897,Q.S.A. C0L/A813,in-letter no.1719 
of 1897, and Central Board of Health to Under Secretary Home 
Department,3 May 1899, Q.S.A. C0L/A830,in-letter no.6045 of 1899. 
11. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Jan 1897; main editorial. Ibid., 11 Nov 
1898, and Ibid., 24 Nov 1898. 
12. Circular from Joseph Chamberlain sending copies of regulations, 
printed in Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, IV (1897) 
1209. 
13. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Jan 1897; main editorial. 
14. Ibid., 3 Dec 1898; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 2 Dec 1898. 
15. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1900, p.73, 28 Dec 1899. 
16. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIII (1899), 1595. All the 
Chief Secretary, James Robert Dickson, proposed on 27 December 
1899 was the proclamation of New Caledonia as an infected port. 
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alarming confession_that if the plague were to break out 
in /New South Wales^ / the authorities would be totally 
unprepared. Over a year^  ago, the urgent representation 
of the Board /of Health/ caused expressions of fear from 
the people lest the government should sanction the 
presence of bacilli in Sydney. The government of the 
day shared that view, and consequently the proposal to 
obtain the prophylactic against the plague was abandoned. 
Dr. Thompson warned that heavy demands for the prophylactic from the 
laboratory in Bombay, where the stuff was made, would certainly slow 
down or even entirely cut off supplies to Australia. This would be 
extremely unfortunate should the plague reach this country. Of 
victims not inoculated 70% to 80% died, but this was generally 
reversed if the prophylactic had been administered. Nurses and doctors 
working with possible plague patients would be in grave danger, if 
17 inoculation were withheld. 
Australians did not have long to wait for the dreaded disease to 
18 break out in their own country. On 13 January 1900, two cases of 
19 plague were reported in Adelaide. This was followed by the discovery 
of victims in Sydney, and the declaration of the capital of New South 
20 
Wales as an infected port. The first case in Queensland occurred at 
21 Rockhampton on the S.S. Burwah on 16 April 1900, and eleven days 
22 later the first Brisbane casualty was detected. 
17. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Dec and 29 Dec 1899. Dr. Ashburton 
Thompson assured contemporaries that if the bacillus was available, 
the material was easy enough to produce. In Queensland, the 
Yersin-Roux serum, obtained at first from the Pasteur Institute, 
Paris, and then from the Lister Preventive Institute in London, 
was used. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1907), 144. 
18. For early warnings from the Courier's correspondents that the plague 
was on Queensland's doorstep see for example The Brisbane Courier, 
1 Jan 1900; letter to editor from A Wanderer, Ibid., 8 Jan 1900; 
letter to editor from Caution, and Ibid., 11 Jan 1900; letter to 
editor from G. Sandford Jackson, M.B. Ch.B. 
19. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1901, p.64, and The Brisbane Courier, 
15 Jan 1900; sub editorial. There was some doubt as to whether 
these cases were true plague. The Bulletin pooh-poohed the idea, 
but doctors in Adelaide and Queensland were convinced. The 
Brisbane Courier, 23 Jan 1900; letter to editor from Hartley 
Dixon, Physician etc. 
20. Extract from Central Board of Health to Home Secretary, 29 Nov 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 839, in-letter no.18303 of 1900 and attachments going 
back to letter from Premier of New South Wales to Premier of 
Queensland, 30 Mar 1900. 
21. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1901, p.94. 
22. Ibid., p.66. 
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By this time, frantic communications had taken place both by 
telegram and letter between the principal cities as yet unaffected by 
the disease - Melbourne and Brisbane. Regulations designed especially 
to prevent the landing of rats from ships were hastily exchanged and 
23 implemented. At a special meeting, the Central Board of Health 
debated the wisdom of allowing any steamers to load or unload at the 
city wharves, but even in this emergency, the claims of trade and 
commerce were taken into account, and to prevent "inconvenience and 
dislocation" in business circles, the Melbourne precautions were 
24 
accepted. The government also arranged for Dr. Hill Wray to proceed 
to Sydney and Melbourne, to examine at first hand "the symptoms of 
25 bubonic plague and sanitary matters in connection with shipping". 
Some confusion as to the transmission of the disease was obvious 
from the type of advice being forwarded to Queensland from Great Britain, 
and from the discussions which took place at the Venice International 
Sanitary Conference and the Australian Intercolonial Medical Congress. 
Noone doubted the danger from rats, and authorities were advised to 
give these creatures and the "accumulations of filth where they could 
0 f\ 
gather", speedy attention. But the Berlin Imperial Health Office, 
whose conclusions were circulated to all British colonies, suggested 
that the illness "most frequently occurs by contact; next by coughing,.. 
/and/ infection by means of dust may ensue". Nevertheless, the Germans 
27 did underline the danger from the fleas which infest rats. 
The work undertaken later by Drs. John Ashburton Thompson, Frank 
Tidswell and B. Burnett Ham was of considerable importance in 
establishing the rat-flea hypothesis already advanced by Simond in 
23. Home Secretary, Victoria to Under Secretary, Home Department 
Brisbane, 7 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/A 835, in-letter no.3527 of 
1900 and attachments. 
24. URGENT letter from Central Board of Health to Under Secretary 
Home Department, 13 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/A 835, in-letter no.3640 
of 1900. 
25. Chief Secretary's Office to Home Secretary's Department, 25 Apr 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/A 835, in-letter no.5911 of 1900 and Wray's reply 
27 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. COL/A 835, in-letter no.5981 attached. One of 
the problems in dealing with exotic diseases is the lack of 
experience with diagnosis. 
26. "Publications of the Berlin Imperial Health Office dealing with 
Bubonic Plague", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, 
V (1900), 1146. See also "Melbourne Plague Convention, 
forwarded to Chief Secretary, Queensland, 11 April 1900", 
Q.S.A. COL/286, in-letter no.18018 of 1900. 
27. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, V (1900), 1146-47. 
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28 
1898, and firmly held by some medical men dealing with the early 
29 plague victims in Australia. But at the beginning of the plague scare, 
the controversy over the alleged dangers from rats was given prominence 
in local and national journals. Sarcastic paragraphs and cartoons 
appeared weekly in The Bulletin, which listed the "comic accessories" 
which surrounded the doctors' handling of the early plague victims in 
Adelaide and Sydney, and jeered at the precautions. 
And this at the end of the 19th century, is the sort 
of science represented by a costly Government 
department manned by picked graduates of the local 
Varsity! Rats 11 30 
In Brisbane, the local authorities and The Brisbane Courier and 
its readers felt that the largest effort should be concentrated, not 
on rat catching, but on the cleaning of drains, gully holes, and 
back-yards, together with the very free use of carbolic acid. Racist 
feelings were well to the fore, as the habits and environment of 
coloured immigrants were castigated for providing the best conditions 
31 for bubonic plague to find its natural home. Particularly vigorous 
attention was to be paid to "those parts of the municipality frequented 
32 by Chinese and other Asiatics", and to the schools "where a 
33 
considerable number of coloured aliens' children attend". In the 
north, the condemnation of conditions and solutions offered were even 
more rigorous and repressive. The Mackay Chronicle demanded that 
28. Ford, "Australia and the Great Plague", no page numbers. See also 
Within, p. 269. 
29. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Jan 1900; Minutes of special meeting of 
Central Board of Health, 25 Jan 1900. The full text of the 
Sydney Board of Health telegram to the Brisbane board is included 
here. The Sydney doctors had found "visible evidence that the 
patient was inoculated by a flea". 
30. The Bulletin, 3 Feb 1900. Further facetious pars followed. For 
instance in Ibid., 17 Feb 1900. "The police are said to be on 
the trail of the flea which caused bubonic plague in Sydney and 
believe they have a clue..." The Bulletin was convinced that the 
real danger stemmed from the lack of proper care with plague 
"specimens". 
31. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Jan 1900; sub editorial. 
32. Ibid., 11 Jan 1900; letter to editor from G. Sandford Jackson, 
Ibid.; main editorial. Ibid., 16 Jan 1900; long article labelled 
"Preventive Action in Queensland", Ibid., 18 Jan 1900, Ibid.; 
letters to editor from West Ward and J.A. Hicklin, and Ibid., 
19 Jan 1900; sub editorial. 
33. Ibid., 24 Jan 1900; letter to editor from M.L.A. South Brisbane. 
By the end of February the Courier was calling for a campaign 
against rats. 
274. 
the authorities retain _/^ the Kanaka_s^ / on the plantations 
where they work, forbidding movement therefrom without 
passes duly signed.... Bathing on the part of Polynesians 
should be enforced. 34 
If Queenslanders were uncertain about some aspects of the causes 
of plague, they were unanimous about one thing - a concerted effort was 
needed to deal with a threat of this scale. No demur was heard from 
ratepayers, or from the various local authorities concerned, when the 
Home Secretary, Justin Foxton, used the relevant clause of the 1884 
Health Act to place practically the whole of the metropolitan area 
under one body for health purposes - the Metropolitan Joint Board 
for the Prevention of Epidemic Diseases. In the north of the colony 
also, the request was made that whatever 
the Government ha/d/ secured in the south should be 
continued in the north, so that it may become a common 
defence. 35 
What was called into question was the efficacy of the 1884 
Health Act and the position of the Central Board of Health appointed 
under that Act, both vis-a-vis the joint board, and also with regard 
to all local authorities, the general population of Queensland, and 
the central government itself. 
The Health Act, in effect, holds the government liable for 
oversight and initiative.... which means if the Home Secretary 
as the minister responsible is careless or foolish, the Board 
of Health may become worse than useless.... The Board of Health 
is dependent upon the Home Secretary. Its recommendations 
may or may not be heeded.... An inspector may not be appointed, 
nor a defiant local body be dealt with unless the minister 
agrees.... This concentration of power is full of possibilities 
both for good and evil. Mr. Foxton has illustrated the good 
by constituting a joint authority. He may illustrate the 
evil by resting on his oars. If he ignores the Board of 
Health in a crisis like the present, it will continue 
helpless while superintending the operation of the Health 
Act. The Board was intended by Parliament to be both hands 
and head to the Government in matters of health; and now is 
the time to equip it with the necessary power, so that not 
only the joint authority, but all local bodies, may be under 
supervision. 36 
34. The Mackay Chronicle, 4 Mar 1900. 
35. Ibid. See also R.H. Robinson, For My Country (Brisbane, 1957), 
p.120, Dr. Hill Wray to Under Secretary Home Department, 
6 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter no.3301 of 1900, and 
Within, p.341. 
36. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Mar 1900; sub editorial. The Courier 
had already questioned the board's powers under the Health Act. 
Ibid., 25 Jan 1900; sub editorial. 
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It was becoming increasingly obvious, even at the beginning of this 
plague year, that frictions between boards were the order of the day, 
37 
and that the much needed cooperation was nowhere to be found. 
Even if the secret of prompt, collaborative effort could have 
been discovered, another ingredient was necessary if a successful 
campaign were to be mounted. What the colony needed was a large 
injection of funds. The government was willing to advance the money in 
the first instance, but the united authorities had to agree to go on 
38 
raising the necessary amounts by precept. This in itself was to cause 
endless problems for the future. 
The difficulties began to multiply almost at once. One of the 
first of the large costs of the plague year was the provision of a properly 
equipped disinfecting chamber, which the Brisbane City Council had 
39 previously refused point-blank to buy. This new emergency had 
already assumed such proportions that the government and the local 
authorities decided to throw monetary caution to the winds, and to 
purchase the largest possible Reck Disinfecting Apparatus immediately. 
Alas, "the best laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft a-gley". There 
was no Reck disinfector to be had in Australia, and although a cable 
40 
was sent immediately to Copenhagen, the colony faced an import delay of 
the 
42 
41 
at least four months. The government did manage one success, ough 
not in time to prevent Brisbane being declared an infected port, 
37. Ibid., 28 Feb 1900; sub editorial, and Metropolitan Joint 
Board for the Prevention of Epidemic Diseases to Home Secretary, 
16 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/A 835, in-letter no.3839 of 1900, 
complaining that it was not kept informed on plague regulations 
and other matters by the Central Board of Health. 
38. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Feb 1900. 
39. In the smallpox emergency of 1892. See Within, p.248, f.n.153. 
40. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Feb 1900. 
41. Ibid., 5 Mar 1900. See also Dr. Hill Wray to Chief Secretary, 
14 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/286, in-letter no.2989 of 1900 asking 
for additional disinfectors for Pinkenba, Townsville and 
Thursday Island, and Wray to Home Secretary, 2 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. 
COL/ 286, in-letter no.5177 of 1900, enclosing a large plan of 
the disinfecting chamber preferred. 
42. Melbourne regarded Brisbane as an infected port from 7 March 1900, 
although no official notification had been received, and although 
the Central Board of Health protested that no "human being here 
has in any way become infected". The Brisbane Courier, 8 Mar 1900. 
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Dr. H.T.S. Bell was despatched to Wallangarra to inspect train 
travellers from Sydney and to remove suspects to an isolated place 
43 
where they could be dealt with properly. As for the Brisbane City 
Council, five new subinspectors were appointed to patrol the wharves 
44 from dawn to dusk to watch for rats, while several local councils 
in and around Brisbane, acting on Central Board of Health advice, 
entered upon a crusade against the rats, offering 2/- a dozen for them, 
45 
and safely cremating the dead bodies at the Gas Works. This bonanza 
for the local small fry was short-lived. On 7 March 1900, the Brisbane 
and South Brisbane councils and the Booroodabin Divisional Board 
withdrew the offer of the reward, because it was feared that unsupervised 
46 handling of rats by children could spread, rather than contain, disease. 
On the very next day, some of Brisbane's worst fears were confirmed 
when C.J. Pound, the government bacteriologist, discovered the plague 
47 bacillus in rats found in Brisbane. The alarm had broken out at 
48 last, and the race to obtain the prophylactic began - too late as 
49 
usual as "Rats I Look Ahead I" complained. In fact, the vaccine was 
due to arrive in Brisbane the following night. 
Other provisions were made at once. The Home Secretary gave orders 
for one "suspect" tent to be erected in Victoria Park. This was done 
immediately, but just as quickly objections from nearby residents poured 
in. The Central Board of Health issued new recommendations covering 
43. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Mar 1900. 
44. Ibid., 8 Mar 1900. 
45. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1901, p.93. 
46. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Mar 1900. But see Ibid., 12 Mar 1900; 
letter to editor from Pro Bono Publico, who suggested that the 
bonus for the collection of rats should not be removed, but 
should be doubled or trebled. 
47. Ibid., 9 Mar 1900. 
48. Earlier The Brisbane Courier had suggested that patriotic feeling 
engendered by the outbreak of the Boer War had counteracted panic 
over the plague so that Brisbanites were "taking the plague /news 
from Sydney/ quietly and in a commonsense fashion". Ibid., 
7 Mar 1900; sub editorial. 
49. Ibid., 9 Mar 1900; letter to editor from Rats! Look Ahead! See 
also^  Ibid.; letters to editor from E. Sandford Jackson and 
Kubberdah. 
50. rbid., 10 Mar 1900. 
51. Ibid. Foxton tried to allay fears by assuring the public that "the 
plague is contagious not infectious, so that there is no danger 
from the site selected." But see, T.A. Bond, Secretary, Trustees 
Victoria Park to Home Secretary, 22 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 239, 
in-letter no.4108 of 1900. 
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the quarantine station at Peel Island, the furnishing of the 
"observation hospital" in Victoria Park, the isolation of suspicious 
cases, the inoculation of officials dealing with the plague, and the 
52 detention of steamers from infected ports at Pinkenba. The Home 
53 Secretary readily agreed to the submissions, but it was not long 
before shipping interests began to protest at the Pinkenba arrangements. 54 
The very real alarm which erupted in the capital at this early 
stage, unnecessarily as it turned out, is illustrated by an incident 
on board the S.S. Burwah which had just arrived in Brisbane from the 
north. The confusion and lack of preparedness for any emergency 
situation is also underlined. The captain, fearing that a sick sailor 
had the plague, called on the Honourable Dr. W.F. Taylor to examine the 
patient. But Taylor, sticking carefully to the conventions, directed 
him to the correct authority, either the health officer. Dr. Hill Wray 
or Dr. Wilton Love, the secretary of the Central Board of Health. As 
Wray was at Dunwich, Love communicated with the Home Secretary. Another 
doctor, who had had plague experience in Hong Kong, was deputed to 
study the case at 2 p.m. that same day. The collector of customs and the 
commissioner of police were alerted, and a cordon was thrown around the 
vessel. Meanwhile, a very anxious secretary of the Seaman's Union, 
fearful for his members confined on the "death ship", called in 
Dr. O'Doherty. This gentleman apparently felt that this was no time 
to uphold protocol. He examined the sailor at once, and pronounced 
him to be suffering from rheumatism, not plague, a diagnosis confirmed 
by Dr. Mayne at the Brisbane hospital to which the sufferer was 
removed. When the correct officials. Dr. Wilton W.R. Love and the 
expert. Dr. F. Wilson, arrived on board at the due time, the police 
guard had been withdrawn and the patient had flown. 
52. Central Board of Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
9 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/286, in-letter no.3439 of 1900. Pinkenba 
wharves are near the mouth of the Brisbane River. The railway 
station is nine miles from the city. 
53. Foxton's marginal comment on Ibid. 
54. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Mar 1900. 
55. Ibid., 10 Mar 1900. 
fiATS AS CURRENCY. 
No. 20. The Bulletin, 17 March, 1900. 
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Yet the Burwah affair was "a blessing in disguise", which spurred 
local councils to renewed cleansing efforts, though the most 
immediately obvious outcome was increased dissension between the 
authorities charged with guarding the public health. The joint local 
board was officially constituted "in business" by the Home Secretary, 
and a medical officer, the experienced Dr. F. Wilson, and a secretary, 
57 
Ernest Harpur, were appointed to serve the board. The board judged 
58 
Victoria Park unsuitable as the site for an isolation ward, a decision 
hotly contended by the Central Board of Health, which won a temporary 
59 
victory on this issue. On the other hand, the Metropolitan Joint 
Board so deprecated the dislocation of trade and the consequent damage 
to the economy threatened by the central board's Pinkenba resolution, 
that the health body agreed, under protest, to waive its recommendations 
Matters were certainly not improved, when a deputation to the Home 
Secretary from the combined local councils sought clarification on 
the question of central government subsidies and local government 
contributions. Although some representatives were satisfied with the 
arrangement, which divided the cost of dealing with the plague on the 
56. The Brisbane Courier,16 Mar 1900;letter to editor from Cleanly. 
A huge niomber of letters on the plague were published at this stage 
in the Courier. Only a few examples are given here. Ibid., 10 Mar 
1900; letter to editor from George Comyn, D.P. Lucas, and 
Observer, Ibid., 14 Mar 1900; letter to editor from Bubonic 
Plague and Rats, Ibid., 15 Mar 1900; letter to editor from 
E.W. Kerr Scott, M.B., Ibid., 16 Mar 1900; letter to editor from 
Phosphor, Ibid., 23 Mar 1900; letter to editor from Resident and 
W.H., Ibid., 2 Apr 1900; letter to editor from W.F. Taylor, M.D., 
D.P.H., Ibid., 3 Apr 1900; letter to editor from Thomas P. Lucas, 
Ibid., 4 Apr 1900;letter to editor from Sanitas, and Ibid., 11 Apr 
1900; letter to editor from Rats, Fleas and Bubonic Plague. 
57. Ibid., 12 Mar 1900;Minutes of first meeting of Metropolitan Joint 
Board for the Prevention of Epidemic Diseases - Justin Foxton in 
attendance, 11 Mar 1900. Dr. Wilson accepted the position on a 
temporary basis only. Ibid., 13 Mar 1900. An even larger board 
embracing further authorities was gazetted on 19 April 1900. 
Queensland Government Gazette, LXXIII (1900), 1131. 
58. This was a long-time attitude of the Brisbane City Council which 
had refused permission for a smallpox hospital in the park. 
Within, p.241. 
59. The Brisbane Courier,13 Mar 1900;Minutes of special meeting of 
Central Board of Health,12 Mar 1900.The erection of tents proceeded, 
and nursing staff was chosen.But see also Harpur to Under Secretary 
Home Department,14 Mar 1900,Q.S.A. COL/286,in-letter no.3768 of 190C 
detailing a number of public protests over the Victoria Park Site. 
60. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Mar 1900;Minutes of Metropolitan Joint 
Board. 
61. Ibid., 13 Mar 1900; Minutes of Central Board of Health. 
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basis of population, others were concerned about the curious fact 
elicited by discussion 
that so long as a local authority was able to raise 
it^ s share of^  the general rates, it would receive 
/government^/ endowment, whereas if its share was so 
large as to compel a health rate, it would have to bear 
the whole burden. 
The Brisbane Courier felt that it was 
impossible to believe that so glaring an anomaly will be 
perpetuated.... Any levy required to serve the local 
joint authority should be debarred. 63 
One issue, on which "Mr. Foxton was specially clear, not to say 
emphatic", caused particular "irritation and offence" to the local 
bodies. This was the relative positions of the Central Board of Health 
and the Metropolitan Joint Board. For although the combined local 
bodies were obviously going to be responsible for the raising of funds, 
they were to have "no say at all" in their disbursal. Rather, members 
of the Metropolitan Joint Board were to hold themselves ready at 
all times 
to carry out the instructions of the Central Board of 
Health,... and were not, either separately or jointly, 
to set their opinion in medical matters against the 
Board, or complain of the expense involved. 64 
The Metropolitan Joint Board extracted only one crumb of comfort from 
the meeting with Foxton, and even this was a tentative suggestion - that 
plague suspects should be placed, not in Victoria Park, but on a hulk 
. ,^ . 65 
m the river. 
There can be no doubt as to the community's interest in the widely 
publicised differences between the health boards, or its concern with 
the plague itself, and the efforts being made to prepare for it. Both 
are attested to by sarcastic and sometimes despairing letters to the 
62. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Mar 1900; Home Secretary's Speech to 
members of the Local Government Association on board the Lucinda, 
7 Mar 1900. The population figures and contribution rates are 
listed here. 
63. Ibid., 16 Mar 1900; sub editorial. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid. It did occur to the Central Board of Health that Peel 
Island might be used, but Dr. Hill Wray judged that the place 
was completely unsuitable. Hill Wray to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 13 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter no.3776 of 
1900. 
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press, and by the enthusiasm and interest shown by the large crowd 
which packed the School of Arts, to hear Dr. Wilson's public lecture 
yn 
on the plague. 
Neither was there any question as to the general relief which 
attended the Home Secretary's announcement that he had purchased 
"Cairncross", a large property near Bulimba, made available to the 
government by the Honourable A.J. Thynne. It "embrace/d/ a considerable 
area between the main road and the river", and could accommodate forty 
to fifty patients, in addition to the necessary attendants. Its only 
drawbacks were a very large natural swamp, its distance from town, 
and the usual rash of complaints, deputations, and public protest 
meetings from nearby residents. 
In a burst of enthusiasm, the government also undertook to aid 
the Metropolitan Joint Board by equipping the hospital 
as far as buildings [yerej concerned, and to pay half 
of the salaries connected with the institution. 71 
But the drainage and sanitary work trenches were so much the province 
of local government, that the Home Secretary left all of these 
72 
arrangements to the joint board. With the "Cairncross" decision, 
which signalled the official abandonment of Victoria Park as a place 
for an infectious diseases hospital, the sensibilities of the local 
government board can be said to have triumphed over that "body of 
66. Within, p. 276, f.n. 51 and p.278, f.n.59. 
67. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Mar 1900. 
68. Ibid., 31 Mar 1900, 3 Apr 1900, 4 Apr 1900; sub editorial, and 
copy of Harpur to Under Secretary Home Department, 31 Mar 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter no.4614 of 1900. 
69. Only Dr. Love mentioned this and even he admitted that it suited 
most people and most local authorities perfectly,_since "the 
general public had strong objections to this", /a suspect or 
plague hospital close to town/. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Mar 
1900. 
70. Ibid., 3 Apr 1900. "It was a most preposterous thing to plant 
in the midst of a thriving suburb what must be a pest and fever 
breeding hospital". Later Foxton refused to receive a deputation 
from the Balmoral Divisional Board, which averred that the 
government had treated the locality "shabbily". Ibid., 7 Apr 1900. 
71. Ibid., 10 Apr 1900, and Home Secretary to Joint Board and Central 
Board of Health, 11 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, unnumbered 
memorandum of 1900, and marginal comment. 
72. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Apr 1900. 
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73 
experts", their rivals at the Central Board of Health. 
Only one dark cloud seemed to remain on the eve of the discovery 
of Queensland's first plague victim. The Brisbane Courier regretted 
that 
some people still refuse seriously the fact that rats 
and bubonic plague must be fought together.... Fun has been 
made of the fuss regarding rats.... We are told that the 
rats are scavengers, and to reduce their number too greatly 
will reduce nature's balance.... Authorities here seem to 
have abandoned_any serious attempt^ s to reduce their 
numbers.... /But plague experts'/ advice to wage war upon 
rats is as emphatic as it is worthy of adoption.... Cleansing 
is not enough.... The imperative duty is to kill the rats. 74 
Unfortunately, it was not only the eradication of rats - for which 
Dr. Taylor offered the sensible advice that "a dozen or so professional 
75 
rat catchers would be a much better importation than a plague expert" 
- which confronted the authorities when plague first made its appearance 
in Brisbane. Despite Foxton's early enthusiasm for "Cairncross", or 
Colmslie as it became known, neither he, nor the Board of Health, nor 
Dr. E.T. Wynne, who had been attached to the Metropolitan Joint Board 
n f, 
to advise the Home Secretary on the requirements for the hospital, 
had done anything of much practical value. Town water supplies had not 
77 yet been laid on to the property. Nor did it have adequate laundry, 
bathing, cooking or heating facilities, let alone renovated and properly 
78 
equipped hospital wards. Swift communications with Colmslie were 
79 
ensured by the installation of a telephone system late in April, but 
when the actual plague emergency arose, patients had to be accommodated 
80 in tents erected on the property. 
73. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Mar 1900; Report of Metropolitan Joint 
Board for the Prevention of Infectious Diseases to Home Secretary, 
15 Mar 1900. 
74. Ibid., 12 Apr 1900; sub editorial. 
75. Ibid., 18 Apr 1900; letter to editor from Dr. W.F. Taylor. 
76. Harpur to Home Secretary, 1 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. COL/286, in-letter 
no.5504 of 1900. 
77. At this stage supplies had only reached Galloway's Hill which is 
more than a mile away from Colmslie. 
78. Dr. F. Wilson to President Metropolitan Conjoint Board, 17 Apr 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/286, unnumbered copy of in-letter of 1900, and The 
Brisbane Courier, 18 Apr 1900; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
17 Apr 1900. 
79. Superintendent of Telegraphs to Under Secretary Home Department, 
24 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. COL/239, in-letter no.5845 of 1900. 
80. Dr. David Wield to Dr. Hare, 6 May 1900, Q.S.A. COL/239, in-letter 
no.6481 of 1900. 
m^fn lh« cMt i^  Kro» injj rc>d tJide quicVly nut of t ^ l| I 
AnH awiftlv waoh vour he**!. 
WMH ^nil pr»v 1 
dAj il nttuHy < 
And itir »l«r» o^me one by f>oe, 
Pr»y nnd w^h I 
Oh. •|iiifklv »oiik your foot when tho nitjht in f»llin(f fleets 
.\nfl ih<' cvcninf «Ur coo* downward tho dull ttky-rim to tam%, 
And Ih" parmt rriftb wulty in the ficldi of goidcD whc&t, 
A\'tt«h and pray 
liipr^ is but ODC fospcl true Bod I preach it unto you, 
WbcQ the pl&^e comei Like tho ipectre thAl h&onts the sombn 
yew 
^ u \ j Tour tocki -oh . w&sh ihcm »ooa. »Jid your mingled *hirt And lU bony feet ire on the ttrect and tresd them night and d»y 
»t*nt>oQ. WUkx fcad pr»y 1 
ktA Tour •ollkr 'nrr\th the Ixarai of the oold white crc*cent mocm, Bui mora c»peci»Jly waih Uiii earthly tenement of S-^J^ 
Pray mod « fc.sh ! W « h and prey I 
E. McN. 
THE BUBOinC PLAGXTZ-WAflH AJfD FEAT I 
No. 21 . The B u l l e t i n , 14 A p r i l , 1900. 
282. 
Justin Foxton, in attempting to reconcile his "duty to the 
community... with his duty to... protect the Treasury", had ignored 
Wynne's advice, and had tried to furnish Colmslie as economically 
81 
and as slowly as possible. Frugality is normally creditable in a 
statesman, thundered The Brisbane Courier. But in the climate of the 
plague year 1900, when 
with unreadiness would have come such a panic that money 
would have been poured out like water, 82 
Foxton's parsimony looked like crass "inability to grapple with an 
83 
emergency in the right spirit", although his decision to second 
Dr. J.E. Hare, Inspector of Charitable Institutions to advise him on 
"necessities to make the hospital complete", promised improvements for 
the future. 
Nor did the Central Board of Health escape rebuke. In its 
continuing battle with the Metropolitan Joint Board, the central board 
carried correctness to ridiculous lengths, refusing to meet Dr. Wynne 
85 
except at its own invitation and on its own terms, and insisting on 
censuring the doctor for the tardiness for which the board and its own 
permanent chairman, the Home Secretary, certainly bore the greatest 
blame. Small wonder that Wynne, harassed from all sides, "was in a 
Rft 
mind to 'chuck' the whole thing", or that The Brisbane Courier, 
dismayed at the confusion and lack of cooperation exhibited by all 
87 bodies responsible for the health matters in Queensland, made an 
impassioned plea for the amendment of the Health Act, and for the 
bestowal of executive powers on a greatly strengthened Central Board of 
RR 
Health. 
81. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Apr 1900; main editorial. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Marginal comment by Foxton, 23 Apr 1900, on Harpur to Under 
Secretary Home Department, 23 Apr 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter 
no.5710 of 1900. 
85. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Apr 1900; letter to editor from E.T. Wynne. 
86. Ibid., 18 Apr 1900; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 17 Apr 1900 
- defence of Wynne by Dr. Connolly in the face of Theodore Unmack's 
severe criticism. Wynne did resign and refused to reconsider his 
withdrawal. Ibid., 23 Apr 1900; letter to editor from E.T. Wynne. 
87. The Courier wrote this piece in response to a letter from E. 
Sandford Jackson, who deplored the divisive nature of health 
authorities' wrangles. Ibid., 20 Apr 1900; letter to editor 
from Dr. E. Sandford Jackson. 
88. Ibid.; main editorial. 
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These requests were followed by many more specific demands for 
a concentration of authority in one set of hands - preferably those of 
a professional chairman of the central board, who could take his place 
89 
alongside the southern colonies' experts. But the advice fell on 
deaf ears, and Queensland authorities were, as usual, caught napping 
when a plague victim was found in South Brisbane. The Metropolitan 
Joint Board seemed "eager to play its part", but its action was "doubtful 
and spasmodic". Ships began to carry both plague victims and infected 
rats down the Queensland coast, and wharves presented "so many doors to 
90 let in trouble". Drs. Bancroft and Love, who were now charged with 
attending to any plague patients after the resignations of both Drs. 
91 Wynne and Wilson, had only just been inoculated and were too ill to 
92 deal with the disease. To add to the confusion, the arrival of the 
first patient at Colmslie before all of the work had been done, 
precipitated a strike among the workmen, further holding up the 
93 provision of much needed facilities there. Vainly do the Home 
Secretary and the Mayor of Brisbane sit up until two in the morning 
trying to deal with the emergency, admonished The Brisbane Courier. 
The public would be better pleased if the experts were 
equipped to deal with the matter.... Events have presented a 
complete condemnation of defective machinery.... Mr. Foxton 
as head of the Police Department and as chief of Local 
Government has his hands full without attempting to fight the 
plague. What is required now is that he should be given a 
live, vigorous Board of Health to do what, after all, would 
be enough for a department by itself. 94. 
89. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Apr 1900; letter to editor from 
Dr. David Hardie. See also Harpur to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 20 Mar 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter no.3911 of 
1900, calling for the appointment of a plague expert to take 
charge overall and subsequent of 5 Apr 1900, Q.S.A, COL/ 286, 
in-letter no.4955 of 1900. The first call for the year for an 
expert of this kind to take up a permanent position of head of 
a health department was made by the Central Board of Health. 
The Brisbane Courier, 6 Feb 1900. 
90. Ibid., 28 Apr 1900; sub editorial. 
91. Ibid., 28 Apr 1900. The Courier felt that these rapid resignations 
were a disgrace which highlighted general dissatisfaction with the 
government's handling of the plague emergency. 
92. Ibid., 30 Apr 1900; sub editorial. 
93. Ibid. See also Dr. David Wield to Dr, Hare, 6 May 1900, Q,S.A. 
COL/ 239, in-letter no.6481 of 1900. 
94. The Brisbane Courier, 1 May 1900; sub editorial. 
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95 Constant calls on the same lines followed, as the government 
96 hurriedly published regulations to deal with bubonic plague. The 
city was covered with large yellow posters carrying messages in big 
red letters, which screamed the need for forceful exertions against 
97 
rats, and promised the free distribution of poison. 
The Brisbane Courier reinforced the posters' message with urgent 
98 
appeals for the removal of filth, and members of the Brisbane Citizens' 
Vigilance Committee applied themselves to unearthing "dwellings of a 
character which are quite unfit for human habitation, especially in view 
99 
of the threatened spread of bubonic plague". No premises required 
more attention than the government owned and operated court houses, 
watch-houses, cells and outhouses, which abounded in filth, untrapped 
drains, and innumerable rat-holes, and which the clerk of petty sessions 
assumed would take "someone a few weeks" to cleanse, stop up and 
^ . ^ 100 fumigate. 
Two other very real problems were revealed. The first was that 
as no fresh cases of plague were detected in Brisbane in mid-1900, 
even aware citizens were lulled into false security, and became, 
according to the 
judgement of a contemporary and prominent medical man,... 
ca^ llous and_indifferent. . .. and unaware that there was 
/^ continuing^ / danger. 101 
The other difficulty arose from the refusal of a great many people in 
the capital, both lay and medical, to believe that bubonic plague was 
actually in Australia. In spite of the work of C.J. Pound in isolating 
the plague bacillus both in rats and in the human victims, and despite 
95. The Brisbane Courier, 16 May 1900; sub editorial. Ibid., 
17 May 1900; sub editorial, and Ibid., 26 May 1900; sub editorial. 
96. "Regulations of the Central Board of Health for the Treatment of 
Persons affected with Bubonic Plague and for Preventing the Spread 
of that Disease", Queensland Government Gazette, LXXIII (1900), 
1421-30, 19 May 1900. 
97. These posters were the work of Drs. Hare, Bancroft and Love. 
The Brisbane Courier, 17 May 1900. 
98. Ibid., 10 May 1900. 
99. Secretary, Citizens' Vigilance Committee, 2 Jun 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 
239, in-letter no.8360 of 1900. 
100. Clerk of Petty Sessions to Police Magistrate, 9 May 1900, Q.S.A. 
COL/ 239, in-letter no.6712 of 1900, and subsequent of 14 May 
1900, in-letter no.7047 of 1900. 
101. The Brisbane Courier, 17 May 1900. 
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The Lancet's assumption that the disease found in Queensland was plague, 
some medical men insisted that the illness "only exists here in 
102 
unhealthy imaginations". 
Such illusions of safety were shattered when the plague broke 
out again in July 1900, when acrimonious differences of opinion on the 
action taken by the Metropolitan Joint Board and the Central Board of 
Health led to renewed pleas for a single health authority capable of 
103 giving definite directions and practical services. Added to the 
general confusion was the monetary burden of fighting the plague. Though 
local government authorities raised their rates perilously high, they 
still saw their funds "swallowed by the insatiable plague monster", 
which made protracted, immoderate, and quite unexpected demands, and 
left nothing for the ordinary work of their districts. The emergency 
of the plague was leading to nothing less than the strangulation of 
104 local government, and on these grounds various local authorities felt 
justified in refusing to pay plague precepts. The destruction of 
local government was a concept quite unacceptable to transplanted 
Britons, whose ideas of basic freedom were founded, to a large extent, 
on the rights, privileges and obligations of these political units. 
An immediate injection of an extra <^ 5,000 was granted by the Treasury 
to fight the plague, though Ernest Harpur, on behalf of the 
Metropolitan Joint Board, was still complaining that "no final decision 
102. The Brisbane Courier, 29 May 1900; sub editorial. 
103. Ibid., 5 Jul 1900; main editorial. By this time, according to the 
Courier, there had been 61 cases of plague in the colony - 30 
fatal, 18 discharged as cured, and 13 remaining under treatment. 
But see "Appendix to Registrar-General's Forty-first Annual Report 
on the Vital Statistics of Queensland for the year ended 31st 
December 1900", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1901), facing this page, showing the total number of deaths from 
bubonic plague for the whole of 1900 to be 48. 
104. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jul 1900; main editorial, and Ibid., 
general reporting on the deputation of local bodies to the Home 
Secretary on the issue of plague expenses. See also The Telegraph, 
13 Jul 1900. 
105. Harpur to Under Secretary Home Department, 16 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. 
COL/286, in-letter no.12720 of 1900. 
106. Under Secretary Treasury Department to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 18 Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/238, in-letter no.11134 of 
1900. At this time Colmslie was costing £40 a week to run. Two-
thirds of this was contributed by the government. The Brisbane 
Courier, 31 Jul 1900. See also statement of total expenditure 
of Metropolitan Joint Board up to 31 July 1900, attached to 
Harpur to Under Secretary Home Department, 16 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. 
COL/286, in-letter no.12720 of 1900. 
286. 
ha/d7" been arrived at by the Government in regard to the request of 
107 
the deputation", as late as 16 August 1900. 
At the same time as these difficulties were occurring in the south 
of the colony, central and northern coastal towns were, if anything, 
struggling with even more adverse conditions. Certainly that was the 
opinion of residents of these cities. They were very vocal in 
criticism of "fruitful hotbeds of fever", as reports hit the press that 
the "dreadful scourge bubonic plague" had made its appearance in 
108 
Australia. Their fears were echoed in much stronger terms by 
Dr. A. Jefferis Turner, the health officer appointed to oversee plague 
affairs in northern and central Queensland, on the recommendation of 
109 
the Home Secretary's personal adviser in the emergency. Dr. J.E. Hare. 
Even after Jefferis Turner had ordered a clean-up of Rockhampton 
in the wake of a fatal plague outbreak there, he had to report the 
presence of "numerous" rats and a considerable amount of "accessible 
rat-food" lying about in the city, owing to the continued failure of 
the Rockhampton Epidemic Joint Board to provide for house-to-house 
110 
collection of kitchen scraps. Therefore, it was hardly surprising 
that the "epidemic /_in Rockhampton/ proved more serious than anywhere 
107. See Harpur's letter no.12720 as above f.n. 106. The Treasury 
made further special allotments as the year progressed. For 
example. Under Secretary Treasury to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 17 Oct 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 239, in-letter no.16111 of 
1900, and subsequent of 19 Dec 1900, in-letter no.18975 of 1900. 
In each case a further^3,000 was involved. 
108. The Maryborough Chronicle, 17 Jan 1900; letter to editor from 
Prevention. See also The Wide Bay and Burnett News, 15 Mar 1900. 
The Maryborough Chronicle, 2 Jul 1900, and The Mackay Chronicle, 
6 Aug 1900; editorial. 
109. Wilton W.R. Love to Under Secretary Home Department, 5 May 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 243, in-letter no.6464 of 1900, J.E. Hare's unnumbered 
memo to Foxton of 27 April 1900, which is really an excellent 
reference for Turner - it classes him as "the only suitable 
Queenslander", "a good clinician and an expert bacteriologist" -
and other attachments on salary and other matters. In January 
1900, Turner had signified his willingness to assist C.J. Pound 
with bacteriological investigations on the plague, an offer 
gratefully accepted. A. Jefferis Turner to Central Board of 
Health, 26 Jan 1900, .Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.1330 of 1900 
and marginal comment. Turner held a Doctorate of Medicine from 
London and was a Member of the Royal College of Surgeons. 
110. Final Report of A. Jefferis Turner to Rockhampton Joint Board, 
4 Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.10770 of 1900. 
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in Queensland". 
The sanitary situation was equally bad in Townsville, where the 
risks were greatly aggravated by the failure to register deaths and 
issue certificates - laxity which was "dangerous to the public safety, 
112 
and specially dangerous during a plague epidemic". Moreover, the 
plague regulations with regard to shipping had been "very imperfectly 
observed" in that port. Ships had not been fumigated, the Mayor 
of Townsville, though fully informed of this slackness, had permitted 
115 
offenders to "break these regulations with impunity", and no one 
had been deputed to patrol the wharves in search of rats. This 
appeared to be a clear instance of the claims of trade and commerce 
having priority over precautions to preserve the nation's health. 
117 Frustrated, extremely busy, and justifiably angry with those 
who consistently failed to carry out his sensible directions and the 
118 
government's gazetted regulations, the doctor turned to the Central 
Board of Health, in the absense of one supreme medical overseer who 
could enforce the acceptance of such counsel. As Turner complained to 
the board 
111. President, Rockhampton Joint Board to Home Secretary, 6 Jul 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 243, in-telegram no.8351 of 1900, and marginal comment 
by Foxton on Turner to Under Secretary Home Department, 7 Jul 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 243, in-telegram no.8446 of 1900. 
112. Dr. A. Jefferis Turner to Secretary Central Board of Health, 21 
Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.11871 of 1900, p.2. 
113. Ibid., p.3. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Ibid. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Turner was in tremendous demand up and down the Queensland coast. 
He spent considerable periods in Townsville, Rockhampton and 
Gladstone, and also visited Port Douglas, Cardwell, Geraldton and 
Mackay. A very large number of telegrams, letters and reports 
passed between him and the Home Secretary's office. One particularly 
hectic schedule is recorded in Turner to Home Secretary, 21 Jul 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-telegram no.11207 of 1900. 
118. Turner was "caused much surprise" and "considerable annoyance" when 
a confidential report to the Central Board of Health incorporating 
some of this material, and a "delicate question of administration" 
touching a quarantine matter, was published in the press. Jefferis 
Turner to Home Secretary, 8 Sep 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 243, in-letter no. 
14139 of 1900. 
288. 
it is no exaggeration to say, that the protection of those 
ports in Queensland, which have been hitherto uninfected, 
depends on the efficient and uninterrupted performance of 
these fumigations. The plague has been spread from port 
to port by means of infected rats carried by the steamers; 
and there is no reason to doubt that if these regulations 
had been put into force at all Australian ports during the 
past six months Queensland would have escaped the epidemic 
altogether. 119 
Turner had some consolation. The Central Board of Health, acting 
on this information, and with the permission of the Home Secretary, 
120 
tightened regulations for ships proceeding down the Queensland coast, 
though at the same time they relaxed their vigilance on the New South 
121 Wales border at Wallangarra. But on the whole, experiences during 
this plague year, both in northern and southern Queensland, underlined 
the points which The Brisbane Courier had been making for some time. 
The often misdirected or confused conduct of the fight against the plague, 
the relatively ineffective attempts to deal with persistent pockets of 
insanitation, the destruction of rats in the north, in the capital, and 
122 in some of the largest southern Queensland towns, the constant 
119. A. Jefferis Turner to Secretary, Central Board of Health, 21 Jul 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.11871 of 1900, p.6. See also 
A. Jefferis Turner to local manager, Australian Steam Navigation 
Co., 21 Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, unnumbered out-letter of 1900. 
120. Central Board of Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 3 Aug 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, filed under in-letter no.11871 of 1900, and 
subsequent telegrams to Health Officers at Townsville and 
Rockhampton, 4 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, out-telegrams no.6590 
of 1900. 
121. Marginal comment from Foxton on Central Board letter above f.n.120, 
and Under Secretary Home Department to Dr. Bell, 4 Aug 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, out-telegram no.6589 of 1900. This decision can 
also be traced to Turner's contention, also held by some other 
medical men, that inland towns were in little danger from the 
plague which, on the whole, was rat-borne on ships. Turner to 
Home Secretary, no date, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-telegram no.9971 
of 1900. 
122. See for example The Brisbane Courier, 22 Jan 1900; sub editorial. 
Ibid., 10 Feb 1900, Ibid., 15 Feb 1900, Ibid., 16 Mar 1900; letter 
to editor from A Sufferer, and Ibid., 4 Apr 1900, which is a long 
article giving a Courier representative's impression of several 
unsavoury areas in a number of Brisbane suburbs and the city 
itself. The Queensland Times, 10 Mar 1900; editorial. Ibid., 
24 Mar 1900; sub editorial. Ibid., 5 Apr 1900; sub editorial. 
Ibid., 19 Apr 1900, Ibid., 21 Apr 1900; main editorial. But see 
also Report of Metropolitan Joint Board to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 24 Jul 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 286, in-letter no.11569 of 
1900,reporting on the successful inspection of a number of 
insanitary areas and the destruction of a good many condemned 
properties and large numbers of rats. 
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wrangling between boards charged with the protection of the public 
health, and the unedifying, publicly-aired differences which arose 
123 between doctors on both medical treatment and the question of powers, 
had together become so obvious and so dangerous to the well-being of 
the colony that they could no longer be ignored. In introducing the 
second reading of a new and very far-reaching health bill on 2 August 
1900, the Honourable J.F.G. Foxton was 
quite sure that the events which have occurred in our midst 
in connection with health matters owing to the presence 
amongst us of the bubonic plague render it unnecessary for 
me to offer any apology for the prominence I give this 
measure. 124 
But the debate on the bill dragged on until well into November 
1900, while the plague continued its attack in Charters Towers, where 
the character of the epidemic was revealed as being very different from 
125 1?6 
that in the south, in Ipswich, and other towns in Queensland. 
Medical men and hospital authorities persisted in bandying words on 
127 isolation methods and the treatment of victims, and a very virulent 
123. See for example A. Jefferis Turner to Home Secretary, 24 Aug 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.15316 of 1900, Confidential Report 
of A. Jefferis Turner to Central Board of Health, 30 Sep 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, unnumbered in-letter of 1900, A. Jefferis Turner 
to Home Secretary, 6 Oct 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, unnumbered 
in-letter of 1900, A. Jefferis Turner to Home Secretary, 15 Oct 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-letter no.16262 of 1900, The Townsville 
Daily Bulletin, 16 Aug 1900, Ibid., 20 Aug 1900, The Townsville 
Evening Star, 17 Oct 1900, The Townsville Daily Bulletin, 18 Oct 
1900; letter to editor from W. Cockerill, Jun., Ibid., general 
reporting. The Queensland Times, 1 May 1900; letter to editor 
from J.A. Cameron, M.B., and Ibid., 8 May 1900; letters to 
editor from Drs. Albert Dunlop, Roderick Macdonald, and J.A. 
Cameron, and The Brisbane Courier, 20 Sep 1900, on the question 
of the relative powers of Dr, A. Jefferis Turner and Dr. Linford 
Row in Townsville, in deciding on the disposal of plague patients 
in quarantine. 
124. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
125. A. Jefferis Turner to Central Board of Health, 30 Sep 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, unnumbered letter of 1900. See also Joint 
Health Committee, Charters Towers to Home Secretary's Office, 
14 Dec 1900, Q.S.A. C0L/A841, in-letter no.7596 of 1901, and 
subsequent seeking reimbursement for money expended on bubonic 
plague in Charters Towers. 
126. The Queensland Times, 1 May 1900. 
127. Dr. Linford Row to Home Secretary, 1 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 
238, in-telegram no.11668 of 1900, Dr. E. Humphry to Under 
Secretary Home Department, 1 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, in-telegram 
no.11674 of 1900, Dr. M. Bacot to Honourable R. Philp, 2 Aug 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 238, unniombered in-telegram of 1900, and Secretary, 
Townsville Hospital to Home Secretary, 3 Aug 1900, Q.S.A. COL/ 238, 
in-telegram no.11873 of 1900. 
290. 
K E I X B N for FlVK YEAKS thowiiifj the XusruEB of D E i i n s from some of flic priucipal Causes in tlie order of tlieir Degree 
of Fat.-ilily in 1900; also flieir Proport ion per lO/KlO of (Le T O T A L D I A T I I S and per 100,000 of the SIKAN PorrLAiJON 
respoctiTclj- for eiich of the Years 189U-1900. 
• 
5Io«t Commou 
CHIISO of Pealh. 
Phthisis 
Enter i t is ... 
Pneumonia 
Cancer 
Diarrhoea ... 
Knclootivditis and 
A'alvular ]">i>ease 
Premal ure Bi r th ... 
OUier di'eHses Cir-
rulslorv S3 stem 
Convnlsions 
Driglit 's Disease ... 
Tvpl 'oid or En te r ic 
F e \ e r 
Bronchitis ... 
Dv^erlt<•^J• ... 
j ipoplexy ... 
Drox\niing (Acci-
dent) 
Senile Drcfi.T 
"Whooping Cough. . . 
Other Tubercular 
— Scrofula 
Denti t ion ... 
"Want of Breabt-
niiik 
Infliininialion of the 
Braiu or i ts Mem-
hraiies 
Influenza, Coryza, 
Catarrh 
T B W S Jile-entcrica 
Difcate of Slonjach 
Diphtheria 
Hemiplegia, Bra in 
Pa'-Hlv sis 
Aneurism ... 
Dtbil l tT 
fiKrlet FcTcr 
Measles 
To t i l Deatlis of"^ 
each Year from [ 
all CauECS J 
Mean Popvilation > 
of each Year ) 
1 
0 • 
1 
4 M 
'I4S 
377 
:83 
2-0 
199 
197 
160 
199 
92 
130 
1G3 
90 
82 
159 
M 
65 
68 
107 
50 
63 
79 
53 
54 
31 
44 
-.2 
44 
1 
... 
5,645 
... 
1 8 9 G . 
0 
- « 
'— ^ 
767 
439 
668 
324 
505 
353 
349 
283 
353 
16< 
230 
289 
159 
145 
282 
113 
115 
156 
190 
69 
147 
140 
94 
96 
55 
78 
74 
78 
2 
... 
466, 
0 5 i 
c 5 
95 
53 
81 
39 
61 
43 
42 
34 
43 
20 
28 
35 
19 
IS 
34 
14 
14 
19 
23 
11 
J S 
17 
11 
12 
7 
9 
9 
9 
364 
"d 0 
c 
0 
u 
0 
E 
418 
256 
331 
187 
291 
192 
205 
158 
178 
95 
183 
163 
64 
IOC 
101 
72 
42 
67 
75 
43 
60 
29 
54 
33 
42 
36 
S3 
60 
5,423 
... 
1 8 9 7 . 
V. 
0 
0 
I- IT' 
0 ^ 
C 
0 p , 
c — 
c-o 
c ^ u 
771 
472 
610 
345 
537 
854 
378 
291 
328 
175 
337 
301 
118 
195 
160 
133 
77 
124 
138 
79 
i n 
53 
100 
61 
77 
06 
61 
92 
478,4 
^ s 
I- c* 
Is 
87 
53 
69 
39 
01 
40 
43 
33 
37 
20 
38 
34 
13 
22 
21 
15 
9 
14 
16 
9 
12 
C 
11 
7 
9 
8 
7 
10 
40 
c C 
0 
0 
1 
421 
340 
362 
229 
227 
196 
199 
148 
180 
113 
149 
188 
97 
104 
127 
73 
146 
84 
88 
43 
66 
262 
66 
55 
70 
35 
31 
67 
S7 
138 
6,243 
... 
1 8 9 8 . 
0 
c" 
C p; 
C £ 
674 
545 
580 
307 
364 
314 
319 
237 
288 
181 
239 
301 
155 
107 
203 
117 
234 
135 
141 
69 
106 
420 
106 
88 
112 
56 
50 
107 
140 
221 
492,6 
S i 
<^ 
| | 
II 
5 0 
1 . " ^ 
Ct 
85 
C9 
73 
46 
46 
40 
40 
30 
37 
23 
30 
38 
20 
21 
26 
15 
30 
17 
18 
9 
13 
53 
13 
11 
14 
7 
(j 
14 
18 
28 
02 
1 8 9 9 . 
„• 
.a 
& C 
c 
0 
B 
4-07 
341 
297 
243 
194 
240 
217 
160 
179 
127 
149 
171 
101 
110 
349 
60 
128 
80 
79 
44 
63 
44 
74 
0 . J 
82 
46 
4 9 ' 
o5 
59 
116 
1 
'0,144 
1 -
1 
c ^^  
662 
555 
483 
396 
316 
391 
353 
269 
291 
207 
242 
278 
104 
179 
568 
98 
208 
130 
129 
72 
103 
72 
120 
85 
133 
75 
60 
90 
96 
189 
508 
0 r^ 
g-S 
c 
c S 
ii K 
c 0 
60 
67 
58 
48 
38 
47 
43 
81 
35 
25 
29 
34 
20 
22 
69 
12 
25 
10 
16 
9 
12 
9 
15 
10 
16 
9 
10 
11 
12 
23 
804 
e 
... 
0 
1 
427 
357 
3:H 
229 
201 
198 
198 
159 
150 
148 
130 
131 
117 
105 
102 
84 
73 
73 
OS 
61 
Cl 
60 
55 
49 
48 
37 
35 
29 
11 
' 
5,747 
1 9 0 0 . 
o~ 
S. ^ 
c E-
743 
621 
581 
398 
350 
345 
345 
277 
261 
258 
237 
228 
2..:4 
183 
177 
146 
127 
127 
118 
106 
•106 
l a i 
96 
85 
84 
64 
61 
50 
19 
12 
\ 
\ 
490 
il 
u. 0 
P 
C-I 
67 
73 
68 
47 
41 
40 
40 
32 
SI 
SO 
28 
27 
24 
21 
21 
17 
15 
15 
14 
12 
12 
12 
11 
10 
10 
7 
7^  
6 
2 
1 
325 
128 
128. "Registrar-General's Forty-First Annual Report on the Vital 
Statistics of Queensland for the year ended 31st December 
1900", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1901), 1357. 
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type of plague was found in rats captured in Queen Street, George Street, 
Petrie Bight, Spring Hill and Petrie Terrace, Brisbane, necessitating 
sharp words from the Central Board of Health to the Metropolitan Joint 
129 
Board on the need for vigilance. What the colony clearly needed, as 
the plague year drew to its weary close, and the Central Board of 
130 
Health calculated its grim figures of 139 confirmed cases of plague, 
131 
was promised by the Health Act of 1900. This provided for the 
appointment of a commissioner of public health who would become the 
permanent head of a health department - an administrative body 
constituted under the Act, to initiate policy and direct health affairs 
for the whole of Queensland. 
The state of Queensland was to be visited by the plague again 
as the new century advanced. But under the direction of a man with 
proper powers and adequate machinery at his disposal, and subject only 
to ministerial oversight and the availability of funds, Queensland 
would never again flounder in a grave plague emergency, in quite the 
same way as it had done in 1900. 
129. C.J. Pound to Under Secretary Home Department, 15 Sep 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/ 239, in-letter no.14399 of 1900, and marginal comment 
from Foxton, 18 Sep 1900, and the Secretary, Central Board of 
Health, 20 Sep 1900. 
130. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Dec 1900; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 27 Dec 1900. Unfortunately, no accurate figures are 
available on the number of Queenslanders who contracted the 
disease in 1900, or whether they were affected in the April or 
July outbreak. The Registrar-General's normal report for the year 
does not mention bubonic plague, (see table Within, p.290), and 
the figures in his appendix - 48 deaths - do not tally with the 
Central Board of Health's claim that out of 139 cases, 57 were 
fatal. Another different set of figures appears in "Queensland 
Department of Public Health Report on Plague in Queensland, 1900-
1907 by B. Burnett Ham, M.D., M.R.C.S., D.P.H. (Camb.)",Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1907), 62-63. Total recorded cases, 136. 
Deaths, 57. Ibid., p.63. Pressure of executive work and deficient 
organisation, during the first plague year, "militated against 
keeping any reliable detailed accounts". Ibid., p.95. 
131. "The Health Act of 1900", Queensland Government Gazette, II (1900), 
1467 ff. 
10 - THE EARLY STRUGGLE FOR 
HEALTH LEGISLATION 
Discussing the evolution of public health administration in 
Australia, J.H.L. Cumpston has asserted that from 1859 to 1880, "no 
development occurred" in Queensland, and consequently there is "almost 
nothing to record". It is true that any action taken in this period 
was tentative and singularly unsuccessful, but in the years before 
the passing of the relatively effective Health Act of 1884, there 
were always some Queenslanders with a most lively appreciation that 
the admitted salubrity of Queensland's climate was no guarantee of 
2 
immunity from disease and death. In this period, legislative attempts 
were made to protect the colonists from the conditions which, according 
to the prevailing miasmatic theory, caused these evils. 
Before the separation of Queensland from New South Wales in 1859, 
the protection of the public water supplies from filth and rubbish, 
the regulations respecting the slaughtering of animals for food, the 
cleansing of streets, and the removal of nightsoil - all aspects of 
the protection of the public health - were dealt with under the Police 
3 
(Towns) Acts. Later still, in 1858, municipal councils were made 
responsible for local community health under the Municipalities Act. 
This entailed the "abatement of and removal of nuisances, the 
regulation of the meat trade and of markets generally, the control 
of noisome or offensive trades... and the implementation of sound 
4 
sanitary measures", all matters which required attention, if the 
"disgraceful nuisances in existence" in Brisbane were to be dealt 
1. J.H.L. Cumpston, "The Evolution of Public Health Administration in 
Australia", in The Medical Journal of Australia, Feb 1932, p.196. 
2. Newspaper and learned journal articles and official documents 
promoted Queensland's climate as "salubrious, and very favorable 
to the European constitution". See for example. Dr. F.J. Barton, 
"On Climate", 30 Aug 1860, in Transactions of the Philosophical 
Society of Queensland, 1859 to 1872 (Brisbane, 1872), p.6, and 
"Registrar-General's Report for 1864", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, (1865), 1313. 
3. See for example. Police (Towns) Act, 11 Victoria No.44, 15 Jun 1848, 
in Alexander Oliver, The Statutes of Practical Utility, Colonial 
and Imperial, in Force in New South Wales, Vol.11, (Sydney, 1879), 
pp.1717-1740. 
4. Laverty, p.182. 
292. 
293. 
with effectively. Both groups of acts were modelled on British 
legislation, and followed the English tradition that local communities 
were responsible for local needs. 
That these precursors of any true public health acts were 
unsuccessful in their objectives, is borne out by adverse and increasing 
criticism of environmental pollution and the apparently attendant fevers 
which plagued Queenslanders. This criticism appeared in the daily press, 
7 
in official correspondence, and in successive reports to parliament by 
Queensland's Registrar-General. Indeed, in his second annual report, 
F.O. Darvall was already indicating his own awareness of the need for 
central government action in the important area of the public health. 
The civilization of States may to a certain extent be 
estimated and measured by the value its citizens attach to 
human life.... the progressive increase in the value attached to 
it is evidenced... by the numerous laws enacted to restrain or 
entirely forbid the pursuit of occupations injurious to health; 
until at last it is recognised to be the duty of Government to 
protect its subjects as far as possible from the insidious 
attacks of disease, equally as from the assaults of crime, or 
from accidents.... and that State which best does this, is the 
first in the race of civilization.... 
Although this colony - blessed with a healthy climate, and 
as yet possessing only a scattered population in the full 
enjoyment of all the necessities and most of the luxuries of 
life - may not yet require the enactment of Sanatory Laws, 
there is still little doubt that as population increases they 
will become necessary. 8 
In 1864, after a year of "unusually great mortality", a seriously 
worried Darvall was pointing out the scandalously high and rising 
death rate amongst Queensland's children under five years. A comparison 
with the figures for Great Britain revealed the shameful truth that 
the mortality in Queensland was 0.85 per cent higher than that in England. 
5. The Moreton Bay Courier, 27 Oct 1858; editorial. 
6. These were very numerous indeed, but see for example. Ibid., 16 
Mar 1859 and 22 Oct 1861, and The Brisbane Courier, 18 Mar 1863, 
and 29 Nov 1864; main editorial. 
7. This was also frequent. Reports and letters were particularly 
caustic when nuisances also caused the devaluation of property. 
See for example Surveyor-General to Mayor of Brisbane, 13 Apr 1860, 
Q.S.A. Letter Book No.l, out-letter no.465 of 1860, and previous 
no.416 of 20 Mar 1860. 
8. "Second Annual Report on Registration of Births, Marriages and 
Deaths", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1861), 
445. 
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Causes of Death 
Atrophy, Debility, and Marasmus 
Drowning (accident) 
Convulsions 
Phthisis Cconsumption) 
Croup 
Dysentery 
Diarrhoea 
Scarlatina, and "Fever" ... 
Typhus, Gastric,and Typhoid Fever 
Diphtheria 
Teething 
Heart Disease 
Dropsy ... 
Fractures and Contusions(accident" 
Premature Birth 
Hydrocephalus ... 
Thrush ... ... ... ... 
Number of Deaths 
Registered in 
1863 
90 
76 
75 
68 
63 
61 
58 
39 
36 
34 
33 
30 
21 
21 
18 
13 
12 
Proportional number 
from each Cause to 
1,000 Deaths from 
All Causes, in 
Queensland, in 
1863. 
71 
60 
59 
53 
49 
48 
45 
31 
28 
27 
26 
24 
16 
16 
14 
10 
9 
Proportional number 
from each Cause to 
1,000 Deaths from 
All Causes, in 
England, in 
1859. 
64 
6 
60 
115 
18 
3 
42 
46 
36 
22 
9 
37 
19 
13 
17 
17 
3 
Every person examining the preceding table of deaths below 
various ages, must be struck with the large proportion of deaths of 
children; to enable this important subject to be more thoroughly 
investigated, I have prepared the following tables of deaths of 
children. 
DEATHS OF CHILDREN 
District. 
Brisbane 
Dalby 
Drayton 
Ipswich 
Kennedy 
Port Curtis 
Taroom 
Warwick 
Wide Bay 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Condamine, Goondiwindi, Mount Abundance, and Surat 
Banana, Broad Sound, Peak Downs. Princhester, ) 
Rockhampton, and Springsure ) 
Gayndah and Nanango 
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"Fourth Annual Report on Registration of Births, Marriages and 
Deaths", in Ibid., (1864), 891. 
295. 
If the margin seemed small, Darvall reminded parliament that the actual 
situations in the two countries were radically different. In contrast 
to Queensland's immunity from pauperism, sparse population, abundance 
of fresh and wholesome food and healthyclimate, England had pauperism, 
the miseries of destitution, filthy, crowded dwellings, and dark, evil-
smelling towns. When these conditions were taken into account, "it 
would make the difference in the mortality of the two countries far 
greater", to the disadvantage of Queensland. The main causes of the 
high death rate in Queensland towns were bad drainage and inefficient or 
non-existent scavenging, while the rural areas suffered from the 
prevalence of diseases peculiar to newly occupied and undrained districts, 
11 
and the difficulty of obtaining medical assistance. In an emotional 
conclusion to his report, Darvall appealed to the government to stem 
the numbers of victims sacrificed annually to bad drainage and evil 
smells, by bringing in 
those sanatory regulations and appliances which experience, 
in older communities, has shown to be so effective, and 
which, even in this beautiful climate, we cannot dispense 
with. 12 
The Brisbane Courier was quick to take up the message of the 
Registrar-General's report. The burden of editorial comment at that 
time was directed, not so much towards the government in a call for new 
legislation, but towards the Brisbane City Council, in an attempt to 
prod that body into acting vigorously on the Municipalities Act already 
in existence - to arouse the councillors from the "stolid unconcern 
13 
manifested by them". 
In the meantime, the Queensland government took some steps to 
preserve the health of Queenslanders, by what was to become a continuing 
attempt to deal with the public health problem; that is, by the exclusion 
of exotic diseases from the colony through the consolidation of 
10. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1861), 893. 
Other Australian colonies were troubled by similar sanitary problems 
and by high infant mortality in this same period. See for example, 
a Melbourne comment on the high death rate of infants in Victoria, 
The Melbourne Age, 28 Nov 1864. 
11. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1864), 893. 
12. Ibid. 
13. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Sep 1864; editorial, and Ibid., 29 Sep 
1864; editorial. Earlier in 1864, the council had openly declared 
itself to be "the conservator of public health". See Ibid., 
1 Feb 1864; Minutes of Brisbane City Council. 
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14 quarantine regulations. In 1864, one of the medical practitioner 
members of the Legislative Assembly, Henry Challinor, displayed that 
degree of awareness of the need for legislation to preserve the 
community's health, which was to typify the professional members of both 
houses of parliament in Queensland. Challinor was attempting for the 
second time, with the support of the Premier, R.G.W. Herbert, to push 
a subdivision of land bill through the Legislative Assembly. The 
proposed legislation aimed at the prevention of "injury to the morals 
of society", and the provision of "proper ventilation and cleanliness", 
15 by prescribing a reasonable distance between one house and another. 
As Herbert indicated to the bill's opponents, who took a stand largely 
1 ft 
on economic grounds, it was "a purely sanitary measure", which should 
not be objectionable to anyone. Yet shortly afterwards, that same 
government was under stringent attack from The Brisbane Courier, as it 
proceeded with the sale of valuable land in the heart of Brisbane in 
lots as small as four and three-quarter perches. This exceptional 
action, which flew in the face of the government's own arguments on the 
Subdivision of Lands Act, was described by the Courier's editor as "most 
17 
unpardonable", "disgraceful", and "a crying shame". It was also an 
indication that the well-being of the colonial treasury was paramount 
as far as the government was concerned. 
Despite this abandonment of principle in the interest of economic 
gain, the government was deeply concerned about the high death rate 
amongst the infant native-born - those to whom Queensland ultimately 
had to look for her future development and prosperity - and about the 
grossly insanitary conditions which were obvious on every hand. It 
gave practical proof of its anxiety in February 1865, when the Executive 
19 Council decided to establish a central board of health. 
14. Queensland Government Gazette, IV (1863), 785. This aspect of 
disease prevention will not be dealt with again in this section. 
For further discussion see the sections on "Cholera" and 
"Smallpox". 
15. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, I (1864), 181. The bill was 
passed on 31 Aug 1864. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1864), 291. 
16. Ibid. 
17. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Dec 1864; editorial. 
18. Ibid. Newspapers continued to make spirited attacks on this issue. 
See for example. Ibid., 11 Nov 1865; editorial, and The North 
Australian, 12 Jan 1865; editorial. 
19. Executive Council Minutes, 17 Feb 1865, Q.S.A. EXE/E 11, 65/9F. 
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The attention of this board was to be 
in the first instance directed to the preparation of and 
report upon a Health of Towns Act framed upon principles 
similar to those incorporated in like Acts in England. 20 
21 The new Central Board of Health was appointed on 8 April 1865, 
22 to the delight of The Brisbane Courier. It set to work at once, 
quickly producing a report which dealt with the general sanitary 
problems of the paving of streets, the removal of refuse, the 
construction and ventilation of buildings, the supply of sufficient 
and wholesome water for public purposes and domestic use, and the 
23 tremendous problem of sewage disposal. One other immediate problem, 
which emphasises the basic reason for the board's appointment, was 
discussed. Considering the "excessive" infant mortality, the board 
decided that it was 
doubtless owing to the great scarcity and consequent high 
price of milk - the natural food of infants for the first 
two years of existence - and the substitution of animal 
food which is much cheaper; hence the great prevalence 
of diarrhoea and its calamitous results. 24 
The board suggested a solution - the opening up of various 
tramways to facilitate the carriage of milk from the rural areas to 
25 the people of Brisbane. They also settled on the health measure best 
calculated to meet the needs of Queensland. It was a mixture of the 
Health Act of Victoria, itself based almost entirely on a British act, 
20. Executive Council Minutes, 17 Feb 1865, Q.S.A. EXE/E 11, 65/9F. 
21. The first central board reflected the practical side of nineteenth 
century British interest in correcting sanitary problems. It was 
composed of the Colonial Secretary, Colonial Architect, Commissioner 
of Police, Engineer for Harbours and Rivers, President of the 
Medical Board, and the Health Officer, who was to act as secretary 
to the board. Queensland Government Gazette, VI (1865), 313. 
22. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Apr 1865; main editorial. 
23. "Board of Health Report", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, (1865), 1313. 
24. Ibid., 1314. 
25. Ibid. For an adverse criticism which suggested that the tramway 
proposals were "Utopian and beyond the means... of the Colony", 
see The Brisbane Courier, 30 Jun 1865; editorial. However, the 
central board's proposal is probably another instance of the 
influence of the British experience. From 1845 onwards, a 
considerable amount of milk was being brought to London by rail, 
and by 1865-66, the emphasis was on the railway milk trade in 
England, as environmentally aware Englishmen became anxious to 
obtain milk produced in "country" cowsheds which were not 
surrounded by the dirt and filth of cities and towns. P.J. Atkins, 
"London's intra-urban milk supply circa 1790-1914", Institute of 
British Geographers, Transactions, New Series, Vol.2, No.3, 1977 
p.391. 
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and several clauses of the General Police and Improvement (Scotland) 
Act of 1862, the English Lodging House Act, and the English Nuisance and 
Disease Prevention Act.^^ The proposed health bill of 1865, "A bill to 
make provision for improving the Sanitary condition of Towns and Populous 
places", was introduced to the Legislative Assembly on 30 May, by the 
Colonial Secretary, R.G.W. Herbert. The minister did not claim that the 
measure was perfect, but was convinced that to postpone its enactment 
would be dangerous to the health of the people of Brisbane, Rockhampton, 
and certain other large towns. The bill, which provided for the 
appointment of central and local boards of health, was based on the 
municipal system then in force, and its success was dependent on the 
"cordial co-operation of the municipalities, which we have a right to 
27 
expect". But, recognising the sensibilities of local government to 
any incursion from the centre, and the considerable support for this view 
28 in the community, Herbert stressed that the powers of municipalities 
would not be interfered with, and in some cases these powers would be 
29 
strengthened. 
The point which the Colonial Secretary did not explain, but one 
which did not escape the notice of James Taylor, the member for Western 
Downs, was the question of costs. Taylor rejected the bill, not only 
because local jealousies demanded that he oppose the special benefits 
designed for Brisbane and Rockhampton, but also because he objected to 
the extra rate involved to pay for health boards, and for the sanitary 
30 improvements these boards were sure to initiate. But for the most 
part, the Legislative Assembly welcomed the bill. All other speakers 
during the second reading debate. Dr. Challinor prominent among them, 
supported the measure. 
In spite of this, the bill failed to reach the statute book, being 
32 discharged from the paper on Herbert's motion on 7 September 1865. 
26. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1865), 1313. 
27. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II (1865), 378. 
28. This problem was similar, though more severe, in Great Britain. 
See H.J. Beales, "The New Poor Law", History Vol. XV, 1931, p.786. 
29. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II (1865), 380. 
30. Ibid., p.381. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid., p.649. 
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Curiously, the Colonial Secretary who had warned against the perils of 
rejecting the bill, now 
felt that rt was not a measure which was immediately 
required /although/-••• he believed the time would come 
when such a measure would be found very necessary. 33 
According to that astute contemporary observer, the editor of the Courier, 
it was not difficult to assess the reasons for the shelving of the bill. 
Writing shortly after its demise, he suggested that the Herbert government 
was simply "frightfully dilatory" about health matters, and had allowed 
the bill to be set aside time and time again in the interests of more 
34 pressing business. After longer reflection, the editor was severely 
critical of both government and bill, and, by implication, of the 
Central Board of Health. 
Among what were facetiously termed the "slaughtered 
innocents" at the close of the last session of parliament 
was the Health Bill.... Its premature decease was subject 
for very little lamentation.... It wa£ in every_respect a most 
impracticable measure.... introduced /because oij the _ 
promise made at the beginning of the session.... _/But^ / the time 
has long since passed when the neglect of ordinary precautions 
to ward off the attack of an epidemic can be considered with 
impunity.... 
Should fever accept the tempting invitation which is 
held out to it on all sides and fully develop itself, 
what other result could be expected than the rapid 
depopulation of the city. Without appearing in the 
character of alarmists, we are justified in laying 
down the above proposition, the truth of which is 
incontestable. The necessity of taking the best means 
of preventing such an undesirable catastrophe must 
recommend itself. The Government have not chosen to 
move in the matter. The Corporation are financially 
unable to do so. 35 
As well as government apathy over the health bill, there were 
practical considerations. Clearly the costs of public health were 
33. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II (1865), 649. 
34. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Sep 1865; editorial. This attitude was 
prevalent in all of the colonies. For example, Alexander Robertson 
says of Victoria, such reforms are "surrounded with difficulties. 
The apathy with which the public have regarded the subject, and the 
almost contemptuous indifference with which our legislators have 
treated it, are truly astonishing". Alexander Robertson, "Medical 
Reform", Victorian Pamphlets, Vol.IX, 1858, p.l. 
35. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Nov 1865; editorial. 
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high, and in 1865 Queensland faced an increasingly grave economic 
situation. As Coghlan and Ewing point out 
a period of extravagant outlay on public works was followed 
in 1865 by a depression which interfered seriously with the 
progress of the colony. 37 
To make matters worse, since 1857 Queensland had been subject to 
prolonged periods of drought, which had seriously reduced the earning 
capacity of some of the colony's top income earners, the graziers and 
38 big farmers. If the government had not already been aware of its 
responsibility to provide good economic management of available funds 
before all else, it was forcefully reminded of its duty by a petition 
from the carcass butchers resident in the city and suburbs of Brisbane. 
Although this quite influential group of businessmen professed 
themselves 
willing and anxious... for the preservation of cleanliness and 
the abatemeiit_of nuisances, they fail/^ ed_/ to see the necessity 
that exist/ed^ / to inflict upon them, a great pecuniary loss 
and inconvenience, as well as to the public generally. 39 
Given this public and government unwillingness to accept large 
expenditure in a very difficult year, the Registrar-General's report, 
which was reasonably optimistic, presented the government with a very 
slight, but legitimate excuse, for dropping the 1865 health bill. The 
Registrar-General revealed that there was some advance in the birth 
rate of the colony, and that although infant mortality was still 
decidedly high, it showed a "satisfactory" improvement over the 1863 
figures. But on the whole, the report gave the government no cause 
36. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, II (1865), 378. Robert 
Mackenzie, the in-coming Colonial Secretary, considered that 
Herbert's chief objection to the 1865 bill was the expense entailed 
in implementing it. Ibid., III (1866), 294. But Bruce Knox suggests 
that "the modem-minded Herbert was impressed with the need for 
urban cleanliness_and for powers to control epidemics.... The 
ambitions of /his/ Health Bill were considerable, fbutj their 
chances of success were slim, not least because Herbert laid 
emphasis upon the need to leave the execution of its provisions 
chiefly to municipalities". Knox, p.210. 
37. T.A. Coghlan and T.T. Ewing, The Progress of Australasia in the 
Nineteenth Century (London, 1903), p.180. 
38. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Nov 1865; editorial. 
39. "Health Bill (Petition from Carcass Butchers of Brisbane)", Votes 
and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1865), 1321. 
40. "Fifth Annual Report of Registration of Births, Marriages, and 
Deaths", Ibid., 864. 
41. Ibid., p.867. 
to feel complacent 
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42 
During the summer months of the following year, when prevalent 
odours alarmed that self-appointed champion of the public health The 
Brisbane Courier, the editor began to regret the "killing" of the 1865 
health bill, fervently hoping that a similar measure would be brought 
43 before the new parliamentary session. He was joined by Brisbane 
alderman J.A. Thompson, who formulated advanced ideas on the sewering 
of Brisbane, and also proposed a city council deputation to the Colonial 
Secretary Robert Mackenzie on the twin problems of public health 
legislation and a sewerage bill. 
Mackenzie "considered the expense of looking after the health of 
towns a very legitimate one;... an expenditure that could not long be 
Af\ 
avoided". He responded quickly to the agitation, and by May 1866, a 
comprehensive health bill, which "had undergone many judicious additions 
42. "Fifth Annual Report of Registration of Births, Marriages, and 
Deaths", Ibid., p.869. The report concluded that the mortality 
rates for all ages in Queensland were"neither so satisfactory 
nor so decided". 
43. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Feb 1866; editorial. 
44. Thompson was a reluctant candidate for aldermanship in 1866, but 
felt that he "should not shrink from any position which my fellow 
citizens feel that I ought to fill". He fought the election for 
North Ward on a public health platform. Ibid., 24 Jan 1866; 
letter to editor from J.V/. Thompson. Once elected he was not 
only active within the council in proposing health reforms, but 
was also an interested correspondent to The Brisbane Courier. 
See for example. Ibid., 2 Jun 1866; letter to editor from J.W.T. 
45. Ibid., 6 Mar 1866; editorial. This was a very unsettled period in 
Queensland political history. The Macalister ministry was in power 
from 1 February 1866 to 20 July 1866, and from 7 August 1866 to 
15 August 1867. For the short period of less than one month between 
these terms, the Herbert ministry was in power. On 15 August 1867, 
the Mackenzie ministry came to power and remained in office until 
25 November 1868. However, there was considerable continuity as 
far as the personnel of the ministries was concerned. See D.B. 
Waterson, A Biographical Register of the Queensland Parliament 
1860-1929 (Canberra, 1972), for details. 
46. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 294. In taking this 
stand Mackenzie was following the lead of pressure groups, like 
the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Society which, as early 
as the 1840's, had claimed that "one broad principle may be safely 
enunciated in respect of sanitary economics - that it costs more 
money to create disease than to prevent it". Quoted in Briggs, 
Victorian Cities, p.21. 
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and amplifications", was before the house. The 1866 proposal again 
provided for the establishment of a central board of health in Brisbane, 
and local boards to work in other parts of the colony. It proposed that 
registrations of deaths within the colony be made only by health officers 
48 
with a medical certificate, and contained some provisions for the 
regulation of buildings. Slaughterhouses were not neglected, and common 
lodging houses, which were always regarded as potential pest centres, 
featured prominently. Clauses to enable the control of burial grounds, 
because of their connection with the currently-held miasmatic theory of 
diseases transmission, were also included. Nor did the Colonial 
Secretary ignore the importance of pure food, though the editor of the 
Courier felt strongly, that a great deal more attention might have been 
49 paid to the important question of deliberate food adulteration. 
In the end, the 1866 proposal met the fate of its predecessor, 
despite a very gloomy report from the Registrar-General. Brisbane, in 
particular, had a very bad record in the sensitive child death rate area. 
Whichever way we look at the subject, the result is the same -
that a large increase is apparent in the mortality of children. 
In the Registration District of Brisbane, the most populous in 
the colony, we see that the mortality of children below five 
years of age has in one year almost doubled; - the respective 
numbers being, in 1864, 285; in 1865, 4511 In Drayton and 
Toowoomba, the numbers are in 1864, 31; in 1865, 65: actually 
more than double. These figures speak for themselves, in 
unmistakeable language. 50 
In spite of the obvious need for action, definite and important 
objections were raised to the 1866 measure. Some of them were to become 
permanent features of Queensland's public health story. The main 
criticism was the bill's tendency to centralization. Functions to be 
47. The Brisbane Courier, 3 May 1866; editorial. This was followed 
shortly afterwards - 29 June 1866 - by a Sewerage Commissioners 
Bill, which was "intended to be merely a rider to the Health Bill." 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 463. Unfortunately 
this bill was discharged from the paper on 1 October 1866. 
48. Ibid., pp.294-96.This clause was strongly opposed by some members, 
mainly on the grounds that it threatened the rights of the 
individual. Members confessed that they were "very much surprised 
to see a clause of such a description smuggled into the Bill", and 
that this was "the most objectionable feature of the Bill". There 
were also protests from outside the house. A number of petitions 
was sent to parliament, in particular, one from Dr. William Smith, 
of Toowoomba, who protested the "infringement of the liberty of the 
subject" through this clause, as well as the financial "injury". 
Ibid., p.295. 
49. The Brisbane Courier, 3 May 1866; editorial. 
50. "Sixth Annual Report on Registration of Births, Marriages, and Deaths", 
Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1866), 1259. The 
report was presented on 21 August 1866, thirteen days after Macalister 
took office. 
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conferred on a central board of health impinged upon the dearly-held 
right of municipal and town council autonomy. Not only would the 
proposed health board transgress within the province of local authority, 
but there was also the threat of central dispensation of funds, the 
source of which was local rates and taxes. Another area of dispute was 
the amount of discretion, with regard to duties, given to officers of 
either local or central boards. This, in the opinion of some observers, 
could actually redound to the detriment of the public health. The bill 
was also criticised because it did "not take advantage of the new 
discoveries of science". 
To cap all other objections, economic problems continued to dog 
Queensland. The failure of the Agra and Masterman Bank deprived the 
government of a stipulated advance of ^ 100,000, which was to have been 
used for developmental programmes in the still infant colony. Despite 
a brave government assertion that public works would continue to be 
•A ^ 5 2 
carried out, 
efforts to restore the financial position were not successful 
and the whole colony began to feel the repercussions.... Money 
obtained by the sale of Treasury bonds remaining after the 
pressing creditors of the Government had been satisfied was quite 
insufficient for the purposes of government, and much against 
its will, the Ministry was compelled to stop public works. 53 
Given this situation, it is most likely that even had the 1866 bill 
reached the statute book, it would have remained a dead letter. 
The following year was to see yet another attempt to introduce a 
sanitary measure of a rather different kind. Strangely enough. Western 
Wood, who had vigorously defended certain vested interests against "a 
very short Bill of a sanitary nature" directed against filthy slaughter-
54 houses, was in the forefront in presenting a bill for the prevention 
51. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 295, and The Brisbane 
Courier, 7 Jun 1866; editorial. 
52. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1866), 951-52. 
53. J. Pearson, "Social Services in Queensland", unpublished B.A. 
Honours thesis. University of Queensland, 1953, pp.35-36. 
54. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, III (1866), 115. There was 
considerable objection to this measure, many members being unable 
to "see why, if the inhabitants of a town chose to be dirty, the 
Ministry should step in to prevent them". But governments were not 
entirely oblivious to the health needs of the community, even in 
this politically unstable, economically unsound period. See for 
example "Report from the Select Committee on the Hospitals of the 
Colony", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1866), 
1613-16, Trustees of lying-hospital to Colonial Secretary, 
15 Sep 1866, Q.S.A. COL/A 83, in-letter no.2565 of 1866, and 
"Appendix B to Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select 
Committee on Hospitals of the Colony", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, (1866), 1670-72. 
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of contagious diseases to the Queensland Legislative Council. Wood had 
not undergone conversion to become a sanitarian-reformer. He was simply 
shepherding through a bill desired by one of the most well-established 
interests of all - the army medical department of the Australian 
contingent of the British army. But the Executive Council, while 
desiring "to cooperate with the military authorities in a cordial spirit", 
had no wild enthusiasm for the enactment of a law which would entail 
57 
considerable expenditure, and which concerned only one company of the 
line stationed in Brisbane. The government would have preferred to see 
58 
the proposed act put to the test first in Sydney and Melbourne, and 
the bill was allowed to lapse with the dissolution of parliament. 
Wood was quickly on the attack again in the spring session of the 
new parliament, championing the cause of the bill which was designed to 
prevent the spread of venereal diseases by the arrest and enforced 
vaginal examination of any woman suspected of being a prostitute, and 
her incarceration in a lock hospital should she be found to be infected. 
He did not want to be "very mealy-mouthed", though he "hardly liked to 
59 
say much about" the bill. But he and his like-minded colleagues 
overrode the objections of those members who thought the measure 
"beastly" and "un-English", a bill which proposed extreme sexual 
ftO 
discrimination, and which would provide for a medical man to fill 
"an obnoxious, an intolerable, a disgraceful office in the public 
service of Queensland". 
Medical members of both houses, scorning inhibitions, joined forces 
to defend the bill, impressing members with the dangers of neglecting 
55. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, IV (1867), 127. 
56. Senior Medical Officer, Australian Colonies to Major of Brigade, 
Troops in Australian Colonies, 20 Mar 1867, enclosed in Brigadier-
General of troops in Australia to Governor of Queensland, 20 Mar 
1867, Q.S.A. GOV/A 2, p.129. See also E. Barclay, "Queensland's 
Contagious Diseases Act, 1868", Queensland Heritage, Vol.2, No.10, 
May 1974, p.28. 
57. The expense would result from special management requirements, a 
special hospital, and a special system of quarantine. Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, V (1867), 148. 
58. Executive Council Minutes, 24 Apr 1867, Q.S.A. EXE/E 15, 67/25K. 
59. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, V (1867), 184. 
60. Ibid., p.471. 
61. Ibid., p.420. 
62. C.A. Bernays, Queensland Politics during sixty years: 1859-1919 
(Brisbane, 1919), p.16. ~~ ~ ' 
63. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, V (1867), 420. 
"those particular diseases" which were not only common among prostitutes, 
but which could detrimentally effect the whole race. 
But when the great interests involved were taken into 
consideration, and that the Bill was framed for the 
prevention of a loathsome disease which was liable to be 
transmitted from generation to generation, and to produce 
a puny and sickly population, he thought the Legislature 
should hesitate before they refused to take steps to check 
its spread. Honorable members had no conception of the 
number of cases in existence in... Brisbane. During the 
past twelve months the increase had been frightful and 
the ravages... something to deplore. 65 
Dr. Challinor was also very anxious to see the bill pass into law, 
proclaiming that any medical man would support the measure, while Dr. 
O'Doherty used scare tactics in an attempt to persuade the house. 
According to him, immigrants from the old world had brought a 
particularly virulent species of contagious disease into Queensland 
that was rapidly infecting every young man in the colony. He 
had no hesitation in stating that at this moment, there was 
stalking about in the town as frightful a form of venereal 
disease as there was in the world. It was stalking abroad 
amongst those unfortunate females, unseen and unknown to those 
who had dealings with them, or to any one.... Those unfortunate 
women were walking centres of the most frightful disease to 
which the human body could be subject. 66 
Though the doctors agreed that the legislation "could not... 
prevent the dissemination of the vice" which led to the disease, a matter 
of immense concern to not a few parliamentarians and some extremely vocal 
pressure groups outside parliament, they did feel that a contagious 
ft 1 diseases act was essential "for the protection of the innocent". 
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64 
Despite a vigorous anti-contagious diseases bill campaign, which was 
waged by correspondents to the Brisbane press, and the stubborn, 
"fruitless and vexatious" opposition of those members of parliament who 
64. There was reluctance to name the diseases. One, gonorrhoea, 
appears only once in the Act itself. Queensland Government 
Gazette, (1868), 92. 
65. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, V (1867), 148. Speech of 
Dr. W. Hobbs in the Legislative Council. 
66- Ibid., p.471. Speech of Dr. K.I. O'Doherty in the Legislative 
Assembly. 
67. Ibid., speech of Dr. Challinor in the Legislative Assem.bly. 
68. See for example, these letters to the editor of The Brisbane 
Courier, 22 Oct 1867; letter to editor from A Citizen, 23 Oct 
1867; letters to editor from ***, H.P., and A.B.C., 13 Jan 1868; 
letter to editor from Wm. Brookes, 14 Jan 1868; letter to editor 
from Veritas. The Brisbane Courier which was to wage a very 
vigorous campaign strongly supporting the Act in the future, was 
strangely silent at the time of the original debate. 
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69 
"could not support the Bill... in any shape whatever", an Act for the 
70 
Prevention of Contagious Diseases received assent on 5 February 1868. 
The parliament of Queensland had achieved its first piece of purely 
sanitary legislation. 
It was a contentious Act, one which was to arouse the most bitter 
opposition from within and outside parliament, right up to 1914 and 
71 beyond. By that time, the representatives of the medical profession, 
who had been its chief defenders, were convinced that the Act, as it was 
72 
administered in Queensland, was "totally ineffective", and that no 
73 
valid reason could be urged in favour of continuing its operation. In 
74 
spite of this, the Act remained on the statute book. It is still there. 
For the next few years, Queensland suffered from monumental sanitary 
75 problems which the press kept before the notice of the public; there 
was a fair degree of concern over water supplies, especially if they 
'7 ft 
were connected with some profitable industry; running battles ensued 
77 
over the Contagious Diseases Act; there was a pleased interest in the 
comparatively optimistic Registrar-General's reports, with their messages 
69. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, VI (1868), 854-55. 
70. Queensland Government Gazette, XII (1868), 89. 
71. It is impossible to trace the vicissitudes of the battle to try to 
repeal the Contagious Diseases Act in this thesis. For some 
details see R. Evans,"'Soiled Doves': Prostitution and Society 
in Colonial Queensland", Hecate, Vol.1, No.2, July 1975, and 
E. Barclay, "Queensland's Contagious Diseases Act 1868", 
Queensland Heritage, Vol.2, No.10, May 1974 and Vol.3, No.l, 
Nov 1974. 
72. Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
2 Sep 1907, Q.S.A. COL/A 934, in-letter no.10380 of 1907. 
73. Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
17 Aug 1911, Q.S.A. COL/A 934, in-letter no.7759 of 1911. 
74. Only the preamble to the Act has been changed, and that only slightly, 
75. See for example. The Brisbane Courier, 2 Feb 1869, Ibid., 30 Mar 
1870, Mayor of Brisbane to Colonial Secretary, 27 Sep 1870, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 148, in-letter no.2682 of 1870, The Brisbane Courier, 13 Jul 
1869; letter to editor from Still Alive; Ibid., 26 Jul 1869; letter 
to editor from Ignoramus, Ibid.; letter to editor from Resident. 
76. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, IX (1869), 59-67. 
77. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Mar 1869, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
VIII (1868-9), 249, and The Brisbane Courier, 30 Aug 1870; letter 
to editor from G. 
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78 
of statistically-backed improvements; a Waterway Construction Act for 
79 Brisbane was passed; parliament was constantly considering - and 
being eluded by - some efficient and effective way of dealing with 
80 human wastes; proper regard was paid to the provision of a qualified 
81 public analyst and a laboratory in which he could work; and there were 
82 
stirrings of fear over smallpox. Nevertheless, no attempt was made 
to get a public health bill through parliament. 
But by 1871, there was new interest in the various reforms and 
83 
advances which were taking place in Europe and Britain, not least 
those connected with scientific and medical discoveries and experience. 
Popular attention seems to have been aroused in April 1870 by a letter 
to the Courier. In this correspondence "S" complained that 
there is not sufficient information given through the press of 
this colony on the progress of science... and there is some 
astonishment in the minds of those who live at a distance and 
are deba.rred the privilege^ of consulting the periodicals in 
which /scientific matter^ /^ are noticed... that the germ theory 
is fast gaining ground. 84 
Certainly, following this letter, an increasing number of articles were 
85 published on sewage farms, on the question of the water supply and 
Rf, 
sanitation, and on the prevention and cure of zymotic or infectious 
78. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Dec 1869; editorial, and Ibid., 26 Dec 
1870; editorial. Mortality amongst small children was still the 
cause of great regret. Ibid., 8 May 1871. 
79. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XI (1870), 214-15. 
80. "Despatch respecting The Dry Earth System", Votes and Proceedings 
of Legislative Assembly, (1871-1872), 813-26. 
81. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, IX (1869), 360-61, and The 
Brisbane Courier, 28 Jun 1869; letter to editor from Joseph 
Bancroft. The emphasis in the parliamentary debate was on soils 
and minerals, though water was also to be examined for impurities. 
82. Ibid., 6 Feb 1869; letter to editor from O.P.Q., and Ibid., 13 Feb 
1869; letter to editor from Brisbane. 
83. At this time there was some pressure to give the franchise to wom.en. 
The question which came before the Queensland parliament in April 
1871, was linked, through the actions of Miss Faithful, Miss Martineai 
and Miss Nightingale, with the battle against the Contagious 
Diseases Act. In Queensland, some parliamentarians most opposed to 
the Contagious Diseases Act - for example W.H. Walsh - also set their 
faces against the vote for women. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
XIII (1871), 42-43 and 45-46, The Brisbane Courier, 12 Apr 1871; 
letter to editor from A.M., and Ibid., 22 Apr 1871; letter to 
editor from Gyaecian. 
84. Ibid., 14 Apr 1870; letter to editor from S. 
85. See for example. The Australasian, 26 Mar 1870, and The Brisbane 
Courier, 13 Apr 1870, and Ibid., 26 Aug 1870. " 
86. Ibid., 15 Sep 1870; letter to editor from Householder. 
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87 diseases. Early in the new year, the Brisbane City Council 
88 determined to prevent at least one source of disease dissemination 
the very prevalent practice of throwing dead animals in the streets of 
the capital, "where they putrified and caused an intolerable stench". 
The council's inspector of nuisances was authorised to announce a reward 
for information leading to the conviction of offenders. Evidently the 
fear of neighbourhood spy rings willing to exchange intelligence for 
cash was more effective than persuasion, because shortly afterwards 
The Brisbane Courier was able to report that "the evil was greatly 
89 
abated". In April 1871, the newly-formed Queensland Medical Society 
entered the field. The society issued stern warnings on "insanitary 
conditions" and "noxious agents" which 
are the frightful means of pestilence's devastating 
spread. At present they are predisposing and determining 
causes of numerous disorders, especially during infancy 
and childhood, which, if struggled through too frequently, 
precede a sickly period of puberty, impaired manhood, and 
premature decay. 90 
Perhaps encouraged by this renewed interest in sanitary affairs, 
and certainly influenced by the possibility of the importation of 
smallpox to the colony. Dr. K.I. O'Doherty introduced an ill-fated health 
bill to the Legislative Assembly, on 26 April 1871. The measure did 
91 
not even reach the second reading, and though it was reintroduced on 
87. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Nov 1870. There was special interest in 
the reports of the meetings of the British Association in Liverpool, 
England, at which Thomas Huxley and John Tyndall were the "great 
lights". 
88. Ibid. In doing this, the council was defying the scientists and 
clinging to the miasmatic theory of disease propagation. 
89. Ibid., 19 Jan 1871. At the same time private firms were geared 
to perform scavenging duties, as this advertisement testifies. 
Ibid., 11 Oct 1871. 
Nightman! Nightman!! 
and Chimneysweeper. 
W. Allen, Edward and Adelaide Streets 
is prepared to EMPTY 
Water closets, cesspools and remove 
rubbish of all kinds on the shortest 
notice, keeping a proper cart for the 
occasion. 
FURNITURE carefully removed 
by SPRING VAN. 
N.B. Any orders sent to the 
above address will meet 
with punctual attendance. 
90. Ibid., 8 May 1871; report of inaugural meeting of the Queensland 
Medical Society, held 21 April 1871. 
91. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1871), 42. 
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92 1 May, no further mention was made of it until the doctor broached the 
93 
subject in the house again in 1872. 
Even so, Queenslanders were becoming increasingly aware that some 
government action was necessary, if their health were to be protected. 
Fears about the utter disregard of the public health shown by food 
manufacturers, who deliberately adulterated their products, were quite 
widespread. Official control, the expense of which would be "trifling 
in comparison with the advantages which are to be secured", was 
94 demanded. Attention was drawn to "one-roomed humpies without the 
necessary out-offices", which were springing up in various parts of 
Brisbane to threaten hitherto salubrious areas in a manner "unnecessary 
to point out to anyone who has a nose on his face". Unfortunately, as 
this particular correspondent pointed out, "the offence to the olfactory 
organs... /yasj. . . the least part of the mischief, there being no 
95 provision made for drainage". Inured as Brisbane citizens were to 
insanitary conditions and unpleasant odours, complaints about all sorts 
of abominable filth continued to reach The Brisbane Courier throughout 
96 the year. Some noxious smells, like those emanating from the North 
Quay area and the principal streets of the capital, were alleged to be 
of such immense proportions as to "poison the atmosphere for nearly a 
97 
mile around". The realities of putrid accumulations and repulsive 
92. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, (1871), 54. 
93. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 595. There is no 
mention of the bill in debate, and no leader or obvious reference 
in the Courier. 
94. For a sample of the correspondence on adulteration, particularly 
on the alleged chief mischief-maker alum, see The Brisbane Courier, 
7 Sep 1871; letter to editor from Anti-Alum, Ibid., 9 Sep 1871; 
letter to editor from A Long Experienced Baker, and Ibid., 11 Sep 
1871; letter to editor from A Parent. At the same time, medical 
men were showing considerable concern over food values, the 
necessity for "a great deal of education to teach people to 
distinguish unwholesome from wholesome food", and adulteration, 
which "of all crimes... should be punished most unmercifully and 
vehemently". See especially, Andrew Ross, M.D., Jottings on 
Vitality (Sydney, 1872), pp.13-14. 
95. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Jun 1871; letter to editor from Sanator. 
Some opposed reform. "Cosmopolitan" considered the provision of 
sanitation in Brisbane satisfactory and expensive enough already. 
Ibid., 16 Jun 1871; letter to editor from Cosmopolitan. 
96. See for example Ibid., 17 May 1871; letter to editor from B.W. and 
Ibid., 25 Sep 1871; letter to editor from Sufferer. 
97. Ibid., 7 Oct 1871; letter to editor from One of the Sufferers. 
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98 
odours were confirmed by the Brisbane city general inspector's report, 
while the council's apparent inability to enforce its own regulations 
99 
was humiliatingly evident. 
Yet in spite of the all-too-obvious problems and inadequacies, the 
health of Queenslanders actually seemed to be improving. The Registrar-
General's report for 1871 was remarkably satisfactory, revealing the 
death rate to be less than it had been in any year since the separation 
of the colony from New South Wales. Given the prevailing conditions, 
Registrar-General Henry Scott was "unable to put forward any reason for 
the improvement". But in the light of his findings, it is extremely 
unlikely that Dr. O'Doherty's health bill of 1872 would have reached the 
statute book, had it not been for the publicity attending the possible 
introduction of smallpox during 1871, and the actual outbreak of the 
102 disease in Sydney on 10 July 1872. 
Aided by the resulting morbid colonial fears, and fully supported 
103 by the Colonial Secretary, O'Doherty, now the lone medical member of 
the house, urged the health bill upon his colleagues, since 
there was not at the disposal of the Government at the present 
moment, any single instrument or organisation by which they 
could meet the attack of the disease. 104 
At the same time, he appealed to the patriotic pride of the colony's 
representatives, pointing out that Queensland was failing to keep 
abreast with the Motherland and her sister colonies in the public health 
field. The British parliament had passed a Public Health Act in 1848, 
98. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Jan 1872, and Ibid., 9 Apr 1872; reports 
of the Brisbane City Council's general inspector on sanitary 
conditions. 
99. Ibid., 9 Apr 1872. "The bye-law regulating the matter... has as 
yet no legal force.... This subject calls for immediate attention", 
See also Ibid., 22 Oct 1872; main editorial, which alleged that 
the Municipal Institutions Act "remains a dead letter". 
100. "Registrar-General's Report for 1871", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, (1871-2), 661. Unfortunately there were 
still disproportionate numbers of child deaths. 
101. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Nov 1871. 
102. This was certainly the view of Dr. W. Hobbs, Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 694. 
103. Minutes of Executive Council, 11 Jul 1872, Q.S.A. EXE/E26, 72/28. 
104. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 596. 
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and in "all other colonies there was a Health Act such as the one he 
proposed in existence". True, the English and colonial acts applied 
only when proclaimed, but they were symptomatic of 
a general movement for extending the sphere of internal 
administration and of multiplying the supervisory powers 
and positive duties of the State in relation to its citizens. 106 
There was nothing original about O'Doherty's bill, as he freely 
admitted. He had considered the acts of the neighbouring colonies, but 
had turned to a Canadian health measure, as the one most suited to 
Queensland conditions, and had "copied as far as practicable word for 
107 
word, from that Act". 
The main feature of the bill was the appointment of a central 
board of health, which would act as the adviser to the government on all 
sanitary matters, and which would "work in perfect harmony with the 
108 
Colonial Secretary who would be its Chairman". O'Doherty suggested 
that this board should be an honorary one, though "if the House thought 
109 fit, they could pay it". The proposed central board would extend its 
operations throughout the whole of Queensland, only when necessary, only 
with the cooperation of the local authorities, and with the utmost 
simplicity, through the appointment of local boards of health. 
Of no less importance was the proclamatory nature of the proposed 
act. With an eye to placating those members who were sure to resist 
the bill on economic grounds, O'Doherty explained that the act would be 
put in force only when "disease was found to be actually in a 
district". 
105. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 596. 
106. J. Redlich and F.W. Hirst, Local Government in England, Vol.1, 
(London, 1903), p.137. 
107. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 595. O'Doherty 
followed the Canadians so closely that the words "Act to Amend the 
Health Laws" appears in the Queensland Act. Queensland Government 
Gazette, XIII (1872), 1263. Dr. Hobbs indicated that "he had not 
discovered any laws which the Bill could amend", but the title 
of the bill was not changed. 
108. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 596. The inability 
of the various central boards and their Colonial Secretary 
chairmen to achieve harmonious relations was a prominent feature 
of Queensland's public health history during the nineteenth 
century. 
109. Ibid. 
110. Ibid., p.597. 
111. Ibid. 
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Expenses entailed by the central board of health would have to be 
defrayed out of parliamentary appropriations, but the outlays of local 
112 boards would be the responsibility of municipal or shire authorities. 
Thoroughly alarmed by the threat of a smallpox invasion, the 
Colonial Secretary, Arthur Palmer, appealed to members "not to pick out 
any clauses which they might think would interfere with the liberty of 
113 
the subject", one of the major obstacles to the passage of earlier 
health legislation proposals. In the Legislative Council, the debate 
was correspondingly forthright. Henry Bates Fitz's fears that the health 
bill would "outrageously violate" municipal autonomy, were overridden 
at once by the President of the Council. Sir Maurice O'Connell 
considered that the great dangers from disease importation, which had 
accom^ panied the "more speedy communication Queensland now enjoyed with 
the older portions of the world", fully justified central board powers 
of interference, be they with individual, or with local government 
freedoms. Dr. William Hobbs thoroughly agreed. His criticism of 
the bill was more stringent, though more constructive, than any other 
offered. Rebuking the legislature for its previous "very great 
indifference" to health matters, Hobbs nevertheless regretted the 
"peculiar" object of the 1872 bill. The preservation of the public 
health of the country should be a matter for permanent concern, not 
something to be proclaimed by the governor in council only when 
formidable disease threatened. The central board of health should be 
constantly on the alert, not called together merely at the discretion 
of, and "at such times as the Colonial Secretary may appoint". Hobbs 
felt that the bill had some serious omissions, and needed considerable 
amendment. It was an "instalment", albeit a useful one, a mere 
precaution towards the preservation of the public health. It 
was only a temporary measure to meet an outbreak of disease; 
therefore much could not be expected from it. 116 
Despite its shortcomings, the bill was rushed through both houses, 
very largely on account of the immediate smallpox scare. But it also 
received considerable support, because "very malignant diseases /which/ 
112. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 695. 
113. Ibid., p.610. 
114. Ibid., p.696. 
115. Queensland Government Gazette, XIII (1872), 1264. 
116. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 695. 
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threatened to be attended by very serious results" had already broken 
117 
out in various far-flung towns and villages throughout the colony. 
Government attention had been directed to the plight of these communities, 
but the lack of effective legislation inhibited relief efforts. For 
this reason, representatives of some peripheral electorates "trusted 
118 
that there would be no delay in passing the proposed Bill". 
Queensland's first Public Health Act received assent on 12 August 
119 1872. As Piobbs had predicted, experience was to prove the measure a 
frail thing. It gave the central board of health, yet to be appointed, 
120 power to issue regulations under certain conditions, and provided for 
penalties to be imposed for wilful obstruction of officers appointed 
121 
under the Act. But, in practice, it had no real teeth. 
The seven appointees to the new Central Board of Health - four of 
122 123 
them medical men - were chosen fairly quickly, and Queenslanders 
waited expectantly for health improvements. It was not long before 
public complaints about the uselessness of the Act, and the board's lack 
of action, began to make their appearance. An outbreak of scarlatina 
in the capital in October 1872 seemed to "Alpha" to be an excellent 
reason for the proclamation of the Health Act, and some speedy attention 
124 
from the Central Board of Health - but nothing was done, tven worse, the 
inadequacies and inefficiencies of the Municipalities Act, which the 
1872 Health Act might have been expected to eradicate, were not overcome. 
so that under the new law, Brisbane was as filthy and germ-ridden as 
125 before. "Cholera Morbus" also referred the Central Board of Health 
117. See for example concern over towns like Stanthorpe. Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 610. 
118. Ibid., speech of Mr. MacDevitt, member for Kennedy. 
119. Its passage had been very swift indeed. The Executive Council 
approved it, and O'Doherty introduced it on 11 July 1872. 
120. Queensland Government Gazette, XIII (1872), 1264. The Health Act 
of 1872, 36 Vic. No.14, Clause 9. 
121. Ibid., pp.1265-1267, Clauses 10 and 14. 
122. This was two more than was required under the Act. Ibid., p.1264. 
123. Their names were gazetted on 27 September 1872. Ibid., p.1566. 
See also Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health, 31 Dec 1872, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 176, out-letter no.2377 of 1872. 
124. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Oct 1872; letter to editor from Alpha. 
125. Ibid., 22 Oct 1872; main editorial. The Brisbane City Council was 
busily calling for a new Municipal Act granting greater powers at 
this t^ ime, but the Courier asked "IVhat use has been made of those 
/Acts/ already available?" Ibid., 8 Nov 1872; main editorial. 
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to "choked drains" and "filthy stagnant pools", and "urged the Central 
. I l l - 126 
Board of Health... at once to set about the duties entrusted to them''. 
The board did not get down to practicalities until early in 1873, 
but that was hardly its fault. The legislation required that members 
should meet and act only at the minister's discretion, and it was not 
until 31 December 1872, that Arthur Palmer directed the Queensland 
Central Board of Health to commence work. It was to draw up rules of 
conduct, make a statistical analysis of Queensland's birth and death 
figures for the previous five years, and publish regulations covering 
all aspects of sanitation and the exigencies of malignant epidemic 
outbreaks. Most importantly, the board was to make arrangements for 
127 
"efficient sanatory Inspection". 
The board's regulations and its instructions for the guidance of 
128 local boards of health were finally published on 23 May 1873, but the 
central board was more interested and more concerned than this apparent 
tardiness would indicate. Certainly it was alarmed enough "on account 
of the increase of endemic and epidemic diseases in the District of 
Brisbane arising from... remediable causes", to petition the government 
on 1 May 1873, for the proclamation of the Health Act in the capital. 
The board was supported by the registered medical practitioners of 
Brisbane, who forwarded a second petition to the government to the 
129 
same effect, but the government did nothing. The central board wrote 
130 
again on 8 May, requesting immediate action on their petition, and 
131 Brisbane was at last proclaimed on 17 May 1873. 
The very real weaknesses of the 1872 Health Act became apparent 
immediately. On the one hand, the central health authority was faced 
126. The Brisbane Courier, 20 Nov 1872; letter to editor from Cholera 
Morbus. 
127. Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health, 31 Dec 1872, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 176, out-letter no.2377 of 1872. 
128. Queensland Government Gazette, XIV (1873), 826-28. 
129. Petition from Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 1 May 
1873, Q.S.A. COL/A 188, enclosure in in-letter no.2388 of 1873. A 
second petition from the registered medical practitioners is also 
enclosed. This petition is undated. 
130. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 8 May 1873, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 188, in-letter no.2388. 
131. Queensland Government Gazette, XIV (1873), 800. The capital was 
proclaimed again on 15 November 1873. Ibid., p.1895, and Central 
Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 3 Nov 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A 
186, in-letter no.1908 of 1873. 
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with intolerable delays which posed potential threats to the health of 
the nation. On the other, the wording of the Act itself inhibited any 
anticipatory action for disease prevention by the central board. 
The proclamation of Brisbane in May 1873 required the municipal 
council to set up a local board of health, financed from local funds. 
Claiming that "the revenue of the Brisbane Corporation is scarcely in 
so flourishing a condition at present as to admit of any fresh demand, 
132 to a serious extent, being made upon its resources", the Brisbane 
City Council declined to appoint any such board, unless the expenses of 
working were borne by the government of Queensland. This demand seemed 
reasonable enough to Brisbane aldermen and ratepayers. Brisbane was the 
principal port for the whole colony, and the city was therefore more 
liable to suffer from epidemic diseases than any other municipality: 
and freedom from diseases was dependent, in the council's view, on the 
provision of a proper system of drainage - an undertaking quite beyond 
133 the financial capabilities of the corporation. 
Early in July, the city council offered to appoint a local board 
of health on these conditions. But the central board threatened legal 
action under the 1872 legislation, if a local board was not appointed 
on or before 11 July 1873. Still the council procrastinated, 
debating the issue in its legislative committee, in the presence of 
135 Dr. K.I. O'Doherty, who was finally goaded into writing a very long 
letter to the press. 
O'Doherty explained the leading features of the recent legislation, 
and the financial arrangements of the Act. He maintained that the very 
latest advice on public health matters received from Great Britain and 
the older colonies, had been incorporated into Queensland's Health Act. 
He revealed the horrendous results of the Central Board of Health's 
investigation into the colony's mortality tables, commencing with the 
year 1867. 
132. The Brisbane Courier, 19 May 1873. 
133. Ibid., 17 Jun 1873. Report of the Improvement Committee of Brisbane 
City Council, printed in full. The mayor, town clerk and city 
surveyor, and Dr. O'Doherty and Charles Lilley had pressed for 
government assistance for a proper system of drainage. Ibid., 19 
and 20 May 1873 and Ibid., 22 May 1873; main editorial. 
134. Letter from Arthur Rawlins to Brisbane City Council, 5 July 1875. 
This correspondence is not available in the Queensland State 
Archives. Fortunately, The Brisbane Courier, recognising the 
importance of the exchange, printed all the letters written on this 
matter in full. See Ibid., 15 Jul 1873. 
135. Ibid., 29 Jul 1873. 
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Such a rate of mortality, especially among young children of 
tender age, although lamentable to think of in a young colony, 
of which the children may well be considered the life blood, is 
in no way to be wondered at if we take the trouble to walk 
through the streets at night and inhale for hours the foul 
atmosphere such children are doomed to breathe. 
The Central Board of Health... did not hesitate to recommend the 
Government to proclaim the city.... The Government however 
hesitated to act without further warrant, which they received 
in the form of a memorial signed by every duly qualified 
medical man practising in Brisbane.... The Government of course 
no longer hesitated.... The municipal body, seemingly unaware 
of everything that the Parliament, the Government, and the 
Central Board of Health have been doing, refuse to do their part 
in the good work.... It must... be made plain to them that in 
doing so they are upholding a system which necessarily entails a 
wholesale slaughter of our children, and imminent danger as 
well to their own precious lives. 136. 
The debate was now in the public arena, and The Brisbane Courier 
eagerly entered the lists. The editor emphasised that, like every 
municipal council world-wide, the Brisbane corporation was backed by 
property interests. These "tenementary property owners" invariably 
resisted strenuously, any approach of the tyranny of having to sacrifice 
the rights of private property, in the interests of public sanitation 
137 
enforced by law. Yet the 
liberty of the subject does not include the liberty of one 
man to poison his neighbour with foul smells, or injure his 
health by carelessness or greed. 
The Brisbane Courier might have felt some sympathy with the financially 
hard-pressed council had it not been for the fact that the municipal 
body had consistently neglected its first duty - to "take effectual 
1 38 
means to protect the health of its inhabitants". 
"A Bohemian" added his ironic comments to the argument. 
136. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Jul 1873; letter to editor from 
Dr. K.I. O'Doherty. 
137. Asa Briggs contends that in the nineteenth century "the most 
effective argument for sanitary reform was that it would actually 
save money in the long run, not squander it". Briggs, Victorian 
Cities, p.2. This possibility had not been grasped by Brisbane 
property owners and ratepayers in 1873. A similar attitude had 
obtained among British landlords and cottage ratepayers, who 
banded together in an attempt to prevent the introduction of 
various public health and local government acts, thereby slowing 
down the rate of sanitary progress in that country. See for 
example. Finer, p.501. 
138. The Brisbane Courier, 1 Aug 1873; editorial. 
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I am glad to see the City Council making a firm stand against 
the Central Board of Health and their newfangled notions. A 
pretty thing indeed if aldermen are to trouble their heads about 
stinks and go poking into back-yards and gutters to secure the 
observance of what people call sanitary laws'. The next thing 
I suppose will be to ask them to become nightmen. Suppose 
four or five hundred babies are really killed off year by 
year by bad smells, are there not others come to take their 
places? And if a fever should break out and sweep away a 
number of adults - are there not plenty who would be spared?... 
The Municipal Council have something better to employ their 
energies than in poking about to see that the streets are 
properly drained, and all disagreeable smells kept down. 139 
An overwhelming number of aldermen continued to withstand the 
appointment of a local board of health, even though the threat of the 
increased incidence of epidemic diseases grew alarmingly with the 
approach of the hot summer months. The city fathers claimed that such 
an appointment "relegated /the councijV to the position of rate-raiser 
for an irresponsible board"; that it was the proposal of "doctors who 
ought not to be allowed to tyrannise over them"; and that "ratepayers 
would not submit to further taxes". The opposition was so deep-drawn 
and so vehement, that these objections were still being raised after the 
council had received the city solicitor's opinion that any writ of 
mandamus issued by the Central Board of Health under the Health Act, 
could not be successfully resisted, and that it would be best for the 
140 
council to appoint a local board at once. 
In a last ditch stand, the aldermen decided to call a public 
meeting of ratepayers to consider the matter, declaring that they would 
not vote for a local board, unless instructed to do so by that meeting. 
142 It was poorly attended, and in the face of obvious public apathy, the 
first Brisbane Local Board of Health was appointed at a hurriedly called 
extraordinary municipal council meeting. Further difficulties arose 
139. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Aug 1873; letter to editor from A 
Bohemian. 
140. On 21 August 1873 a show cause application was made to the Supreme 
Court against the Brisbane City Council over the local board issue. 
Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1874, p.88, and The Brisbane Courier, 
22 Aug 1873. See also Redlich and Hirst, Vol.11, pp.366-67, for 
an explanation of the workings of mandamus in British courts. 
141. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Aug 1873. 
142. Ibid., 6 Sep 1873. The opening of the meeting was delayed in the 
vain hope of an influx of late arrivals, but only fifty people were 
present. 
143. Ibid., 9 Sep 1873. 
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144 
as some appointed members refused to act. But by mid-September, 
Brisbane had a working Local Board of Health which, according to The 
Brisbane Courier, was "marked... by an evident determination... to carry 
145 
out vigorously the duties undertaken". Unfortunately, contemporaries 
could detect no improvement in the sanitary state of the capital, and 
complaints continued to flood into all three bodies now concerned with 
1 Aft 
the public health. 
As for the Health Act itself, the apprehensions expressed by many 
Queenslanders when O'Doherty first introduced his legislation, now seemed 
justified. The objections of anti-centralist parliamentarians, who 
had opposed the Act because "very serious" and "too great powers" would 
be conferred on the Central Board of Health to enable it to "interfere 
even with municipalities", appeared to be vindicated by the enforced 
appointment of Brisbane's first Local Board of Health. The worst fears 
of the Brisbane council were certainly confirmed, when, on 20 October 
1873, a bill for;^36.11.6 to cover law charges, was presented by the 
city solicitor. The bulk of the fee had been incurred by the Local 
Board of Health in checking the legality and enforceability of their 
148 
regulations. Extra expenses continued to mount as the council 
general inspector, who had carried out some work at the direction of the 
local board, requested remuneration from the council for these duties, 
149 
which "entailed considerable extra work". 
144. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Sep 1873. The first meeting of the board 
was a farce since three members refused to attend. "A Bohemian" 
marked the occasion with another facetious letter to the Courier. Ibi 
145. Ibid., 17 Sep 1873. None of the local board members was a council 
alderman in 1873, but each had already served at least one term as 
mayor of Brisbane. The only "professional" on the board was W. 
Apjohn, the council's general inspector of nuisances. See Brewer and 
Dunn, for details of aldermen and mayors of Brisbane up to 1924. 
146. See for example Ibid., 7 Oct 1873; general reporting. Ibid., 22 
Oct 1873; letter to editor from Oxygen, Ibid., 9 Dec 1873; letter 
to Local Board of Health from L.A. Bernays, Acclimatization Society 
about illegal manure dumping. 
147. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XIV (1872), 610 and 696. 
148. The Brisbane Courier, 21 Oct 1873. See also Ibid., 17 Sep and 
24 Sep 1873. 
149. Ibid., 18 Nov 1873. In self-defence, the council refused to allow 
the local board to use the city surveyor to inspect new buildings 
and drainage, claiming that this officer was fully employed within 
his own department. Ibid., 9 Dec 1873. The full text of the 
correspondence between the Local Board of Health and the council on 
this important matter of staff use is recorded in this issue of 
The Brisbane Courier. 
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Those who had claimed that the 1872 Health Act did not go far 
enough in dealing with Queensland's monumental health problems, also 
had the doubtful satisfaction of seeing their prognostications come 
150 true. The Central Board of Health had been subjected to the 
annoyance and frustration of the government's reluctance to act quickly 
on the advice of its health experts, and the Brisbane City Council's 
shilly-shallying when the Act was finally proclaimed. The board soon 
discovered that the Act itself was a stumbling-block to the forestalling 
of any possible outbreak of disease. During the latter half of 1873, 
the central board received a number of complaints about "nuisances 
injurious to health" from the neighbourhoods of Milton and Breakfast 
Creek. These were accompanied by urgent requests for the appointment 
152 
of local boards of health, but the Attorney-General ruled against the 
153 issuing of proclamations under the terms of the Act, which precluded 
preventive action. The application of a cure was not permitted until 
the disease actually appeared. 
Given the unsatisfactory health legislation, the constant, urgent, 
154 
and wasteful necessity of reproclaiming the capital, the "thoroughly 
polluted" state of the city, the consequent very high infant mortality 
150. Notably Dr. Hobbs. Medical members of the Central Board of Health 
very quickly realised the very circumscribed nature of their 
powers, and began to press for executive powers. 
151. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 22 Sep 1873, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 185, in-letter no.1661 of 1873, in which the central board 
urged the provision of an extra fever ward as existing wards were 
"grossly overcrowded". The government replied that no new buildings 
were to be erected, but "should emergency arise it will be provided 
for". Marginal comment on above, 25 Sep 1873. 
152. The complaints were fulsome and numerous, and the requests for 
local boards even included the names of would-be members. Central 
Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 6 Oct 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A 
186, in-letter no.1752 of 1873, and Central Board of Health to 
Colonial Secretary, 3 Nov 1873, Q.S.A. COL/A 186, in-letter 
no.1907 of 1873. 
153. The opinion of the Attorney-General was sent to the Central Board 
on 17 November 1873. It was based on Section I of the Act. 
154. See Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 9 May 1874, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 194, in-letter no.962, and Central Board of Health to 
Colonial Secretary, 28 Oct 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A 199, in-letter no. 
2211 of 1874. The Milton and Breakfast Creek situation was so 
serious by December 1874, that the two areas were proclaimed as 
from 11 January 1875. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 
6 Dec 1874, Q.S.A. COL/A 201, in-letter no.2528 of 1874, and 
marginal comment re actual proclamation. 
155. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Sep 1874; editorial. 
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rate, and the Brisbane Local Board of Health's declaration that it 
157 
was "completely unable to abate nuisances of certain kinds", it is 
hardly surprising that by early July 1874, the Central Board of Health 
158 had drafted amending health legislation. It is astonishing that by 
16 July of that same year, the bill, which had qualified government 
approval, and which was favourably commented on in the committee of 
159 the whole, had been discharged from the paper. 
The rejection of the amendment bill was based on parliament's 
reluctance to place wide taxing powers in the hands of the Central Board 
of Health. Members also objected to an irresponsible board's being 
given wide-ranging controls over the inspection of public boarding 
houses, and the detection and prevention of the adulteration of foods, 
1 fi 1 drinks, drugs, and medicines. The final blow to the bill was the 
central board's attempt to introduce compulsory vaccination against 
smallpox. Even those members favourably disposed towards the bill were 
unable to stomach this blatant attack on individual freedom. 
Evidence of the inefficiency of the Queensland Health Act 
156. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Sep 1874; editorial. 
157. Part of the local board's self-confessed impotence arose from the 
dispute over the funding of their projects. In the city 
solicitor's opinion, the payment of local board expenses could not 
be successfully resisted by council, but the aldermen strongly 
desired a more subject local board, to try to curb what they saw 
as excessive outlays. Council feeling ran so high that a deputation 
waited on the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Macalister, asking him to 
disband the local board entirely. He refused to do this, but 
agreed to allow the council to appoint a board "more amenable to 
its wishes". The resulting board, appointed on 3 December 1874, 
consisted of the Mayor, James Swan, and five sitting aldermen. 
Its membership was approved by the Central Board of Health. For 
details see The Brisbane Courier, 16 May, 2 Sep, 22 Sep, 3 Nov, 
6 Nov, 4 Dec 1874, and 5 Nov 1874; letter to editor from Health. 
158. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVII (1874), 936. In introducing 
the bill. Secretary for Public Works, Thomas Mcllwraith, asserted 
that the original Health Act was "a very excellent measure", "had 
worked... very satisfactorily, and was calculated to be of very 
great benefit". 
159. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1874), 341 and 381, 
160. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVII (1874), 936. The government 
had never approved this clause of the bill. 
161. Ibid., p.937. William Bailey, who particularly objected to these 
clauses was the son of a medical practitioner, and a failed medical 
student. 
162. Arthur Palmer, under whose government the 1872 Act was passed, 
thought the new bill was "badly wanted", but strongly opposed 
compulsory vaccination. Ibid., p.938. 
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continued to mount during 1875. Members of the Central Board of Health 
repeated their complaint that although the legislation was being 
proclaimed in various centres throughout the colony, "valuable time was 
lost before the Act was fairly brought into operation". During 
heated debate on the 1875 Brisbane drainage bill - a piece of sanitary 
legislation which did reach the statute book - bitter attacks were 
made in both houses of parliament on the 1872 Health Act, the Central 
and Local Boards of Health, and the Brisbane City Council. All of these 
bodies were accused of actually "preventing the improvement of the 
sanitary condition of Brisbane", by allowing the existence of "what 
had been termed 'stink pots'". Members professed them.selves shocked 
1 fi 7 
by a "heavy death rate which had been something frightful", and the 
representative for Brisbane, Robert Stewart, having consulted medical 
authorities, warned that the mortality "was very likely to greatly 
increase". Stewart was convinced that "the recently appointed /_Loca.lJ 
Board of Health had something to do with it, as, since it had been 
169 
established, the city had been in a far worse state than it was before". 
The member for Fortitude Valley agreed. Francis Beattie 
believed that this unhealthiness had been greatly accelerated by 
the Plealth Act that had been put in force. A more pernicious 
system, he believed, had never been in existence than that at 
present in force in Brisbane. 170 
In the face of this criticism, the government simply resorted to 
reproclamations of the capital under the already discredited Health Act, 
171 
which had raised the ire of parliamentarians and citizens alike. 
163. Particularly in fever-ridden Maryborough. Central Board of Health 
to Colonial Secretary, 6 Mar 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A 219, in-letter no. 
575 of 1876. This letter stood in lieu of a central board report. 
No reports had been published to this date, though called for 
under the 1872 Health Act. 
164. Queensland Government Gazette, II (1875), 1451. 
165. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XVIII (1875), 599. Speech of 
H.G. Simpson in the Legislative Council. 
166. Ibid., p.481. Speech of W.H. Groom, member for Drayton and Toowoomba 
167. Ibid., p.599. Speech of A.H. Brown in the Legislative Council, echoe( 
in the Assembly by Francis Beattie, member for Fortitude Valley. 
168. Ibid., p.472. 
169. Ibid., p.473. 
170. Ibid., p.476. On the other hand, C.H. Buzacott, member for 
Rockhampton, complained that the fault lay in the Act's never 
having been enforced. Ibid., p.477. 
171. Queensland Government Gazette, XVI (1875), 1058, and Ibid., XVII 
(1875), 2249. 
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Even this solace was not extended to Ipswich. In March 1875, the 
mortality in that city assumed "a very serious character", and the 
172 
central board requested proclamation, but to no avail. By mid-1875, 
measles had a hold on both Brisbane and Ipswich, while in nearby Goodna 
173 
scarcely one family had escaped the scourge. Again the government 
declined to proclaim Ipswich and her environs, but this was partly 
because the Central Board of Health itself attributed the "high death 
rate at present, not to drainage, /that is, to remedial causes^ /, but to 
~ 174 
a virulent epidemic of measles 'due to atmospheric changes'". 
The weather had certainly been unkind to the colony. Queensland 
was once more in the grip of a drought, which was not only allegedly 
devastating from a health point of view, but was certainly causing 
"great anxiety and loss" financially as well. Queensland was "suffering 
an evident depression", and although it was "without its too-often 
concomitant - a panic", government works and expenditure had received a 
pai 
176 
175 definite check, rticularly in the area of capital works for 
sanitary purposes. 
Nevertheless, given the physical, political, and economic climate, 
changes to the 1872 Health Act were obviously necessary, and a health 
act amendment bill was produced. The bill was calculated to appeal to 
the decentralization faction, with its proposal to limit interference 
172. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 30 Mar 1875, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 207, in-letter no.990 of 1875. 
173. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1876, pp.56-7. 
174. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Jul 1875. See David Hardie's Notes on some 
of the More Common Diseases in Queensland in Relation to Atmospheric 
Conditions, for an explanation of this contemporary view. 
175. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1877, p.71. Maryborough was an exception 
to the drought situation. In the early part of 1875, disastrous 
floods had hit the town. In this case, water and "a lot of muck 
lying around" was blamed for the unsatisfactory health of the town. 
See The Brisbane Courier, 11 Mar, 22 Mar, 25 Mar, 29 Mar, 31 Mar, 
and 5 Apr 1875. 
176. Apart from government reluctance to finance sanitary improvements, 
funds were either entirely lacking, or very slow in being passed on 
for local board of health purposes. See especially with regard to 
Milton and Breakfast Creek boards. Central Board of Health to 
Colonial Secretary, 30 Mar 1875, Q.S.A. COL/A 207, in-letter no.994 
of 1875, Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health,12 Apr 1875, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 206, out-letter no.260, and reminder letter from Central 
Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 14 Aug 1875, Q.S.A. COL/A 
213, in-letter no.2394 of 1875. 
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177 
"with any powers belonging to any Municipalities". Like the 
amendment bill of the previous year, it was favourably received by the 
committee of the whole, yet it was ignominiously discharged from the 
178 
paper before the second reading. 
179 The following year, one of continuing recession, which was 
180 
marked by a depressed state in the labour market, was a rare period 
in the decade of the seventies - a year which did not see any attempt 
to pass amending health legislation. Sanitary difficulties had certainly 
not disappeared, and the Central Board of Health was still experiencing 
troublesome delays in having obvious trouble spots declared and 
181 proclaimed. But in 1876 the Registrar-General produced a favourable 
182 
report, and local, and even more importantly, overseas medical 
journals, began to comment propitiously on Queensland - "one of our 
healthiest colonies... in spite of what are acknowledged to be grave 
183 
sanitary evils and defects in the principal towns of the colony". 
The respite from attempts to pass health legislation did not last 
long. In 1877, Queensland's health situation deteriorated. Rampant 
home-grown diseases were multiplied with the arrival of typhoid, measles, 
184 
and scarlet-fever-ridden ships from Great Britain and Europe, and 
185 
smallpox made its appearance on the Queensland coast. Fever attacks 
177. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 27 Apr 1875, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 208, in-letter no.1229 of 1875. 
178. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, I (1875), 312. 
The bill was discharged on 3 September 1875. 
179. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1877, p.71. 
180. Immigration Agent's Report on the Queen of Nations to Colonial 
Secretary, 22 Sep 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A 226, in-letter no.2301 of 1876. 
181. For example, on 12 January 1876, Cooktown was reported, by telegraph, 
to be "one great hospital". Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1877, p.48. 
Yet the central board achieved only partial proclamation by 25 
November. Only after a deputation had pressured the Colonial 
Secretary, was the Act proclaimed in full force. Central Board 
of Health to Colonial Secretary, 25 Nov 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A 229, 
in-letter no.3075, and marginal comments on results. 
182. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, II (1876), 
especially pp.388 and 390-93. 
183. The Lancet, Vol.11, 8 Jul 1876, p.63. See also Pugh's Queensland 
Almanac, 1877, p.75. 
184. For example, the Charles Dickens, which sailed from Hamburg on 5 
April 1877 and arrived in Moreton Bay on 14 July, with measles and 
scarlet fever rife in the ship. The ship was immediately put into 
quarantine, being granted pratique early in September 1877. The 
Telegraph, 3 Nov 1971. 
185. Within, p.223. 
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increased throughout the colony, particularly amongst men working on 
1 Rf, 
important government developmental projects in rural areas, and in 
187 heavily-populated areas near the heart of the capital. To add to 
these problems, the Central Board of Health was deeply concerned over 
"the Chinese invasion of the Palmer Gold Fields", and the distinct 
possibility that the formidable contagious diseases prevalent in the 
188 East might enter the colony with these aliens. The immediate 
reaction of the board was to call upon the government to reconsider 
189 their 1875 health act amendment bill. 
After deliberation, the board made fresh proposals to the 
government. A new amendment bill incorporated the central board rules 
190 
and regulations which had been gazetted in 1876, and which would 
certainly have made for a more effective and comprehensive piece of 
191 health legislation. But incredibly, the 1877 bill met exactly the 
192 
same treatment as its immediate predecessor, possibly because 
Dr. K.I. O'Doherty, now elevated to the Legislative Council, was 
unavailable to fight for the measure during its short life in the 
Assembly. 
The following year witnessed repeat performances for Queensland in 
two important areas. Once again, the colony was faced with serious 
193 drought conditions, which, in some tragic instances, had disastrous 
186. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXIII (1877), 28. "Malarial" -
type fevers were rife amongst men working on the Dalby to Roma 
railway line, and parliam.entarians representing the area were 
most concerned. 
187. South Brisbane "prayed" to be brought under the 1872 Act on 4 
January 1877. The first notice came on 27 Septem.ber 1876, with a 
petition from forty-one persons. The situation was confirmed by 
the central board as "urgent" in November 1876. Central Board of 
Health to Colonial Secretary, 24 Nov 1876, Q.S.A. COL/A 229, 
in-letter no.3083 of 1876 and attachments. 
188. "Progress Report of the Central Board of Health", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1877), 1145. 
189. Ibid., p.1146. 
190. Queensland Government Gazette, XIX (1876), 839. 
191. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 19 May 1877, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 238, in-letter no.2889 of 1877. 
192. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1877), 166. 
193. See for example The Brisbane Courier, 9 Feb 1878, and 11 Feb 
1878; editorial. 
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194 
effects on the health of Queensland towns. Another health act 
am.endment bill was placed before the Queensland parliament, with Kevin 
195 O'Doherty as a strong proponent once again. This bill, which was 
more strongly worded, and sought wider power for the Central Board of 
Health than any other previously prepared, was supported by the 
196 government, but was stopped through prorogation. 
With monotonous regularity, an amending attempt appeared before the 
house again in 1879. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the 
government, now led by the conservative Thomas Mcllwraith, with A.H. 
Palmer as Colonial Secretary, was presiding over an ever-worsening 
public health situation. Grave sanitary problems, which needed 
E 
198 
197 immediate attention, were shamefully neglected. The Central Board 
of Health admitted to having "no power to deal with the matters", 
and the local board immediately concerned also confessed to 
experiencing the "greatest difficulty in properly enforcing Health 
199 Regulations". 
In Maryborough, a city plagued by fevers and a high death rate, 
government tardiness in reproclaiming the 1872 Health Act set back 
programmes which were essential "in order to maintain due health during 
the hot months". The government was also irritatingly slow in paying 
professional men for services rendered. Dr. Joseph Bancroft, having 
inspected the construction of drains, the water supply, the water 
194. In particular the typhoid outbreak in Toowoomba. Within, 
pp.99-102. 
195. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXV (1878), 67-68. The Douglas 
ministry with Douglas as Colonial Secretary was in power. 
196. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, I (1878), 18. 
197. Particularly bad "plague spots" existed in South Brisbane, ranging 
from large swamps to cesspits, pools of stagnant water, and "pigs 
luxuriating in the filth of the place". Report of Committee of 
Central Board of Health (John Petrie and K. Cannan), attached to 
Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 30 Apr 1879, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 276, in-letter no.1584 of 1879. 
198. Letter no.1879 of 30 April 1879 attached to Ibid. 
199. South Brisbane Local Board of Health to Central Board of Health, 
15 Nov 1878. Unnumbered in-letter attached to Ibid. 
200. The original letter from E.P. Wells, Secretary to the Maryborough 
Local Board was written on 2 September 1878. The central board 
was still requesting government action on 7 April 1879. Central 
Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 7 Apr 1879, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 275, in-letter no.1368 of 1879. 
326. 
closets, and other sanitary arrangements at government house, had to 
wait for months for the settlement of his account. Bancroft, who felt 
that he "should not refuse government work without adequate reason" 
for the sake of the public health, nevertheless complained that it took 
"twice the time to get paid for government work as it /did_/ to get the 
work done". 
Even worse, from an overall public health point of view, 
considerable differences of opinion had arisen between all of the parties 
charged with looking after the welfare of the colony, particularly over 
the essential, but prohibitively expensive business of drainage for 
Brisbane, its suburbs, and nearby populous areas. The drainage plan 
itself was "elaborately" and "carefully drawn" by the government, and 
202 the Brisbane City Council was duly grateful. But the council's 
improvement committee was unable to advise the city fathers to accept 
the scheme, because it involved a large expenditure on works outside 
municipal boundaries. Moreover, in the opinion of the medical experts, 
Drs. Joseph Bancroft and Richard Rendle, the sanitary effects of the 
open drainage envisaged, in which "large areas of mud, sewerage, and 
offensive material might be expected to collect", would be most 
deleterious. 
Before so large a risk to public health is incurred and 
the city involved in a debt of such magnitude, further 
scientific opinions should be sought and obtained. 203 
The problem was so pressing, that, despite objections on account 
of the expense, it was decided, on the suggestion of Colonial Secretary 
Palmer, to call a conference between the Central and Brisbane Local 
Boards of Health and the Brisbane City Council. Antagonism between the 
parties was obvious at once. The necessity for better drainage was not 
in question, but there were "some recriminations with respect to the 
204 Central Board of Health's criticism of the Local Board of Health". 
The local board claimed that the objects of the conference were being 
defeated by the tactics of the Central Board of Health, and that the 
failure of that board to persuade their Colonial Secretary chairman to 
201. Joseph Bancroft to Colonial Secretary, 16 Aug 1879, Q.S.A. COL/A 
275, unnumbered in-letter of 1879. The Colonial Secretary denied 
having received the vouchers and marked this letter "Pay this". 
202. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Jan 1879; report of the Brisbane City 
Council improvement committee on the Government Drainage Scheme. 
203. Ibid., 7 Jan 1879. 
204. Ibid., 28 Feb 1879. 
327, 
introduce new, satisfactory sanitary legislation had rendered Local 
205 Board of Health "inspection well-nigh useless". 
By March 1879, it was quite clear that lines of communication 
between the two boards of health were stretched almost to breaking point. 
The situation was not improved by The Brisbane Courier's publication 
of the Central Board of Health sub-committee's report on the work of 
Of) ft 
the local board with respect to the earth closet system, and the 
reply from the chairman of the Local Board of Health, Alfred Hubbard. 
The Central Board of Health gave no help to the Local Board 
of Health, even when asked to, and the Local Board had 
frequently pointed out the weaknesses of the present 
legislation to no avail. They /^ the Central Board./, had given 
no instructions as to which system they desired to be enforced.... 
The weaknesses of the Health Act and the Instructions to 
Local Boards are: 
1. The Local Board has no power to collect any money for 
work done; 
2. No power to prevent ships landing offensive goods within 
the municipality; 
3. No power to inspect lodging houses; 
4. Municipal bye-laws are useless as the Health Act 
supersedes them; 
5. The Local Board has no power to interfere with food 
unfit for use. 207 
Dr. O'Doherty took up the local board's challenge, sarcastically alluding 
to Hubbard's letter as "idle wind", and pointing out that the Central 
Board of Health had endeavoured to have the Health Act amended on a 
, n . 2 0 8 
number of occasions. 
The Local Board of Health, prompted by Dr. Joseph Bancroft, tried 
209 
"in part to meet the views of the Central Board of Health", but 
Dr. O'Doherty persisted in his attacks, the focal point of which was the 
local board's duties under the 1872 Health Act. This important matter 
was taken up by the central board's ministerial chairman, who called 
attention to the provisions of the Health Act, under which appointees 
to the Local Board 
205. The Brisbane Courier, 7 Mar 1879; letter from the Local Board of 
Health to the Conference, printed in full. 
206. Ibid., 12 Feb 1879. 
207. Ibid., 1 Feb 1879. 
208. Ibid., 18 Feb 1879; letter to editor from K.I. O'Doherty. 
209. Ibid., 20 Mar 1879. 
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were to be health officers who were themselves to do t!ie 
work. If the members of the Local Board did not do this, 
they must either resign or be superseded.... If the 
provisions of the Health Act were carried out, the Local 
Board would be one of the most effective bodies possible. 210 
This was a calculated insult both to the Brisbane Local Board of Health 
and to the Brisbane municipal council which appointed it. The impact was 
made effective by its full exposure in the Brisbane press. 
211 The argument developed as letters to the editor, reports of 
212 
central board meetings, and general news items oh the insanitary 
213 
state of Brisbane, kept the health question before the public eye. 
Then on 7 June 1879, the Local Board of Health, fed up with constant 
destructive criticism from the central board and the press, appointed 
a committee to examine the workings of the 1872 Health Act. On the 
credit side, the committee reported that valuable improvements were 
slowly but surely being made in the sanitary condition of the city; that 
even more importantly, the customs and habits of the people of Brisbane, 
214 
which were prejudicial to health, were gradually being improved; 
that a cleaner, more effective method of human waste disposal was being 
introduced - again gradually; that Brisbane's street drainage had shown 
a marked improvement; that many low lands had been filled in, and other 
allotments had been drained; that house-to-house, and some special 
inspections had been made; and that financially, the Act had been a 
215 
success. On the other hand, the local board's committee underlined 
the very definite weaknesses of the 1872 Act under which they had to 
work. One of the main complaints was that the life of a local board was 
too short. Local board existence was dependent upon the reproclamation 
210. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Apr 1879; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 7 Apr 1879. 
211. See for example. Ibid., 9 Apr 1879; letter to editor from 
Dr. J. Bancroft. 
212. Ibid., 1 May 1879; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 30 Apr 1879. 
213. One other public health landmark in 1879 was the publication of the 
"Report on the Working of 'The Prevention of Contagious Diseases 
Act of 1868'", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II 
(1879), 1273-78. 
214. The recognition of the need for personal hygiene was one of the 
most important steps on the way to the creation of a satisfactory 
health situation in every country. 
215. The Central Board of Health had already calculated that the local 
board had shown a profit of £-90 over their five years of operation. 
The Brisbane Courier, 12 Feb 1879; sub committee report of Central 
Board of Health on work of Local Board of Health with respect to the 
Earth Closet System. 
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of the city, otherwise its life span was only six months. This prevented 
the board from entering into contracts and agreements, and discouraged 
it from sanctioning expenditure. Of crucial importance was the recovery 
of expenses, since the Health Act authorized the removal of nuisances, 
but did not provide for just remuneration. Local boards were also 
severely handicapped by the lack of proper by-laws, and by the necessity 
to make inspections of nuisances only in daylight hours. Lack of power 
and/or of proper regulations also inhibited the board in dealing with 
sanitation in new buildings, with the inspection of food, and with other 
similar matters, which the local board considered were essential to the 
9 1 fi 
maintenance of the public health in Brisbane. The central board and 
its shortcomings are not mentioned in the report, but the legislative 
weaknesses which the local board chose to emphasise, were those already 
covered in their publicly-aired disagreements. Criticism of that board, 
and a defence against its attacks, are implicit in the local board report. 
By the end of July 1879, there could scarcely have been a 
newspaper reader in the capital who was not aware of the bitterness 
existing between the two health boards. This was the situation when 
Dr. K.I. O'Doherty rose in the Legislative Council to move the second 
reading of the health act amendment bill, very late in the session of 
217 1879. 
Vi/hen considerable difference of opinion arose between the 
sanitary authorities, the Municipal Council and the Local 
and Central Boards of Health,... the Colonial Secretary as 
Chairman of the Central Board of Health, on a recent... 
occasion,... threw out a hint to the Central Board 
to take the present Health Act in hand and to endeavour to 
frame an amending Bill upon it which would meet the 
difficulties that were encountered in the working of the 
existing sanitary law. 218 
O'Doherty still insisted that the 1872 Health Act was very 
satisfactory, because it had enabled the government to deal with 
diseases imported by the Chinese, and all sorts of ills of "a similar 
219 
malignant kind". But he also pointed out that 
216. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Jul 1879. 
217. It is doubtful if this bill, which required the raising of money 
by the state for its proper functioning, should have been introduced 
in the upper house. See the arguments on this question which arose 
when the Contagious Diseases Act was before parliament in 1867. 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, V (1867), 148. 
218. Ibid., XXVIII (1879), 408. My italics. 
219. Ibid., p.409. 
330. 
the main purpose of a sanitary law... was not merely to be 
prepared in every way to meet the invasion,... but it should 
be efficient in all the means that obtained for preventing 
the outbreak of many dreadful diseases amongst us. 220 
The organisation of preventive measures to ensure domestic as well as 
public cleanliness was essential. But the various health boards were 
unsure of their ground, since scientific developments had left 
221 
sanitarians bewildered as to the best course to pursue. 
It was quite possible... that under present circumstances, 
owing to the great uncertainty prevailing in every part of 
the world, even in England, upon some important questions 
of sanitary law, the authorities might be endeavouring to 
carry out a system that was utterly inconsistent with 
public safety. 222 
In this way, with considerable delicacy, O'Doherty covered the 
differences of opinion on methods of dealing with Queensland problems, 
which had caused the health boards of the colony to differ so violently. 
But because of this dissension, he stressed that the passing of the bill 
then before the house was an "urgent necessity". Members should do their 
homework, and be prepared, at the opening of the next session, "to take 
an intelligent and earnest course", by reforming and amending the 
existing Health Act. 
Legislative Council members eagerly agreed that the bill was a 
223 
"very important one indeed", but despite the aura of good-will, 
neither that bill nor any other amending legislation was brought 
224 before parliament in the new year, probably because of the very 
220. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXVIII (1879), 409. 
221. At this time and later, many northern Queensland papers in 
particular were offering their readers advice on the latest 
domestic sanitary arrangements. The journal articles of Dr. W.H. 
Corfield, M.A. , were used as the basisformuch of this newspaper 
material. Corfield wrote for the British public, but the articles 
were reprinted first in Australia in the Australian Engineering and 
Building News, Vols.1-3, 1879-1881. 
222. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXVIII (1879), 410. 
223. Ibid., p.412. 
224. There was apparently no pressing economic reason for delaying 
amendment. In 1879, Pugh's Almanac reported that in general, 
things has improved, and a good deal of building was proceeding 
in Brisbane. However, in reviewing the year 1880, the same journal 
reported that "the returning tide of prosperity had not been so 
rapid as anticipated", though there was no cause for alarm. In 
the Almanac's opinion, the retarding of progress and conmierce in 
the colony was "undoubtedly due to the unsatisfactory state of 
politics". See Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1880, p.98 and Ibid., 
1881, p.77. 
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favourable Central Board of Health progress report for 1879, which was 
225 
released on 13 October 1880. This report was based on returns 
furnished by the Registrar-General, and not merely on central board 
observations. It revealed that Brisbane, and the colony generally, 
had shown "continued improvement", and that benefits to the public 
health were most marked "in those townships proclaimed under the 
operation of 'The Health Act of 1872'". This declaration of faith in 
the Act was not accompanied by any criticism of local boards which had 
neglected their duty under the legislation. Indeed the Brisbane Local 
Board of Health, the alleged chief offender in this regard, received an 
indulgent mention in the report. Where an exceptionally high, above 
00 ft 
average death rate had occurred, the central board defended itself, 
227 
asserting that it had issued early warnings, and had appointed a 
special commission which "very clearly point/ed/ out from whence the 
— — 228 
evil IfLTOseJ, and the best mode of dealing with it". 
The central board admitted to only one "defect" in the 1872 Act. 
This was the six monthly proclamation period which had already been 
singled out for special condemnation by the Brisbane local board, and 
which aroused a feeling of "distaste among all municipalities and 
townships... brought under the operation of 'The Health Act'". No 
beneficial results could be expected in any community in so short a 
time, and the Central Board of Health "strongly urged" the government to 
proclaim all Queensland municipal townships to be permanently under the 
operation of the Act. If this were done, the central board pledged 
itself "to afford to the local authorities every help in the difficult 
task they ha/d/ to perform". At the same time the central board, 
"considering the yet imperfect state of sanitary science", promised to 
refrain from arbitrary rule. In future it would offer advice on 
"general principles only,... leaving the widest possible latitude as to 
229 the means by which these principles may be carried out". 
225. "Central Board of Health, 1879, (Progress Report)", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1880), 1503-4. 
226. In Warwick. Ibid., p.1503. 
227. In this case as far back as 1878. Ibid. 
228. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 2 Nov 1878, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 267, in-letter no.4039 of 1878, and attached papers. 
229. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1880), 1503-4. 
332. 
During the early 1880's, the central and local boards continued 
to limp along under the 1872 legislation, in the face of increasing 
health hazards. Boards were still proclaimed - and reproclaimed - for 
230 . . 
six monthly periods at the government's discretion, even as opposition 
mounted from municipal and town councils which "condemned our sanitary 
law and sought to consign our Health Boards and the Acts (sic) under 
231 
which they are constituted to Hades". 
Genuine, but usually ineffective, attempts were made to deal with 
sanitary problems, but contemporary observers could detect little 
232 improvement, either in Brisbane and its suburbs, or in outlying 
233 
cities and towns. By the end of 1882, only Dr. O'Doherty continued 
to give public praise to the existing health legislation, affirming 
I am quite content with the good work our Health Act has done, 
during the ten years of its existence.... I feel that our 
Association will guard with jealous care, the Health Act and 
the Central Board as the fountain-head of our sanitary law. 
It is quite likely that the time has arrived for a revision of 
its code of sanitary regulations... but... I contend that the 
law itself should be defined by the government represented in 
the Central Board whose chairman is the Colonial Secretary, and 
that it should be altered and modified only by them.... I 
230. Although the government did nothing about amending the Health Act 
during the early 1880's, they did pass two very important measures 
bearing on the public health. One was the Sale of Food and Drugs 
Act of 1881, which was passed in spite of opponents' claims that 
it would "to a great extent embarrass trade" and would cause great 
difficulties for the public service because of "an insufficient 
number of analysts". Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XXXV (1881), 
260-2. The other act was again, in part, the work of Dr. O'Doherty. 
It was intended to "provide the public with some efficient 
guarantee... that they would be provided with proper drugs... and 
have the prescriptions of medical men properly compounded". Ibid., 
XXXIV (1881), 139. 
231. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Dec 1882. 
232. For examples see. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Feb 1881, 3 Jul 1881, 
21 Oct 1882; sub-editorial, 14 Dec 1882, Lutwyche Local Board of 
Health to Colonial Secretary, 20 Jun 1881, Q.S.A. COL/A 315, 
in-letter no.2646 of 1881, Central Board of Health to Colonial 
Secretary, 16 Jan 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A 330, in-letter no.256 of 
1882, and Woolloongabba Local Board of Health to Central Board of 
Health, 10 Jul 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A 338, in-letter no.3086 of 1882. 
233. For examples see The Queensland Times, 5 Apr 1881, editorial. 
Ibid., 26 Apr 1881; letter to editor from Pro Bono Publico, Ibid., 
9 Jul 1881, letter to editor from Sanitas, Warwick Local Board of 
Health to Colonial Secretary, 10 Oct 1882, Q.S.A. COL/A 347, 
in-letter no.5365 of 1882, Wide Bay and Burnett News, 18 Jan 1882, 
Ibid., 11 Mar 1882; letter to editor from X. Miloof, Ibid., 15 
Aug 1882; editorial, and Supplement to Wide Bay and Burnett News, 
2 Nov 1882. 
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contend that this Act has not alone been of great benefit to 
Brisbane,... but in addition, we may justly claim for it that 
it has proved its efficiency in protecting the colony threatened 
with an attack of a formidable disease. 234 
The Brisbane Courier, already campaigning to see an end to the Health 
Act and the restoration of local authorities to their traditional position 
in sanitary affairs, expressed surprise that Dr. O'Doherty should cling so 
stubbornly to his out-moded legislation, but assured its readers that 
"although we know and esteem /the doctor^ /, we do not look to him for 
"~ 235 perfect accuracy of statement". 
Noone had long to wait to witness the death throes of Queensland's 
first Health Act. Certainly, on 24 February 1883, the government began 
0 '\ft 
again to reproclaim the Act, in an attempt to deal with the 
increasingly serious public health problems facing the colony. There 
were "flagrant pest holes" in and around the city of Brisbane and 
237 throughout the whole colony, in spite of the existence of the Cen" 
and Local Boards of Health. Indeed, in The Brisbane Courier's view. 
"the working of the systems under the Act was responsible for this 
horrible state of affairs". 
The deficiencies were so patently obvious, that the Central Board 
of Health offered little defence against this opinion, but on 13 April 
1883 presented the government with a set of amended regulations to try to 
239 
ensure the better working of the 1872 Health Act. But at least one 
local board of health was convinced that the time for amendment and 
patchwork treatment was over. The Milton local board suggested the 
holding of a conference of Brisbane and suburban local board chairmen, 
234. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Dec 1882; Address to the inaugural meeting 
of the Queensland Medical Society. See Cilento, p.42 for the story 
of various attempts to form and re-form this Society. 
235. Ibid., 20 Dec 1882; main editorial. 
236. Woolloongabba, Lutwyche, Breakfast Creek, Milton and Warwick were 
all reproclaimed on 24 February 1883. Under Colonial Secretary to 
various Boards and Councils, 6 Mar 1883, Q.S.A. COL/G 20, 
out-letter no.349 of 1883. 
257. For some examples outside of Brisbane see The Queensland Times, 
15 Feb 1883, Town Clerk Toowoomba to Colonial Secretary, 13 Feb 
1883, Q.S.A. COL/A 354, in-letter no.720 of 1883, Charters Towers 
Herald, 28 Feb 1883, 7 Mar 1883, 10 Mar 1883, and 17 Mar 1883; letter 
to editor from Father. 
238. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Apr 1883; main editorial. 
239. Central Board of Health to Under Colonial Secretary, 13 Apr 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 357, in-letter no.1795 of 1883. 
to discuss the drawing up of an entirely new health act 
334. 
240 
This call was long overdue. Weaknesses in the wording of the Act 
which had been made very clear to the Central Board of Health almost from 
the beginning, were now being detected by laymen, who managed to prevent 
2^ 1 inspections of offensive premises being carried out. Without 
inspection rights to root out deliberate pollution, the Act could not 
stand. Similarly, the defective Act was constantly preventing the 
effective prosecution of detected offenders by the Brisbane Local 
242 
Board of Health. 
Finally, the Brisbane City Council decided to take a firm stand. 
Just one week previously, in another attack on the council, the Central 
Board of Health had decided "conclusively" that the municipal body had 
"failed to carry out the spirit of the /Health/ Act, hence in some 
~ 243 degree its failure to secure the results desired". The council 
retorted that "always averse to the city being under the Health Act", 
they considered that the health by-laws of the council met the case more 
effectively, and more summarily, than the regulations made under the 
Health Act. On these grounds, the council unilaterally declared that 
when the operation of the current proclamation of the 1872 Health Act 
ceased on 1 May 1883, it should do so forever. 
The formalities had to be observed, and a deputation waited on the 
Colonial Secretary, asking that Brisbane be not reproclaimed. 
Fortunately for the council, A.H. Palmer, who had piloted the 1872 Act 
through the house, and who had taken the central board's part in the 
240. The Brisbane Courier, 14 Apr 1883; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 13 Apr 1883. However, at a special meeting of the central 
board held on 27 April 1883, the board reverted to the bill 
unsuccessfully proposed by Dr. O'Doherty in 1879. They considered 
its proposals, and "more or less approved of it". Ibid., 28 Apr 1883. 
241. In Rockhampton, two or three individuals had questioned the right of 
local board representatives to enter their properties, and Dr. John 
Thomson doubted the legal right of paid inspectors to enter private 
property under the Act. Only "Health Officers", that is actual 
members of health boards, had that right. Ibid., 14 Apr 1883; 
Minutes of Central Board of Health, 13 Apr 1883, and Ibid., 17 Apr 1883 
242. Ibid., 20 Apr 1883; Minutes of the special meeting of Local Board 
of Health, 19 Apr 1883. 
243. Ibid., 17 Apr 1883; main editorial. 
244. The Brisbane Courier, 26 Apr 1883; Minutes of the special meeting of 
the Brisbane City Council, 24 Apr 1883. 
245. O'Doherty acknowledged the importance of Palmer's contribution to 
the passing of the Act in his speech to the Medical Association in 
December 1882, and at the same time, voiced his doubts as to 
whether Mcllwraith would lend the Act his support. 
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No. 24. Sir Thomas M'llwraith, Queensland Punch, 8 August, 1893, 
335. 
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altercations of 1879, had gone to the Legislative Council in 1881. 
Thomas Mcllwraith, who now held the Colonial Secretary's office was a 
traditionalist. He was alarmed by the centralising tendencies of the 
Health Act, and was very amenable to council pressure. Municipal claims 
that the system under the Act was eminently unsuited to the current 
requirements of the colony, and that in principle, the Health Act 
nullified local self-government, found an answering chord in the 
Premier's heart. Unable at that moment to give the council a precise 
answer, he nevertheless gave it as his opinion 
that the care of the health of the city should be placed 
in the hands of those representing the ratepayers and 
not in those of a Board appointed by the Government.... 
He would be acting against his own principles if he were 
unable to comply with the request, because he would much 
rather see the work transferred to the representatives of 
the citizens. 247 
Mcllwraith did not waste time in assessing the best way of 
248 
attaining the council's object. On 28 April 1883, he informed the 
Central Board of Health of his opinion "that the conservation of the 
public health should be left entirely to the local bodies", and requested 
249 the central board to "inform the several Local Boards accordingly". 
The colony of Queensland now entered a curious state of limbo, as 
far as the 1872 Health Act was concerned. On 13 June 1883, the Registrar-
General presented a grim report, which revealed a very high general 
death rate, and an infant death rate greater than it "was in either of 
250 the three years preceding that of 1882". In Brisbane and its 
246. Palmer became President of the Legislative Council in 1881 and was 
granted a knighthood in 1882. Writing of his elevation, the Wide 
Bay and Burnett News said that he got his appointment and his 
jSl,000 rise in salary through his brother-in-law, Thomas Mcllwraith. 
"The new salary is a lot for the waspish and not too courteous 
knight. We do not... begrudge the money, for his removal from the 
Assembly has been so beneficial to the tone of the debates and the 
temper of the House". Wide Bay and Burnett News, 24 Aug 1882. 
Palmer's biographer is kinder, claiming that his "brusque manner" 
and "rough way of speaking" hid "much kindness, strong common 
sense, and capability". Percival Serle, Dictionary of Australian 
Biography, Vol.11 (Sydney, 1949), p.212. 
247. The Brisbane Courier, 27 Apr 1883; report of the deputation to the 
Colonial Secretary, 26 Apr 1883. 
248. Ibid. 
249. Under Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health, 28 Apr 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/G 20, out-letter no.750 of 1883. 
250. "Registrar-General's Report for 1882", Votes and Proceedings of 
Legislative Assembly, II (1883), 348 and 351. 
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environs, where the local boards of health had been abolished, "the 
residents who /^erej not rich enough to go to law on their own account 
— — ~ ~ — — 251 
/were/ at the mercy of anyone who /^chos^/ to commit a nuisance". 
Some city dwellers began to regret bitterly the non-proclamation of 
the Act. In Toowoomba, the withdrawal of the proclamation extending the 
Health Act to that city, and the failure of the new Griffith government 
to confirm the city's by-laws led, according to the Mayor, to a severe 
252 
outbreak of typhoid fever. And in Charters Towers, where many fatal 
cases of typhoid had occurred, the local press urged the inhabitants 
themselves to bring the town under the Health Act, "if the municipal 
253 
council does not perform its obvious duty in this respect". The 
confusion was compounded when a successful summons was brought under the 
no-longer-proclaimed Health Act, and the Central Board of Health 
attempted to have new regulations accepted by an unsympathetic 
^ 255 government. 
The situation became clearer once Samuel Griffith was firmly in 
o r z: 
command. Although the central board was still meeting regularly in 
257 
the early part of 1884, "it was evident that /it/ was merely a 
Board in name and could effect no good in the existing state of affairs". 
On the motion of Dr. John Thomson, the board adjourned until they were 
o r Q 
summoned by the Colonial Secretary himself. In a year of panic over 
259 the killer disease typhoid, when pollution was evident on all sides, 
251. The Telegraph, 15 Dec 1883; editorial. 
252. Mayor of Toowoomba to Colonial Secretary, 28 Apr 1884, Q.S.A. 
COL/A 388, in-telegram no.3122 of 1884. 
253. The Northern Miner, 11 Jan 1884; editorial. 
254. Memorial from Robert Gowdy to Colonial Secretary, 20 Dec 1883, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 377, in-letter no.6756 of 1883. 
255. Apparently the new regulations were rejected by the government. 
The suggested regulations are undated, but the Central Board of 
Health proposed that they should be put into operation from 
2 July 1883. They do not appear in the Queensland Government 
Gazette. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, undated, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 357, in-letter no.1795 of 1883. 
256. Griffith came to power on 13 November 1883. 
257. The Brisbane Courier, 15 Mar 1884; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 Mar 1884. 
258. Ibid. 
259. Joseph Bancroft to Colonial Secretary, 1 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 
404, in-letter no.7385 of 1884. 
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"with gross difficulties met with to overcome these problems", the 
necessity for the government to bring in an entirely new, and far more 
comprehensive health act was all too obvious. On 12 August 1884, 
Samuel IValker Griffith, who, with A.H. Palmer, was credited by 
Dr. Kevin O'Doherty with having helped to push the first health act 
through parliament as the smallpox scare 1 
process of giving Queensland that new act. 
9 fi 1 
through parliament as the smallpox scare threatened, began the 
260. Joseph Bancroft to Colonial Secretary, 1 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A 
404, in-letter no.7385 of 1884. 
261. The Brisbane Courier, 19 Dec 1882. 
11 - QUEENSLAND'S FIRST COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH ACT 
The new health bill, framed and introduced by Samuel Griffith in 
the spring session of 1884 because 
it has for some years past been notorious that the laws 
of this colony with regard to public health are, if not 
discreditable to the Legislature, undoubtedly in a most 
unsatisfactory condition, 1 
resembled the predecessor which was repealed under it, in several ways. 
The government finally realized the danger of delaying enabling health 
legislation any longer, because of fears of a renewed onslaught of 
typhoid fever following the disastrous inroads of the summer of 1883-
2 3 
1884. There was no real opposition to the bill, for once again 
"Panic /^ had becom£7 the Handmaid of Hygiene". In 1884, no less than 
in 1872, the Queensland government placed implicit faith in improved 
sanitation as the only effective means of attaining public health with 
any degree of certainty, and numerous clauses covering this area were 
included in the bill. The 1884 proposal, like the original measure, 
owed a great deal to British experience, being "founded not 
altogether, but almost entirely upon /an/ Imperial Act". And once 
more, the government signified its intention to appoint a central 
board of health, which would be responsible, within certain limits, for 
the overall supervision of the colony's health. 
But in spite of these similarities there were very significant 
and very far-reaching differences between the two acts. Not least was 
the fact that 
to the lasting shame of the constituencies /^ the 
Legislative Assembly did not now/ contain a single 
member of the medical fraternity whose assistance in 
1. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLII (1884), 135. 
2. Brisbane City Council to Colonial Secretary, 23 Jul 1884, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A395, in-letter no. 5139 of 1884. 
3. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 501. 
4. R. Cilento and Clem Lack, Triumph in the Tropics (Brisbane, 
1959), p.432. 
5. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 501. This 
was the comprehensive British Public Health Act of 1875. 
338, 
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framing a sanitary law adapted to the peculiar conditions 
of colonial settlement and climate must be deemed 
indispensable. 6 
Perhaps for this reason, despite the vaunted improvements claimed by 
Griffith for the undoubtedly much more comprehensive legislation of 
1884,loopholes, discrepancies and downright deficiencies were soon 
detected, as observant critics perused the new bill. 
One entirely new provision of the bill, which concerned and 
amended local government Acts passed in 1878 and 1879, allowed for 
the suspension of council by-laws which dealt with any of the matters 
y 
covered by the newly proposed health legislation. Councils from all 
Q 
over Queensland were unhappy with this proposal, as it would require 
them to produce new health by-laws, which would then be exposed to 
Central Board of Health and government scrutiny, before approval. Their 
objections were summed up by John McMaster, the Mayor of Brisbane, who 
felt that local authorities, who were familiar with local conditions, 
could produce more effective and more stringent by-laws than any central 
9 
board of health. But the clause was acceptable to the majority of 
parliamentarians, and was allowed to go through. 
Perhaps the largest changes proposed in 1884 reflected a profound 
shift in basic British policy - a departure from laissez-faire, and a 
growing awareness of the need for state intervention for the protection 
of the public good. 
Public health enactments^ /were/ but part of the 
modem movement which [yasj lifting the masses,... 
ameliorating the struggle fo^ r existence. .. lessening 
...human misery,and enlarg/in_g/ the possibilities of 
a better life for all. 10 
6. The Colonist, 27 Sep 1884; sub editorial. By this time 
Dr. K.I. O'Doherty was in the Legislative Council. 
7. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1417 - Clause 6. 
8. Representatives from Brisbane and Brisbane suburbs,Toowoomba, 
Maryborough, Ipswich,Rockhampton,Bundaberg and Townsville met the 
Premier and Colonial Treasurer as a deputation. Parliamentary 
representatives were sent as substitutes if councillors were 
unable to attend. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Aug 1884; report of 
deputation to Premier, 28 Aug 1884, 
9. John McMaster to Colonial Secretary, 4 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. C0L/A399, 
in-letter no, 6174 of 1884, 
10. Campbell, p.2. 
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The people of Queensland, for their own well-being, were to be 
subjected to stricter, more minute inspection and supervision of their 
shops, lodging houses and private homes than any undertaken 
previously. 
The matter of defraying health costs, which had caused immense 
problems and dissatisfaction under the old Health Act was given 
attention in the new measure. Under a clause which the Postmaster-
General considered the "most important" in the bill, municipal 
authorities were to be empowered to levy a general health rate on all 
rateable property in a district. The government would be liable to 
pay the same endowment on these special rates as they did on general 
rates - under the provisions of the Local Government Act of 1878 and 
12 the Divisional Boards Act of 1879. 
The whole question of central government aid to local 
authorities was a thorny one, since the injection of such funds almost 
always brought with it the threat of increased pressure and control from 
the centre, to the outrage of local autonomists. The problem had already 
engaged the attention of parliamentarians in Britain, because the 
enactment of sanitary legislation in that country had effectively 
doubled local government rates within thirty years. In the face of such 
horrendous rises, even the most ardent supporters of local authority, 
and indeed the central government itself, were "not adverse to the cry 
for State aid"."^ ^ 
What was good enough for Britain was good enough for the colony 
of Queensland, and generally the endowment provision was welcomed. But 
despite this supposed generosity the press of the colony was wary, 
with good reason as it turned out in 1886, warning the ministry not to 
"add too heavily to the burden already imposed on ratepayers", and 
praying instead for a large, unconditional infusion of central 
government moneys. For only then, could Queensland's city and town 
councils undertake the massive capital works on sewerage and drainage 
14 
which would lead to truly improved sanitation. 
11. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 506 and 565. See 
also The Brisbane Courier, 25 Aug 1884; main editorial. 
12. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLII (1884), 138 and Queensland 
Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1442 - Clause 121. 
13. Redlich and Hirst, Vol. I, pp.160-61. 
14. The Maryborough Chronicle, 17 Sep 1884; editorial. This paper 
echoed the fears of William Henry Groom, member for Drayton and 
Toowoomba. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,XLIII (1884), 575. 
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There was another yery important departure from the first Health 
Act, One of the most contentious issues arising out of the 1872 
legislation had been the resistance to the proclamation of the Act in 
areas seriously affected by disease, and the refusal of some local 
authorities, to recognise dangers and to accept responsibilities. 
The Colonial Secretary proposed to deal with this problem by automatically 
applying those parts of the bill which dealt with sewerage, drainage and 
sanitation, and the regulation of cellar dwellings and lodging houses, 
to eighteen of the most populous or most imperilled cities and towns in 
the colony. Other municipalities or divisions were to be proclaimed 
17 
under these sections - parts III and IV of the Act - should the need 
arise. The remainder of the legislation was to apply at all times, 
throughout the whole colony. These sections comprised clauses to enable 
the control of nuisances of any kind, noxious trades, the adulteration 
of food, and the sale of unsound meat, provisions against the spread of 
infectious and epidemic diseases, including the right to authorise or 
require combinations of local authorities to fight epidemic diseases, 
and the legal proceedings under which action could be enforced or fines 
extracted from offenders. 
None of the sections of the bill was allowed to pass without some 
challenge, though there was no opposition to the aims of the measure. 
Rather, protestations were made because the proposed legislation 
contained no explicit instructions on how local governments were to 
prevent insanitary conditions. The new measure failed from the 
beginning to eradicate the principal difficulty facing local 
authorities, especially where nuisances and foul trades lying on or 
within the boundaries of other local councils were concerned - they 
1 8 
simply "did not know what to do". 
Another part of the bill which attracted considerable debate, 
both within the two houses of parliament and in the press of the colony, 
15. See for example Within, pp.315-17. 
16. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1417, The towns and 
divisions concerned were Booroodabin, Brisbane, Bundaberg, 
Charters Towers, Cooktown, Gympie, Ipswich, Mackay,Maryborough, 
Rockhampton,Roma,Sandgate,Toombul,Toowong,Toowoomba,Town svi11e, 
Warwick, and Woolloongabba. 
17. Ibid., pp.1419-30. 
18. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXIII (1884), 566-67. Complaint 
of Matthew Mellor, Wide Bay, Robert Aland and William Henry 
Groom, both of Drayton and Toowoomba. 
342. 
was the position of the proposed central board of health, Like the board 
constituted under the 1872 Act, the new health authority was to be an 
appointed one, chosen by the governor in council. It was to have not 
more than seven members, at least three of whom were to be medical 
19 practitioners, and the Colonial Secretary was to be its chairman. 
The board was to be empowered to appoint officers, subject to 
ministerial approval, to assist in carrying out the colony's health 
20 
requirements, and was to hold its meetings at "such times and places 
_ 21 
as the Minister /might/ appoint". Although the new bill provided "for 
the handing over of the whole business /of the public health/ to the 
22 
local authorities", the central board could be authorized to compel 
defaulting local councils to perform their duties, such order to be 
enforced by writ of mandamus, should councils fail to comply within 
23 
the given time. In emergencies, either the board or the Colonial 
Secretary could "exercise all or any of the powers by this Act 
conferred upon a local authority", but in such cases, any expenses 
24 incurred were to be paid out of consolidated revenue. 
Members of the Assembly showed considerable surprise that a 
board of health should be the minister's chosen vehicle for sanitary 
reform "seeing a board had already shown themselves incapable of doing 
the work". Boyd Dunlop Morehead wanted to know why "one capable 
25 
medical man... could not do instead of a board". John Ferguson was 
very anxious about the "dangerous" amount of power being left in the 
Of, 
hands of a body of proven incapacity, and Edward Palmer was 
convinced that the previous record of the central board would not 
persuade any honourable member that such a body should be "continued 
27 
under the measure now under consideration". 
The Mayor of Brisbane, John McMaster, was also gravely concerned 
that this purely nominee body /wa_s/ to possess a power 
which /would/ enable them to altogether override 
representative institutions...and that the people upon 
IgT Queensland Govemment Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1417 - Clause 8. 
20. Ibid., pp.1417-18 - Clause 9. 
21. Ibid., p. 1418 - Clause 10. 
22. The Brisbane Courier,29 Aug 1884;report of deputation of local 
authorities to Premier - Samuel Griffith in reply. 
23. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1418 - Clause 15. 
24. Ibid., p.1419 - Clause 16. 
25. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 545. 
26. Ibid., pp.547 and 551. John Ferguson, member for Rockhampton. 
27. Ibid., p.503. Edward Palmer, member for Burke. 
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whose properties the rates can be levied to provide 
funds for disbursement as this Board /Right/ direct 
/would/ have no voice in tlie expenditure, 28 
The criticism in the press, though on the same lines, was even 
more harsh. Only The Northern Miner, which catered for the people of 
Charters Towers, where the local authorities showed "sinful apathy to 
the danger that threatens...health and lives", came to the defence of 
the minister's proposal to reappoint a central health authority. 
This is a very wise and necessary provision, for the 
stupidity and obstinacy of "local authorities" require 
to be overcome and borne by the superior intelligence 
of a Central Board. 29 
The Queensland Times on the other hand, regretted that power should be 
given to a central board of health, especially if any of the old members 
30 
who were "rather useless", and "fast approaching the fossil period of 
31 life" should be included on a new board. The Maryborough Chronicle 
managed to combine local hostility against a "Queen Street government" 
led by Samuel Griffith with its attack on the proposed health body. 
The new Bill provides for one Board only for the whole 
colony, headquarters in Brisbane of course, who, while 
enjoying perfect irresponsibility, will legislate for 
all towns included in the scope of the Bill and order 
the "local authorities" to carry out their instructions.... 
Even in the Health Bill it will thus be seen the 
Bismarckian autocracy wriggles in. 32 
The Brisbane Courier joined in the general press condemnation of 
the decision to persist with a central board. The proposal 
to v_est administration in a body whose incompetency 
ha/d/ been proved in past years 33 
was ludicrous, the Courier claimed. 
28. John McMaster to Colonial Secretary, 4 Sep 1884, Q.S.A. C0L/A399, 
in-letter no. 6190 of 1884. McMaster who was to become very active 
in all parliamentary health debates did not enter parliament until 
September 1885. 
29. The Northern Miner, 12 Sep 1884. 
30. The Queensland Times, 1 May 1884; editorial. 
31. Ibid., 4 Sep 1884; editorial. 
32. The Maryborough Chronicle,17 Sep 1884; editorial. 
33. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Aug 1884; main editorial.For example,as 
one Courier correspondent pointed out, not only did the Central 
Board of Health do nothing,but complaints to them went unheeded. 
Ibid., 21 Jul 1884; letter to editor from Ratepayer. 
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Surely nothing in our experience will induce us to 
resuscitate the Central Board of Health and endow 
it with such powers as the Bill proposes,,,.The 
ultimate authority in the administration of a Health 
Act must be vested in a sort of despot, a qualified and 
intelligent despot, endowed with sufficient authority 
to enforce his enlightened will on reluctant and lazy 
local authorities, 34 
Exception was also taken to the proposal to pay members of the central 
board at the rate of £l. 1. 0 per sitting. 
The protesters might have saved their breath and printing-ink. 
Samuel Griffith abhorred the idea of bestowing centralized power in the 
person of a single "despot", not being 
disposed to propose that the minister of the day, with the 
advice of one medical officer, should be empowered to order 
the local authorities to do what he liked. 36 
He was fully of the opinion "that the existence of such a controlling 
board as the Central Board of Health /was/ essential to ensure a 
37 
satisfactory working of the scheme". Nevertheless, the Premier had 
no intention of vesting the central board with unlimited powers. No less 
38 
than The Maryborough Chronicle, Griffith recognised that the central 
board owed no accountability to electors. Executive authority and the 
right to interfere with property, which were powers "too serious to be 
)arc 
40 
39 left to a board", were to be held in ministerial hands. The bo d's 
duty was supervision of local authorities "in matters technical". 
It could not compel local councils to act, but could simply recommend 
41 — 
that the governor in council should do so. In fact, "/a/mple 
provision /had been made/ by the Bill to prevent the arbitrary exercise 
42 
of the powers of the Board". 
Griffith dealt with the objections to the appointment of the board 
and their position vis-a-vis the local authorities with considerable 
delicacy. He knew, as an experienced administrator, that the proper 
34. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Sep 1884; main editorial. 
35. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 548. 
36. Ibid., p.546, 
37. Under Colonial Secretary to Mayor of Brisbane,8 Sep 1884, Q,S.A. 
C0L/G26, out-letter no. 2722 of 1884, 
38. Within, p.343. 
39. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 559, 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid., L (1886), 1129, 
42. Under Colonial Secretary to Mayor of Brisbane,8 Sep 1884, 
Q.S.A. C0L/G26, out-letter no. 2722 of 1884. 
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operation of the proposed bill depended entirely on cooperation between 
the centre and the periphery. He recognised that the placing of 
too much authority in the hands of an irresponsible and administratively 
inexperienced board would be to go against 
recent developments of the principles of self government,... 
and that to coerce the elected repre_s^ entativ£S of the 
people in their corporate capacity /would he/ a reflection 
on the effective efficiency of the ratepayers of the colony. 43 
But at the same time, a clear parliamentary majority's 
determination to retain a central board of health with restrictions 
44 
placed on it, put such irksome and debilitating restraints on the 
health authority, that members were indeed unable to give that clear, 
concerted leadership which the colony so badly needed and desired. As 
the century drew to its close, more and more of the energy of the 
central board was spent in constant wrangling with the minister over the 
scramble for power, making it progressively less capable of giving 
clearly defined directives for the protection of the public health. 
If the central health authority projected under the new 
legislation was like its precursor in appointment and function, the 
local boards, which had been central board agents in towns proclaimed 
under the old Act, were to disappear altogether in 1884. The government 
proposed instead "to leave health administration" in the hands of 
45 
elected local councils, which could, if they wished, appoint health 
committees from among their own numbers to perform or oversee the day to 
day chores. In this way, it was hoped to obviate the friction 
previously generated between local boards and corporations to the 
46 detriment of the public health. For the health committees, unlike 
the old local boards, were specifically forbidden to incur expenses, to 
borrow money, or to levy any rate. 
The Colonial Secretary hoped to solve another problem with his 
1884 bill. Under the old legislation, some councils and divisional 
43. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Oct 1884; main editorial. 
44. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIII (1884), 559. 
45. Ibid., p.504. 
46. For a classic example of Brisbane City Council and Brisbane 
Local Board of Health antagonism, see Within, pp.318 and 326-29. 
47. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1442 - Clause 119. 
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boards had strenuously resisted the appointment of inspectors of 
nuisance, or health officers, whose salaries or retainers added to 
ratepayers' burdens. Now Griffith suggested that a degree of 
compulsion should be applied where such appointments were concerned. 
This was written into his bill, and accepted by his parliamentary 
48 
colleagues in both houses. Members of the Council did send certain 
amendments to the bill to the lower house, but all things considered, 
they found the subject matter of the measure "so attractive and savoury 
in itself" and so necessary for the general good, that on the whole it 
49 
was heartily approved. Nor had spirited debate in the Assembly 
blinded members to the urgent need to pass this bill, and on 21 October 
1884, "An Act to Make better Provision for Securing and Maintaining the 
Public Health", reached the statute book.^° 
The Health Act of 1884, which The Brisbane Courier, in spite of its 
criticism, hoped would be "the panacea of all our sanitary" ills,^ 
was put to work at once, but not always as the body of legislators who 
had passed it might have expected. Certainly the Bundaberg council, 
after an approach to the Colonial Secretary, was urged to take full 
advantage of the endowment scheme on health rates, and of any available 
govemment loans, in its efforts to prevent "a recurrence of the dismal 
52 
experiences of last summer". But Griffith's dealings with the police 
magistrate at Charters Towers, where filthy court house cesspits had 
been condemned by the usually careless local council, were hardly in 
accord with the spirit of the Act. The local nuisance inspector had 
taken this initiative on the authority of council by-laws shortly 
before the passing of the bill, and Griffith's advice to the police 
magistrate was to "wait till the Health Bill becomes law, when the 
53 by-law will be suspended". By January 1885 the police magistrate, 
48. Queensland Govemment Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1441 - Clause 116. 
49. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLII (1884), 139. Peter 
Macpherson, Member of Legislative Council. 
50. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1415. 
51. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Oct 1884; sub editorial. 
52. Marginal coimnent on Andrew Goodwin,Bundaberg, to Colonial Secretary, 
10 Oct 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A404,in-letter no. 7252 of 1884, and Under 
Colonial Secretary to Goodwin, 21 Oct 1884, Q.S.A. COL/G27, 
out-letter no. 3196 of 1884. 
53. Marginal comment on Police Magistrate, Charters Towers to 
Colonial Secretary, 7 Oct 1884, Q.S.A. C0L/A414, in-letter 
no. 7142 of 1884. 
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recognising the advantages of clean accommodation, had called tenders 
for the work and had investigated on-going fees for the night-man's 
54 
regular attendance. He recommended that the work be done at once, 
only to have his request for funds and improvements refused by Griffith 
under the relevant clause of the Health Act. This was not the only 
case where the Colonial Secretary hid behind the provisions of the new 
legislation in the interests of trifling economies, and to the chagrin 
of local councils. The Clermont council was overridden in the same way. 
But in this instance, the police magistrate wanted to retain the 
cesspits in violation of the council regulations, because the earth 
closet substitutes, "unless used discreetly and kept accurately clean 
57 
are an abominable nuisance".' His wish was granted. 
Nevertheless, great hopes were held that with the automatic 
enforcement of the whole of the 1884 Health Act 
in all our chief centres of population, the good 
effects of the statute will soon be visible. 58 
The four medical and three lay members of the Central Board of Health 
59 
were chosen, began to meet, and immediately ran into trouble over the 
interpretation of certain provisions for lavatory accommodation, not 
made clear under Clause 37 of the new Act. Even after discussion, the 
central board members still had "some doubt on the subject", and the 
supervisory body of experts ultimately decided to forward the problem to 
Griffith "for advice". 
54. Police Magistrate to Colonial Secretary, 27 Jan 1885, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A414, in-letter no. 718 of 1885. 
55. Under Colonial Secretary to Police Magistrate, 12 Feb 1885, 
Q.S.A. COL/G28, out-letter no. 460 of 1885. 
56. Under Colonial Secretary to Police Magistrate, 6 Nov 1884, 
Q.S.A. C0L/G27, in-letter no. 3386 of 1884. 
57. Police Magistrate Clermont to Under Colonial Secretary, 
27 Oct 1884, Q.S.A. COL/A405, in-letter no, 7672 of 1884. 
58. The Brisbane Courier, 31 Oct 1884; main editorial. 
59. Members were Drs. K.I. O'Doherty, Joseph Bancroft, John Thomson, 
Hill Wray (Secretary), and Messrs. John Petrie, T. Finney, and 
J.H. Wilson, 
60. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Nov 1884;Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 7 Nov 1884,letter from Mayor,Brisbane to Central Board 
printed in full,Queensland Government Gazette,XXXV (1884), 1423, 
and Hill Wray to Under Colonial Secretary, 15 Nov 1884, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A406, in-letter no, 7997 of 1884, 
61. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Nov 1884. 
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Griffith's reply to the board, though partially settling the 
ftO ft '^  
immediate question, emphasised basic differences between board members, 
and fatal weaknesses in the board's structure. No one member was the 
"qualified", "intelligent", "enlightened", all-powerful "despot" of 
the Courier's editor's imagination, and after a failure to agree 
"on a subject very seriously affecting the health of the city", the 
board "thought /the^/ had better not commit themselves". 
Despite these set-backs, Brisbane's Mayor had not yet lost faith 
in the Act, rejoicing that it would enable the council to levy a 
scavenging rate to allow it to deal, not only with refuse collection, 
but with "the whole sanitary question". By November 1884, the health 
committee set up under the Act had recommended the calling of tenders 
for the scavenging of the streets. This was accepted by the whole 
council, and by January of the following year, very satisfactory 
amounts of foul rubbish were being removed from city streets. For this 
reason alone, and the improvements achieved under a new council by-
70 law for the regulation of common lodging houses, the 1884 Health Act 
might be deemed a success. But it was not long before the corporation 
was in dispute with the central government and the board of health, over 
the even bigger headache of the disposal of human excreta - a problem 
which had been evident at the time of the 1884 health bill debate. 
The Booroodabin Divisional Board Chairman was also convinced 
that the new Health Act gave him power to stop the conveyance and 
62. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Nov 1884;Minutes of Central Board of 
Health,12 Nov 1884,and Under Colonial Secretary to Secretary 
Central Board of Health,18 Nov 1884,Q.S.A. COL/G27,out-letter 
no.3483 of 1884. 
63. Especially between two of the lay members,Finney and Wilson, 
though Dr.Thomson was drawn into the argument. 
64. Within, p.344. 
65. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Nov 1884; sub editorial. 
66. Ibid.,13 Nov 1884;Minutes of Central Board of Health,12 Nov 1884. 
67. Ibid.,21 Oct 1884;Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 20 Oct 1884. 
68. Ibid.,18 Nov 1884;Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 17 Nov 1884. 
69. Ibid.,27 Jan 1885;Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 26 Jan 1884. 
The urgent need for scavenging was obvious.According to the 
inspector's report,644 loads of rubbish were removed in one 
fortnight ending 26 January 1885, 
70. Brisbane City Council to Colonial Secretary,10 Mar 1885, 
Q.S.A, C0L/A421, in-letter no. 1656 of 1885. 
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deposit of refuse within his division, and he was determined to do his 
71 duty in this matter. A glance at the saga of the gigantic Enoggera 
72 Creek nuisance shows how sadly astray the Chairman's convictions were. 
As to the rest of Queensland, in the Maryborough district, difficulties 
over the dumping of that city's nightsoil in the neighbouring division 
of Tinana re-erupted, as both the divisional board and nearby residents 
73 
were encouraged to expect relief under the new Health Act. They 
achieved the same degree of success as the Booroodabin Board's Chairman. 
In Charters Towers, the local hospital had quarrelled with the council 
over sanitary matters, and had called in the new Central Board of Health 
for advice, but problems were no closer to resolution. And in Ipswich, 
an important south Queensland city which had been brought automatically 
under sections III and IV of the legislation, as late as July 1885, 
"nothing had...been done towards carrying out the provisions of the new 
health act".'^ ^ 
Things did not improve much in 1885-86 as far as sanitary affairs 
were concerned, although a number of cities and towns throughout 
Queensland applied for and implemented new sets of by-laws under the 
7fi 
terms of the 1884 Health Act. To supplement any improvements made 
under the health legislation in Brisbane, and to try to alleviate the 
bad or insufficient air caused by overcrowding, the govemment did push 
through another sanitary measure, the Undue Subdivision of Land 
77 
Prevention Act of 1885. This was done in the face of very considerable 
opposition from the conservatives, for whom the intent of this Act 
represented "an invasion - a gross invasion of the rights of property 
78 
71. The Brisbane Courier,8 Nov 1884;Minutes of Booroodabin Divisional 
Board. 
72. Within, p.32-34. 
73. The Colonist, 15 Dec 1884;Minutes of Tinana Divisional Board. 
74. The Northern Miner,5 Dec 1884;editorial. Ibid., 11 Dec 1884, and 
Ibid., 16 Dec 1884; Minutes of Charters Towers Council. 
75. The Queensland Times,28 Jul 1885.But see also Ibid.,22 Sep 1885, 
which reports a start being made on the destruction of 
insanitary and dilapidated buildings. 
76. A number of these applications for by-law approval are listed in 
Within, pp.29, f.n.181. 
77. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXVII (1885), 1573. 
78. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLVII (1885), 849. 
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The 1884 Health Act, and the central board-local government health 
arrangements made under it, underwent a very exacting testing time 
during the summer of 1885, when the colony had an unfortunate episode 
involving the deadly disease cholera, and when weaknesses apparent from 
the very inception of the Act, particularly with regard to the competence 
79 
of the Central Board of Health, were underlined. To add to this, the 
inefficacy of the Act through "Mr. Griffith's omission to insert 
/adequate wording^ / in the condemnatory clauses" was becoming increasingly 
evident,as feeble legislation "greatly hampered the /Centraj^/ Board in its 
on 
attempts to complete the sanitation of /Brisban^/." 
It was obvious too, that many councils and divisional boards on the 
periphery, which were presently outside the provisions of parts III and IV 
of the Act, had little or no idea of the significance of those clauses,nor 
of their natural obligation to avoid "gross neglect of the ordinary sanitary 
81 
precautions". It was further revealed at the Municipal Conference held in 
Brisbane in May 1886, "that there was hardly a municipality /in the colony/ 
82 
satisfied with the existing Health Act", although some delegates 
deprecated any interference with the Health Act 
provisions or limitation of its powers, which 
effected not only themselves but their families. 83 
Many of the complaints sprang from the necessity, under the Act, for 
raising the health rate from whole towns or cities automatically 
brought under the legislation. This applied even where the expense of 
extending sanitary measures to sparsely settled sections in outlying 
84 
areas precluded councils from such undertakings, to the great 
annoyance of unhappy ratepayers, who were forced to pay for improvements 
which were never received. The same difficulties faced boards outside of 
79. Within, pp.174-75. 
80. The Brisbane Courier, 5 Mar 1886; report of inspection by 
Dr. J. Bancroft, general inspector Lee Bryce, and several aldermen. 
81. Town Clerk, Rosalie Divisional Board /Darling Down_s^ / to Colonial 
Secretary, 29 Mar 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A490, in-letter no.2440 of 
1886, and attachments from the equally confused local authorities 
in Gowrie and Highfields. 
82. The Brisbane Courier, 27 May 1886; report of Municipal Conference. 
83. Ibid., 28 May 1886; report of Municipal Conference. 
84. Ibid. 
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sections III and IV, who required the protection of the Act in special 
circumstances, but who wanted it to pertain to "a certain portion' 
; di 
86 
Qr 
only. The Act did not allow for this fferentiation. If applied,it 
had to be to all areas or none at all. 
Another bone of contention for the newspapers, the Colonial 
Secretary, and particularly the colony's Treasurer, was the way in 
which certain councils had managed to pry considerable sums from the 
87 
central govemment under the general health rate endowment scheme. 
The practical operation of /that clause/ has been 
what was never intended by Parliament, General health 
rates have been made, not for the general purposes of 
the Health Act, but for the purpose of cleansing earth-
closets, privies, ashpits, and cesspools. 88 
Griffith asserted that the government should not be called upon to 
raid the public purse "to contribute towards the cost of performing 
such purely domestic work as that". He ignored the obviously continuing 
89 
misunderstandings over the content of the 1884 Act, some parts of which 
required amendment to assist clarification. The protests from Central 
Board of Health members, that he had consistently failed to listen to 
their proffered advice, and that he should therefore revise the Act to 
90 
strengthen board powers, were also ignored. The government chose 
instead to introduce a short amending bill, which promised real 
improvement to the public health in only one area - the right of 
investigators to enter, and examine any dairy, to check on unwholesome 
or unclean conditions, to search for diseased animals, and to prohibit 
the sale of suspect milk in an effort to contain "one of the most fruitful 
91 
sources...of typhoid fever". The rest of the bill included new, much 
85. Woongarra Divisional Board to Colonial Secretary, 26 Jun 1886, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A472, in-letter no. 5336 of 1886. 
86. Under Colonial Secretary to Woongarra Divisional Board, 
23 Jul 1886,Q.S.A. C0L/G35,out-letter no. 3439 of 1886. 
87. In particular the Booroodabin Divisional Board. 
88. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIX (1886), 700. 
89. Shire Clerk Tiaro to Colonial Secretary,9 Oct 1886, Q.S.A. C0L/A484, 
in-letter no. 7965 of 1886. See also Chairman Johnstone Divisional 
Board to Colonial Secretary, 20 Jan 1887, Q.S.A. C0L/A488, 
in-letter no. 911 of 1887. 
90. The Brisbane Courier,4 Dec 1886;Minutes of Central Board of Health, 
3 Dec 1886,comment of W.F,Taylor,who was now a member of the board. 
91. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,XLIX (1886), 700, and 
Queensland Govemment Gazette,XXXIX (1886), 1601-1602, 
352. 
more stringent rules relating to the general health rate, and the 
categorical statement that "no endowment shall be payable to a local 
92 
authority in respect of moneys raised by a Cleansing Rate". 
The Amending Act passed into law on 13 October 1886, in spite of 
anguished protests from local authorities, the press, and some 
parliamentarians. Councils all over Queensland warned of dire 
consequences, such as the complete inability to "cope successfully with 
93 
sanitary requirements...in this climate", if endowments were cut off. 
Contracts entered into on the strength of government promises would have 
to be abandoned - a terrible, retrograde step, just as sanitary 
94 
affairs were making headway. The Brisbane Courier thought that the 
Treasurer's "resort to stop this particular outlet in his purse a very 
95 
unwise one". Some parliamentary members, averring that "it was worth 
96 
more than money to preserve the health of the public", deeply 
regretted the introduction of a bill which would only punish local 
97 
authorities which had acted in good faith to engage in capital works. 
The Treasurer, J.R. Dickson, assured the house that the bill "was in 
no way intended to affect outlay upon the construction of works for 
98 
sewerage and drainage". But for technical and time-tabling reasons, 
this statement is misleading. Only those municipalities which had 
already begun capital works under the 1884 Health Act were covered for 
99 
continuing general health rate endowments. 
92. Queensland Government Gazette, XXXIX (1886), 1600-1601. 
93. Mayor Hipwood of Brisbane to Colonial Treasurer, 26 Aug 1886, 
Q.S.A. COL/A480, in-letter no. 7019 of 1886. 
94. Ibid. For further protests see also Mayor,Ipswich to S.W.Griffith, 
1 Sep 1886, Q.S.A. COL/A479, in-telegram no. 6770 of 1886, The 
Brisbane Courier, 7 Sep 1886;Minutes of Brisbane City Council, 
6 Sep 1886,recording support for action against the amending bill 
from Sandgate and Rockhampton,Burrum Divisional Board to Colonial 
Secretary,13 Sep 1886, Q.S.A, COL/A480,in-letter no. 7124 of 1886, 
and Bundaberg City Council to Colonial Secretary,11 Sep 1886, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A480, in-letter no. 7132 of 1886. 
95. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Sep 1886. 
96. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIX (1886), 702. 
97. Ibid., pp.701-703 and 705. Foremost amongst the protesters were 
John McMaster,Fortitude Valley,John Ferguson,Rockhampton,and 
William Pattison,Blackall, but with an interest in Rockhampton. 
98. Ibid., p,705, 
99. Ibid., p.706. Maurice Hume Black, member for Mackay, brought out 
this point which Dickson presumably would have preferred to 
avoid. 
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^ ^ ^ s personalitj ponctrato the whole of Qneensland, 
No. 25. S i r Samuel G r i f f i t h , The Judge , 20 September, 1890. 
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Nevertheless the Premier and Treasurer won the day, and the Act 
was passed with the aid of those members who thought that "in this 
country people should clean out their back-yards themselves", if they 
wanted it done, and others who suggested that those who neglected 
their duty in this respect "should be made to pay to the fullest 
extent".-^ -^^  
Like the Health Act of 1884, the amending measure was applied at 
once. Unfortunately only limited results were achieved with regard to 
102 
the state of dairies, owing to central board and local govemment 
103 failure to enforce the Act rigidly. The only noticeable result of 
the Act was one which The Brisbane Courier had feared and condemned. 
Early in 1887, Brisbane ratepayers' health rate contributions rose 
sharply as the inevitable consequence of the withdrawal of the govemment 
endowment. 
The govemment passed two more amendments to the Health Act of 
1884. One, the Health Act Amendment Act of 1890, confirmed and 
exceeded the Act of 1886 in refusing absolutely any govemment 
endowment on health rates. The other, which was passed in 1889, 
was introduced for one specific purpose - the attempt to solve the 
107 
capital's overwhelming human waste disposal problem. But one of 
the main weaknesses of the 1884 Act - the inability of the Central 
Board of Health to enforce sanitary action on recalcitrant councils and 
unheeding governments - was left for a new minister to handle, when the 
tragedy of a plague invasion made immediate, drastic alterations to 
the colony's health arrangements essential. 
The intent of Samuel Griffith who framed it, and its scope as 
compared with the legislation of 1872, made the Health Act of 1884 
100. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIX (1886), 707. William 
Kellett, member for Stanley, 
101. Ibid., XLVIII (1886), 124, Dr. W.F. Taylor, Member of Legislative 
Council. 
102. The Brisbane Courier,15 Jan 1887;Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 14 Jan 1887. 
103. Ibid., 26 Apr 1888; sub editorial, 
104. Ibid., 4 Dec 1886; main editorial, 
105. Ibid., 5 Feb 1887. 
106. Queensland Government Gazette,III (1890), 1061. See also 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LX (1890), 176, and Within, 
p.61. ' 
107. This Act is dealt with in Ibid.,pp.51-54. 
354. 
"in the main a good piece of legislation, but the machinery to put it 
1 oo 
into force /was_/ defective and weak". The story of the central 
board's vain struggle to achieve executive powers throughout the late 
1880's and 1890's, is an accurate reflection of the true, underlying 
impotence of Queensland's first comprehensive health act. 
Members of the central health authority had always smarted under 
the criticism that they were weak and ineffectual, but by 1887 it 
had become obvious that 
they had no power to deal with the smallest thing that 
came before them and the machinery of the law was so 
cmibersome that it might take months to remedy an evil.... 
/^r.W.F. Taylor/ thought this should be represented to 
the Govemment with a request that executive power should 
be given to the Board.... in the interests of sanitation. 109 
Taylor was unflagging in his campaign. He pressed for amending 
legislation which would do away with the "unsatisfactory and anomalous 
position of the Central Board of Health of Queensland",which did not 
have the executive powers possessed by its colleagues in the other 
colonies. His agitation led to a request for a deputation from the 
board to the Colonial Secretary to explain its difficulties in enforcing 
the Health Act - difficulties of which Moreton was probably unaware -
as they never saw him at board meetings' Moreover, in spite of the 
passing of the 1884 health legislation 
the condition of Brisbane was as insanitary now as it 
was in 1885: there was no single alteration..../There 
were/ crying evils... but the board waxed powerless, 112 
when confronted with antagonistic, or openly hostile, local authorities. 
Members of the board were also stung into protesting that they were 
always "saddled with the responsibility when anything went wrong", 
113 
since the general public assumed they had "full powers". Faced by 
a determined deputation, Moreton admitted the need for action, and 
108. The Brisbane Courier, 9 Aug 1887; main editorial. 
109. Ibid.,12 Feb 1887;Minutes of Central Board of Health,11 Feb 1887. 
110. Ibid.,12 Mar 1887;Minutes of Central Board of Health,11 Mar 1887. 
111. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary,14 Mar 1887, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A493, in-letter no. 2212 of 1887,with an undated, 
unidentified newspaper cutting of the report of the deputation 
attached. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid, See also for example, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
L (1886), 1128, for McMaster's very strong criticism during the 
supply debate. 
355. 
114 
promised to bring the matter before cabinet, but no mention of the 
central board appears in the record of Executive Council meetings for 
1887.11= 
Entering the argument. The Brisbane Courier again called for a 
single medical adviser to the government, not because it did not esteem 
central board members personally, but because "collectively their 
wisdom is not... above question". Too often the colony of Queensland 
had been treated to unseemly displays of differences of medical opinion 
being aired in public. If central health authority members wished to be 
taken seriously, they should "sink professional jealousies, cease to 
ventilate crotchets, and devote themselves to the real business of an 
117 
executive board in a business-like manner". 
Such criticism may well have been justified in a period when 
rapid developments in medical science led to uncertainties as to theories 
and methods, but the galling fact remained that central board advice was 
being ignored with impunity. The Brisbane City Council refused central 
118 board suggestions to appoint a slaughterhouse inspector, the Roma 
119 City Council did not consider a dairy inspector necessary, and 
Rockhampton local authorities stated that "the health of the town did 
120 
not require the appointment of a health officer". The Colonial 
Secretary, B.B. Moreton, refused to recommend the approval and issuing 
121 
of regulations drawn up by the central board. Later, B.D. Morehead 
114. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 14 Mar 1887, 
Q.S.A. COL/A 493, in-letter no.2212 of 1887. 
115. Minutes of Executive Council, 6 Jan 1887 to 30 Dec 1887, Q.S.A. 
EXE/E1£^ 0 - EXE/Elll. /Except for preliminaries to the supply 
debat^/. 
116. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Mar 1887; sub editorial. 
117. Ibid., 9 Aug 1887; main editorial. See also Ibid., 20 Mar 1888; 
letter to editor from W.H. Chambers. 
118. Ibid., 11 Jun 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 10 Jun 1887. 
119. Ibid., 30 Jul 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 29 Jul 1887, 
120. Ibid., 30 Jul 1887; Minutes of Central Board of Health, 29 Jul 1887, 
121. See for example Ibid., 8 Oct 1887; Minutes of adjourned meeting 
of Central Board of Health, 7 Oct 1887, Ibid., 19 Nov 1887; 
Minutes of Central Board of Health, 18 Nov 1887, and Central 
Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 20 Mar 1889, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A574, in-letter no.2642 of 1889. 
356. 
disregarded that body's carefully documented and very sensible advice on 
the need for the appointment of a medical inspector and sanitary 
engineer, both of whom could give helpful advice and instruction, where 
122 
and when needed, throughout the whole colony. During supply debates, 
123 
criticisms ranged from mild comments that the board was unsatisfactory, 
to jibes that the body would probably not be missed if it were only 
124 
summoned once a year. Morehead, was even unkind enough to assert 
125 
that unless he prodded it, the board did no work at all. This 
provoked a very hurt reply from members, who were astonished that the 
minister could make such a statement in parliament, for subsequent 
1 2fi 
publication in Hansard and The Brisbane Courier. When the 
unrepentant Colonial Secretary confessed that he had indeed said and 
127 
meant the words, which he felt were fully justified, the board 
replied at length, giving examples of work successfully done against 
great odds, but ending with the old cry that 
unless the Health Act is to be allowed to remain a dead letter, 
either executive power must be granted to some individual or 
Board, or the Govemment must adopt the recommendations of the 
Central Board of Health and act promptly on them. 128 
Morehead did nothing to amend the Act, and the same sorts of 
insults were heaped on the central board in succeeding years. It was 
129 labelled "helplessly incompetent and inefficient", medical 
colleagues calling for the board's replacement by a department of 
130 health. With considerable justice, country parliamentary 
representatives accused the board of failing to interest itself with 
131 
obvious sanitary evils outside the capital. And a frustrated 
122. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 17 Dec 1889, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A601, in-letter no. 11097 of 1889, and subsequents, 
extending to 21 October 1890. 
123. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LIII (1887), 1252. 
124. Ibid., p.1254. 
125. Ibid., LVIII (1889), 1648. 
126. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 20 Sep 1889, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A591, in-letter no. 8357 of 1889. 
127. Under Colonial Secretary to Central Board of Health, 24 Sep 1889, 
Q.S.A. COL/G52, out-letter no. 3412 of 1889. 
128. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary, 9 Nov 1889, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A596, in-letter no. 9882 of 1889. 
129. The Brisbane Courier, 13 Mar 1888; main editorial. 
130. The Brisbane Courier, 15 May 1888; letter to editor from 
Dr. Richard Rendle. 
131. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LVIII (1889), 1648, complaint of 
Arthur Morgan, member for Warwick, and Ibid., LXII (1890), 1343, 
complaint of W.H, Groom, member for Drayton and Toowoomba, 
357. 
Dr. W.F, Taylor confided that he and his fellow board members were 
132 
"just like a lot of fowls trying to fly over a fence". The only thing 
for the "practically useless", "inept", and "restricted" board to do in 
these circumstances, suggested The Brisbane Courier, was to resign 
133 
en masse, and force an amending health act on the government. Board 
members did not take the Courier's advice at that time. But thwarted 
once too often, Drs. Taylor and Marks resigned in 1894, when the 
Colonial Secretary rudely remarked that he would now have "a live 
134 board.., likely to answer all requirements". Meantime, some minor 
successes did redound to the board's credit, as from time to time 
local councils appointed medical officers of health and health 
135 inspectors at the board's behest. 
The central board's struggle for administrative authority and 
parliamentary debate on the matter, dragged on throughout the nineties. 
Gradually, more and more parliamentary members began to realize that 
without the investment of executive powers, the board could hardly be 
1 "^f, 
expected to exercise properly, the provisions of the 1884 Act. 
If any further proof were needed, that both the Act and its supervisory 
agent had failed to work as the legislature had planned, it was 
provided in 1891. Startlingly damning evidence against the legislation 
was revealed, not as part of a campaign by a power-seeking Central 
Board of Health, nor by its increasingly-sympathetic parliamentary 
supporters, but by the commissioners investigating the conditions under 
which thousands of workers toiled in the factories, shops and workshops 
137 
of Brisbane and Ipswich. 
132. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Feb 1889;Minutes of special meeting of 
Central Board of Health,21 Feb 1889.The Courier thought Taylor's 
simile a thing of "rare felicity" spoken by a "genius". Ibid., 
23 Feb 1889; sub editorial, 
133. Ibid. 
134. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXI (1894), 600. View of 
Horace Tozer. 
135. In 1890 both South Brisbane and Ipswich appointed medical officers 
of health.The Brisbane Courier,14 Jan 1890,and The Queensland Times, 
7 Jan 1890. Most of the councils and divisional boards written to 
at this time denied the need for medical officers. The Brisbane 
Courier, 3 Jan 1890. 
136. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXII (1890), 1342-45. 
137. "The Shops, Factories, and Workshops Commission Report", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1891), 957-1319, 
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After uncovering ill-ventilated, overcrowded, disgustingly filthy 
work places, which were "completely unfit for human occupation", and 
which provided no decent amenities for staff, nor clean, private, 
1 38 
proper closet accommodation, the commissioners made a most damaging 
accusation against Queensland's 1884 health legislation, which was 
139 
supposed to cover these areas under Clause 71 of the Act. 
Neither the Local Government Act nor the Health Act 
gave /"Che niiisance ins£ectorVsufficient power to 
deal with /these evils/. 
The indefinite, feeble wording of the clause prevented its being 
effectual, 
This shocking report made the need for legislative action only too 
evident, but Queensland was moving into a depression period. No 
factories and shops legislation was passed until 1896, and as far as 
the central board was concerned, apart from peaks of activity when special 
141 
meetings were called to discuss extraordinary problems, votes of 
money for the board, and meetings, were held to a minimum. Members 
144 
were prevented from meeting altogether for months at a time in 1894, 
145 by the action of the Colonial Secretary, when the overall supervision 
required under the Act was done without altogether. And although the 
board later gave useful advice on various diseases within the colony, 
and on local authorities which should be proclaimed, that counsel was 
•-T . , 146 not necessarily taken. 
138. "The Shops, Factories, and Workshops Commission Report", Votes 
and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1891), 1304-1308. 
139. Queensland Govemment Gazette, XXXV (1884), 1430. 
140. "Shops, Factories...Report", Votes and Proceedings of Legislative 
Assembly, II (1891), 1061. 
141. For example over a smallpox scare.Central Board of Health to Under 
Colonial Secretary, 24 Apr 1893, Q.S.A. COL/A732, in-letter no. 
4656 of 1893. 
142. Money was so scarce in 1893 that the Colonial Secretary felt the 
board might be "desirous of foregoing their fees in these 
depressed times".Central Board of Health to Under Colonial 
Secretary, 5 Dec 1893, Q.S.A. C0L/A755, in-letter no. 14246 of 
1893. 
143. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXX (1893), 807. 
144. Ibid., LXXI (1894), 600. 
145. Central Board of Health to Colonial Secretary,19 Apr 1894, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A768,in-letter no, 4389 of 1894,and reply 23 Apr 1894, Q,S.A. 
COL/G90, out-letter no. 2769 of 1894, 
146. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Oct 1894; Minutes of Central Board of 
Health, 5 Oct 1894. 
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Perhaps because of government disinclination to take the 
proffered advice, the board does appear to have been remarkably 
lethargic at times. For instance, members did debate the dangers 
presented by the plague outbreak in Asia and Africa, "on several 
occasions". But they "decided not to take any action" until 
frequent exchanges of letters with the Central Board of Health in 
Melbourne, appears to have made up their minds for them. Queensland 
certainly followed the Victorian example as far as the proclamation of 
148 
147 infected ports was concerned, and copied the Melbourne board's 
early plague regulations, once the disease had broken out in Australia. 
Even at this stage, and beyond, the board's main energies were 
149 
engaged with "looseness, dissatisfaction, and want of power". Right 
up to the period when the invasion of Queensland by the plague made the 
amendment of the now utterly useless Act of 1884 and the appointment of 
the long-awaited "despot" absolutely essential, the board, "having 
no authority... could best be described as a lion tied down with 
. . M 151 cotton". 
As far as the Act itself was concerned, it had been a step in 
the right direction. It was a piece of legislation based on an 
English Act, which, at the time of passing, contained the most 
152 
up-to-date medical and sanitary knowledge available. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, it had more than outlived its usefulness. 
147. Central Board of Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
3 May 1899, Q.S.A. COL/A 830, in-letter no.6045 of 1899. See also 
Within, p.270, which shows an energetic board at work with regard 
to rat extermination. 
148. Ibid., p.272. 
149. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXVII (1897), 830. 
150. Within, pp.274 and 283 ff. 
151. The Street, 19 Mar 1898. 
152. Cartwright, p.112. 
12 - LEGISLATION OF THE EARLY 
COMMONWEALTH PERIOD: 
FOOD AND DRUGS 
The very comprehensive "Act to Consolidate and Amend the Laws 
relating to Public Health" in Queensland received royal assent on 
20 November 1900, to take effect from the beginning of the new century. 
This measure did not repeal any of the health acts then extant, although 
it contained some radical departures from its predecessors. In a very 
real sense, as far as the conferring of enormous emergency powers was 
concerned, it was 
altogether an experimental piece of legislation /for 
whicli/ there was no parallel. .. in any British community. 2 
The Health Act of 1900 was the product of the obvious need for 
change. Its introduction was fully justified by the almost complete 
breakdown of Queensland's existing health arrangements, which had been 
apparent for some time, by rapid advances in medical science, and by the 
need to keep the colony abreast with the latest developments in health 
3 
administration both in countries overseas, and in the southern colonies. 
Yet it is doubtful whether Queensland would have entered the Commonwealth 
period with this modem law on its statute book, had it not been for the 
invasion of the colony by the fearsome disease bubonic plague. Certainly, 
neither the official revelations of instances of extreme insanitation 
4 
laid bare by the chief inspector's report on factories and shops, nor a 
serious outbreak of typhoid fever throughout the whole colony early in 
1900, were sufficient to pressure the government into bringing in 
amending or new health legislation, in the unsettled political, and very 
1. Queensland Government Gazette,II (1900), 1467 ff.(64 Vic. No.9). 
2. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXV (1900), 1098. 
3. Ibid., LXXXIV (1900), 224-25, and Ibid., LXXXV (1900),1002 and 1098, 
4. "Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops, 1899",Votes 
and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, V (1900), 1046. 
5. Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1901, pp.64, 68, and 71. 
6. T.A.Coghlan,Labour and Industry in Australia, Vol.IV(Oxford 
University Press-,1918), p. 1959,There was a full-scale ministerial 
crisis late in 1899 when Anderson Dawson was in power from 1 to 7 
December,before the return of J.R.Dickson's government with 
J.F.G. Foxton as Home Secretary. 
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unsatisfactory economic climate then prevailing. 
361. 
7 
The economic situation, in particular, was hardly conducive to 
the introduction of a health bill, whose fundamentally different concept -
the setting up of an entirely new department of health - would be 
expensive to implement. After several seasons of consistent drought, the 
crucial pastoral industry was reeling. In a period when wool was still 
one of the foremost export money earners for Queensland, 
/w/hen the pastoralists suffered almost to the point 
of extinction from 1899 to 1903, wages everywhere 
were low, work was scarce, trade was bad, and the 
industrial classes suffered exceedingly. 8 
Some measure of the economic and social importance placed on rural 
industries by contemporaries can be gauged from the Commissioner of 
Public Health's 1902 statement on the importation of foreign fodder which 
was urgently needed to supplement local drought-affected supplies. Although 
these imports posed the threat of introducing exotic " 'germs' of a very 
contagious nature", it was 
difficult to see how, without great delay, expense, and 
harrasment to the shipping and commerci^ al communities 
of the State, precautionary measures /were/ to be 
insisted upon. 9 
The mining industry, which might have tided the colony over the bad years, 
was also affected by the lack of water, and to the inroads made on the 
treasury by "parsimonious nature", were added the severe financial demands 
of Federation. 
In these circumstances, only an extreme emergency could have 
induced the govemment to act on behalf of the public health, since 
financial crises had always inhibited moves in this direction in Queensland' 
But having made his decision to bring down a bill, Justin Foxton was 
10 
11 
12 
T.A. Coghlan, p.1959. 
Harry C. Perry, Memoirs of the Hon.Sir Robert Philp, K.C.M.G. 
1851-1922 (Brisbane, 1923), p.208. 
"Interim Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, I (1902), 4. 
Pugh's Queensland Almanac, 1901, p,87. 
Our First Half-Century A Review of Queensland Progress 
Jubilee Memorial Volume (Brisbane, 1909), p.27. 
See for example. Within, pp.300-303, and 322-23. 
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13 determined not to make any apology for the measure. Nor were members 
of either house, or of any political complexion, to allow the question of 
14 finance to stand in the way. 
This determination, and a genuine fear of the plague, particularly 
in the latter part of 1900, did not ensure a smooth or quick passage for 
the bill. The debate was very long drawn out, touching every facet of 
previous and projected health legislation: and at times it was very 
acrimonious, as members took the opportunity to castigate old enemies and 
to defend pet interests. Yet in view of the changes contemplated, it was 
both inevitable and necessary, that the parliamentary representatives of 
the people of Queensland should seek to understand and discuss the new 
legislation very thoroughly indeed. 
The most significant alteration proposed under Foxton's bill was 
the authorisation of the governor in council to appoint a commissioner 
of public health - a medical practitioner expert in sanitary affairs -
who would be the permanent head of a health department, with 
responsibility for the administration of the act. The governor in 
council was also to have the right to appoint medical inspectors and 
health officers, who were to be medical practitioners and experts in 
sanitary science, medical practitioner public vaccinators, analysts, 
engineering inspectors and nuisance inspectors. These officers were to 
work within the department of health, and could be assigned to any area 
throughout the colony. They were to be invested with large powers to 
give directions or advice to local authorities, but they were to report 
any orders they might make "as soon as may be", to the commissioner of 
public health. 
Financial difficulties during the period up to 1914 ensured 
that this new bureau did not reach the proportions envisaged by the 
13. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
14. Ibid., p.529. George Ryland, member for Gympie, Labor. 
15. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
16. John L. Woolcock (ed.). The Health Act of 1900 (Brisbane, 
1903), pp. 15-16, Clauses 24, 26, 27 and 28. 
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17 
minister in 1900, but its purpose remained the same. It was created 
to replace and far surpass the old central board of health. A central 
board was to be retained under the new bill, but its numbers were to be 
reduced, its function was to be purely advisory, and its chairman was to 
1 8 be the commissioner of public health. Under this new arrangement, the 
Home Secretary hoped to eliminate that grave weakness in the 1884 Health 
Act, which The Brisbane Courier had so frequently and so perspicaciously 
pointed out - the absence of "a strong man occupying a strong position" 
19 
who could assume direction of Queensland-wide health affairs. Not 
unnaturally, the Courier was quick to take full credit for pushing the 
20 govemment "m the right direction". 
The Queensland branch of the British Medical Association also 
welcomed the suggested appointment, though its deputation to the Home 
Secretary tried to protect both the monetary and professional interests 
of the proposed appointee. The delegation advocated that a minimum 
salary be fixed by statute. But above all, remembering the unenviable 
situation in which the doctor members of the Central Board of Health had 
often been placed, the British Medical Association's representatives 
requested that the proposed medical officer should be in a position to 
be "independent of criticism", because by the very nature of the proper 
discharge of his duties, "a great deal of opprobrium" was likely to be 
17, Queensland's first health commissioner complained frequently of 
lack of staff to undertake necessary work "by reason of economic 
administration". When he left the Queensland service in 1909, the 
protest was taken up by his successors. "Report of Commissioner of 
Public Health",Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1904), 113. 
For other examples see. Ibid., I (1902), 883, Ibid., II (1903), 
170, Ibid., II (1905), 136, Chief Inspector,Health Department to 
Commissioner of Public Health,5 Feb 1906, Q.S.A. C0L/A878, 
in-letter no. 9706 of 1906, Commissioner of Public Health to Home 
Secretary,15 Feb 1906, Q.S.A. C0L/A869, in-letter no. 2154 of 
1906, Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 15 Mar 1907, Q.S.A. H0M/J24, in-letter no. 2927 of 1907, 
"Report of Commissioner of Public Health",Queensland Parliamentary 
Papers, II (1908), 289, Ibid,, II (1909), 356, Ibid,, II (1910), 
377, and Ibid., II (1913), 18, 
18, The board was to have five members,two of whom were to be medical 
practitioners.At least one board member was to have had three years' 
experience in local govemment, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
LXXXIV (1900), 815, 
19. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 224. 
20. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Aug 1900; main editorial. One member of 
parliament actually suggeste^ d that the Courier had "largely 
induced /the Home Secretary^ / to bring in this Bill". Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 236. 
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21 
cast upon him. Impressed, the minister promised to give the 
suggestions of this "pretty strong union... of the medical fraternity" 
22 his serious consideration, but he forgot his assurances when confronted 
by even more effective pressure groupings, defending the independence of 
local government. 
The local authorities retained the vital position in the public 
health scheme of 1900, which they had had under the 1884 Health Act -
the requirement that they "carry out... all works and matters of health... 
23 
under the supervision of the Commissioner". But they were concerned 
about their position, following this new appointment, because it seemed 
to some observers, that the govemment had jumped from the extreme of 
having a central board of health with 
no responsibilrty at^  all, to creating a sort of 
autocrat who [yonld/ be able to do all sorts of 
things on his own responsibility. 24 
Local government bodies therefore resolved on delaying tactics, to 
enable further consideration and the drafting of amendments covering 
a number of areas. 
In this they were very firmly supported by those parliamentarians 
for whom the preservation of local authority rights continued to be 
of the utmost importance. The ratepayers of Queensland might be as 
anxious as any one else to preserve the public health, and might welcome 
Oft 
the bill to this end, but local autonomist sympathy was strong enough 
21. Minute Book of the Queensland Branch of the British Medical 
Association, 8 Aug 1900, pp.182-84, and The Brisbane Courier, 
14 Aug 1900; report of deputation of Drs. Thomson, Love, 
Brockway, Connolly, Sutton, Carvosso and Hirschfeld, 13 Aug 1900. 
22. Ibid. The quotation is from George Kerr's speech on the 1900 bill 
in the Legislative Assembly. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 
LXXXIV (1900), 544. Kerr, the member for Barcoo, was a Laborite. 
23. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
24. Ibid., 821. This included the power to force local authorities 
to appoint medical officers of health, public analysts, inspectors 
and any other necessary officers to ensure the proper execution 
of the provisions of the proposed health act. Woolcock, p.16, 
Clause 29. 
25. Minutes of Proceedings of the Local Authority Association of 
Queensland, Executive Committee, No.54, 5 Aug 1900. 
26. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 529-30. 
Especially the views of J.G. Stewart, Rockhampton North, 
F. McDonnell, Fortitude Valley, both Labor, and Thomas Glassey, 
Bundaberg, formerly Labor. 
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27 to win a temporary postponement of the health bill debate. Indeed, 
because it was clearly necessary to appease that body of opinion, both 
inside and outside of parliament, which feared the persistent incursion 
of the central govemment into peripheral affairs, the Home Secretary 
28 
promised to limit the public health commissioner's powers. Thomas 
Glassey pointed out, that to have a health commissioner "clearly and 
distinctly under the thumb of the Minister", would be to risk the 
perpetuation of obvious weaknesses in the 1884 Act. But the Home 
Secretary declared that he had reached a satisfactory compromise. 
The Commissioner would have ample power to deal with 
local authorities, but would not be an irresponsible 
autocrat. 29 
Some members of both the Assembly and Council were critical of 
the idea of a medical head of a govemment department for other 
reasons, which were consistent with the British experience that "laymen 
30 
are always jealous of the specialist administrator". W.H. Groom was 
convinced that the medical man had not yet been bom who was capable of 
31 
managing the local authorities of Queensland. The Honorable 
A.C. Gregory agreed. He was quite happy to let a commissioner deal with 
medical matters, but was uncertain of his capabilities, when it came to 
32 the practical administration of the Act. The Honorable Dr. C.F.Marks 
assured his colleagues that medical sanitary experts understood all 
33 forms of local govemment. But Gregory persisted in his opinion, 
which accorded strongly with the views of business groups in the 
27. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 469, 471, 
526-27, and 823.Especially W.Stephens,South Brisbane, W.H.Groom 
and J.Fogarty,Drayton and Toowoomba,and the Honorable A.C.Gregory, 
Member of the Legislative Council. 
28. Ibid., p.529. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Cartwright,p.112.This was certainly the case with Sir John Simon, 
"the inspired leader"of the English public health movement,who 
became "Simon the desk official...increasingly subservient to lay 
officials...with his power so eroded that his usefulness had 
almost gone".See also,Anonymous,"Sanitary Progress",The Edinburgh 
Review,CLXXIII,Jan to Apr 1891, pp.85-87, and Lambert, pp.519 ff. 
31. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 238. 
32. Ibid., p.823. 
33. Ibid. 
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34 
community, that 
it would be highly injudicious and improper to pass 
a law which would give a person who is not an expert 
in business...power to spend the money of other people 
on sanitary improvements. 35 
Yet another aspect, which was connected with local pride and 
prejudice, ruffled the feathers of loyal Queenslanders. As the debate 
progressed, it became increasingly obvious that the govemment had 
already selected a medical gentleman for the proposed position of 
3fi 
commissioner; it also appeared clear to members of the Assembly that 
he would be "an imported man, who /would/ not understand local govemment 
37 here and local matters at all". In fact, the government's choice could 
not offend any patriotic Queenslander. The successful candidate for the 
38 
post, Bertie Burnett Ham, whose medical qualifications were excellent, 
was "an Australian and one who was resident in this country until he had 
39 been some years at Melbourne University". 
One other important reservation was expressed, not by local 
authority enthusiasts, but by the redoubtable Honorable Dr. W.F. Taylor. 
It concerned the proposed emergency powers which the appointee was to 
assume whenever a crisis situation - of which he was to be the sole 
40 judge - should arise. To grant these powers would be to depart from 
any "recognised course", and place Queensland in a pioneering situation 
with regard to the public health; for they went far beyond powers 
41 granted to any one officer of the Local Government Board in England, 
or to the heads of the health authorities in New South Wales and Victoria. 
34. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXV (1900),100.Petition from 
"certain merchants in Brisbane". 
35. Ibid. For Gregory's personal involvement in local govemment affairs 
see Douglas Pike (ed. )^  Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.IV 
(Melbourne, 1972), pp.294-95, and Within , p.64, f.n.147. 
36. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 527. 
37. Ibid., pp.239 and 544. View of William Stephens,John Fogarty and 
others. 
38. At the time of his Queensland appointment,Ham held a Doctorate in 
Medicine and the essential Diploma in Public Health from Cambridge. 
39. Under Secretary Home Department to Chief Secretary's Office,12 Oct 
1900, Q.S.A. COL/A904,in-letter no. 10750 of 1900. 
40. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXV (1900), 1098. 
41. The Local Government Board was administered by a ministerial 
head with a chief medical adviser and a chief engineering 
adviser and a staff of experts. 
367. 
Such proposals would also create the chance for a minister to escape 
"all responsibility" for any far-reaching or unpopular decisions taken in 
42 
an emergency, "by sheltering himself behind the commissioner". Taylor 
43 
won some support for his views, but the leader of the debate in the 
upper house, the Postmaster-General James George Drake, and a majority of 
members, saw no difficulties on this score, and Taylor's amendment was 
44 defeated. 
Taylor attempted another unsuccessful amendment on a related 
matter. The doctor, who had engaged in continual battles with various 
colonial and home secretaries during his term as a member of the Central 
45 
Board of Health, suggested that under the new bill the projected "quasi-
department of public health" would 
46 
simply be an appendage to the Home Secretary's Department,.. 
[y^tj he knew of no other department at present existing 
that was as important...as far as the public were concerned. 
Its work would be greatly facilitated if it was controlled by a 
Minister, who would be responsible to Parliament and the 
country for its due administration. 47 
The Postmaster-General acknowledged the importance of this argument -
possibly even recognising that future needs might justify such a move. 
48 Vigorous debate took place, but in the end Taylor's amendment was lost, 
because a separate ministry would lead to "unlimited expense" for the 
49 
already hard-pressed govemment, and the eve of federation was "an 
inappropriate time... to contemplate the creation of an additional 
r ] 
51 
Minister". In the event, Queensland had to wait until 5 Decembe 1935 
before the first Secretary for Health and Home Affairs was appointed. 
42. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXV (1900), 1097. 
43. Especially from A.C. Gregory, Ibid., p.1098. 
44. Ibid., p.1099 and John L. Woolcock, p.13, Clause 20. 
45. See for example Within, pp.354 and 356-57. 
46. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXV (1900), 957. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid., pp.957-59. 
49. Ibid., p.959. 
50. Ibid., p.957, 
51. Edward Michael HanIon,formerly Home Secretary,first held the post. 
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The first minister to head a department purely concerned with health was 
52 
not appointed in Queensland until 1963. 
53 
Another seemingly "drastic" innovation, which was based entirely 
on a British act, and which was to be brought into operation only by 
54 proclamation, was included in the 1900 health bill. This section 
related to the protection of infant life in the colony, and was aimed 
in particular at the crime of baby-farming, which the minister was 
happy to state, was rare in Queensland. On paper these clauses looked 
very stringent indeed, requiring close inspection and registration of 
the people concerned, the houses in which the children were to be kept, 
and the children themselves. But in practice this part of the Act 
57 proved "totally inadequate to deal with many cases of neglect". 
The much tougher "Act to Make Better Provision for the Protection of 
Infant Life",which was to be administered by the police rather than the 
health department, had to be brought down in 1905, because of the 
"enormous death rate among /sucli/ children". The enforcing of the new 
Act had a "salutary" effect, according to the Commissioner of Police. The 
children were 
52. Henry Winston Noble, appointed on 26 September 1963. 
53. This was the Courier's description of this section. The Brisbane 
Courier, 7 Aug 1900; main editorial. 
54. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
55. Ibid., p.227. But see L. Goldman, "Child Welfare in Nineteenth 
Century Queensland: 1865-1911",unpublished M.A.Qualifying thesis. 
University of Queensland,1978, p.170. Goldman,quoting The Brisbane 
Courier,asserts that there was "an extensive system of baby-farming 
in Brisbane" at least from 1890 onwards. 
56. Woolcock, pp.69-71, Clauses 152-158. 
57. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health",Queensland Parliamentai 
Papers, II (1905), 432. 
58. See Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCV (1905), 510-13 and 881, 
for the debate on the question of police ability to recognise cases 
of medical neglect and inadequate sanitation. 
59. Queensland Government Gazette,LXXXV (1905), 1369-76. 
60. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCV (1905), 509. Vety often these 
were illegitimate babies who were "farmed" out as their mothers had 
to work for their support. See Thomhill Weedon,Queens land Past and 
Present(Brisbane,1898), p.109, for a contemporary assessment of the 
illegitimacy rate in Queensland as compared with that of other 
colonies in Australia.Registrar-Generals' reports for the period 
give tables showing illigitimate births,but there are no figures 
on the death rates of these particular babies. 
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generally speaking well_looked after, and there /yasj 
no doubt that the Act /had/ very much conduced to the 
bettering of the conditions of life for these infants. 61 
Even so, observers considered this Act "but an instalment of the 
fi9 
necessary legislation on this subject", especially in the area of 
inspection, which appeared to be very much more satisfactorily conducted 
fi3 
in New South Wales under that state's more rigorous Act. The matter 
was of very great concern to the Commissioner of Public Health,although 
the police authorities had been entrusted with the work. Dr. Ham felt 
that the health department was "not wholly exonerated" by this official 
shift of responsibility, since only his inspectors were 
competent to express opinions on sanitary matters, which 
must necessarily affect the health of the infants boarded 
out in the various nursing homes throughout the State. 64 
One very important improvement was made with the appointment of a 
fully qualified nursing sister to the position of inspector, under the 
Infant Life Protection Act in 1908. But difficulties which fully 
justified the health commissioner's warnings continued to occur, as 
experienced but unqualified persons tried to cope with sanitary problems 
fifi 
in nursing homes registered under the Act. 
The rest of the health bill of 1900 included very many significant 
changes and additions designed to overcome the inadequacies of the 1884 
Act, and to reduce some sections and clauses "to a more orderly 
fi7 
arrangement". Yet the method of operation for a number of the divisions 
was similar to those obtaining under the old Act. The very much expanded 
Part III which dealt with sanitary provisions of all kinds, including 
61. Memorandum from Commissioner of Police to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 25 Jul 1906, Q.S.A. C0L/A873, in-letter no. 9109 
of 1906. 
62. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Jan 1906; main editorial. 
63. Ibid. 
64. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1908), 304. 
65. Under Secretary Home Department to Eveline Smith, 12 May 1908, 
Q.S.A. COL/A903,in-letter no. 5641 of 1908 and attachments, and 
Queensland Government Gazette, CIV (1908), 1180. Previous to this, 
"practical nurses" had been employed as women inspectors. For 
example,Hannah Elizabeth Wilson had been an inspector on these 
terms from 1 February 1906. The Morning Bulletin,27 Aug 1908. 
66. See for example,the successful appeal against the deregistering of 
a very doubtful nursing home,Daniel Carey to Under Secretary for 
Justice,1 Sep 1908, Q.S.A. C0L/A892,in-letter no. 10394 of 1908 
and attachments. 
67. Greenwood and Laverty, p.232. 
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sewers and drains, the disposal of sewage, sanitary conveniences and 
scavenging, and Part IV which covered such things as ordinary housing, 
cellar dwellings and lodging houses, were, like their counterparts in the 
1884 Act, 
only to be in force in such portions of the colony as 
they may be proclaimed to be in force in, 68 
There was very little resistance to the substance of these clauses, 
because the need for strengthened powers to ensure proper cleanliness, 
especially in the presence of bubonic plague, was obvious to most 
members. What did concern some speakers was the desirability of putting 
these sections 
into force all over the colony....Any safeguards for the 
preservation of health should be enforced in all towns, 
large and small. 69 
Nevertheless, such a concept was immense in planning and cost, and the 
proposals were rejected. That subdivision of the bill, which concerned 
the very touchy problem of vaccination against smallpox, was also to be 
70 brought into operation only by proclamation. But the whole of the rest 
of the bill was to be in force in all parts of Queensland, from the time 
it became law. 
This included very large sections on nuisances and offensive 
71 72 
trades, on food and drugs, and on all aspects of infectious illnesses 
including an extremely important section on compulsory notification of 
)nc( 
74 
73 
certain diseases, and the appointment of joint epidemic boards. On e
again most members found these parts of the bill to be "very good", 
68. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 223. 
69. Ibid., pp.230, 243, 536 and 560.Labor members were most concerned 
with this issue which affected conditions in small towns,shearing 
and woolsheds,railway and fencing camps and other such places which 
catered for the working men of Queensland.Glassey,McDonnell,and the 
leader of the party,William Henry Browne,member for Croydon,were 
foremost in speaking on these points.See also Within , pp.120-122. 
70. Woolcock, pp.65-69, Clauses 139-151. 
71. Ibid., pp.38-44, Clauses 79-89. 
72. Ibid., pp.45-57, Clauses 90-116. 
73. Ibid., pp,57-69, Clauses 117-151. See also Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 542-43, 820-21, and Within, p.274. 
74. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 241. 
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"decided improvement/"s/ on our present laws relating to health", which 
would be "hailed with considerable satisfaction throughout the length 
and breadth of the country", and for which the Home Secretary was to be 
75 
"highly commended... and congratulated". Nevertheless, this did not 
prevent protracted arguments on what constituted nuisances as far as 
7fi 
noxious trades were concerned, nor the accusations that the Home 
Secretary had framed certain clauses in an endeavour to shield from 
77 
ruin, some businesses which did cause irritation and annoyance. 
Some very lengthy and vitriolic discussion also took place on the 
preservatives and colouring used in food, on the weights and measures 
of breads, on antiseptics and drugs, and on the type, quality and 
number of analysts and other public servants, who would be required to 
administer that section of the proposed health act under the direction of 
78 
a commissioner of public health. There is no doubt that some of this 
argument was encouraged by very effective pressure groups within the 
community, who feared the loss of business or increased costs, if the 
79 
apparently stringent clauses went through. But there was also a 
suspicion amongst some parliamentary members, that the government was 
deliberately delaying the passage of the bill. For example George Kerr 
pointed out that on occasions 
there was not a quorum present when they were discussing 
such an important Bill, and that the Home Secretary was 
the only Minister present, there was so much indifference 
displayed. 80 
Matthew Reid complained that during several evening sessions there were 
81 
scarcely any govemment members in the house, while William Higgs 
observed that not only were more opposition than govemment members 
75. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 243 and 471. 
76. Ibid., pp.634-36 and Ibid., LXXXV (1900), 1241-42. 
77. Ibid., LXXXIV (1900), 635. 
78. Ibid., pp.245, 529 and 637, and Ibid., LXXXV (1900), 1243-46, 
1342-48, 1375-81, 1470-75, and 1794-1803. At this stage the 
government analyst was a member of the Department of Mines. 
79. For bakers' representations see Ibid., p.1242, the dairy industry 
protests. Ibid., pp.1244-45, for the meat industry petition. 
Ibid., p.1246, and a petition from the Brisbane Traders' 
Association, Ibid., p.1349. 
80. Ibid., LXXXIV (1900), 544. 
81. Ibid., p.566. Matthew Reid, member for Enoggera, Labor. 
372 
present during debate, but that they took a more "intelligent interest 
8 2 
in the discussion of the measure". 
In contrast, there was never any want of attention when matters 
connected with financing the new bill came up for discussion. Under 
the proposed health act of 1900 
all expenses incurred by the Commitssioner. .. in the 
execution of this Act... /were to/ be defrayed out of 
moneys from time to time appropriated by Parliament 
towards the expenses of the Commissioner. 83 
But unfortunately for local councils and divisional boards, all costs 
and expenses incurred by the commissioner in emergency situations were 
to come, not from government appropriations, but from the local 
84 
authorities concerned. Moreover, although the measure provided that 
local governing bodies were to be given "a great deal more power than 
85 
they had had before", increased powers almost inevitably meant 
"increased liabilities", which would "undoubtedly entail additional 
8fi 
expense". Vocal local government supporters insisted that there was 
87 
"no alternative but for the Govemment to find the money", for 
88 
council rates were already too high. But the bill made no such 
provision, even though a Royal Commission on Local Government had 
found, as early as 1896, that one overwhelming barrier to the success 
of the 1884 Health Act had been limited local council and divisional 
board funds. 
82. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 567. 
William Guy Higgs, Fortitude Valley, Labor. 
83. Woolcock, p.14, Clause 23. 
84. Ibid., p.13, Clause 20. 
85. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 229. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid., pp.238 and 562. 
88. Ibid., pp.242, 528 and 531. 
89. "Report of the Local Government Commission of 1896", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1896), 555-56. See 
also Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 238, for 
severe criticism of the removal of cleansing rate endowments 
under the Health Act Amendment Act of 1890 and references to 
the Royal Commission on Local Government by Stephens of South 
Brisbane. There was considerable sympathy for local govemment 
in the upper house as well. See for example, the speeches of 
C.H. Buzacott and A.C. Gregory, Ibid., pp.819-20 and 823. 
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David Hay Dalrymple^ minister without portfolio, could not agree, 
Local authorities in this country do ratherless than more 
than they may fairly be expected to do,,,/I/n the towns it 
is a perfectly proper thing that local authorities should 
find the cost of those things necessary to the health of 
their community. 90 
The Home Secretary, J.F.G. Foxton was rather more sympathetic, 
acknowledging the difficulties, and pledging that 
not only the present Government, but any Govemment, would 
necessarily have to see that the resources of the local 
govemment were not overtaxed. 91 
The Treasurer would either have "to see his way to increase the endowment", 
92 
or the rating powers of local authorities would have to be enlarged. 
In the end, the govemment chose the second option, thus 
transferring a very considerable amount of the financial responsibility 
for the public health affairs of cities and towns to the ratepayers of 
93 Queensland. In the fiscal year 1902-3, a period of "special retrenchment", 
the allocation of funds for endowments to local government dropped to 
94 
^30,000, and in the following year no moneys were made available at all. 
To cover this loss of endowment, the govemment had "no alternative but 
95 to increase again the rating powers of local authorities". Consequently, 
the health bill which depended so much on local and central governments 
96 
working "harmoniously together", passed on to the statute book with one 
97 
obvious flaw. Indeed a very short amending health bill concerning 
certain financial arrangements for local authorities had to be passed 
almost at once. 
90. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 240. 
91. Ibid., p.640. 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid., LXXXIX C1902), 347. See also The Brisbane Courier, 4 Feb 
1902. 
94. Laverty, p.256. 
95. Ibid. See also Within, pp.352-53. 
96. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 240. 
97. Cumpston,writing particularly of smallpox,suggests that the main 
weakness of the Act was the government's failure to ensure the 
active application of provisions written into the Act.Cumpston, 
History of Smallpox, p.140. 
98. "Health Act Amending Act of 1900",Queensland Govemment Gazette, 
II C1900), 1581, (64 Vic. No. 10), This allowed local authorities 
which undertook their own sanitary work to recover the cost 
from householders. 
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But the minister was supremely confident, Contrary to Labor 
99 
claims, and his own later admissions that the department was "not 
as yet fully equipped", Foxton maintained that he had "the whole 
machinery for the working of the /Act/already in existence". 
102 
Dr. B. Burnett Ham, one of the "young men revelling in new fields 
— — 103 
/and/ limitless possibilities, was installed as head of the health 
104 department from 1 January 1901. He began work immediately, 
investigating an area covered by one of the most fiercely debated 
sections of the Health Act of 1900 - the "whole question of 
preservatives used in food, and the adulteration and unwholesomeness of 
certain foods manufactured in the State of Queensland". 
Ham had taken a special interest in this subject before leaving 
England, and had kept in touch with the latest developments and 
usages both in that country, and on the continent of Europe. He 
promptly fell foul of vested interests in the community, and 
109 incidentally uncovered "a very weak spot in the Act", as he delved 
into the preservatives added to certain imported food, liquor and drugs, 
99. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,LXXXIV (1900),527, View of 
Andrew Fisher, Gympie. 
100. Foxton before the Local Authorities Association,Minutes of Fifth 
Annual Meeting of the Local Authorities Association of Queensland, 
No.61, 6 Mar 1901. 
101. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 527. 
102. Agent General,London to Under Secretary Home Department,16 Oct 1900, 
Q.S.A. COL/A904, in-cablegram no. 16229 of 1900. 
103. Cumpston,Evolution of Public Health in Australia, p.197. 
104. Ham claimed to have commenced duty on this date in various reports. 
The official record states that his appointment commenced on 10 
January 1901. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, 1 
(1901), 1007. 
105. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health Upon Food Preservatives 
and Adulterated Food",Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, 
II (1901), 1655 ff. 
106. Ibid., p.1655. 
107. Letter to Ham from Dr.Theodore Thomson,21 Mar 1901,included in 
Ibid., pp.1655-56. 
108. Ibid., pp,1656-57,See also Ham's insistence on awaiting the findings 
of the British Royal Commission into food and drugs before taking 
definite steps in Queensland, Ibid., p.1658. 
109. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXVII (1901), 1165. 
110. See for example,J,Brownlie Henderson,Government Analyst to Collector 
of Customs,Brisbane,21 Mar 1901,Q.S.A. COL/A842,letter no, 1549 of 
1900 and attachments,including letters from federal parliamentarians 
who were drawn into the argument because trade and customs is a 
Commonwealth responsibility. 
and into the manufacturing methods of some home-grown industries 
375. 
Ill 
Attacks were made on the commissioner on two fronts. "Very old 
and highly esteemed colonists" who had set themselves up in the food 
and drink manufacturing business, objected strenuously to the claim 
that "at present there is not a single sample of the Queensland 
— — 112 
/products^/ which I have tested that is 'pure'". The other offensive 
was waged in parliament by those confirmed champions of the local 
113 govemment cause, Messrs. Fogarty and Stephens. When the government 
analyst found himself overwhelmed by the rapidly increasing health 
114 department work load, and the Commissioner of Public Health requested 
local councils to appoint their own public analysts, there was a great 
outcry from both Stephens and Fogarty. They condemned the provisions of 
the Health Act which empowered the commissioner to compel defaulting 
authorities to appoint such officers. They contended that as 
no financial assistance was given to the local 
authorities it was utterly impossible for them to 
carry out the recommendations made to them....Local 
authorities were at their wits' ends to make ends 
meet. 116 
And John Fogarty, reaching for the impossible dream of perfect local 
autonomy and access to central govemment funds, declared that in any 
case "it was the duty of Govemment to see that the food supply was 
„ 117 pure". 
111. Particularly wineries. Report from Govemment Chemical 
Laboratory to Home Secretary, 18 Oct 1901, Q.S.A. C0L/A843, 
in-letter no. 17240 of 1901. 
112. Further report of Dr. J.C. Brunnich, and complaints of Messrs. 
Bassett, Lambert and Childs, attached to Ibid. 
113. Within, p.365, f.n.27, p.366, f.n.37, and p.372, f.n.89. 
114. The govemment analyst was an officer of the Mines Department 
who made tests for the Commissioner of Public Health on request. 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXVII (1901), 1165. 
This "courteous", "extremely helpful", "overworked" officer, and 
the govemment chemical laboratory in which he worked, were 
transferred to the Home Secretary's department in 1906. "Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 193. 
115. Woolcock, p,16. Clause 29. 
116. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXVII (1901), 1165. 
117. Ibid. Fogarty was very persistent in his criticism. See for 
example. Ibid., XCI (1903), 458-65, supply debate. 
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This question continued to concern Ham - and aware 
118 Queenslanders - throughout the whole period of his commissionership. 
In the doctor's opinion, Queensland "led the van in the matter of the 
prevention of food adulteration", being the first state in the 
Commonwealth to issue judiciously-framed regulations based on the 
119 
recommendations of an English departmental committee, but it would 
appear that New South Wales had ousted Queensland from its premier 
120 position by 1910. 
Ham had achieved a notable victory in persuading the Home 
Secretary to accept his regulations, particularly as it was obvious 
to some observers that the govemment had studiously ignored health 
121 
authorities' representations on adulterated food "for years". 
But he still faced an uphill battle in convincing the local authorities 
that 
one of the primary objects of the Health Department /wa_s/ 
to secure for the public at large a good and wholesome 
food supply; 122 
and that this could only be achieved, if local governments fulfilled 
their part under the Health Act of 1900, and undertook "systematic 
inspection, and condemnation, /of impure foo^/, followed by prosecution, 
123 
where necessary". 
118. According to Ham too few Queenslanders were aware."On many 
occasions" he bemoaned "the public apathy in the matter of daily 
food supplies". "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public 
Health",Queensland Parliamentary Papers,II (1907), 220. But 
The Brisbane Courier backed his call for pure food.See for 
example. The Brisbane Courier,31 Jul 1901; main editorial. Some 
parliamentarians also showed great interest. 
119. Queensland Parliamentary Papers,I (1902), 883. This was the 
outcome of the British Royal Commission's findings. See also 
Queensland Government Gazette,LXXVIII (1902), 1495-96. 
120. See Within , p.384. 
121. Queensland Parliamentary Debates,XC (1902), 1073. View of 
Vincent Bernard Joseph Lesina,member for Clermont.Lesina refers 
here to the Department of Health,but presumably he means the 
Central Board of Health. 
122. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health Upon Food 
Preservatives and Adulterated and Unwholesome Food", Votes and 
Proceedings of Legislative Assembly, II (1901), 1662. 
123. Ibid. 
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By 1903, a disappointed Burnett Ham claimed that that part of the 
Health Act of 1900 concerned with food and drugs was "practically a 
dead letter". This was partly because of local authority "complacency", 
but chiefly because the proper carrying out of those provisions of the 
Act, would involve the councils in very considerable expense. Peter 
Airey, the Labor member for Flinders, entirely supported the health 
commissioner during the subsequent supply debate. The local authorities 
were "the greatest hindrance in the way of Dr. Ham doing efficient work. 
126 
125 /Because/ they had the key to the situation", Airey asked that 
govemment pressure be brought to bear to force them to do their duty. 
The conservative Philp govemment failed to act decisively against 
the local authorities in this matter, and consequently the Commissioner 
of Public Health could record little improvement during the ensuing 
127 
months. But Airey, on becoming Home Secretary early in 1904, did 
not hesitate to reprimand the periphery. It was clear that the wording 
of the Act itself was creating a considerable stumbling block. Even as 
the minister labelled the councils and divisional boards "very remiss 
and very careless", he admitted that the "proceeding that had to be 
128 followed was somewhat cumbrous" and therefore at least off-putting. 
The impetuous V.B.J. Lesina argued that 
the proper course was to amend the Health Act so as to 
take the whole business out of the hands of the local 
authorities, who, as a rule, consisted of little 
pettifogging grocers and other traders who were 
interested in the sale of these very food products that 
were complained about, and it was not likely that they 
were going to take any action. 129 
The Morgan govemment did not bring down any amending legislation 
at that time, and it was 1911 before any noticeable change in 
124. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers,II (1903),170. See also Within, p.375. 
125. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCI (1903), 461. 
126. Ibid. 
127. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1904), 110, and Ibid., II 
(1905), 149. Only "feeble action" or "total apathy" could 
be expected from local authorities, according to Ham. 
Ibid. 
128. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCVI (1905), 1325. 
129. Ibid. 
378. 
govemment thinking placed the protection of consumer interests before 
130 
those of the manufacturer and retailer. Nevertheless, the year 
1906 was to see a slight but definite change in the attitude of some 
local authorities. This followed closely on two important developments. 
The first was the transfer of the invaluable J. Brownlie Henderson and 
his laboratory from the Mines Department to the jurisdiction of the 
Home Secretary, following some impassioned representations from 
131 
Burnett Ham. The move allowed the analyst to occupy "his time more 
132 fully with matters directly pertaining to the public health". At the 
same time. Ham achieved a decided advance as far as the Manufacturers 
and Traders Association and the Grocers' Association of Queensland 
were concerned. With the cooperation of these bodies, much good work 
was done to eliminate adulterated food, until "on the whole, the large 
bulk of foodstuffs manufactured and retailed in Brisbane [yasj free 
133 ~ 
from adulteration". 
No doubt the official posture taken by the traders' associations, 
134 the attacks made by The Truth on disgusting conditions and foodstuffs, 
the commissioner's close liaison with the southern states on the "live 
135 question" of food standards, and the continuing interest of 
parliamentarians in the pure food question, all combined to make 
Lesina's "little pettifogging grocers" in local govemment more 
amenable to Burnett Ham's overtures. Certainly by 1907, the health 
commissioner was able to report that although 
130. View of Home Secretary, John George Appel,during debate on the 
food and drugs section of the health act amending bill of 1911, 
Ibid., CVIII (1911-12), 513. This conservative govemment was 
bringing in "a measure of...great importance to the democracy of 
this State,involving,as it does,the health of that democracy". 
(Hear,hear! and Opposition laughter.)Exchange between Appel and 
William Lennon,member for Herbert. Ibid., p.512. 
131. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary,15 Feb 1906, 
Q.S.A. COL/A869,in-letter no. 2154 of 1906. 
132. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health",Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 193. 
133. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 196. See also 
Commissioner of Public Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 
24 Nov 1905,Q.S.A. C0L/A869,in-letter no. 12026 of 1905, and 
Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary,15 Feb 1906, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A869,in-letter no. 2154 of 1906. 
134. See for example. The Truth,15 Apr 1906. 
135. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jan 1906. 
379. 
too much [yasj expe£ted of the central authority, 
and too little /was_/done by the local authority, 
in the matter of protecting the people from adulterated 
and sophisticated foodstuffs...the local authorrties,... 
in by far the great majority of instances, /had/ 
honestly done their best with the resources at their 
command. 136 
However, the real break through came after the passing of the 
137 Health Act Amendment Act of 1911, which was itself, the direct 
result of a conference of the chief health officers of the various 
1 38 
states, held in Sydney in 1910. This Act contained a very large 
number of clauses covering all manner of matters concerning food, 
drink and drugs, including patent medicines. The sheer size of this 
part of the measure and the time spent in parliamentary debate on these 
139 questions, give some indication of the growing contemporary anxiety 
over impure food as a grave health hazard. Purity, packaging,labelling 
and advertising, blending and adulteration, utensils used in 
manufacture, inspection, sampling and analysis, and the punishment to 
which offenders would be liable, were all dealt with under this Act. 
Most importantly, it removed the anomalies caused by local govemment 
unwillingness to participate whole-heartedly in this work. Local 
authorities were still to be involved in analysis and prosecution,being 
empowered to work side by side with the health department. But the 
question of pure food had by now assumed national importance. For this 
reason, the administration of the Act was entrusted to the central 
authority. 
136. "Annual Report of Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers,II (1907),220. But see also The Brisbane 
Courier, 28 Oct 1907; sub editorial, for the Courier's sharp 
criticism of both local and central govemment neglect of "their 
first concern, the health of the people". 
137. "An Act to Amend The Health Act of 1900", Queensland Govemment 
Gazette, XCVII (1911), 1763-81, Section II,Pure Food,Clauses 13-59. 
The Act was effective from 1 January 1912. 
138. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12), 331. 
139. The debate lasted from August to December.The measure was delayed 
by the time spent discussing issues which aroused a good deal of 
public resentment,and which might well have been the subject of 
separate legislation - venereal disease and the Contagious Diseases 
Act. A lot of debating time was taken up with sanitation and 
specific diseases such as dengue,diphtheria and typhoid. But the 
question of pure food was almost always on parliamentarians' lips 
over this period. The record of the debate is spread over 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12) and Ibid., 
CIX (1911-12). 
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We have not taken any power whatever from /the local 
authorities/, but the sole power to carry out this 
Act is vesFed in the central authority.... There are 
so many different local authorities there cannot be 
that combined action which should exist in connection 
with this particular matter. That action, as I have 
already pointed out, can only be taken by the central 
authority, who must be, and by this measure is, vested 
with all the necessary powers to carry into effect the 
different provisions of the Bill. 140 
As The Brisbane Courier pointed out to its readers, the new Act rendered 
it possible for the health department 
to take steps for the protection of the people's 
health untrammelled by some of the forma^ l j^ egal 
restrictions and technicalities which /had/ stood 
in the way of effective administration and much 
useful work. 141 
Only the difficulty of extracting sufficient funds from the government 
to provide for extra inspectors and adequate machinery to carry out the 
legislation, now stood in the way of the completion of the work which 
142 had been "so excellently begun". 
Popular reaction to the pure food section of the Act was varied. 
It ranged from angry protests that such a measure would allow the 
general public to be 
crushed under a medical despotism_whose^ interference 
with the liberty of the subject /would^ / be more 
harassing than any other form of despotism known to 
Britishers, 143 
to acclaim for any legislation, which promised the people of Queensland 
144 
a reasonable chance of obtaining pure food for human consumption. 
The Brisbane Courier, in an outburst of patriotic fervour which was a 
feature of the early Commonwealth period, rejoiced that this Act meant 
that 
140. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12), 514. 
141. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Dec 1911. 
142. Ibid. 
143. Ibid., 15 Aug 1911; letter to editor from Veritas. See also 
Ibid., 12 Aug 1911; letter to editor from Pharmacist. "Whilst 
the... measure provides for a high standard... [\.tj may 
prove an injustice to a section, and a detriment to the whole 
community". 
144. Ibid., 1 Nov 1911; letter to editor from Viator, and Ibid., 
6 Dec 1911; letter to editor from D. O'Connor. 
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no other part of the British Empire /yas/ better 
equipped in respect of sanitary legislation than this 
state. 145 
As for the "extensive mercantile interests affected by the new 
legislation", they had offered no resistance to its passage, and the 
Commissioner of Public Health confidently expected "the mercantile 
146 
community to aid cordially in securing its efficient working". 
Queensland had a long way to go before all difficulties were 
resolved, as the royal commissioner looking into uniform standards of food 
purity for the whole of the Commonwealth discovered, in August 1912. 
In fact, the Queensland health commissioner gave evidence that although 
"the public interests were protected in the first place.../h£/ 
148 
endeavour/ed./ to harass trade as little as possible". Nevertheless in 
November 1912, eleven months after the Act became effective. 
Dr. Elkington was able to announce to The Brisbane Courier that five extra inspectors, who could make more rigid investigations into foods and 
lan 
150 
149 drugs, had been chosen. By March 1913, these officers had more tha
justified their appointment by the work done in and around Brisbane, 
In the following month, a number of inspectors were despatched to pay 
flying visits to Gympie, Maryborough and Bundaberg. Here again, the 
commissioner was pleased with the impact made, for the very presence of 
the departmental officers ensured that traders exercised greater care. 
But at this time, and well beyond 1914, there was some disappointment, 
as many prosecutions begun by the department had to be dropped, either for 
145. The Brisbane Courier, 29 Dec 1911. 
146. "Annual Report" /of the Commissioner of Public Healtli/, Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 9, 
147. Within, p,385 
148. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Aug 1912. Dr. Elkington did not give 
specific instances. 
149. Ibid., 29 Nov 1912 and Queensland Government Gazette, XCIX (1912)^ 
1451. From 28 Nov 1912, the government appointed H.W.Petherick, 
chief food inspector, C.W.Beaver and J.Stewart, senior food 
inspectors, and A.E.L.Mason and A.N.Young, food inspectors. 
150. The Brisbane Courier, 10 Mar 1913. 
151. Ibid., 9 Apr 1913. 
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want of evidence or because of legal technicalities. Another 
constant cause of dissatisfaction was lack of staff. 
One other element of the food and drug problem, which had caused 
great concern to Queensland's first health commissioner, also awaited 
resolution well after 1914. This was the swamping of Queensland markets 
152 
with "low-priced, inferior, adulterated and fraudulently labelled goods", 
allegedly dumped in Brisbane, by southern manufacturers taking advantage 
154 
of the removal of the tariff barriers affected by federation. It seemed 
to Dr. Burnett Ham, that the only really effective method of dealing with 
this problem in Australia, was to invite the various health authorities 
15c 
throughout the Commonwealth to reach "some uniform ruling on the matter". 
The commissioner persisted in his calls for a Commonwealth 
conference on food and drug standards, and the related problem of regulating 
the wording of labels. He was ably supported by the left wing orientated 
152. See for example. Justice Department to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 20 Mar 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, in-letter no.2537 of 1914 
regarding the selling of adulterated milk in Toowoomba, Atthow § 
McGregor to Under Secretary Home Department, 15 Apr 1914, Q.S.A. 
H0M/B44, in-letter no.3272 of 1914 re adulteration of liquor at 
the Railway Hotel, Goodna, and Health Department to Under 
Secretary Home Department, 5 Nov 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, in-letter 
no.9216 of 1914, enclosing a list of cases regarding adulterated 
whisky, gin, milk and essence of lemon, which were not proceeded 
with. 
153. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1903), 169. Presumably, as Queensland 
fell behind other states, notably New South Wales, in the matter 
of food standards, goods which became unsaleable on southern 
markets were sent to Queensland, in much the same way that 
inferior goods refused sale in Brisbane, were dumped in towns in 
Queensland's north and west. See Within, p.383, and f.n.159. 
154. Burnett Ham made this claim in Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 
II (1903), 169, but it was echoed by some parliamentarians. See 
for example, Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCI (1903), 461, 
view of John McMaster. 
155. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, I (1902), 883. 
156. See for example. Ibid., II (1905), 148, Commissioner of Public 
Health to Under Secretary Home Department, 24 Nov 1905, Q.S.A. 
C0L/A869, in-letter no.12026 of 1905, Queensland Parliamentary 
Papers, II (1906), 196, The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jan 1906, and 
Cross Sons and Absolom Ltd., London to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 17 May 1907, Q.S.A. COL/A880, in-letter no.7111 of 
1907 and attachments. This 1907 example deals with an imported 
coffee "mixture", and involved "a verbal mistake in labelling". 
The "coffee" was actually chicory, and the strength claimed for 
the product was "grossly misleading". It is typical of a number 
of claims made at this time. J. Brownlie Henderson to Commissioner 
of Public Health, 1 Jul 1907, Q.S.A. C0L/A880, in-letter no.7489 
of 1907. 
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parliamentarians, Francis Kenna and V.B.J. Lesina. Both men protested 
157 
about the "cheap and nasty" rubbish coming into Queensland, mainly 
because very low-priced tinned food, which according to Dr. Ham was 
"something diabolical", was given by 
poor women /to/ their children as a cheap and reliable lunch 
.... Poor people were forced to buy these cheap 
articles; their consumption led to internal disorders 
and disease, which filled our hospitals and charitable 
institutions. 158 
An outbreak of ptomaine poisoning high-lighted the difficulties facing 
the poorer sections of the state's population, particularly in the north 
and west. In a country with a very large meat consumption, the high 
price of fresh meat removed it from many Queensland tables, and resulted 
in the substitution of the tinned variety. This in turn enabled the 
purveyors of bad, but cheap, canned meat to reap profits at the expense 
of those least able to cope with the resultant damage. 
The long-sought-after meeting of the chief medical officers 
of the various states on the standards of food and drugs, was finally 
held in Sydney in 1910, at the instance of a conference of state 
premiers. By that time, Burnett Ham had taken up a position as head 
of the Victorian health department, and the new Queensland health 
1 fi3 
commissioner Dr. J.S.C. Elkington represented the state in his stead. 
157. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCVI (1905), 1322-25.For examples 
of earlier interest in this question from Lesina and Kenna see 
also Ibid., XC (1902), 1073-74, and Ibid., XCI (1903), 458-64. 
158. Ibid., XCVI (1905), 1323. 
159. The situation was grave in these areas for longer than in southern 
Queensland,because foodstuffs^ cond_emned and withdrawn from the 
Brisbane market sometimes "/found./ their way to the northern and 
western towns of the State". Commissioner of Public Health to 
Under Secretary Home Department, 20 Feb 1908, Q.S.A. C0L/A891, 
in-letter no. 2207 of 1908. Ham's italics. But see also The 
Brisbane Courier, 19 Dec 1908,on the despatch of inspectors to the 
north. 
160. Within, pp.88-89. 
161. Report on ptomaine poisoning from Commissioner of Public Health to 
Under Secretary Home Department, 5 Jan 1903, Q.S.A. C0L/A850, 
in-letter no. 605 of 1903. 
162. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Jun 1910. Every state except Western 
Australia sent delegates. 
163. Chief Secretary to Home Secretary,14 May 1910, Q.S.A. HOM/24, 
in-letter no. 5973 of 1910.The govemment analyst J. Brownlie 
Henderson also attended the conference. The Brisbane Courier, 
11 Jun 1910. 
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Very wide-ranging discussion took place during the fifteen day 
conference, but special emphasis was placed on infant food regulations, 
on dairy produce requirements, and on the special precautions to be 
taken to protect food and drink from contamination during manufacture 
A * 164 
and storage. 
Queensland no longer held its place in the van of the Australian 
states as far as food standards were concerned, if indeed it ever had -
except in Burnett Ham's opinion. The conference took the current 
New South Wales standards as a minimum to be attained, although the 
Commonwealth govemment urged delegates to be prepared to revise and 
raise this standard if, and when required. But the main emphasis was 
placed on the uniformity of the criteria, which was considered to be "just 
as necessary from the trade point of view as from the public health point 
1 /; y 
of view". With this in mind, the Premier of New South Wales 
investigated the progress made in that direction as the year drew to its 
1 CO 
close. This was despite the fact that 
conference standards as such /had/ no force of law, but 
/yevej designed to coordinate administration and 
manufacturing methods in the different states, where pure 
food acts may or may hereafter be legislated and enforced. 169 
With the encouragement of the Queensland Commissioner of Public 
Health, some food manufacturers in Brisbane had already begun the process 
170 
of improving production standards, and the equally important task of 
upgrading methods of delivery, storage, and the conditions of sale of 
171 perishable goods. Increasingly, pasteurization plants were being 
172 
erected throughout the state, in an effort to ensure a pure milk supply. 
164. Three copies of the report of the conference were included in Chief 
Secretary to Home Secretary,16 Jun 1910,Q.S.A. HOM/24,in-letter 
no. 7378 of 1910. See also The Brisbane Courier,23 Jun 1910. 
165. Within, p.376. 
166. The Brisbane Courier,23 Jun 1910. 
167. Ibid. 
168. Chief Secretary to Home Secretary,12 Nov 1910,Q.S.A. COL/24, 
in-letter no. 12701 of 1910,enclosing the New South Wales Premier's 
request. 
169. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Jun 1910. 
170. See for example,Robert Harper § Co.,to Home Secretary,14 Jul 1909, 
Q.S.A. COL/A903, in-letter no. 8630 of 1909. 
171. Master Bakers' Association of Queensland to Home Secretary,15 Jun 
1910, Q.S.A. COL/163, in-letter no. 7195 of 1910. 
172. See for example,North Ipswich Ice and Butter Factory to Home 
Secretary,16 Feb 1911,Q.S.A. HOM/B39,in-letter no. 1645 of 1911. 
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But overall improvement had to await the health commissioner's advice 
to the government, on the action which would give effect to the 
173 
conclusions of the Health Commissioners' Conference. Late in 1911, 
this not only resulted in the passing of the Health Act Amendment Act, 
but also in the appointment of Dr. J. Ashburton Thompson, the chief 
medical officer of New South Wales, as a Royal Commissioner for 
Queensland, charged with collecting evidence of the state's progress 
174 towards uniformity of standards. Ashburton Thompson was not entirely 
175 
satisfied with what he found, and some time later, suggested that 
1 7fi 
another conference on uniformity of standards was necessary. The 
Chief Secretary of Queensland, Digby Frank Denham, again after some 
177 delay, was happy to agree. But the question was not decided in that 
year - 1914 - and manufacturers in the southern states continued, 
sometimes for years, to put forward their arguments for permission to 
sell in Queensland, products whichv^ ere allegedly considered perfectly 
178 
safe in their place of origin. 
Adulteration of food, drink and drugs had certainly not been 
abolished by the health legislation of Queensland's early Commonwealth 
period. Nor had the problem of Commonwealth-wide uniformity been 
solved. But considerable progress had been made, as the health 
173. Commissioner of Public Health to Home Secretary, 16 Dec 1910, 
Q.S.A. COL/24, in-letter no.12925 of 1910. 
174. "Appointment as Commissioner of our Trusty and Well-beloved 
Dr. John Ashburton Thompson", Queensland Government Gazette, 
XCVII (1911), 1629, 21 Dec 1911, and The Brisbane Courier, 
22 Dec 1911. 
175. Ibid., 30 Aug 1912. 
176. Ibid., 10 Jun 1913. 
177. Chief Secretary to Home Secretary, 7 May 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, 
in-letter no.3982 of 1914 and subsequent no.5822 of 1914. 
178. See for example, Bacchus Marsh Milk Co. to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 25 Aug 1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, in-letter no.7236 of 
1914, and subsequent in-letter no.10194 of 1923. See also 
Health Department to Under Secretary Home Department, 20 Nov 
1914, Q.S.A. H0M/B44, in-letter no.9641 of 1914, and subsequent 
in-letter no.9754 of 1914 enclosing submissions from a southern 
firm, Clifford Love and Company. It is difficult to assess from 
this correspondence whether the Queensland government was anxious 
to protect industries within its own state from competition from 
southern firms, or whether it feared that interstate companies 
might try to dump inferior goods, not saleable under their own 
stricter regulations, on the Queensland market. 
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179 
commissioner was pleased to record. In any case, the struggle to 
provide pure food and drugs - though looming large in the calculations 
of all of the health commissioners who held office to 1914 - did not 
present the Queensland legislation of the period with the acid test. 
This was to be provided by renewed attacks of the bubonic plague. 
179. "Annual Report" /of the Commissioner of Public Health/, 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 9. "The food 
inspector is now regarded by traders in the light of a business 
friend". 
13 - QUEENSLAND'S HEALTH LEGISLATION OF THE 
EARLY COMMONWEALTH PERIOD : 
THE TRIUMPH OF CENTRALISM 
The year 1901, the first in which Queensland's Health Act of 
1900 was in operation, was, not unnaturally, one of considerable official 
activity as far as public health matters were concerned. As events were 
to prove, that activity did not always lead to successful conclusions. 
Nor was the Act of 1900 the definitive measure its framers had hoped. 
The installation of the Commissioner of Public Health, 
Dr. B. Burnett Ham, was followed almost immediately by the proclamation 
of no less than seventy-two cities, towns, and divisions under those 
parts of the Act which were designed to stamp out sanitary evils, and 
unsound or filthy dwellings. The necessity for this widespread 
application of Parts III and IV of the Health Act of 1900 is sufficient 
testimony that grave insanitation still existed in most of the populous 
areas of the state, and that the health provisions of the nineteenth 
century had failed to deal adequately with this basic problem. 
Burnett Ham, fearing a recrudescence of the plague, enjoined 
scrupulous cleanliness upon the local authorities in special memoranda 
2 
sent to all councils and divisional boards throughout the state. He 
followed his written instructions with an early "northern tour" 
culminating in Townsville. As he worked his way north, visiting the 
3 
seaports of Maryborough, Gladstone, Bundaberg and Rockhampton en route, 
the health commissioner was able to see at first hand, the peculiar 
problems besetting a country with the "greatness of the size of 
1. Queensland Government Gazette, LXXV (1901), 461, 23 Feb 1901. 
2. The Brisbane Courier, 12 Feb 1901. See also "Department of Public 
Health Report on Plague in Queensland 1900-1907 by B.Burnett Ham, 
M.D., M.R.C.S., D.P.H. (Cambridge), Appendix B", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1907), 166, for a copy of this 
memorandum dated 28 January 1901. 
3. The Brisbane Courier, 30 Apr 1901 and 1 May 1901. Later, Ham gave 
"popular" lectures on sanitation in "various centres of the State", 
but there is no record of the actual venues. "Report of the 
Commissioner of Public Health",Queens land Parliamentary Papers, II 
(1903), 172. 
387, 
388. 
4 Queensland". As well, he was able to lecture the local authorities m 
these thriving gateways to the state on their vital role of arresting any 
possible plague threat. 
Recognition of the first case is of paramount importance, 
for the history of epidemics teaches over and over again 
that a single case has contaminated a hitherto clean 
country. 5 
Also with the plague in mind, the government tried to ensure that 
those parts of the Act concerned with infectious diseases were in good 
working order, particularly in Brisbane and its suburbs. The Home 
Secretary named those local authorities which were "to join to act 
together /as the Metropolitan Joint Board for the Prevention of Epidemic 
y 
Diseases/ for the purposes of the Act". This board, and any others 
called into being in a emergency, was to take action if and as required 
7 
by the health commissioner. The duties of all such boards, especially 
Q 
with regard to isolation hospitals, were fully set out, as were 
9 
instructions on the compulsory notification of diseases. The new 
Metropolitan Joint Board, showing a commendable sense of responsibility, 
promptly chose Dr. A.C.F. Halford as its new medical officer of health. 
4. The Brisbane Courier, 8 Jan 1901. Ham's comment taken from a report 
on the Courier's first interview with the commissioner. 
5. Ibid., 12 Feb 1901. Queensland's 2,250 miles of coastline and many 
harbours presented the state with problems quite unknovm in New 
South Wales and Victoria, where commerce passed almost exclusively 
through Sydney and Melbourne. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II 
(1907), 91. 
6. Queensland Government Gazette, LXXVI (1901), 485. 
7. The commissioner made this quite clear to the Townsville City 
Council. A local body was obliged to send members to sit on the 
epidemic board in its own area. A council also had to pay the 
precepts which were levied to cover the costs of fighting 
infectious diseases at the local level. The Brisbane Courier, 
18 Apr 1901. 
8. Queensland Govemment Gazette, LXXVI (1901), 486. 
9. Ibid., p.487 and Ibid., pp. 1667-73 for "The Infectious Diseases 
Regulations of 1901". 
10. The Brisbane Courier,7 Feb 1901. A.C.F. Halford, M.D., Ch.B 
(Melbourne), was an experienced bacteriologist who had worked for 
considerable periods in general hospitals. He had an excellent 
knowledge of Brisbane and its suburbs, and possessed that other 
mystical qualification so esteemed by Queenslanders at this time -
he was an Australian. The Courier fully expected him to do very 
well. 
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The Executive Council also performed its part, appointing a new Central 
11 Board of Health to fulfil the requirements of the Act; and John Simpson, 
a plumber with seven years' experience as a sanitary inspector in 
Aberdeen, Scotland, was engaged as a foundation member of the Queensland 
12 health department in that same capacity. 
It was not long before these preparations were put to the test, 
when the plague broke out in March 1901 at Myrtletown - a village near 
13 the mouth of the Brisbane River. A number of other cases were reported 
in various parts of the state, usually accompanied by "foul and 
14 insanitary conditions", and "gross overcrowding". But fortunately, 
the disease was in a "mild form", and although the scourge lingered 
for some months, this particular outbreak is more notable for its 
political and administrative machinations, than for any peculiarities in 
17 the nature of the disease itself. 
Several matters were of intense interest to contemporary observers 
in this plague year of 1901, when, for the first time in Queensland's 
history, existing health legislation seemed to provide "the machinery 
1 Q 
necessary to deal with the problem". The first essential for which 
early twentieth century Queenslanders looked was the hearty cooperation 
of the local authorities. But in spite of the Metropolitan Joint 
Board's early zeal over the Halford appointment, it was far from certain 
11. The Brisbane Courier,2 Feb 1901. The new board comprised Drs.John 
Thomson, Wilton Love, and D. Hardie, and Messrs.Theodore Unmack 
and G.V.Hellicar. Hellicar's appointment fulfilled the requirement 
that at least one board member should have had local government 
experience,and the preference that there should be a legal man on 
the board. 
12. Ibid., 21 Feb 1901. Dr. K.I. O'Doherty was reappointed public 
vaccinator. Votes and Proceedings of Legislative Assembly,II 
(1901), 44. 
13. The Brisbane Courier,5 Mar 1901. 
14. For example,a number of cases occurred at Petrie Terrace,Brisbane, 
and at Bundaberg.A nurse at Colmslie Plague Hospital also contracted 
the disease. Ibid., 18 Apr, 23 Apr, 30 Apr, 10 May 1901. 
15. Ibid., 11 Mar 1901; sub editorial. 
16. Ibid., 24 Aug 1901, and The Street, 3 Aug 1901. 
17. But see Queensland Parliamentary Papers,II (1907),especially pp.124 ff. 
155 ff., and 219 ff., for details of useful scientific experiments 
carried out, particularly between 1902 and 1907, on the types of 
plague occurring in Queensland,with anti-plague sera, and on the 
rat-flea theory of the dissemination of bubonic plague. 
18. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Mar 1901; sub editorial. 
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that further concerted action would be forthcoming. The new board's first 
19 few meetings were spent almost entirely bemoaning its impecunious state, 
and its finance committee resolved to delay any large outlays until some 
20 
satisfactory formula could be worked out with the Home Secretary. 
A deputation from the board which waited upon Foxton, discovered 
that financial arrangements between the central and local authorities, as 
represented by the joint boards, had already been laid down on the 
"proper basis... of a fixed principle". In practice, this meant that 
government assistance would be given at the rate of a pound for a pound, 
based on amounts raised by precepts levied on the various local councils 
concerned. This new scheme was not expected to be as liberal as the one 
in operation during the first plague year. But the Home Secretary 
claimed that it would be fair to the whole country; that it would result 
in joint boards doing only that work proper to such bodies; and that 
since the govemment endowment would be granted only after the receipt 
of precepts, "as good businessmen they would see that these precepts 
were paid". Justin Foxton made two other telling points. Local 
governments and joint boards should not ignore their financial 
responsibilities, in the hope that the central govemment would come to 
the rescue - a tendency which was "painfully prevalent" - because the 
21 
government itself was in no position to throw money away. Furthermore, 
he revealed that the health commissioner had been instructed to draw up 
plans prescribing the work which epidemic boards would be required to 
22 
perform. Only these undertakings would attract the government subsidy. 
Despite these warnings, some local councils had to be pressed 
23 
strongly before precepts were paid. By July 1901, the Ithaca, Enoggera, 
24 Sherwood and Wynnum Councils were in default, and by August of that 
19. The Brisbane Courier, 28 Mar 1901. 
20. Metropolitan Joint Board's Finance Committee's Report, 13 Apr 1901, 
Q.S.A. COL/400, Report No.2 of 1901. Large expenses such as the 
purchase of an ambulance wagon,and the work on the Reck Disinfector 
and the disinfecting chamber were delayed. 
21. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Apr 1901; report of the deputation of the 
Metropolitan Joint Board to the Home Secretary,17 Apr 1901, 
22. Supplementary Report of the Finance Committee of the Metropolitan 
Joint Board,undated, Q.S.A. COL/400, attached to Report No.2 of 
1901. 
23. The Brisbane Courier, 25 Apr 1901; meeting of the Metropolitan 
Joint Epidemic Board, 24 Apr 1901. 
24. Finance Committee of the Metropolitan Joint Board Report, 
16 Jul 1901, Q.S.A. COL/400, Report No.9 of 1901. 
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year, the Metropolitan Joint Board had issued writs against the 
offending local government bodies to enforce payment. This process was 
or oz; 
repeated on 16 October 1901, and many times thereafter. Small 
wonder, observed The Brisbane Courier, "if the local authorities are 
27 looking longingly for the day when the Joint Board will be dissolved"; 
and that the point was soon reached where local councils were not only 
in dispute with the central govemment, but had also entered into bitter 
28 
controversy with the Metropolitan Joint Board. Well before the end of 
the first year of operation of the Health Act of 1900, it was already 
clear that where the expenditure of money was concerned, the new 
legislation contained no magic prescription that would ensure the 
willing cooperation of the local councils of Queensland in the government's 
health schemes. 
Nevertheless, the central government persisted with this method of 
dealing with an increasingly virulent plague epidemic until 15 July 1902, 
when the President of the Metropolitan Joint Board announced that the 
responsibility for the plague "has at last been taken over by the 
29 Govemment... as a National matter". This did not absolve the joint 
boards of Queensland from all commitment to fighting the plague 
30 immediately, but it was the beginning of the end for those bodies. The 
government's decision followed a series of deputations to the Premier 
25. Finance Committee of the Metropolitan Joint Board Report, 17 Dec 
1901, Q.S.A. COL/400, Report No.22 of 1901. 
26. See for example President's Report,Metropolitan Joint Board,4 Mar 
1903,Q.S.A. COL/400-401,Report No.35 of 1903.Almost all of the 
local councils and divisional boards connected with the Metropolitan 
Joint Board failed to pay their precepts at some time during the 
period of the board's operation. 
27. The Brisbane Courier, 18 Sep 1901. 
28. See for exam.ple President of Metropolitan Joint Board to Coorparoo 
Shire Council, 17 Oct 1902, Q.S.A. COL/400-401, Board's letter 
no. 241 of 1902. 
29. President's Report, Metropolitan Joint Board for the Prevention of 
Epidemic Diseases, 15 Jul 1902, Q.S.A. COL/400-401, Report No.9 of 
1902. Writing in 1907,Dr.Ham suggests that boards throughout the 
state were abolished on 19 September 1902. Queensland Parliamentary 
Papers, II (1907), 92. 
30. See for example,President's Report,Metropolitan Joint Board,2 Sep 
1902,Q.S.A. COL/400-401,Report No.13,which details the board's 
continuing interest in the infectious diseases hospital,Wattlebrae, 
the proposed new buildings for an isolation hospital,Dr.Halford's 
report on the plague,and the board's involvement in the cleansing 
operations in Brisbane because of the plague. 
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and the Home Secretary, which sought to have the joint board system 
31 
abolished. When this was refused, the Metropolitan Joint Board itself, 
although "not desiring to shirk responsibility", announced that it 
32 
"could not go on". 
Foxton, intent on preserving the integrity of his Health Act, 
insisted that "unquestionably...all epidemics should be regarded as 
33 
matters to be dealt with by local government". It was probably only a 
combination of pressures, which eventually caused the Home Secretary to 
34 
change his mind - press revelations of pockets of incredible filth, 
35 
"a crying disgrace to... Brisbane", which the Metropolitan Joint Board 
•zy 
was apparently powerless to cleanse, the complicated procedure necessary 
37 
should emergency plague cases arise outside joint board areas, and 
most importantly, the intervention of Dr. Ham. The health commissioner, 
taking a line which was to be pursued by Home Secretary John George 
38 
Appel in presenting the health act amendment bill of 1911, asserted 
that the joint board arrangement had only been introduced to ease the 
31. The Brisbane Courier, 4 Feb 1902;Deputation to Robert Philp and 
Justin Foxton from South Brisbane. W.Stephens was a prominent member 
of the deputation,once again defending local government rights. 
32. Ibid., 21 Apr 1902; report of deputation from Metropolitan Joint 
Board to Home Secretary, 20 Apr 1902. 
33. Ibid. 
34. At this time,23 Apr 1902,the government was still determined that 
local bodies should administer plague matters under the direction 
and supervision of the health commissioner. 
35. The Brisbane Courier,15 Mar 1902;a Reporter's Experiences in 
Insanitary Brisbane, Ibid., 19 Mar 1902;0fficial Correspondence on 
the Insanitary State of Brisbane, Ibid., 3 Apr 1902;letter to 
editor from Dr.Ham on the Insanitary Condition of Brisbane,and Ibid., 
23 Apr 1902; Report on Insanitary Brisbane and Special Council 
Meeting on Health By-Laws. 
36. There was a great deal of legal difficulty involved in the question 
of joint board powers to enforce by-laws,to undertake inspection,and 
to give instructions about cleansing operations.A new order in 
council had to be made constituting the epidemic boards as local 
authorities under the Local Govemment and Health Acts before such 
powers could be granted. Ibid., 6 Jun 1901;Meeting of Metropolitan 
Joint Board,5 Jun 1901,with apologies from Dr.Ham regarding delays 
in drawing up Metropolitan Joint Board regulations under Part VII 
of the Health Act of 1900. 
37. Secretary,Metropolitan Joint Board to Under Secretary Home 
Department,10 Apr 1902,Q.S.A. COL/238,in-letter no.5772 of 1902. 
See also The Telegraph, 11 Apr 1902, 
38. Within, pp.379-380. 
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burden of expense for individiual councils, and that this system 
complicated the administration a good deal....At any 
rate, the cooperation of the Joint Board had not been 
very successful owing to the divided and disputed 
authority between the independent local government 
bodies,the overlapping of work,and the endowment of the 
board being insufficient to carry on its work. 39 
The Metropolitan Joint Board continued to function for some 
months, undertaking, 
under an Order in Council...duties...of a preventative 
character...against the spread of diseases which though 
less dreaded because more familiar than Plague, are far 
more fatal in their ravages on our population. 40 
But if the board was to function properly and efficiently against 
the spread of infectious diseases, it needed the power - automatically 
vested in local authorities under the Health Act of 1900 - to compel 
the notification of those diseases. In the legal opinion of John L. 
Woolcock, the order in council controlling the joint board's new duties 
41 had specifically denied these particular rights. Once again, the 
decision was vitally affected by the attitude of the health 
commissioner. In the light of Woolcock's findings, Burnett Ham refused 
to support the joint board's application for these powers, bringing 
42 
the board into open conflict with himself, and almost certainly 
43 hastening its dissolution. 
39. The Brisbane Courier, 23 Apr 1902;Report of conference between the 
Health Commissioner and the Metropolitan Joint Epidemic Board, 
20 Apr 1902. 
40. President Metropolitan Joint Board to Coorparoo Shire Council, 
17 Oct 1902, Q.S.A. COL/400-401, Board's letter no.241 of 1902. 
See also President,Metropolitan Joint Board to Members of Board, 
8 Oct 1902, Q.S.A. COL/400-401, unnumbered copy. 
41. Opinion of John L.Woolcock,Barrister-at-Law in Re Health Act of 
1900,Part VII,Section 120,attached to Secretary,Metropolitan Joint 
Board to Under Secretary,Home Department,12 Dec 1902,Q.S.A. 
COL/400-401,Board's letter no.338 of 1902. Woolcock was very 
influential in local authority affairs in Queensland from 1893,when 
he was secretary to the Royal Commission which investigated local 
govemment matters.His prestige was enhanced when,in 1899,he 
became parliamentary draftsman. Robinson, pp,6-7. 
42. The Metropolitan Joint Board claimed that the Commissioner's 
memorandum on the matter was deliberately given to the press by 
the Health Department. See President's Report,Reply to Dr.Ham, 
8 Jan 1903, Q.S.A. COL/400-401, unnumbered copy. 
43. Queensland Govemm.ent Gazette, LXXX (1903), 1135. The board was 
now gazetted as The Metropolitan Joint Hospital Board. 
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The depression-like conditions of 1903 forced the dismissal of 
44 
the board's paid staff, and the end came on 1 April of that year. 
But as Burnett Ham had pointed out earlier, the joint boards set up under 
the Health Act of 1900 had never really worked. From a government and 
local authority point of view, the exercise had been an expensive failure. 
The cost to the whole community in inefficiency, filth, extended sickness 
and death, will probably never be measured. 
If The Brisbane Courier and other observers had been interested 
in assessing the extent of local authority cooperation and effectiveness 
under the provisions of the Health Act of 1900 and in an emergency 
45 
situation, they were even keener to see how the newly-appointed 
Commissioner of Public Health would perform. Burnett Ham commenced his 
duties under the eyes of sceptics, who were convinced that a Brisbane-
based commissioner could not possibly control health matters Queensland-
46 
wide; and even those favourably disposed towards him admitted that 
47 
"Dr. Ham cannot be expected to cover all the ground". 
The health commissioner's task was far from easy. Before his 
department was even off the ground, he had to cope with a plague outbreak, 
with chronic shortages of funds, lack of staff, and a battle against the 
insensitivity of governments and the apathy of local authorities. Yet by 
1911, both the commissioners and the departmental staff appointed under 
the Health Act of 1900, had proved their worth to such an extent, that a 
conservative government - ignoring the traditional right-wing tendency to 
eschew centralization - was willing to vest a central health authority 
with the powers necessary to put the comprehensive Health Act Amendment 
48 Act of 1911 into effect. Dr. Bertie Burnett Ham's early successes were 
44. Queensland Government Gazette, LXXX (1903), 1135. 
45. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Mar 1901; sub editorial. 
46. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, LXXXIV (1900), 243. View of 
Thomas Glassey. 
47. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Mar 1901; sub editorial. 
48. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12), 514. John George 
Appel, who as Home Secretary introduced the bill, called himself 
a "democrat", and showed "much capacity for bestowing largesse on 
the poor". Bemays, p.286. 
THE COUNCIL—Yon'r* a 61thy little gertny br«t, you're fall of unell and dirt. 
XHK CITY—Wuh ro« cle&ner then, yoo duffer; yon don't Ksmb enough to hurt. 
THE COUNCIL—Yoo're na»ty »nd yon're vermlny, yoa're dU<»»ed beyond » hope— 
THK CITY—Scrape me harder then, old fellow, be more llbend with your »o«p. 
OTHER A0TH0R1T1E8—We've got to »h»r» the danger too, and we've hardly got a »*y. 
JOINT BOARD—W« make our little lery, though, and yonVc got to p«y, pay, p«y. 
THK RATS—Yon oaptore a», and ho»rd nj, and we Uagh the laugh Ironic ; 
We kixrw yon're but dUtdbutlng the little flea bubonic. 
We're twice a« harnileaa Uring M we'r< boarded np whes deed. 
Though jou think yoo'r* doing wofxlert putting prioe* oo our head, 
Yon oftOM 01 more amoMmant than a dty full ol oata— 
DVL HAM—Of jour mercy, gentlerocs, f*«d thaaa rat*, rata, rat*. 
THE PUBLIC -LUt«n to the word* of wiadom Uut v « taUiag tr»m oar Proa, 
KILL orr ALL m i DOOTOBS AHD THE Pi.aooi WILL QUICKLT OO ! 
No. 26. The S t r e e t , 22 March, 1902, 
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49 
significant in ensuring this triumph of centralism. Once again, the 
presence of the bubonic plague, and Ham's methods of dealing with it, 
presented contemporaries with a useful yardstick for measuring his 
performance - not least because the government itself placed the plague, 
and all virulent, exotic ailments, in a different category from ordinary 
mrectious diseases. 
In 1902, to the delight of Brisbane residents, a "strongly worded 
letter" threatening the emergency take-over of the work by the health 
commissioner, resulted in a massive sanitary effort by the combined local 
authorities, who had previously failed to effect the cleansing operations 
needed in the face of an increasingly serious bubonic plague outbreak. 
"Coincidentally with this special cleansing, the cases of the plague 
52 began to fall off". A similar significant improvement took place 
during the 1903 outbreak in Brisbane and its suburbs, as systematic, well 
directed scavenging was carried out by all local authorities, "as never 
before", after the health commissioner had forcefully "reminded /the 
— 53 
councils^ / of their powers and duties under the Health Act". 
Outside the capital, Burnett Ham's instructions to the Maryborough 
City Council were taken so seriously that in 1901 an immediate and 
54 
vigorous crusade against rats was undertaken, some much-needed 
improvements in the management of the district's dairies were institute a^  
49. For reasons of space,it is possible to give only a few examples of 
Ham's successes in this thesis;and this section is not intended to 
give a comprehensive history of the bubonic plague outbreaks in 
Queensland from 1901.For some additional information on the plague 
see Report on the Outbreak of Plague in the State of Queensland, 
1903 (Brisbane, 1903), and "Department of Public Health Report on 
Plague in Queensland 1900-1907 by B.Burnett Ham, M.D., M.R.C.S., 
D.P.H. (Cambridge)",Queens land Parliamentary Papers,II (1907), 
pp. 54 ff. 
50. Undated and unsigned /indecipherable initial^/ Memorandum on the 
Powers and Duties of Local Authorities under the Health Acts with 
respect to_infectious_diseases, written for the advice of the 
Minister /John Huxham/ in 1917, Q.S.A. Department of Health Files 
1913-1919, Home Secretary's File No. 16702 of 1917. 
51. See for example,The Brisbane Courier, 23 Apr 1902;letter to editor 
from A.H. Barlow. 
52. City of Brisbane Mayor's Report 1902-3 (Brisbane,1903), pp.51-52. 
53. Report on the Outbreak of Plague, 1905, p.7. 
54. Wide Bay and Burnett News, 23 Mar 1901. 
55. Ibid. 
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and a new system of human waste disposal was eventually put into 
ry 
operation. Maryborough's many health problems were certainly not 
eliminated under the commissioner's supervision at that time. But when 
the city was unfortunate enough to suffer an outbreak of the particularly 
severe and dreaded pneumonic plague in 1905, The Australasian Medical 
Gazette considered that only the "prompt and energetic action of the 
Public Health Department" had prevented what might otherwise have been 
58 
a very considerable spread of the disease. The disgruntled Maryborough 
council objected to the increased expense of fighting the plague, as the 
health department moved in to take charge of the cleansing operations in 
59 
the city. And an irate Dr. H.C. Garde accused the "so-called experts 
from Brisbane" of interference in the local conduct of the plague campaign, 
and of causing the death of two of his nurses. But the health 
commissioner was able to justify the departmental action, and win government 
1 61 approval. 
Comparable successes were achieved by the commissioner and his 
department, over a number of years, in widely separated centres of 
Queensland. Plague outbreaks were brought under control, and defensive 
measures were taken, in Childers, in Cairns, in Thursday Island, 
in Port Douglas, and in Ipswich. In most cases, the commissioner 
56. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health,1903",Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers,II (1903), 174. 
57. Within, p.75. 
58. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health",Queensland Parlia^ 
mentary Papers, II (1905), 137. 
59. Town Clerk,Maryborough to Home Secretary, 12 Jul 1905, Q.S.A. 
COL/A864, in-letter no. 7536 of 1905. 
60. Dr.H.C.Garde,Maryborough to Home Secretary,3 Jul 1905,Q.S,A. C0L/A864, 
in-letter no. 7134 of 1905.The Brisbane expert referred to was 
CC. Baxter-Tyrie. 
61. Ham's explanation of the whole business is in Burnett Ham to Under 
Secretary Home Department,24 Jul 1905, Q.S.A. C0L/A864, in-letter 
no. 7892 of 1905, and marginal comment. 
62. Clerk,Department of Health to Health Commissioner,30 May 1905, Q.S.A. 
COL/A863,in-letter no. 8577 of 1905,enclosing reports from 
Dr. CC.Baxter-Tyrie and Chief Inspector John Simpson. 
63. "Report of the Commissioner of Public Health",Queens land Parliamentary 
Papers,II (1904), 117 and Town Clerk,Cairns to Home Secretary, 29 Jul 
1905, Q.S.A. C0L/A865, in-letter no. 8289 of 1905. 
64. Memorandum to Commissioner of Public Health,16 May 1906, Q.S.A. 
COL/A871, in-letter no. 6253 of 1906. 
65. VERY URGENT Memorandum written by hand by Dr.Ham to John Woolcock, 
18 Jun 1907,Q.S.A. COL/A880,in-letter no. 7071 of 1907 and attachments 
66. The Queensland Times, 14 Feb 1907. 
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worked either through health officers resident in the areas concerned 
fi7 
and local councils frightened into cooperation, or by sending 
departmental medical officers, sanitary inspectors and specially-trained 
rat gangs, to assess the sanitary situation, and to initiate remedial 
f,R 
action. But occasionally, for example during the Rockhampton outbreak 
in 1906, the commissioner made himself personally available, because of 
69 
the plague's virulence and widespread nature, and to counteract bitter 
70 
attacks from the "yellow" press. But whatever method - or staff - the 
commissioner chose to use, the Central Board of Health was convinced that 
the more virulent epidemics, i_^ e. Asi^ atic cholera. Plague, 
Smallpox and Yellow Fever,.../should/ be left entirely to 
the care and administration of the Commissioner of Public 
Health, the only responsible officer able to effectually 
cope with the emergencies wh_ich are iiecessarily associated 
with all these diseases .. ./including^ /. . .conferring and 
arranging with the Health authorities of other states in 
matters of notification, proclamations, etc. 71 
This had basically been the government's view, since the responsibility 
for fighting the plague had been taken from the Metropolitan Joint Board 
in 1902. Discussions held between the minister, Woolcock and Ham, 
72 
ensured that commissioners of public health did retain this power. 
Commissioners also insisted on plague prevention work, in the form of a 
73 
"war against the rat", being carried out for the whole period under 
review in this thesis, although no cases of the disease were detected 
67. As for example in the case of Thursday Island.Cilento suggests that 
Ham "brought local authorities to heel in no uncertain manner". 
Cilento, p.53. 
68. See for example,John Simpson /writing from Rockhampton./to Commissioner 
of Public Health, 9 May 1906, Q.S.A. COL/A871,in-letter no. 5936 of 
1906,and Frank Daniel,Inspector to Commissioner of Public Health, 
9 May 1906, Q.S.A. COL/A871, in-letter no. 5945 of 1906. 
69. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1906), 180. 
70. See for example The Sunday Truth,15 Apr 1906."What is the 
Commissioner of Health doing?...analysing spirits,milk,jams etc. But 
is he aware of what is going on in plague matters under his very 
nose, of the most vital importance". 
71. Central Board of Health to Under Secretary Home Department, Q.S.A. 
COL/A865, in-letter no. 10837 of 1905. At this time there was a bill 
before parliament which proposed placing the care of all victims of 
epidemics in the hands of a Metropolitan Hospitals Board. 
72. Marginal comment on Ibid. 
73. "Annual Report" /of Commissioner of Public Health^/, Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1914), 10. J.I. Moore was now commissioner. 
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74 in man or rats for a number of years, and the cost to the state was 
considerable. Queensland's freedom from this frightening disease 
depended "mainly upon the accuracy and thoroughness with which this work 
[yasj carried out". Ministerial cooperation with the central health 
authority in this matter was given readily, since the government itself 
7fi 
feared the bubonic plague so greatly - not only from a medical point 
of view, but because its presence caused a drastic interruption to trade 
and commerce. Moreover, even expensive preventive measures cost a great 
deal less than the outlay required to fight an established disease. 
But it would be quite wrong to assume that Queensland's public 
health commissioners of the early Commonwealth period had an 
unimpeded path to success, or that ministerial support was always given 
freely. It has already been shown that the commissioner was strongly 
77 
criticised at times by some of the state's newspapers; and there were 
occasions, when Queensland's executive was very upset by health 
department "revelations" - "calculated to do much harm to the State" -
78 
appearing in the press. An annoyed Premier warned his Home Secretary 
that 
/t/he Health Commissioner...should be instructed that 
these continual "scare" references to Health matters 
appearing in daily newspapers are calculated to 
prejudicially affect the commerce of the city and 
ought to be discontinued.... You might consider... 
laying down a rule that in future only such information 
in relation to the public health as may be furnished by 
the Health Commissioner through the Minister shall be 
published. 79 
74. For example for the years 1911-12, 1912-13, and 1913-14. See Annual 
Reports of Commissioners of Public Health for 1911-1914 in relevant 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers. 
75. Ibid., II (1913), 9. 
76. Undated Memorandum to Minister written in 1917, Q.S.A. Department 
of Health Files 1913-1919, Home Secretary's File No. 16702. 
77. See Within,p.397, f.n.70. See also The Street,3 May 1902, Ibid., 
14 Jun 1902, and parliamentary comment on press reports, Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates,XCXII (1904), 1091-92. 
78. Marginal note from Digby Denham to Chief Secretary, 17 Apr 1905, 
on clipping from The Telegraph, 17 Apr 1905, Q.S.A. C0L/A863, 
in-letter no. 4389 of 1905. 
79. Undated marginal note on Ibid., from Arthur Morgan, Premier to 
Home Secretary, Peter Airey. 
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This suggestion would impose a severe gag on the department's 
right to issue warnings to the public, and ran counter to the apparently 
unrestricted powers which the Health Act of 1900 had vested in the health 
commissioner. As one informed contemporary observer, J.R. Baker has 
indicated, the Queensland Act was far from ideal, like the rest of the 
health legislation placed on Australasian statute books during the 
1890's and early 1900's. In all states, the ministers who held the 
ultimate responsibility for the administration of health measures, 
"dragged after" the eager experts, who, because they outstripped their 
lay masters in knowledge and enthusiasm, seemed to make unreasonable 
80 demands both on the government and the general public. 
But the threat to impose special ministerial supervision on a 
commissioner when vital commercial interests were at stake, does not 
necessarily mean that centralizing tendencies were abandoned. When the 
question of the health commissioner's ability to act with a "free hand" 
was questioned in the Queensland parliament during the 1906 supply debate, 
Q 1 
especially with regard to areas outside Brisbane, the minister 
capitulated with a fairly good grace, and members representing north 
Queensland electorates were promised increased visits by health 
inspectors to their areas. This was largely because of the spectacular 
improvements which followed Chief Inspector John Simpson's remedial 
82 
work in Charters Towers. But it also pointed to the government's 
increasing realization that real reforms on the periphery were 
dependent upon direct central health department intervention, backed 
by the authority of the minister and the health commissioner. The 
growing awareness of this need was not restricted to health 
authorities or governments. The residents of fast-growing towns which 
were mushrooming throughout the state, often 
too far distant from the seat of the Local Authority for any 
efficieiit /sanitary;/ control by the Council,... naturally 
look/ed/ to this Department for assistance. 83 
80. J.R.Baker,"Notes on the Public Health Legislation of Australasia", 
Australasian Medical Congress Transcription, 1905, p.436. Baker 
himself was a layman. 
81. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XCVIII (1906), 1614-15. 
82. Ibid., p.1615.Particular complaints came from M.J.R. Woods, 
representing Woothakata, CF.Nielson, Musgrave,and John Mann,Cairns. 
83. Chief Inspector John Simpson to Commissioner of Public Health, 
25 Jan 1908,Q.S.A. COL/A890,in-letter no. 1160 of 1908, and 
subsequent in-letter no. 5972 of 9 May 1908.The underlining on the 
original was probably done by Burnett Ham. 
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As Dr. Ham neared the end of his commissionership in Queensland, 
praise was lavished upon him for his initial aggressiveness which had 
placed his bureau in the position where it could offer sanitary help 
and advice; for his strength in dealing with local authorities, which 
had been "in a sense minatory", but at the same time supremely necessary; 
and for his constant willingness to listen to reason and to treat each 
84 
case on its merits. After Ham's splendid service in stamping out the 
or 
plague, the only restrictions on a full-scale effort by the Health 
Department's officers up to 1914 and well beyond, were those imposed by 
the government's failure to "form a separate Department with a Minister 
8fi 
of Health as its fitting head", and the executive's continuing 
87 88 
parsimony with regard to funds - both for staff, and for incidentals. 
The appointment of Dr. J.S.C. Elkington as the new Commissioner 
84. See for example The Brisbane Courier,14 Jul 1909, Ibid.,28 Jul 1909, 
Ibid., 30 Jul 1909, Ibid., 9 Aug 1909; sub editorial,and Ibid., 
13 Aug 1909. Plaudits came from shipping companies,the Pharmaceutical 
Society,the Master Bakers' Association,the Lifesaving Society, the 
Royal Sanitary Institute, and the general public. 
85. Ibid., 9 Aug 1909; sub editorial. 
86. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health",Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1909), 336. 
87. John Simpson to Commissioner of Public Health,25 Jan 1908,Q.S.A. 
COL/A890,in-letter no. 1160 of 1908,and attachments up to 9 June 
1908,but especially in-letter no. 6385 of 21 May 1908,when two 
inspectors were upgraded in salary,but only one additional 
inspector was grudgingly appointed.See also a series of letters 
between Drs.Humphry and Ham,which detail friction between these 
medical men,but also show govemment tardiness in paying for 
fumigation work,rat gangs,and other salary and pay claims. 
Dr.Humphry to Under Secretary Home Department,being notes,letters 
and comments dated between 25 Nov 1907 and 15 Dec 1908, Q.S.A. 
COL/A897, top in-letter no. 1128 and attachments. 
88. The govemment went to ridiculous lengths at times to reduce 
expenditure. For example, the cost of very inexpensive repairs 
to the Bundaberg rat catcher's bicycle were refused at first, 
even though the man had provided his own cycle, and the 
government medical officer had "certified that a bicycle was 
absolutely necessary for the efficient carrying out of the work 
by the man". Payment was eventually made - very unwillingly. 
Dr. May, Govemment Health and Medical Officer, Port and Town 
of Bundaberg to Commissioner of Public Health, 18 Nov 1907, 
Q.S.A. C0L/A884, in-letter no. 12279 of 1907 and marginal 
comment. 
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89 
of Public Health, if anything, strengthened this impulse towards 
centralization. Under his direction 
a_systematic survey of the principaj^ cen_tres of population 
/wa£/ undertaken,...the results.../bein^/ recorded...in such 
a way as to secure uiiiformity of observation and ready 
reference.... By/thi^/ means a large amount of precise 
information /was/ secured, for use in emergency, for enabling 
sanitary progress to be accurately computed and assisted 
or stimulated where necessary, and for justifying...measures 
of rect^ification where deliberate default or neglect 
occur/red/ in the local performance of statutory duties. 90 
Indeed, although Cilento gives Burnett Ham due credit for his able work 
id 1 
92 
91 in establishing a health department in Queensland, he does contend that 
it was Elkington "who actually made the Queensland Health Service", 
Undoubtedly the new commissioner was helped considerably when the 
northern sub-department was opened formally in Townsville on 
89. John Simeon Colebrook Elkington, M.D., D.P.H., L.R.C.P.E., L.R.C.S.E., 
L.F.P.S.G.,was appointed to the Queensland service on 5 November 1909 
to commence duty on 1 January 1910. Queensland Government Gazette, 
XCIII (1909), 1165. See also J.S.C.Elkington, Chief Health Officer, 
Ta^smania to Chief Secretary, Tasmania, 17 Nov 1909, T.A_J3., C.S.O., 
/Tasmanian Archives Office, Colonial Secretary's Offic^/ 22/128, 
File No. 60/6/09. He had worked at the Plague Research Laboratory in 
Bombay in 1902, Queensland Parliamentary Papers,II (1907),220, and 
held the position of Chief Health Officer in Tasmania from 1903 to 
1909. Chief Secretary, Tasmania to J.S .CElkington, T.A.O., C.S.O., 
22/70, File No. 124/15/03. Elkington's real interest was in 
quarantine and related services,and from the commencement of his 
work in Queensland he showed particular concern for the northern 
parts of the state. J.S.CElkington to Under Secretary Home 
Department, 22 Aug 1910, Q.S.A. H0M/J69, top letter no. 11121 of 
1910. He resigned his Queensland post on 16 November 1913 - to the 
great surprise of his minister - to transfer to the Commonwealth 
service. He sustained a considerable drop in salary to do so, and 
The Brisbane Courier called on the Queensland government to boost 
Elkington's salary by ^6200-300 immediately, to try to keep a man of 
his "special attainments", "administrative capacity", and "strength 
of character" in the state service, but Elkington was resolved to 
go. The Brisbane Courier, 11 Sep, 12 Sep, 13 Sep, 15 Sep, and 
16 Sep 1913. 
90. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Public Health", Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1910), 376. 
91. Cilento, p.56. 
92. Cilento and Lack, p.433. 
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93 18 January 1912 - as a result of strenuous representations from 
94 
Elkington himself. Tnis masterly piece of decentralization actually 
gave the Brisbane office added strength. It allowed the commissioner to 
keep a close watch on all health matters in the north, through a 
medical inspector, assisted by two sanitary inspectors, working under 
95 
Elkington's direction. Above all, it allowed the commissioner to put 
departmental officers on the spot quickly, when serious outbreaks of 
96 infectious diseases occurred, eliminating the long journeys up the 
Queensland coast from Brisbane which, besides being costly and time-
consuming, could possibly mean the loss of precious lives. 
The Health Act Amendment Act of 1911, which contained clauses 
covering the control of adulteration of food, drink and drugs, 
infectious diseases, rat and mosquito infestation, typhoid carriers, and 
97 the usual instructions for the provision of sewerage and drainage, set 
the seal on the direction taken from the commencement of the Commonwealth 
period. The 1911 Act vested sole power in the central health authority 
to carry out all sections of the legislation. It also illustrated the 
great and growing importance with which the government and the parliament 
98 
regarded the public health department. Like all Queensland's health 
99 legislation up to 1914, the Act of 1911 was far from perfect. For 
93. "Annual Report" /of the Commissioner of Public Health/,Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 8. 
94. Within,pp.257-59. 
95. J.S.CElkington to Under Secretary Home Department,7 Apr 1910, 
Q.S.A. HOM/J69,in-letter no. 4179 of 1910.With the salaries of the 
professional staff and clerical,travelling and general expenses 
added together,Elkington calculated that the annual cost of the 
sub-department would be ^ 1,330. 0. 0. 
96. Within, pp.149-56. 
97. "An Act to Amend 'The Health Act of 1900'"', Queensland Govemment 
Gazette, XCVII (1911), 1757-1798 (2 Geo V. No. 26). 
98. Unnamed,undated and unnumbered newspaper cutting filed in Q.S.A. 
COL/163, and date-stamped 16 Jul 1912. 
99. The sections on venereal disease - listed under infectious 
diseases- were particularly bothersome,both to get through parliament 
and afterwards.Endless correspondence and investigations by doctors 
and letters to the press were forthcoming on this subject,but by 
March/April 1913,new disease regulations and new provisions had to 
be drawn up.See Queensland Government Gazette,C (1913), 117, and 
The Brisbane Courier,17 Apr 1913. The very large amount of 
official correspondence on this subject for the period 1911-14 
can be perused in Q.S.A. bundles C0L/A934 and COL/165. 
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instance, some sections which had consumed very considerable time in 
debate, were allowed to fall into disuse after powerful vested 
interests registered immediate protests, claiming that it was 
impossible to produce the high grade products demanded by the Act at 
a price people could afford. But the health commissioner was 
pleased with the legislation, which eliminated some weaknesses in the 
Act of 1900. In particular, he welcomed those parts of the new Act 
which increased the central authority's powers to deal with epidemics, 
102 103 
with the notification of diseases, and with the pure food sections. 
It also permitted the commissioner much greater access to private 
property in his fight against the mosquito, which was assuming great 
• ^u- -A 104 
importance m this period. 
In fact, in many ways this Act, and the debate which led to its 
passing, epitomized the whole of the changing and developing attitudes 
displayed by health authorities, governments, and the general public 
from the time of the passing of the first Health Act in 1872, up to 
1914. The Act of 1911 greatly increased the possibility of central 
govemment interference in the private lives of the people of 
Queensland - but equally, it demonstrated a greatly increased concern. 
100. See for example Queensland Parliamentary Debates, CVIII (1911-12), 
668-69, 890-91, and Ibid., CIX (1911-12), 1161-62 and 1874-78. 
101. The Brisbane Courier, 22 Aug 1912; Report of deputation from the 
Boot and Shoe Retailers to the Chief Secretary, Digby Frank 
Denham. Further suspension of this section until 31 December 
1913 was later agreed on 28 November 1912. Ibid., 29 Nov 1912. 
Clause 31, paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of the Health Act Amendment 
Act of 1911 are referred to here. Queensland Government Gazette, 
XCVII (1911), 1769. 
102. "Annual Report" /of the Public Health Commissioner/, Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers, II (1912), 4-5. 
103. The Brisbane Courier, 3 Jan 1912. 
104. Ibid., 31 Oct 1911. Everyone - the Commissioner and his staff, 
the Institute of Microbiology, the state schools, and the 
general public - were invited to join the fight against this 
bearer of disease. The Commissioner must have been gratified 
by the continuing interest. See for example. Ibid., 7 Apr 1914; 
letter to editor from Tormented, Ibid., 17 Apr 1914, Ibid., 
22 Jun 1914, and Ibid., 1 Jul 1914. 
14 - C O N C L U S I O N 
The history of the struggle to provide decent standards of public 
health in any country is the story of the passing of restrictive 
legislation which leads, in turn, to increasing centralization of 
govemment, to increasing incursions upon personal liberty, and to 
greatly increased taxes. For these reasons, the process of acquiring 
effective health laws is almost invariably slow. On the one hand, 
governments themselves must be educated to the point where they recognise 
the need to provide for the expensive staff appointments and sanitary 
undertakings which must necessarily follow the enactment of such laws. 
As well, the members of the general public, who inevitably have to pay 
for the high costs of public health, must be made aware of the dangers 
which threaten their own well-being, before such legislation can be 
implemented successfully. 
In Queensland, the threat of virulent exotic diseases, likely to 
strike at rich and poor alike, was most effective in leading to vigorous, 
legislative and administrative action. But by 1864, there had already 
been some recognition that 
the interests of the public at large must be considered 
in preference to individual interests, 2 
when sanitary evils apparently menaced the community with fever and death. 
This was translated into official action with the appointment of a 
Central Board of Health,but the government failed to pass health 
legislation at that early stage - probably due in part, to the inability 
of an inexperienced executive to formulate workable administrative 
policies, but overwhelmingly, because of the severe restrictions placed 
on governments by a depression. But at the same time it was also related 
to the strength of laissez-faire attitudes within the community. 
Even when smallpox threatened Queensland in 1872, and the colony's 
first Health Act was rushed onto the statute book there were many 
1. Cumpston suggests that a feeling of communal responsibility for 
health improvement was not well developed in Australia as a whole. 
He bases his views on the colonies' slowness to legislate to 
provide central boards of health. Only three colonies - Victoria 
(1855), Queensland and South Australia (1873) - had such boards 
before 1880. New South Wales, Western Australia, and Tasmania 
followed in 1881, 1884 and 1885 respectively. Cumpston, "The 
Health of the People", p.19. 
2. The Brisbane Courier, 24 Mar 1864; editorial. 
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Queenslanders who resented and feared the centralizing tendencies 
of that Act, which they saw as a direct threat to the rights and 
privileges of local government. Almost certainly, the 1872 health bill 
would not have been passed, in spite of the emergency, if it had 
involved the universal application of the health measures it contained, 
instead of being brought into operation by proclamation. 
Such opposition to the authority of the central 
government may be seen as part of the general individualist 
movement of the nineteenth century and to this extent can 
be regarded as one manifestation of the broad movement in 
favour of laissez-faire. 3. 
Thomas Mcllwraith and others in his party placed themselves 
firmly in this league, when in 1883, the conservative government 
announced its decision to suspend the working of the 1872 Act, and to 
leave the conservation of the public health where Mcllwraith felt it 
4 
belonged - entirely in local government hands. Even The Brisbane 
Courier, which had campaigned vigorously for stronger sanitary laws 
with the inevitability of more govemment interference, questioned 
whether the modern tendency of the state to undertake more and more of 
the functions connected with the collective interests of the 
community might cause, through some fatal weakness at the centre, the 
paralysis of the whole body politic. To ensure some balance, as central 
government became increasingly complex, local government needed 
strengthening as well, lest individual duty should become 
lost under the shadw o^f the all pervadin^ g national 
machinery. Where /yasj it all to end? /Was/ law then 
to prevail over liberty, order over that self-reliance 
out of which great nations have been bom? 5. 
In fact, Flinn has pointed out that in Britain, the natural 
concomitant of the strengthening of central government powers has been 
that the periphery was expected to shoulder increased responsibility 
for a wide range of local services, since governments in that country 
have "implicitly accepted the principle of local government intervention 
3. Arthur J. Taylor, Laissez-faire and State Intervention in 
Nineteenth Century Britain (London, 1972), p.46. Taylor is writing 
here specifically of the British Public Health Act of 1848, on 
which the Queensland Act of 1872 was based. 
4. Within, p.335. 
5. The Brisbane Courier, 6 Feb 1884; sub editorial. 
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under the authority of the central govemment". When Samuel Griffith 
came to power in Queensland in time to draft the much-needed Health Act 
of 1884, he certainly applied this principle to his work, and it was 
expanded and strengthened by his successors in the even more 
comprehensive and repressive Health Acts of 1900 and 1911. For by that 
time, it was no longer a question of whether the public health was a 
legitimate area for government interference, but of how far that 
interference should go. Moves towards centralization were becoming 
acceptable to an increasing number of Queenslanders, because many had 
reached the conclusion that 
/w/here local self-government means merely mis-govemment 
we are apt to wish for a little wholesale despotism to 
curb such vagaries. 8. 
Griffith was also convinced that all sanitary laws are 
an infringement of the liberty of the subject... but 
that...in matters of public health the comfort of the 
individual must yield to the good of the public. 9 
These attitudes were to find more and more acceptance within the 
Queensland community in the period up to 1914, particularly as the 
preservation of extreme localism became impossible with the extension 
of scientific knowledge. When the Health Commissioner Dr.J.I. Moore 
made a northern tour of the state late in 1914, he reported finding 
all local authorities willing, and even eager, to conform with the 
health legislation. Where matters were unsatisfactory, the main cause 
was lack of knowledge; but to remedy this, councils looked 
increasingly to the central health department for help. Indeed, 
R.H. Robinson, who was wholly committed to the cause of local govemment 
to which he devoted a lifetime of service, feared that it was possible 
that central departmental interference could destroy local government 
6. Flinn, p.41. My italics. 
7. The Health Act of 1884 and the Local Government and Divisional 
Board Acts passed under Griffith "led to the creation and 
functioning of municipal bodies controlled by the State". Murphy 
and Joyce, p.168. 
8. Briggs, Victorian Cities, p.146, quoting James Hole of Leeds, 
England. 
9. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, XLIV (1884), 1531. 
10. The Brisbane Courier, 16 Nov 1914; report of northern tour 
by Dr. J.I. Moore. 
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11 
responsibility and efficiency. Even so, he offered this "impartial 
view" of Queensland's early twentieth century health legislation. 
/T/he working of these compelling powers and the powers 
of interference in this instance... has been for the 
general good and in the interests of the public health 
of the people of the State. 12 
But one area continued to present immense problems to health 
administrators, inhibiting progress during the whole period under 
review. This was the question of funding - at both the central and local 
13 government level. In this period according to Buer, political power 
in local govemment was passing into the hands of the petite bourgeoisie 
who, though thrifty and hard working, were "notoriously lacking in large 
14 
views or sympathetic imagination". Most were wholly committed, as were 
the ratepayers of Queensland, to resisting any threat of increases in 
local taxation, thus making it virtually impossible for local 
authorities to fulfil their expanding obligations. This stance drew 
severe criticism from Dr. B. Burnett Ham, who claimed that Queensland 
local authorities were "helpless... in direct proportion to the activity 
of the responsible State Health Authority". But at the same time he 
did consider that the govemment, with its great resources, should be 
ready to render reasonable assistance to needy local authorities. 
The reluctance to use central government funds on public health 
projects at a local level seems to have been something of a British 
tradition. It arose from a fear that such prodigality would lead to 
wasteful spending on the periphery, and possibly, to the spinelessness 
to which Burnett Ham refers. As R.J. Morris has pointed out, it dates 
back to the first reaction of the English administration to the 
demands of the cholera outbreak in 1831. Although some of the country's 
leaders - notably Robert Peel - felt that national money should be used 
to meet what could clearly become a national emergency, all members of 
the govemment were certainly not convinced that such liberality was 
16 
necessary. 
11. Robinson, p.121. 
12. Ibid., p.379. My italics. 
13. And V.B.J. Lesina. Within, p.377. 
14. Buer, p.233. 
15. Queensland Parliamentary Papers, II (1907), 97. 
16. R.J. Morris, Cholera 1832 : A Social Response to an Epidemic 
(London, 1976), p.73. 
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The same attitude imbued ministers in the Queensland government. 
For a short time, after the passing of the Health Act of 1884, 
Queensland local authorities enjoyed the benefits of endowments on 
health rates, but by 1890, the government had acted to prevent this 
too great abuse of its funds. With some justification, ministers could 
claim that for many years the country either wallowed in deep 
depression, or faced troublesome recessions, crippling droughts, or 
devastating floods. But the state health department continued to be 
starved of funds, even though after 1904, under William Kidston's 
careful management, the treasury was able to record budget surpluses 
for a number of years. 
The reason for the lack of funding is not hard to find. Sadly, 
but not surprisingly, in this early period, when economic and industrial 
development seemed of the utmost importance in the still young but 
potentially rich state, all governments rated the demands of public 
health rather low in terms of total commitment. Dr. John Thomson 
had mourned in 1883, that the claims of public health always had to 
18 give way to what was considered more urgent or more profitable business. 
The Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. J.S.C. Elkington, into whose 
hands the welfare of the whole state had been placed, was even more 
critical of governments which neglected health administration because 
they 
regard/ed/ the production of actual revenue as the only 
criterion of usefulness. 19 
Yet despite these disappointments, by 1914 the governments and 
people of Queensland, under the tutelage of their expert commissioners 
of public health, had developed some understanding of the standards of 
public health required in a modern state. Through the great advances 
in medical science, they had also grasped the principle that prevention, 
and not merely cure, is the ultimate aim of public health programmes. 
17. Murphy and Joyce, pp.251 and 259. 
18. The Brisbane Courier, 17 Apr 1883; Minutes of Central Board 
of Health, 16 Apr 1883. 
19. J.S.C. Elkington, quoted in Cilento, p.63. 
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